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Abstract	  Extant	   studies	   of	   lobbying	   in	   the	   European	  Union	   (EU)	   by	   private	   actors	   have	  focused	  on	  the	  legislative	  arena:	  how	  such	  actors	  target	  the	  Commission,	  or	  the	  Parliament.	   These	   works	   have	   generally	   considered	   lobbyists	  as	  uniform	  transnational	  capitalist	  actors,	   seeking	  to	  extend	  the	  reach,	  or	  depth,	  of	   the	   single	   market.	  	   Recent	   advances	   in	   supranational	   institutional	   capacity	  have	   begun	   to	   create	   a	   ‘single	   European	   regulatory	   space’	   (Levi-­‐Faur,	   2011),	  through	  which	   the	  EU	  now	  seeks	   to	  achieve	  market	  delivery.	  However,	   to	  date	  there	   has	   been	   little	   study	   of	   how	   private	   actors	   lobby	   this	   new	   institutional	  venue.	  	  	  	  Using	   the	   example	   of	   the	   European	   Banking	   Authority	   (EBA)	   –	   one	   of	   the	  regulatory	   institutions	   in	   this	  new	  arena	  –	   this	   thesis	  examines	   the	  patterns	   in	  lobbying	  behaviour.	  It	  takes	  the	  cases	  of	  British	  and	  German	  banks,	  and	  uses	  the	  notion	   of	   durable	   variations	   in	   domestic	   contexts	   to	   account	   for	  differences	  in	  their	  lobbying	  activities.	  This	  approach	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Hall	  and	  Soskice	  (2001),	   and	   posits	   that	   domestic	   financial	   systems	   and	   their	   associated	  regulatory	   regimes	   shape	   lobbying	   in	   the	   European	   regulatory	   arena.	  These	  features	   of	   the	   national	   landscapes	   condition	   banks’	   holding,	   and	   deployment,	  of	  lobbying	  resources;	  and	  shape	  their	  beliefs	  about	  European	  bank	  regulation	  -­‐	  meaning	  that	  banks	  engage	  essentially	  as	  national	  capitalist	  actors.	  
	  The	   thesis	   uses	   a	   variety	   of	   qualitative	   data	   to	   investigate	   these	   activities	   and	  their	   roots.	   The	   findings	   show	   that	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours	   can	   be	  seen	   to	  remain	  grounded	  in	  their	  national	  contexts;	  and	  in	  turn	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  domestic	   institutional	   and	   ideational	   structures	   mean	   that	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  lobbying	   remains	   distinctly	   national,	   even	   where	   directed	   at	   a	   supranational	  venue.	  Targeting	  of	  the	  EBA	  is	  fragmented	  and	  contingent.	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
1.1:	  Introduction	  Private	  actors	  play	  an	   integral	   role	   in	   the	  European	  Union’s	   legislative	  activity,	  providing	   expertise	   into	   policy-­‐making	   processes.	   This	   began	   with	   the	  reinvigoration	   of	   the	   single	   market	   programme	   several	   decades	   ago,	   and	   the	  associated	  transfer	  of	  policy-­‐making	  competences,	  in	  several	  domains,	  upwards	  from	   national	   governments	   to	   European	   legislative	   actors	   (Pollack,	   2003).	  Private	   actors	   are	   now	   afforded	   a	   status	   as	   ‘legitimate	   political	   actors’	   (Coen,	  1997),	  and	  their	  provision	  of	  information	  to	  legislators	  has	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  lobbying1:	  deploying	  a	  resource	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  influencing	  decisions,	  and	  shaping	   eventual	   legislative	   outcomes.	   In	   turn,	   such	   lobbying	   has	   been	   the	  subject	  of	   a	   rich	  and	   lively	   scholarly	   literature,	   and	  we	  now	  know	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  the	  drivers	  of	  private	  actors’	  behaviour:	  how	  they	  supply	  different	  types	  of	  information	   in	  order	   to	  gain	  access	  different	  venues	  (Bouwen,	  2002;	  Chalmers,	  2011);	   how	   they	   strategically	   navigate	   their	   complex	   policy-­‐making	  environment,	   selecting	   the	   most	   appropriate	   forum	   based	   on	   an	   internal	  rationale	  (Guiradon,	  2000;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006);	  and	  the	  circumstances	   which	   drive	   them	   to	   collaborate	   and	   pursue	   collective,	   and	  perhaps	   transnational,	   approaches	   (C.	   Mahoney,	   2007).	   The	   present	   study	  contributes	   to	   this	   literature,	   investigating	   lobbying	   behaviour	   in	   a	   new	  empirical	  context.	  	  This	  legislative	  lobbying,	  aimed	  at	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  Parliament,	  has	  been	  concerned	   with	   shaping	   the	   broad	   principles	   behind	   market	   creation.	  Meanwhile,	   firms	   and	   associations	   have	   also	   long	   been	   engaged	   in	   a	   similar	  activity	   aimed	   at	   national	   regulatory	   authorities:	   the	   agencies	   to	   whom	  governments	   have	   delegated	   regulatory	   competences,	   often	   in	   the	   name	   of	  demonstrating	  a	  credible	  commitment	  to	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  market	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	   is	   a	   rather	   protean	   term,	   laden	   with	   many	   connotations	   in	   the	   public	   imagination.	   For	  discussions	   of	   the	   various	   conceptualisations	   as	   used	   in	   political	   science,	   see	  Naoi	   and	  Krauss	  (2009),	  Baumgartner	  (2007)	  or	  Hall	  and	  Deardorff	  (2006).	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activities	   (see	   Thatcher	   &	   Stone	   Sweet,	   2002). 2 	  This	   regulatory	   lobbying,	  involving	  a	  similar	  provision	  of	  information,	  has	  been	  pursued	  with	  the	  intention	  of	   shaping	   the	   detailed	   rules	   which	   achieve	  market	   delivery,	   and	   regulate	   the	  behaviours	   of	   market	   actors.	   The	   interactions	   between	   private	   actors	   and	  regulatory	  agencies	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  interdependence,	  with	  both	  parties	  embraced	  in	   a	   stable	   relationship	   allowing	   a	   degree	   of	   strategic	   co-­‐operation	   in	   shaping	  market	  structures	  (Ayers	  &	  Braithwaite,	  1992;	  Coen,	  2005).	  	  The	   picture	   we	   have,	   then,	   is	   of	   lobbying	   cast	   into	   two	   distinct	   modes	   –	   in	  Europe,	   aimed	  at	   legislative	  actors,	   and	  at	  home,	   aimed	  at	   regulatory	  agencies.	  Recently,	  however,	  changes	  in	  the	  EU’s	  institutional	  capacity	  have	  created	  a	  new	  layer:	   supranational	   regulatory	   authority	   has	   been	   crystallised	   in	   a	   set	   of	  standalone	  bodies,	  replete	  with	  their	  own	  mandates,	  resources	  and	  powers.	  This	  has	   led	   to	  what	  has	  been	   termed	   the	   ‘single	  European	   regulatory	   space’	   (Levi-­‐Faur,	   2011),	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   this	   institutional	   layer	   has	   generated	   an	  incentive	   for	   private	   actors	   to	   combine	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   on	   the	  European	  scene.	  Two	  features	  of	  this	  crystallisation	  combine	  to	  create	  an	  area	  for	  research	  where	   current	   theoretical	   coverage	   is	   lacking.	   First,	   the	   bodies	   in	   the	  supranational	   regulatory	   layer	   have	   a	   novel	   institutional	   form	   –	   hybrids	   of	  networks	  and	  agencies	  –	  and	  this	  creates	  a	  complex	  landscape	  in	  which	  private	  actors	   operate.	   Secondly,	   and	   more	   importantly,	   their	   role	   represents	   an	  incursion	  by	  the	  EU	  into	  the	  (previously	  national)	  business	  of	  market	  delivery,	  or	  the	  writing	  of	   specific	   rules	  by	  which	   regulation	   is	   achieved.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  an	  opportunity	   for	   research:	   to	   investigate	   the	   lobbying	   by	   private	   actors	   of	   the	  authorities	   which	   inhabit	   this	   unified	   regulatory	   space.	   This	   thesis	   seeks	   to	  address	   this	  opportunity	  by	  answering	   the	  question:	  “What	  shapes	  the	  lobbying	  
behaviours	  of	  banks	  in	  the	  European	  regulatory	  arena?”	  	  In	  answering	   this	  question,	   this	   thesis	   seeks	   to	  make	  a	  distinct	   contribution	   to	  the	   lobbying	   literature	  by	  examining	  how	  the	  national	  origins	  of	  private	  actors	  shape	  the	  way	  they	  lobby	  the	  European	  regulators.	  It	  takes	  as	  its	  case	  a	  specific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  has	  occurred	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  transition,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  ‘regulatory	  state.’	  See	  Majone	  (1994),	  Braithwaite	  and	  Drahos	  (2000a)	  or	  Moran	  (2001;	  2002).	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policy	   domain:	   that	   of	   banking,	   and	   thus	   of	   the	   European	   Banking	   Authority	  (EBA).	  As	  will	  be	  explained,	   the	  unique	  nature	  of	   this	  policy	  domain	  makes	   it	  a	  valuable	  ground	  in	  which	  to	  investigate	  these	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  	  	  1.2:	  Setting	  the	  scene	  
1.2.1:	  Identifying	  the	  research	  opportunity	  	  Banks	   perform	   a	   vital	   function	   in	   a	   capitalist	   economy,	   connecting	   savers	   to	  borrowers	  and	  bridging	  the	  divide	  in	  time	  horizons	  between	  the	  two:	  savers	  may	  need	  access	  to	  their	  funds	  at	  any	  point,	  while	  users	  of	  these	  funds	  need	  them	  to	  be	   stable	   over	   a	   period	   of	   time3.	   By	   carrying	   out	   this	   role	   banks	   enable	  investment,	   facilitate	   output	   and	   promote	   growth,	   but	   this	   role	   brings	   with	   it	  several	   risks.	   Some	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   ‘primary’,	   as	   they	   arise	   directly	   from	  banks’	   activities:	   these	   include	   the	   danger	   that	   they	   cannot	   meet	   a	   sudden	  demand	  for	  withdrawals	  by	  depositors,	  or	  that	  the	  firms	  to	  whom	  they	  have	  lent	  money	   fail.4	  A	   second	   category	   of	   risks	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   ‘consequential’	   –	  since	   exposure	   to	   them	   arises	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   how	   banks	   carry	   out	   their	  business.	   For	   example,	   banks	   face	   operational	   risk:	   the	   danger	   that	   failures	   in	  their	  internal	  governance	  or	  control	  procedures	  allow	  errors	  to	  occur,	  exposing	  them	  to	  losses	  or	  fraud.	  In	  this	  category	  also	  resides	  compliance	  risk:	  the	  danger	  that	   banks	   can	   fall	   foul	   of	   some	   piece	   of	   regulation	   written	   to	   constrain	   their	  behaviour,	  or	  more	  broadly,	  that	  some	  part	  of	  their	  conduct	  later	  transpires	  to	  be	  illegal.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  functions	  of	  banks	  are	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  4	  More	  formally,	  these	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  follows.	  The	  first	  is	  liquidity	  risk:	  the	  danger	  that	  banks	  are	  unable	  to	  meet	  a	  sudden	  demand	  for	  withdrawals	  by	  depositors,	  because	  their	  funds	  are	  tied	  up	  in	  long-­‐term	  investments.	  When	  this	  happens	  banks	  can	  fail	  very	  quickly	  indeed.	  Banks	  also	  face	   the	   risk	   that	   their	   clients	   –	  businesses	  or	   individuals	   to	  whom	   they	  have	   lent	  money	  –	   go	  bankrupt;	  when	  this	  happens,	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  loan,	  if	  not	  all,	  may	  be	  lost	  (credit	  risk).	  Third,	  they	  face	   the	   risk	   that	   prevailing	   interest	   rates	   fall,	   meaning	   a	   corresponding	   fall	   in	   the	   difference	  between	  that	  paid	  out	  to	  depositors,	  and	  that	  received	   in	  as	  returns	  on	   investments;	  when	  this	  happens,	   their	   profitability	   is	   harmed	   (interest	   rate	   risk).	   Finally,	   banks	   face	   the	   risk	   that	  securities	  prices	  or	  foreign	  exchange	  rates	  move	  against	  them,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  value	  of	  assets	  held	  or	  making	  foreign	  currency	  commitments	  more	  costly	  to	  service	  (market	  risk);	  again,	  when	  this	  happens,	  profitability	  is	  harmed.	  
	   17	  
Such	  regulations	  exist	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  primary	  risks	  banks	  face,	  and	  the	  harm	   potentially	   caused	   to	   society	   –	   or	   to	   public	   finances	   –	   by	   their	   being	  realised.5 	  	   The	   control	   of	   banks’	   behaviours	   and	   activities	   is	   delivered	   by	  regulatory	  authorities,	  which	  have	  evolved	  over	  time	  from	  previously	  often	  very	  informal,	  meso-­‐corporatist	  structures	  with	  little	  statutory	  backing	  (Moran,	  1991;	  1994).	   The	   resulting	   institutional	   frameworks,	   and	   their	   practices,	   can	   be	   cast	  into	  various	  types	  (Barth	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  H.	  Davies	  &	  Green,	  2008;	  Sousa,	  2008),	  as	  they	  have	  emerged	  in	  distinctive	  political	  contexts	  and	  are	  founded	  on	  different	  understanding	   of	   the	   risks	   involved	   and	   the	   associated	   responsibilities	   of	   the	  state	   in	   managing	   them	   (Quaglia,	   2008a;	   Westrup,	   2007).	   Indeed,	   these	  developments	  have	  been	   typical	   of	   a	  broader	   shift	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market	  which	  has	  seen	  the	  delegation	  of	  regulatory	  authority	  to	  independent	   agencies.	   The	   wide-­‐ranging	   transfer	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   a	  literature	  on	  regulatory	  governance,	  examining	  the	  logics	  behind	  the	  delegation	  (Thatcher,	  2002a;	  Thatcher	  &	  Stone	  Sweet,	  2002),	   the	  variations	   in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  body	  (Coen	  &	  Thatcher,	  2005),	  and	  in	  its	  degree	  of	  independence	  (Maggetti,	  2009;	   Thatcher,	   2002b;	   2005).	   The	   literature	   has	   also	   taken	   a	   more	   holistic	  perspective	  that	  has	  allowed	  the	  comparison	  of	  regulatory	  regimes	  –	  comprising	  these	   bodies,	   but	   also	   their	   regulatory	   practices	   or	   supervisory	   techniques	   –	  across	  national	  contexts	  or	  policy	  domains	  (Hood	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Levi-­‐Faur,	  2006;	  S.K.	  Vogel,	  1996).	  A	  significant	  finding	  of	  this	  research	  is	  that	  there	  exist	  distinct	  ‘national	  styles’	  to	  regulation,	  framed	  around	  different	  legal	  traditions	  or	  cultural	  perceptions	  on	  risk	  (Moran,	  1986;	  D.	  Vogel,	  1986).	  	  Importantly,	  bank	  regulation	  entails	  a	  stark	  information	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  parties	   involved,	   and	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  business	   that	  banks	   engage	   in.	   In	   performing	   maturity	   transformation,	   and	   in	   placing	  themselves	  between	  savers	  and	  borrowers,	  they	  create	  balance	  sheet	  assets	  and	  liabilities	   the	   specifics	   of	   which	   only	   they	   have	   any	   information	   on.	   Almost	  everything	  about	  the	  contract	  is	  private	  to	  the	  banks,	  and	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  external	  parties	  (such	  as	  regulators)	  to	  independently	  gain	  knowledge	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  This	  notion	  is,	   itself,	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  lively	  literature.	  See	  Dow	  (1996)	  on	  uncertainty;	  Benston	  and	  Kaufman	  (1996)	  on	  prudential	  regulation;	  or	  Dowd	  (1996)	  on	  financial	  laissez-­‐faire.	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details	  of	  these	  assets.6	  This	  difficulty	  –	  the	  essential	  privacy	  of	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  assets	  and	  their	  associated	  risks	  –	  means	  that	  the	  regulation	  of	  banking	  relies	  heavily	  on	  input	  from	  the	  banks	  themselves,	  so	  that	  a	  lively	  interaction	  emerges	  between	   the	   two	   parties.7	  This	   is	   certainly	   the	   case	   during	   the	   regulatory	  functions	  of	  monitoring	  and	  behaviour	  modification;	  yet	  it	  is	  just	  as	  true	  during	  the	   prior	   exercise	   of	   standard-­‐setting,	   or	   rule-­‐making.	   Banks	   have	   the	   best	  knowledge	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  their	  markets,	  and	  so	  are	  almost	  uniquely	  placed	  to	  provide	  advice	  on	  the	  impacts	  (intended	  or	  otherwise)	  of	  rule	  changes	  to	  the	  functioning	   of	   those	  markets.	  We	   can,	   of	   course,	   conceptualise	   this	   in	   a	   rather	  different	  way:	   given	   that	   banks	  provide	   expertise	   and	   informational	   input	   into	  rule-­‐making	  discussions	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   shaping	   outcomes,	  we	   can	   identify	   this	  behaviour	  as	  regulatory	  lobbying.	  	  	  The	  delegation	  to	  independent	  regulators	  at	  ground	  level	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	   a	   similar	   transfer	   of	   broader	   policy-­‐making	   competences	   up	   to	   European	  legislative	   actors	   (Pollack,	   2003).	   The	   consequence	   of	   this	   has	   been	   that	  while	  regulatory	   authority	   has	   remained	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   these	  independent	  agencies,	   the	  writing	  of	   the	  over-­‐arching	   legislation	  has	  moved	   to	  the	  supranational	   level.	  Banks	  have	  naturally	  directed	   lobbying	  efforts	  at	   these	  legislative	  actors,	  and	  this	  has	  involved	  providing	  information	  and	  expertise	  into	  discussions	  aimed	  at	  establishing	  the	  broad	  principles	  of	  legislation,	  or	  building	  the	  conceptual	  frameworks	  behind	  market	  creation.	  In	  other	  words,	  banks	  have	  faced	   two	   distinct	   lobbying	   arenas:	   the	   national	   regulatory	   context	   and	   the	  European	   legislative	   context.	   The	   result	   has	   been	   a	   bifurcated	   lobbying	  approach,	  maintaining	  two	  separate	  modes	  of	  engagement.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  contrasts	  markedly	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  statutory	  regulation	  we	  might	  imagine:	  consider,	  for	   example,	   regulating	   emissions	   from	   a	   chemical	   plant.	   A	   regulator	   seeking	   to	   limit	   such	  emissions	  can	  measure	  them	  for	  herself;	  she	  can	  also	  call	  on	  independent	  scientific	  expertise	  to	  inform	  her	   of	   ‘safe’,	   or	   harmful,	   levels.	   Conversely,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   about	   the	   risks	   run	  by	   a	  bank	   –	   which	   have	   an	   equivalent	   ability	   to	   cause	   harm	   to	   society	   –	   which	   can	   be	   externally	  determined,	  and	  very	   little	  source	  of	   independent	  expertise	  as	   to	  how	  those	  risks	  may	  actually	  cause	  harm.	  7	  The	  asymmetry	  behind	  this	  interdependence	  is	  not	  unproblematic,	  and	  has	  sat	  behind	  theories	  of	  ‘regulatory	  capture’	  (Laffont	  &	  Tirole,	  1990;	  Stigler,	  1971).	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Recently,	  however,	  the	  EU	  has	  made	  advances	  in	  its	  institutional	  capacity	  which	  have	  begun	   to	  unify	   these	  arenas.	   In	   the	   latter	  decades	  of	   the	   last	   century,	   the	  implementation	   of	   the	   European	   legislation	  was	   co-­‐ordinated	   through	   a	   set	   of	  loose	  networks	  –	  committees	  of	  national	  agency	  heads	  brought	  together	  to	  share	  best	   practices	   (Coen	   &	   Thatcher,	   2008;	   Dehousse,	   1997;	   Eberlein	   &	   Grande,	  2005;	  Eberlein	  &	  Newman,	  2008;	  Majone,	  1997a).	  Following	  a	  long-­‐run	  process	  instigated	  and	  then	  encouraged	  by	  two	  reports	  (the	  Lamfalussy	  Report	  in	  2001	  and	   the	   de	   Larosière	   report	   in	   2009),	   these	   were	   crystallised	   into	   standalone	  supranational	  regulatory	  authorities	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  with	  a	  distinct	  mandate,	  their	  own	  resources,	  and	  new	  powers	  (Alford,	  2005;	  McPhilemy,	  2014;	  Moloney,	  2003;	  Thatcher,	  2011).8	  Indeed,	  this	  transition	  is	  part	  of	  a	  far	  larger	  evolution	  in	  capacity,	  which	  has	   seen	   agencies	   and	  other	   bodies	   gradually	   develop	   through	  processes	  of	   institutional	   layering	   (Thatcher,	  2011;	  Thatcher	  &	  Coen,	  2008).	   In	  the	  empirical	  context	  of	   this	  project,	   this	  process	  brought	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  ‘agencified	  network’	  (Levi-­‐Faur,	  2011:	  810)	  :	  the	  European	  Banking	  Authority	  (EBA).	  This	  new	  body	  writes	  the	  specific	  rules	  and	  standards	  which	  implement	  European	  financial	   legislation	  in	  national	  contexts,	  drawing	  input	  and	  expertise	  from	  the	  national	  regulators	  themselves.	  In	  practice,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  locus	  of	  rule-­‐making	   authority	   has	   moved	   upwards	   from	   the	   domestic	   to	   the	   new	  European	  regulatory	  arena;	  meaning	  in	  turn	  that	  banks	  have	  a	  new	  institutional	  venue	  –	  albeit	  one	  with	  a	  complex	  structure	  –	  at	  which	   to	  aim	  their	  regulatory	  lobbying.	  	  We	  thus	  have	  a	  picture	  comprising	  several	   layers	  (see	  Figure	  1.1).	  At	  the	  top	  is	  the	   European	   legislative	   arena,	   where	   the	   established	   actors	   have	   been	  producing	   legislation	   governing	   banking	   for	   nearly	   three	   decades.	   Here,	   the	  banks	  have	  been	  engaged	   in	  the	  activity	  of	   legislative	  lobbying,	  aiming	  to	  shape	  market	   creation;	   this	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   European	   interest	   group	  literature.	   At	   the	   bottom	   are	   the	   national	   contexts,	   where	   independent	  regulatory	  authorities	  have	  traditionally	  translated	  the	  European	  legislation	  into	  market	   delivery	   using	   specific	   implementing	   standards.	   Here,	   the	   banks	   have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  This	  evolution	  is	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	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been	   involved	   in	   the	  more	  detailed	  business	  of	  regulatory	  lobbying.	  Finally,	   the	  third	   layer	   is	   the	  newly-­‐formed	  European	  regulatory	  arena,	  where	  the	  EBA	  has	  begun	   to	   take	   over	   this	   function	   of	   rule-­‐making.	   The	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	  banks	   at	   this	   new	   institutional	   venue	   are	   the	   subject	   of	   this	   thesis,	   which	  addresses	   the	   question:	   “What	   shapes	   the	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	   banks	   in	   the	  
European	  regulatory	  arena?”	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  puts	  forward	  a	  theoretical	  argument	  that	  lobbying	  behaviours	  are	  shaped	  by	  banks’	  national	  origins.	  	  
Figure	  1.1:	  The	  three	  layers	  
	  	  
1.2.2:	  Rationales	  for	  the	  study	  This	   topic	   –	   how	   banks	   lobby	   regulators	   –	   is	   particularly	   germane,	   for	   two	  reasons.	   The	   first	   we	   could	   call	   empirical,	   or	   circumstantial.	   The	   crisis	   which	  swept	  through	  banking	  markets	  between	  2008	  and	  2010	  caused	  a	  seizing	  up	  of	  credit	  and	  liquidity,	  and	  prompted	  what	  became	  the	  deepest	  recession	  since	  the	  1930s.	   	   It	   also	   led,	   some	  eighteen	  months	   later,	   to	  a	  protracted	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	   which	   beset	   the	   Eurozone,	   and	   which	   has	   arguably	   come	   to	   re-­‐define	  European	  integration	  (Crum,	  2013;	  Mourlon-­‐Druol,	  2014).	  The	  speed	  with	  which	  the	   crisis	   spread,	   and	   the	   reach	   it	   had	   into	   economies	   and	   national	   balance	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sheets,	  exposed	  many	  flaws	   in	  the	  extant	  regulatory	   frameworks	  governing	  the	  financial	   sector,	   and	   specifically	   banks.	   A	   litany	   of	   collapses,	   bail-­‐outs	   and	  scandals	   has	   focussed	   public	   attention	   on	   revising	   these	   frameworks,	   and	  politicians	  and	  regulatory	   thinkers	  have	  responded	  with	  great	  vigour.	  Virtually	  every	   country	   impacted	   by	   the	   crisis	   has	   enacted	   some	   legal	   or	   regulatory	  response:	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	   Vickers	   Commission	   and	   the	   Parliamentary	  Commission	  on	  Banking	  Standards	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  Dodd-­‐Frank	  Act	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  similar	  moves	  in	  Germany	  and	  France	  (see	  Mayntz,	  2012).	  But	  equally	  significant	  have	  been	  the	  more	  co-­‐ordinated	  efforts	  at	  the	  transnational	  level,	  notably	  third	  iteration	   of	   the	   Basel	   Accords9	  in	   2010,	   and	   the	   passing	   of	   the	   fourth	   Capital	  Requirements	   Directive	   and	   the	   Capital	   Requirements	   Regulation	   (collectively	  CRDIV/CRR)	  by	  the	  EU	  in	  2011.	  	  The	   thesis	   takes	   this	   last	   instance	   of	   regulatory	   policy-­‐making	   as	   its	   policy	  context,	   focussing	   on	   the	   interactions	   between	   banks	   and	   the	   EBA	   during	   the	  writing	  of	  the	  rules	  in	  support	  of	  this	  legislative	  package.	  A	  study	  of	  how	  banks	  lobby	   regulators	   is	   of	   academic	   –	   and	   public	   –	   interest:	   in	   normal	   times,	  establishing	   an	   understanding	   of	   how	   banks	   do	   this	   provides	   an	   important	  control	   and	   oversight	   into	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   regulatory	   process.	   For	  responses	  following	  a	  period	  of	  crisis,	  this	  is	  additionally	  important.	  	  The	  second	  reason	  is	  more	  theoretical,	  and	  relates	  to	  the	  state	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	   lobbying	   behaviour	   in	   the	   EU.	   Since	   they	   first	   became	   ‘legitimate	   political	  actors’	   (Coen,	   1997)	   after	   the	   Single	   European	  Act,	   scholars	   have	   studied	   how	  firms	   have	   lobbied	   political	   actors	   in	   the	   EU	   over	   the	   drafting	   of	   legislation,	  tackling	  a	  set	  of	  key	  questions:	  what	  goods	  were	  offered	  to	  policy-­‐makers?	  How	  were	  they	  targeted?	  What	  norms	  prevailed	  over	  the	  activity	  of	  lobbying?	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  build	  generalizable	  knowledge	  about	  private	  actors’	   lobbying	  across	  the	  board,	   and	   so	   the	   focus	   was	   on	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   actors	   themselves,	  rather	  than	  their	  national	  origins.	  The	  empirical	  reason	  for	  this	  pattern	  was	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  These	   are	   the	   internationally-­‐agreed,	   non-­‐binding	   standards	   which	   underpin	   global	   bank	  regulation.	  They	  are	  given	  force	  by	  national	  implementation	  –	  which	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  been	   achieved	   via	   a	   series	   of	   directives	   (and	   lately	   a	   regulation).	   The	   standards,	   and	   the	  accompanying	  EU	  legislation,	  are	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	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for	  most	   of	   the	   period	   since	  Maastricht,	   the	   EU’s	   liberalising	   agenda	   had	   been	  aimed	   at	   integrating	   product,	   and	   latterly	   service	   markets,	   and	   at	   this	   stage	  private	   actors	   sought	   to	   extend	   or	   deepen	   the	   single	   market.	   Essentially	   they	  lobbied	   as	   transnational	   capitalist	   actors;	   as	   a	   result,	   lobbying	   behaviours	  remained	   shaped	   by	   ‘institutional’	   rather	   than	   ‘national’	   factors,	   and	   that	   was	  where	  scholars’	  attention	  lay.	  	  Recently,	  however,	  the	  EU	  has	  turned	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  financial	  markets,	  and	  so	   begun	   the	  process	   of	   integrating	   the	   ‘deep	   cores’	   of	   the	  national	   economies	  into	  a	  single	  European	  market.	  At	  the	  deep	  core	  sits	  the	  financial	  system,	  and	  the	  regulation	   of	   it	   resides	   in	   a	   body	   of	   rules	   developed	   in	   national	   contexts.	   The	  lobbying	   activities	   of	   private	   actors	   (banks,	   primarily)	   over	   this	   new	   field	   of	  European	   integration	  will	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	   features	  of	   these	  national	  contexts;	  or,	   to	   put	   it	   another	   way,	   by	   the	   private	   actors’	   national	   origins.	   They	   now	  operate	   as	   national	   capitalist	   actors;	   and	   so	   the	   shift	   towards	   supranational	  financial	   regulation	   affords	   an	   opportunity	   to	   bring	   a	   new	   perspective	   to	   our	  understanding	  of	  lobbying,	  by	  bringing	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  national	  origins	  of	  private	  actors.	  	  Finally,	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  element	  to	  this	  argument	  relating	  to	  the	  new	  field	  of	   integration,	   in	   that	   the	   lobbying	   literature	   has	   not	   specifically	   embraced	  ‘banks’	   as	   a	   unique	   class	   of	   firm.	   Other,	   non-­‐financial	   firms	   are	   engaged	   in	  producing,	   or	   selling,	   physical	   goods,	   or	   providing	   services	   in	   support	   of	   that	  activity.10	  However,	   banks	   are	   economic	   actors	   in	   their	   own	   right,	   playing	   a	  central	   role	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   financial	   systems	   and	   capitalist	   economies;	   but	   the	  
way	  they	  do	  so	  varies	  significantly	  between	  national	  contexts.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  their	  regulatory	  environment	  has	  been	  significantly	  centralised	  with	  the	  creation	  of	   the	   EBA,	   and	   while	   studying	   their	   lobbying	   in	   this	   new,	   supranational	  landscape	   we	   should	   be	   aware	   of	   their	   unique	   position	   in	   their	   domestic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Bertrand	  Russell	  memorably	   referred	   to	   these	   forms	   of	   activity	   thus:	   ‘Work	   is	   of	   two	   kinds:	  first,	  altering	  the	  position	  of	  matter	  at	  or	  near	  the	  earth’s	  surface	  relatively	  to	  other	  such	  matter;	  second,	   telling	   other	   people	   to	   do	   so.	   The	   first	   kind	   is	   unpleasant	   and	   ill	   paid;	   the	   second	   is	  pleasant	  and	  highly	  paid’	  (1935:	  3).	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contexts.	  To	  paraphrase	  a	  recent	  research	  agenda	  article,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  put	  ‘finance’	  back	  into	  the	  study	  of	  lobbying	  (Mügge,	  2013:	  461).	  	  1.3:	  Answering	  the	  research	  question	  
1.3.1:	  The	  theoretical	  approach	  In	   the	   thesis	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  private	   actors	   in	   the	  new	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  are	  shaped	  by	  their	  national	  origins.	  To	  address	  the	  research	   question,	   and	   to	   establish	   how	   national	   origins	   shape	   lobbying	  behaviours,	  I	  use	  a	  ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  approach	  (P.A.	  Hall	  &	  Soskice,	  2001)	  as	  an	  organising	  theory.	  This	  informs	  us	  that	  national	  contexts	  vary	  robustly,	  and	  more	   importantly	   helps	   us	   operationalize	   the	   features	   of	   this	   variation	  coherently.	   It	   provides	   a	   means	   of	   identifying	   and	   categorising	   the	   different	  national	  landscapes.	  	  The	  theoretical	  framework	  is	  used	  to	  generate	  two	  manifestations	  of	  variety.	  The	  first	  draws	  on	   the	   ‘varieties	  of	   financial	   system’	   literature	   (Allen	  &	  Gale,	   2000;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   &	   Levine,	   1999)	   to	   posit	   that,	   like	   broader	   models	   of	   the	  economy,	  we	  can	  classify	  countries’	  financial	  systems	  into	  two	  casts.	  The	  second	  manifestation	   takes	   us	   from	   the	   banking	   market	   to	   its	   associated	   national	  regulatory	   regime	   (Hood	   et	   al.,	   2001;	   S.K.	   Vogel,	   1996),	   and	   in	   particular	   the	  underlying	  paradigm	  on	  which	  it	  is	  founded.	  Similar	  to	  the	  broader	  conception	  of	  the	   policy	   paradigm	   (P.A.	   Hall,	   1993),	   this	   contains	   a	   set	   of	   beliefs	   about	   how	  banking	  should	  be	  regulated,	  and	  so	  conditions	  the	  perceptions	  and	  preferences	  of	   private	   actors	   towards	   EU	   bank	   regulation.	   Together,	   these	   two	  manifestations	   form	   the	   key	   elements	   of	   the	   national	   contexts	   in	  which	   banks	  have	   their	   origins.	   The	   specification	   of	   this	   theoretical	   framework,	   and	   the	  model,	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	  	  
1.3.2:	  The	  variables	  and	  hypotheses	  I	  define	  the	  dependent	  variable	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model	  as	  the	  observed	  lobbying	  behaviour	   of	   the	   banks.	   The	   first	   concerns	   the	   approach	   they	   take	   when	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targeting	   the	   EBA:	  whether	   they	   do	   so	   individually,	   or	   through	   an	   association.	  The	  next	  builds	  on	  the	  prominent	  role	  played	  by	  national	  authorities	  in	  the	  EBA’s	  rule-­‐making	   processes,	   which	   mean	   banks	   can	   still	   seek	   to	   influence	   their	  Europeanised	   regulatory	   environment	   by	   enlisting	   the	   support	   their	   home	  regulator.	   The	   second	   aspect	   of	   the	   lobbying	   behaviour	   thus	   considers	   the	  regulatory	   venue	   –	   domestic	   or	   European	   –	   chosen	   by	   banks.	   The	   final	   aspect	  examines	   the	   type	   of	   informational	   input	   (technical	   and	   regulatory,	   or	   more	  political	  and	  high-­‐level)	  they	  provide.	  	  Meanwhile	  the	  two	  independent	  variables	  extend	  from	  the	  two	  manifestations	  of	  national	   variety	   outlined	   above.	   Thus,	   for	   the	   first,	   I	   take	   as	   an	   initial	   premise	  that	   the	  prevailing	  mode	  of	   financial	   capitalism	  conditions	   the	   structure	  of	   the	  domestic	   banking	   market,	   which	   then	   determines	   the	   distribution	   of	   lobbying	  
resources;	   these	   act	   as	   the	   independent	   variable	   and	   shape	   behaviours.	   The	  resources	   are	   conceived	   of	   as	   informational	   capability	   (rather	   than	   simply	  material	   or	   financial	   resources):	   the	   capacity	   the	   bank	   has	   to	   monitor	   policy-­‐making	   discussions,	   generate	   relevant	   expertise,	   and	   represent	   itself	   in	   the	  various	   fora.	  For	   the	  second	  manifestation,	   I	   take	  as	  a	   similar	  premise	   that	   the	  paradigm	   underneath	   the	   national	   regulatory	   regime	   in	   which	   banks	   operate	  shape	   their	  preferences	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation;	   these	   are,	   roughly,	  for	   ‘more’	   or	   ‘less’	   harmonisation	   of	   regulation	   (although	   naturally,	   at	   a	  more	  granular	   level,	   they	   are	   often	   for	   a	   specific	   alterations	   to	   a	   certain	   aspect	   of	  regulation).	   The	   preferences	   thus	   act	   as	   the	   second	   independent	   variable:	   it	   is	  the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   banks’	   preferences	   align	   with	   those	   of	   the	   regulatory	  institutions	  –	  at	  either	  level	  –	  which	  shape	  behaviours.	  	  From	   these	   stem	   three	   elements	   of	   a	   theoretical	   model,	   each	   with	   a	   set	   of	  hypotheses.	  The	  first	  element	  examines	  how	  banks	  lobby	  the	  EBA,	  and	  how	  this	  part	   of	   their	   behaviour	   is	   shaped	   by	   their	   lobbying	   resources.	   H1	   thus	   links	  increased	  holdings	  of	   lobbying	  resources	  among	  banks	  with	  direct	  engagement	  with	   the	   EBA;	  while	  H2	   predicts	   that	   as	   resource	   diminish	   so	   banks	   lobby	   via	  representative	   associations.	   The	   second	   element	   presents	   an	   alternative	  explanation,	   allowing	   banks	   to	   deliberately	   lobby	   their	   domestic	   regulator.	  H3	  
	   25	  
therefore	   focuses	   on	   preferences,	   and	   predicts	   that	   banks	   will	   examine	   the	  alignment	   of	   their	   own	   preferences	   with	   those	   of	   either	   the	   domestic	   or	   the	  European	  regulators,	  and	  direct	  their	  efforts	  correspondingly.	  H4	  examines	  how	  banks	   flex	   the	   content	   –	   the	   information	   provided	   –	   according	   to	   the	   varying	  discursive	   rules	   of	   these	   venues.	   Finally,	   the	   third	   element	   brings	   the	   two	  together,	  and	  examines	  the	  possibility	  that	  resources	  and	  preferences	  combine	  to	  shape	   lobbying	   behaviours.	   Since	   theorising	   about	   such	   an	   interaction	   is	   very	  difficult	  to	  do	  a	  priori,	  H5	  simply	  suggests	  that	  with	   increased	  resources,	  banks	  are	  better	  able	  to	  lobby	  based	  on	  their	  preferences.	  	  In	   this	   way,	   the	  model	   knits	   together	   the	   various	   literatures.	   The	   ‘varieties	   of	  capitalism’	   (P.A.	   Hall	   &	   Soskice,	   2001)	   theory	   provides	   the	   explicitly-­‐specified	  manifestations	   of	   national	   variety	   (expressed	   either	   as	   financial	   systems	   or	  national	   regulatory	   paradigms).	   Next,	   the	   EU	   lobbying	   literature	   provides	  insights	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   private	   actors	   to	   operate	   in	   a	   complex	   opportunity	  structure	   (Guiradon,	   2000;	  Holyoke,	   2003;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	   2006),	   on	   the	  role	  of	  informational	  resources	  (Chalmers,	  2011;	  2013;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012)	  and	  associational	  activity	  (C.	  Mahoney,	  2007)	  and	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  matching	  this	  input	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   venue	   being	   targeted	   (Bouwen,	   2002;	   Dür	   &	   De	  Bièvre,	  2007;	  Michalowitz,	  2004).	  The	  model	   then	   takes	  us	   through	   two	  causal	  pathways,	   and	   ultimately	   to	   banks’	   observed	   lobbying	   behaviours	   in	   the	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  	  
1.3.3:	  Data	  and	  methods	  To	  investigate	  the	  lobbying	  patterns	  around	  the	  EBA,	  I	  concentrate	  on	  the	  rule-­‐making	   exercises	   conducted	   in	   support	   of	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   CRDIV/CRR	  legislative	  package.	  I	  use	  a	  qualitative	  research	  design,	  which	  was	  chosen	  for	  its	  strength	  in	  examining	  the	  causal	  processes	  behind	  observed	  phenomena,	  rather	  than	   searching	   for	   co-­‐variation	   among	   numerically-­‐coded	   variables	   (George	   &	  Bennett,	  2005;	  Gerring,	  2004;	  Lin,	  1998;	   J.	  Mahoney	  &	  Goertz,	  2006).	  Thus,	   the	  variables	   which	   are	   specified	   (and	   which	   were	   outlined	   in	   the	   previous	  paragraphs)	  are	  intended	  as	   ‘guides’	   into	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  empirical	  realm	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of	   the	   subject.	   The	   study	   takes	   a	   comparative	   case-­‐study	   approach,	   with	  empirical	  cases	  arranged	  into	  a	  nested	  structure	  (Gerring,	  2004).	  At	  the	  top	  level	  are	  the	  UK	  and	  Germany,	  chosen	  as	  exemplars	  of	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  variety	  suggested	  by	   the	   theoretical	   framework.	  Within	   this	   sit	   the	   embedded	  units	   of	  analysis,	  or	  the	  cast	  of	  actors	  –	  banks,	  associations,	  regulators	  –	  relevant	  to	  the	  study.	  	  The	   data	   for	   the	   study	   were	   gathered	   from	   three	   sources.	   Firstly,	   55	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   with	   representatives	   of	   banks,	   trade	  associations	  and	  regulators	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  Germany.	  Second,	  publicly-­‐available	  responses	  submitted	  by	  banks	  and	  associations	  into	  consultation	  processes	  were	  gathered.	  Third,	  a	  range	  of	  supporting	  material	  and	  secondary	  sources	  –	  such	  as	  notes	  taken	  at	  public	  events,	  position	  papers,	  media	  reports	  and	  commentary	  –	  were	   used	   to	   complete	   the	   empirical	   picture.	   These	   various	   sources	   were	  subjected	  to	  a	  qualitative	  content	  analysis	  procedure,	  which	  was	  used	  to	  extract	  information	   pertaining	   to	   the	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours,	   and	   to	   the	   reasons	  behind	  them.	  In	  turn,	  the	  causal	  narrative	  was	  framed	  around	  specific	  instances	  of	   lobbying,	   in	  which	  process	   tracing	   techniques	  were	  deployed	   to	   connect	   the	  variables	   to	   the	   observed	   behaviours.	   In	   this	   way,	   a	   richly-­‐detailed	   but	  theoretically	  robust	  explanation	  was	  developed.	  The	  specification	  of	  the	  research	  design,	   including	   the	   variables,	   data	   sources	   and	   analytical	   techniques,	   is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Three.	  	  1.4:	  Empirical	  findings	  Chapter	   Five	   deploys	  H1	   and	  H2,	   examining	   how	   domestic	   market	   structures	  shape	   the	   distribution	   of	   lobbying	   resources	   among	   banks,	   and	   how	   the	   very	  different	  models	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  in	  Britain	  and	  Germany	  give	  rise	  to	  very	  different	   capacities	   in	   the	   sets	   of	   banks.	   It	   then	   examines	   how	   these	   different	  holdings	   of	   resources	   shaped	   the	   various	   banks’	   lobbying	   in	   the	   emergent	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  Successive	  sections	  study	   the	  activities	  of	   the	   large	  banks	  (both	  British	  and	  German)	  and	  then	  the	  remainders	  of	  the	  two	  sectors	  in	  turn.	  The	  chapter	  finds	  that	  the	  large	  banks	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  direct	  lobbying	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efforts	   at	   the	   European	   regulator,	   and	   that	   the	   far	   greater	   organisational	  strengths	   of	   the	   German	   sector	   led	   to	   strong	   engagement.	   The	   medium-­‐	   and	  small-­‐sized	  British	  banks	  lost	  out	  in	  this	  arena:	  they	  had	  neither	  the	  independent	  resources	  nor	  the	  associational	  support	  to	  lobby	  effectively	  in	  Europe.	  	  Chapter	  Six	  deploys	  H3	  and	  H4,	  looking	  at	  how	  banks’	  lobbying	  behaviours	  were	  shaped	   by	   their	   perceptions	   of,	   and	   preferences	   over,	   European	   regulation.	   It	  grounds	  these	  in	  the	  domestic	  regulatory	  paradigms	  in	  which	  the	  banks	  operate,	  explaining	  how	  their	  understanding	  of	  European	  regulation	  stemmed	  from	  their	  deep-­‐rooted	  beliefs	  about	  how	  regulation	  should	  be	  practiced	  as	  a	  whole.	  Next,	  it	  draws	   out	   similar	   preferences	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   national	   authorities,	   showing	  how,	   over	   certain	   specific	   policy	   debates,	   the	   positions	   of	   the	   banking	   sectors	  and	   regulatory	   authorities	   were	   aligned.	   It	   finds	   that	   although	   alignments	  between	  banks	  and	  regulators	  were	  often	  circumscribed	  and	  problematic,	  banks	  continued	  to	  focus	  their	  regulatory	  lobbying	  on	  domestic,	  over	  European,	  actors.	  It	   also	   shows	   how	   banks	   shifted	   the	   content	   of	   their	   informational	   input,	   but	  often	  retained	  a	  central	  thread	  which	  was	  linked	  to	  their	  paradigmatic	  beliefs	  on	  European	  financial	  regulation.	  	  Chapter	   Six	   also	   applies	   H5,	   bringing	   together	   the	   resource-­‐	   and	   preference-­‐based	   explanations.	   It	   describes	   how	   greater	   resources	   allowed	   banks	   to	   use	  lobbying	   strategies	   based	   on	   their	   preferences,	   but	   also	   how	   stronger	  associational	   representation	   enabled	   the	   small	   German	   banks	   to	   effectively	  penetrate	  the	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  	  Finally,	  Chapter	  Seven	  reviews	  the	  study,	  first	  presenting	  some	  broad,	  contextual	  findings,	  and	  then	  a	  set	  of	  conclusions	  pertaining	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  causal	  model.	  It	  connects	  these	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  lobbying	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  to	  broader	  thoughts	   on	   European	   regulatory	   governance.	   It	   also	   offers	   some	   practical	  implications	  and	  possible	  avenues	  for	  further	  study.	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Chapter	  2:	  Theoretical	  framework	  
2.1:	  Introduction	  	  
“What	  shapes	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  banks	  in	  the	  
	  European	  regulatory	  arena?”	  	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  EU’s	  policy-­‐making	  capacity	  following	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  came	   a	   parallel	   rise	   in	   lobbying	   activity	   by	   private	   actors	   (Coen,	   2007;	   Woll,	  2006).	   This	   became	   the	   subject	   of	   a	   lively	   scholarly	   debate,	   and	   of	   a	   richly	  detailed	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   literature.	   Once	   early	   and	   important	  theoretical	   advances	   had	   been	   made	   attention	   switched	   to	   the	   drivers	   of	   this	  lobbying	  behaviour,	  and	  consensus	  settled	  on	  it	  being	  essentially	  an	  exchange	  –	  of	  informational	  goods	  for	  privileged	  access,	  and,	  perhaps,	   influence	  (Broscheid	  &	  Coen,	  2003;	  2007).	  The	  key	  determinants	  of	  private	  actors’	  ability	  to	  penetrate	  policy-­‐making	  venues	  thus	  centred	  on	  the	  resources	  they	  commanded,	  and	  so,	  in	  a	   secondary	   sense,	   on	   the	   various	   institutional	   characteristics	   which	   effected	  holdings	  of	  these	  resources.	  	  	  Operating	  in	  this	  vein	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  valuable	  work	  was	  conducted,	  and	  we	  now	  have	   a	   clear	   picture	   of	   how	   institutional	   characteristics	   shape	   lobbying	  behaviours.	  Meanwhile,	   a	   second	   feature	  of	   this	   literature	  has	  been	  an	   implicit	  view	  of	   lobbyists	  as	  transnational	  capitalist	  actors,	  seeking	  to	  extend	  or	  deepen	  the	   single	   market.	   Hence,	   the	   story	   ran,	   these	   actors	   pushed	   the	   Commission	  towards	   further	   liberalisation	   and	   integration	   of	   markets	   in	   goods,	   and	   later	  services.	   The	   conclusions	   reached	   about	   lobbying	   were	   based	   on	   these	   two	  facets:	   lobbying	   behaviour	   was	   shaped	   by	   institutional	   characteristics,	   and	  driven	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  spread	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  market.	  	  This	   thesis	   takes	   a	   slightly	   different	   perspective.	   It	   argues	   that	   this	   extant	  literature	  has	  under-­‐estimated	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  national	  origins	  of	  private	  actors	   as	   significant	   factors	   in	   shaping	   their	   behaviour,	   focussing	   instead	   on	  institutional	  characteristics	  and	  transnational	  intentions.	  Furthermore,	  it	  has	  not	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yet	   absorbed	   the	   recent	   developments	   in	   the	   EU’s	   institutional	   architecture,	  which	   have	   created	   a	   single	   European	   regulatory	   space	  with	   a	   set	   of	   discrete,	  standalone	  bodies	  at	  the	  supranational	  level	  (Levi-­‐Faur,	  2011).	  The	  extent	  of	  this	  centralisation	   has	   varied	   across	   policy	   domains,	   but	   has	   been	   particularly	  pronounced	   in	   that	   of	   bank	   regulation.	   Here,	   a	   new	   institutional	   has	   been	  created,	   at	   which	   private	   actors	   can	   address	   their	   lobbying:	   the	   European	  Banking	  Authority	  (EBA).	  	  By	   investigating	  the	  research	  question	  above,	   then,	   this	   thesis	  aims	  to	  make	  an	  important	   theoretical	   contribution	   by	   showing	   the	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	  private	  actors	  in	  the	  developing	  regulatory	  arena	  are	  shaped	  by	  features	  of	  their	  national	   contexts.	   It	   does	   so	  by	  using	   the	   case	   of	   the	  EBA	  and	  by	   focussing	  on	  how	  banks	  have	  lobbied	  it.	  The	  thesis	  deploys	  a	  ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  approach	  (P.A.	  Hall	  &	  Soskice,	  2001)	  as	  an	  organising	  theory,	  using	  it	  to	  a	  build	  theoretical	  model	   linking	   national	   contexts	   to	   behaviours.	   Two	  dimensions	   of	   variation	   in	  these	  national	  contexts	  are	  established.	  First,	  national	  varieties	  of	  capitalism	  are	  associated	   with	   different	   financial	   systems,	   and	   different	   arrangements	   for	  linking	   them	   to	   the	   broader	   economy.	   	   These	   ‘varieties	   of	   financial	   capitalism’	  then	   bring	   about	   very	   different	   structural	   patterns	   in	   banking	   sectors,	   which	  dictate	   the	   number,	   types	   and	   sizes	   of	   the	   constituent	   banks.	   This	   drives	   the	  distribution	   of	   lobbying	   resources	   among	   banks,	   and	   so	   shapes	   the	   ways	   in	  which	  they	  lobby	  regulatory	  actors.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  thesis	  investigates	  whether	  these	   domestic	   arrangements	   for	   lobbying	   regulators	   –	   caused	   by	   the	  distribution	  of	  resources,	  and	  ultimately	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  national	  sector	  –	  are	  replicated	  in	  the	  new	  European	  arena.	  	  Second,	  national	  varieties	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  are	  accompanied	  by	  distinctive	  regulatory	  regimes,	  which	  are	  themselves	  based	  on	  different	  sets	  of	  beliefs	  about	  banking	  markets	  and	  their	  regulation.	  These	  beliefs	  are	  held	  (to	  varying	  degrees)	  by	  both	  banks	  and	  regulatory	  authorities,	  and	   they	  serve	   to	  structure	  relations	  between	   the	   two.	   The	   thesis	   investigates	   how	   the	   perspectives	   of	   banks	   on	  European	  financial	  regulation	  –	  shaped	  by	  these	  domestic	  ideational	  frameworks	  –	  shape	  the	  way	  banks	  lobby	  in	  the	  emergent	  arena.
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This	   chapter	   sets	   out	   to	   develop	   the	   research	   question,	   and	   to	   construct	   the	  theoretical	   framework	   on	   which	   the	   thesis	   rests.	   Drawing	   on	   Maxwell	   (2005:	  39),	  I	  use	  the	  framework	  to	  specify	  the	  ‘working	  parts’	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model	  –	  the	  key	  actors,	  the	  fundamental	  concepts,	  and	  so	  on	  –	  and	  to	  explain	  how	  they	  fit	  together.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  First,	  I	  open	  with	  a	  broad	  thematic	  review	  of	   the	   literature	  covering	   the	  activities	  of	  private	  actors	   in	   the	  European	   Union,11	  in	   order	   to	   establish	   a	   general	   context.	   From	   this,	   I	   then	  extract	   a	   more	   detailed	   study	   of	   that	   part	   of	   the	   literature	   which	   deals	  specifically	   with	   various	   aspects	   of	   their	   lobbying;	   this	   provides	   many	   of	   the	  conceptual	   components	   on	   which	   the	   thesis	   is	   founded.	   Section	   three	   then	  identifies	   two	   opportunities	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   literature,	   and	   from	   there	  isolates	  the	  research	  question;	   it	  also	  explains	  the	  use	  of	  the	  organising	  theory.	  With	   this	   in	  place,	   section	   four	  develops	   two	  manifestations	  of	  national	  variety	  relevant	   to	   the	   study,	   and	   explains	   the	   theoretical	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   two	  approaches	  used	  to	  answer	  the	  question.	  Section	  five	  extends	  these	  into	  a	  causal	  model,	   weaving	   in	   insights	   drawn	   from	   the	   earlier	   review	   of	   the	   lobbying	  literature.	  Finally,	  section	  six	  offers	  some	  concluding	  remarks.	  	  2.2:	  Interest	  groups	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  
2.2.1:	  Thematic	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  Our	  first	  task	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  broad	  theoretical	  context	  in	  which	  this	  study	  is	  grounded,	  and	  so	  we	  begin	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  main	  themes	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  interest	  groups	  and	  their	  activity	   in	  the	  EU.	  This	   literature	  grew	  with	  the	  rapid	  expansion	   of	   engagement	   by	   private	   actors	   in	   EU	   decision-­‐making	   processes	  after	   the	   Single	   European	   Act	   (Coen,	   2007;	   Woll,	   2006).	   Early	   investigations	  described	   activity	   in	   individual	   issue	   areas	   or	   policy	   fields,	   and	   tracked	   the	  growth	   of	   interest	   representation	   alongside	   the	   transfer	   of	   competences	   up	   to	  the	   supranational	   level.	   These	   then	   moved	   onto	   more	   theoretically	   ambitious	  projects	   aimed	   at	   establishing	   whether	   national	   patterns	   of	   interest	  intermediation	   –	   pluralism	  or	  neo-­‐corporatism	  –	  were	   carrying	   through	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘European	  interest	  group	  literature.’	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European	  stage.	  By	  the	  1990s,	  scholars	  had	  characterised	  the	  European	  system	  as	   ‘transnational	   pluralism’	   (Streeck	   &	   Schmitter,	   1991)	   and	   later	   ‘élite	  pluralism’	   (Coen,	   1997).	  More	   recently,	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   in	   a	   different,	  more	  variegated	   light,	   with	   often	   very	   different	   sets	   of	   actors	   and	   styles	   of	  representation	   in	   different	   policy	   domains	   –	   so-­‐called	   ‘chameleon	   pluralism’	  (Coen	  &	  Katsaitis,	  2013).	  Elsewhere,	  studies	  of	  the	  EU’s	  governance	  style	  began	  to	   integrate	   a	   consideration	   of	   interest	   group	   activities.	   These	   had	   identified	   a	  fluid	   approach	   to	  policy-­‐making,	  with	   shifting	   constellations	  of	   actors	   involved	  over	  several	   layers	  –	  regional,	  national	  and	  European	  (Marks	  &	  Hooghe,	  2001).	  Interest	  groups	  representing	  various	  constituencies	  were	  shown	  to	  participate	  in	  the	   loose	   policy	   networks	   thus	   convened	   (Eising,	   2004;	   Kohler-­‐Koch	  &	   Eising,	  1999).	   As	   this	   developed,	   attention	   turned	   to	   how	   private	   actors	   formed	  groupings,	  either	  within	  or	  across	  these	  various	   levels,	   in	  order	  to	  navigate	  the	  complex	  environment	  and	  achieve	  success	  in	  their	  lobbying.	  The	  intricacy	  of	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  and	  of	  operating	  in	  the	  dynamic	  multi-­‐level	  setting,	  were	  found	  to	  hinder	  the	  formation	  of	  stable,	  transnational	  groupings,	  so	  instead	  firms	  tended	   to	   forge	   ad	   hoc	   alliances,	   or	   to	   operate	   through	   domestic	   associations	  (Coen,	  1997;	  C.	  Mahoney,	  2007).	  Meanwhile,	  federations	  of	  national	  associations	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  sluggish,	  lacking	  in	  resources,	  and	  beset	  with	  collective	  active	  action	  difficulties	  (Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006).	  	  With	   lobbying	   activity	   maturing,	   focus	   turned	   to	   the	   examination	   of	   its	  underlying	   logics.	   These	   projects	   aimed	   to	   uncover	   what	   shaped	   lobbying	  behaviours,	   and	   tackled	   a	   set	   of	   key	   questions:	   what	   goods	   were	   offered	   to	  policy-­‐makers?	  How	  were	  they	  targeted?	  What	  norms	  prevailed	  over	  the	  activity	  of	   lobbying?	   Under	   what	   conditions	   was	   representation	   structured	   through	  associational	   channels?	  These	  studies	  aimed	   to	  build	   ‘system-­‐wide’	  accounts	  of	  lobbying;	  that	  is,	  explanations	  of	  how	  firms	  or	  interest	  groups	  lobbied	  regardless	  of	  their	  national	  origin,	  or	  the	  policy	  involved.	  Their	  empirical	  focus	  was	  thus	  on	  large	   numbers	   of	   groups	   (of	   various	   types)	   from	  as	  many	  national	   contexts	   as	  possible	   (see	  Chalmers,	  2011;	  Coen,	  1997;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012;	  Eising,	  2004;	  C.	  Mahoney,	  2004).	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There	   are,	   naturally,	   many	   other	   strands	   to	   this	   extensive	   literature.	   For	  example,	   scholars	   have	   examined	   normative	   concerns	   about	   the	   legitimacy	   of	  European	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  (Føllesdal,	  2013;	  Héritier	  &	  Lehmkuhl,	  2013;	  Weale,	  2013),	  or	  about	  the	  wider	  democratic	  deficit	  (Føllesdal	  &	  Hix,	  2006);	  they	  have	  also	  studied	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  private	  actors’	  access	  actually	  translated	  to	  influence,	   and	   commented	   on	   the	   methodological	   problems	   inherent	   in	  investigating	   this	   topic	   (Dür,	   2008).	   However,	   for	   our	   purposes	   it	   is	   the	   four	  themes	   outlined	   above	   which	   are	   particularly	   relevant.	   The	   study	   of	   several	  modes	  of	  interest	  intermediation	  reminds	  us	  that	  there	  exist	  differences	  in	  such	  arrangements	  among	  national	  contexts,	  and	  that	  a	  European	  style	  has	  emerged	  which	  is	  itself	  variegated	  and	  complex.	  Analyses	  of	  private	  actors’	  involvement	  in	  the	  many	  networks	   of	  multi-­‐level	   governance	   remind	  us	   that	   such	   activity	   can	  take	   place	   away	   from	   the	   pressures	   of	   intergovernmental	   policy-­‐making,	   in	   a	  quiet	  world	  of	  technocracy.	  Lastly,	  studies	  of	  group	  formation,	  and	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	   behaviour	   focus	   our	   attention	   on	   the	   micro-­‐level	   decisions	   within	   these	  private	  actors,	  and	  so	  on	  what	  shapes	  the	  various	  observable	  lobbying	  strategies.	  	  
2.2.2:	  Components	  From	   this	   overview	   of	   the	   literature	   and	   its	  main	   themes	  we	  move	   to	   a	  more	  specific	  survey	  of	  the	  subset	  of	  works	  concerned	  with	  the	  drivers	  of	  behaviour.	  This	  is	  framed	  around	  the	  set	  of	  key	  questions	  identified	  above.	  	  We	  begin	  with	  an	  important	  conceptual	  clarification:	  of	  the	  term	  ‘lobbying.’	  The	  conceptualisation	   running	   through	   the	   literature	   rests	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   an	  information	   asymmetry	   between	   well-­‐informed	   private	   actors	   and	   under-­‐resourced	  legislators	  (Austen-­‐Smith,	  1993;	  Crombez,	  2002;	  Naoi	  &	  Krauss,	  2009;	  Potters	   &	   Van	   Winden,	   1992).	   Hall	   and	   Deardorff	   refer	   to	   the	   resulting	  arrangement	   as	   ‘lobbying	   as	   legislative	   subsidy’	   (2006):	   information	   and	  expertise	  are	  provided	  in	  order	  to	  help	  legislators	  draft	  better	  policy.	  These	  gifts	  feed	  into	  discussions	  among	  European	  legislative	  actors	  (in	  the	  Commission	  and	  Parliament)	  aimed	  at	  creating	  the	  overall	  framework	  of	  policy.	  At	  this	  level	  there	  is	   considerable	   flexibility	   in	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   debate,	   as	   overarching	  
	   33	  
principles	  are	  constructed	  and	  solidified.	  The	  decisions	  to	  be	  made	  pertain	  to	  the	  general	  direction	  of	  travel:	  which	  of	  several	  competing	  regulatory	  goals,	  or	  tools,	  should	   be	   prioritised,	   for	   example.	   We	   can	   describe	   this	   activity,	   then,	   as	  
legislative	  lobbying.	  	  The	   literature	  has	   taken	   the	  asymmetry	  one	   step	   further,	  however,	   and	   shown	  that	   it	   actually	   generates	   an	   interdependency	   between	   the	   two	   sets	   of	   actors	  (Pfeffer	  &	  Salancik,	  1978).	  Legislators	  seek	  policy	  input	  from	  private	  actors;	  they,	  in	   turn,	   seek	   to	   influence	   their	   future	   regulatory	   environment.	   But	   achieving	  influence	   is	   uncertain,	   and	   so	   a	   second	  motivation	  has	   been	   identified:	   private	  actors	   trade	   their	   expertise	   for	   access	   to	   future	   rounds	   of	   policy-­‐making	  discussions	   (Broscheid	   &	   Coen,	   2003).	   Only	   by	   establishing	   a	   reputation	   for	  providing	   high-­‐quality	   and	   reliable	   information	   can	   they	   do	   this,	   and	   so	   a	  disciplining	  effect	  is	  brought	  to	  bear.	  	  	  Who	   participates	   in	   this	   lobbying	   activity?	  Drawing	   on	   typologies	   provided	   by	  several	  scholars	  (Beyers	  et	  al.,	  2008;	   Jordan	  et	  al.,	  2004),	  we	  can	   identify	   three	  types	   of	   private	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   business	   of	   lobbying	   the	   European	  institutions.	   Firms	   are	  unitary	  players	   acting	   on	   their	   own	  behalf	  with	  distinct	  preferences	   of	   their	   own.	   Next,	   there	   are	   professional	   consultancies,	   to	  whom	  representation	  is	  occasionally	  delegated	  by	  such	  firms.	  Third,	  there	  are	  all	  those	  trade	   bodies,	   peak	   associations	   and	   collective	   organisations	   that	   represent	  shared	   or	   communal	   interests,	   who	   seek	   to	   influence	   policy,	   and	   who	   are	  effected	  by	  internal	  bargaining	  problems	  and	  collective	  action	  difficulties.	  Often	  for	   these,	   lobbying	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   raison	   d’être,	   but	   rather	   an	   additional	  function	  performed	  on	  top	  of	  core	  services	  supplied	  to	  their	  members.	  	  The	  interdependence	  highlighted	  by	  the	  literature	  may	  imply	  a	  certain	  stability,	  with	   private	   actors	   settling	   into	   durable	   relationships	   with	   European	  institutions.	  However,	  the	  European	  policy-­‐making	  system	  is	  complex,	  with	  often	  over-­‐lapping	  stages	  and	  multiples	  points	  at	  which	  influence	  can	  be	  exerted.	  This	  complexity,	   far	   from	  hindering	  private	  actors’	   lobbying,	  actually	  affords	   them	  a	  ‘menu’	   of	   possible	   targets	   for	   their	   lobbying,	   allowing	   them	   to	   switch	   among	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locations	   in	  order	   to	   achieve	  a	  maximum	  return	  on	   their	   efforts.	  This	  dynamic	  venue-­‐shopping	   entails	   a	   delicate	   trade-­‐off,	   balancing	   the	   likelihood	   of	   success	  against	   private	   actors’	   own	   resources	   and	   capacities.	   It	   also	   entails	   an	  understanding	  of	  where	  the	  locus	  of	  policy-­‐making	  power	  sits,	  so	  that	  efforts	  can	  be	  directed	  towards	  the	  most	  appropriate	  venue	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time	  (Alter	  &	  Vargas,	   2000;	   Baumgartner	   &	   Jones,	   1991;	   Beyers	   &	   Kerremans,	   2011;	  Constantelos,	  2007;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006).	  	  Gaining	  access	  to	  these	  multiple	  venues	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  being	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  appropriate	   informational	   goods,	   and	   this	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   challenge	   of	  classifying	  information.	  As	  Mahoney	  notes,	  any	  such	  classification	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  at	   least	   partly	   arbitrary,	   since	   the	   types	   of	   information	  provided	   are	   ‘so	   broad	  and	   rich’	   (2008:	   82).	   Nevertheless,	   we	   can	   follow	   the	   lead	   of	   several	   scholars	  who	   have	   tackled	   the	   problem.	   Bouwen	   (2002)	   offered	   an	   early,	   and	   highly	  influential,	   model,	   which	   distinguished	   between	   two	   broad	   categories.	   First,	  expert	   knowledge	   pertains	   to	   the	   precise	   technical	   details	   of	   the	   policy	   area,	  drawing	   out	   unforeseen	   complications	   or	   unintended	   consequences.	  
Encompassing	  interest	  speaks	   in	  more	  general	   terms	  about	  the	  preferences	  of	  a	  given	   sector	  over	   the	  policy,	   and	   can	  exist	   at	   a	  national,	   or	   at	   a	  pan-­‐European,	  level.	  The	  same	  basic	  distinction	  was	  employed	  by	  Michalowitz,	  who	  described	  the	  more	  general	  type	  as	  ‘expertise	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  national	  situation	  (2004:	  89);	   using	   a	   similar	   framework,	   Dür	   and	   De	   Bièvre	   (2007)	   highlighted	   NGOs’	  inability	   to	   provide	   precise	   technical	   information	   as	   a	   key	   factor	   behind	   their	  exclusion	  from	  EU	  decision-­‐making.	  	  These	  different	  types	  of	  information	  are	  then	  connected	  to	  different	  institutional	  demands.	   In	   Bouwen’s	   formulation	   (echoed	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   literature)	   the	  Commission	  prizes	  high-­‐quality	  expert	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  Parliament	  input	  of	  a	  more	  ‘political’	  nature	  (on	  the	  distributional	  consequences	  of	  policy,	  perhaps)	  –	  reflecting	  their	  differing	  roles	  in	  the	  legislative	  process.	  On	  the	  supply	  side,	  firms	  are	  best	  able	  to	  provide	  detailed	  technical	  expertise,	  since	  they	  are	  closest	  to	  the	  markets	   or	   products	   involved	   and	   not	   required	   to	   arbitrate	   between	   many	  internal	  positions	  when	  generating	  or	  conveying	  the	  information	  (as	  an	  interest	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group	  would).	  The	  sort	  of	  sectoral	  opinion	  needed	  by	  the	  Parliament	  is	  provided	  by	  either	  domestic	  or	  pan-­‐European	  interest	  groups	  (Bouwen,	  2002).	  	  The	   notion	   of	   a	   connection	   between	   the	   policy-­‐making	   institution	   and	   the	  suppliers	  of	  access	  goods	  has	  recently	  been	  extended.	  Coen	  and	  Katsaitis	  (2013)	  argued	  that	  the	  type	  of	  private	  actor	  involved	  varies	  according	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  policy	  domain,	  rather	  than	  the	  overall	  EU	  institution.	  Thus,	  highly	  technical,	  or	   regulatory	  domains	   (including	  dossiers	   such	  as	   economics	  or	   finance)	  draw	  input	   from	   unitary	   actors;	   whereas	   areas	   which	   are	   more	   political,	   or	  distributive,	   in	   nature	   attract	   associations,	   NGOs	   and	   civil	   society	   groups.	   For	  Chalmers,	  meanwhile,	  informational	  input	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  more	  granular	  terms:	   he	   proposed	   a	  more	   comprehensive	   typology	   including	   information	   on	  legal	   or	   technical	   aspects	   of	   policy,	   on	   public	   opinion,	   and	   on	   the	   social	   or	  economic	  impact	  of	  a	  proposal	  (Chalmers,	  2011:	  479).	  Again,	  he	  also	  relaxed	  the	  link	   between	   EU	   institutions	   and	   types	   of	   actor,	   finding	   that	   in	   practice	   both	  firms	  and	  associations	  had	  access	  to	  a	  ‘large	  repertory	  of	  strategies’	  (2011:	  481).	  A	   similar	   theme	   was	   conveyed	   by	   McGrath	   (2007),	   who	   compared	   the	  presentation	   of	   political	   argumentation	   in	   different	   institutional	   venues	   to	   the	  approach	  of	  ‘product	  positioning’	  used	  in	  advertising	  strategies.	  The	  implication	  was	   that	   messages	   need	   to	   be	   subtly	   shifted	   –	   without	   losing	   their	   intent	   to	  persuade	  –	  according	  to	  the	  tastes	  of	  the	  audience	  being	  targeted.	  These	  newer	  perspectives	  combine	  to	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  clustering	  of	  private	  actors	  around	  lobbying	  venues	  is	  a	  complex	  business,	  and	  that	  actors	  of	  various	  types	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  different	  informational	  goods.	  	  However,	  information,	  of	  any	  type,	  is	  not	  simply	  ‘held’	  by	  private	  actors:	  it	  has	  to	  be	  either	  internally	  developed	  or	  bought	  in.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  disagreements	  about	   the	   links	   between	   venue	   and	   type	   of	   private	   actor,	   scholars	   have	   been	  fairly	   unanimous	   in	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   underlying	   resources	   in	  driving	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  The	  most	  basic	  consideration	  is	  clearly	  the	  financial	  resources	  the	  private	  actor	  has	  available	  to	  fund	  the	  costly	  business	  of	  lobbying	  (Eising,	  2007a;	  Klüver,	  2010).	  Using	  these	  resources	  entails	  making	  an	  important	  strategic	  choice	  (Lowery,	  2007):	  for	  firms,	  it	  means	  diverting	  money	  away	  from	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business	   activities;	   for	   associations,	   the	   choice	   is	   between	   engaging	   in	   costly	  political	   activities	   or	   providing	   core	   services	   to	   members	   (particularly	   if	   we	  consider	   that	  many	   such	   groups	   do	   not	   solely	   exist	   to	   lobby	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	  members).	   	   Indeed	   for	   the	   latter,	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   connection	   to	   the	  membership	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  the	  quantity	  of	  financial	  resources	  available	  (Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	  2007).	  	  	  Beyond	   this	   hard	   financial	   aspect,	   we	   come	   to	   more	   subtle	   considerations,	  relating	  to	  how	  information	  is	  generated	  or	  communicated.	  Private	  actors’	  ability	  to	  access	  policy-­‐makers	   is	   linked	  to	  resources	  such	  as	   the	  number	  of	  staff	   they	  have	  dedicated	  conducting	  research	  and	  generating	  policy-­‐relevant	  expertise	  (of	  whatever	  form	  –	  be	  it	  ‘political’	  or	  ‘technical’).	  It	  is	  then	  further	  shaped	  by	  their	  ability	   to	   use	   transmission	   channels:	   namely,	   to	   deploy	   the	   various	   types	   of	  information	  generated,	  they	  need	  to	  have	  established	  contact	  with	  their	  possible	  target	  venues,	  and	  staff	  dedicated	  to	  representation	  (Chalmers,	  2011;	  2013;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012).	  These	  strengths	  have	  then	  been	  related	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  private	  actor:	  being	  able	   to	  navigate	   the	  EU’s	  complex	  and	  dynamic	  policy-­‐making	   process,	   and	   its	   institutional	   system,	   requires	   private	   actors	   to	   have	   a	  high	  degree	  of	  decentralisation	  and	  functional	  specification	  (Klüver,	  2012).	  	  Considering	  these	  types	  of	  resources	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  organisation	  of	  lobbying.	  At	   a	   basic	   level,	   unitary	   actors	   facing	   a	   shortage	   of	   resources	  will	   be	  forced	  to	  find	  alternative	  approaches.	  They	  can	  hire	  a	  professional	  lobbyist,	  or	  a	  consultancy,	   to	   act	   on	   their	  behalf,	   or	   they	   can	  enter	   into	   a	   loose	   alliance	  with	  peers.	  Most	  likely,	  however,	  they	  will	  participate	  in	  associational	  representation	  via	   a	   trade	   body,	   or	   a	   similar	   group,	   which	   will	   help	   organise	   the	   lobbying.	  Depending	   on	   circumstances,	   and	   perhaps	   on	   the	   opportunity	   structure	  involved,	  this	  association	  may	  then	  choose	  to	  work	  with	  others	  –	  across	  sectoral	  divides	   or	   borders.	   The	   drawback	   of	   such	   an	   associational	   approach	   is	   that	   it	  necessarily	  entails	  a	  dilution	  of	   the	   firm’s	  message,	  since	   it	  must	  be	  considered	  alongside	   those	   of	   all	   the	   others	   who	   are	   participating.	   For	   this	   reason,	   firms	  with	   adequate	   resources	   of	   their	   own	   will	   avoid	   this	   channel,	   and	   prefer	   to	  organise	  their	  own	  efforts.	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2.2.3:	  Summary	  	  These	  various	  insights	  can	  be	  brought	  together	  to	  form	  a	  picture	  of	   lobbying	  in	  the	   EU’s	   political	   structure,	   to	   define	   some	   key	   terms,	   and	   to	   establish	   the	  elements	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model	  this	  study	  will	  employ.	  	  	  First,	   the	   definition	   of	   lobbying	   used	   in	   this	   study	   follows	   that	   employed	  elsewhere	   in	   the	   literature.	   Underlying	   it	   is	   an	   assumption	   of	   rationality,	  whereby	  private	  actors	  go	  through	  an	  internal	  thought	  process	  in	  which	  the	  cost	  of	   lobbying	   is	   weighed	   against	   the	   benefits	   of	   achieving	   the	   desired	   policy	  outcome,	   discounted	   against	   the	   probably	   of	   success.	   Next,	   it	   is	   purposive:	  information	   is	   provided	   to	   policy-­‐makers	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   shaping	   the	  direction	  of	  legislation,	  or	  of	  resolving	  high-­‐level	  questions	  of	  design.	  Finally	  it	  is	  a	  dynamic	  activity,	  in	  which	  private	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  operate	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  their	   opportunity	   structure	   and	   to	   absorb	   changes	   in	   that	   structure	   into	   their	  behaviours.	  	  Second,	   the	   key	   good	   provided	   by	   private	   actors	   is	   informational,	   rather	   than	  being	   in	   the	   form	  of	  electoral	  or	   financial	   support.	  Thus,	   they	  supply	  high-­‐level	  
information,	   relating	   to	   the	   scoping	   and	   shaping	   of	   fundamental	   issues	   of	  framework	   design:	   which	   of	   several	   competing	   goals	   should	   be	   pursued,	   for	  instance.	  This	   information	  may	  also	  speak,	   in	  general	   terms,	   to	   the	  unintended	  consequences	   of	   a	   legislative	   proposal.	   Alternatively,	   they	   provide	   technical	  
information,	  which	  is	  more	  akin	  to	  Bouwen’s	   ‘expert	  knowledge’	  and	  which	  is	  a	  more	   precise,	   detailed	   version	   of	   the	   political.	   This	   speaks	   to	   specific	  technicalities	  of	  the	  legislative	  proposal.	  	  Third,	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  lobbying	  activity,	  private	  actors	  must	  be	  able	  to	  call	  on	  certain	  resources.	  Interface	  resources	  govern	  the	  flow	  of	  information	  into	  and	   out	   of	   the	   organisation.	   They	   have	   several	   different	   manifestations,	  beginning	  with	  monitoring	   capacity	   –	   the	   ability	   to	  watch	   for	   developments	   in	  various	   regulatory	  discussions	   at	  many	  different	   levels,	   and	   to	   keep	   abreast	   of	  consultation	  requests,	  scheduled	  public	  hearings,	  and	  papers	  being	  circulated	  by	  policy-­‐makers.	   This	   is	   followed	   by	   an	   ability	   to	   manage	   the	   procurement	   of	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information	   –	   referred	   to	   as	   internal	   brokerage,	   which	   is	   important	   as	   often	  responses	   to	   such	   requests	   will	   require	   input	   from	   different	   parts	   of	   the	  organisation,	   or	   from	   different	   sections	   of	   the	   membership	   in	   the	   case	   of	  associations.	  Last	   is	   the	  ability	   to	   communicate	   such	   information	  back	   into	   the	  outside	  world	  –	  a	  capacity	  for	  external	  representation.	  	  	  These	  various	  resources	  shape	  private	  actors’	   interaction	  with	  their	  milieu;	  but	  obviously	   equally	   important	   are	   resources	  dedicated	   to	  generating	   information	  that	   policy-­‐makers	   require	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   What	   matters	   is	   the	   ability	   to	  answer	   different	   types	   of	   question	   –	   or	   rather,	   to	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   different	  types	   of	   information,	   as	   this	   affords	   the	   actors	   access	   to	   the	   many	   different	  venues.	   In	   this	   vein,	   private	   actors	   need	   to	   have	   developed	   internal	   capacity	  capable	   of	   generating	   both	   high-­‐level	   and	   technical	   information,	   and	   this	   is	  achieved	  by	  investing	  staff	  and	  resources	  in	  research	  or	  policy	  analysis.	  	  Finally,	   the	   costs	   involved	   in	  meeting	   the	   informational	   demands	   of	   the	   venue	  with	   suitable	   input,	   and	   doing	   so	   in	   a	   timely	   manner,	   have	   an	   effect	   on	   how	  lobbying	  is	  organised.	  Unitary	  actors	  unable	  to	  muster	  the	  financial	  wherewithal	  to	   sustain	   these	   informational	   resources	   are	   faced	   with	   three	   choices	   of	  substitution.	   They	   can	   hire	   in	   external	   consultants	   or	   lobbyists,	   to	   both	   keep	  them	  informed	  of	  policy	  developments	  and	  to	  represent	  them	  at	  the	  appropriate	  fora.	  Next,	  they	  can	  enter	  into	  informal	  alliances	  with	  peers,	  hoping	  to	  share	  the	  burden	  while	  retaining	  some	  degree	  of	   individual	   input.	  Alternatively,	   they	  can	  delegate	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   to	   a	   trade	   association,	   and	   so	   sacrifice	   their	  autonomy	  and	  input.	  	  2.3:	  Developing	  the	  research	  question	  As	  we	   have	   seen,	   the	   literature	   has	   provided	   vital	   insights	   into	   the	   activity	   of	  lobbying	   in	   the	   EU.	   However,	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   literature	   also	   contains	   two	  important	   areas	   in	   which	   contributions	   can	   be	  made.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   outline	  these:	   the	   first	   opens	   the	  way	   for	   the	   thesis’	   theoretical	   contribution;	   and	   the	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second	  provides	   the	  empirical	  opportunity.	  With	   these	   in	  place,	   I	   then	  develop	  the	  research	  question	  and	  explain	  the	  organising	  theory	  deployed	  to	  answer	  it.	  	  
2.3.1:	  National	  origins	  The	  first	  observation	  is	  that	  the	  literature	  has	  under-­‐estimated	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  national	  origins	  of	  actors	  as	  factors	  shaping	  their	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  This	  is	  primarily	  because,	  as	  was	  noted	  earlier,	  this	  literature	  has	  pursued	  generalizable	  knowledge	   about	   private	   actors’	   lobbying	   across	   the	   board,	   and	   in	   this	  endeavour	  what	  mattered	  was	  understanding	  how	  behaviours	  were	  shaped	  by	  institutional	  resources	  and	  characteristics,	  not	  national	  origins.	  However,	   there	  is	   also	   an	   empirical	   reason	   for	   this	   pattern.	   For	   most	   of	   the	   period	   since	   the	  Maastricht	   treaty,	   the	   EU’s	   single	   market	   agenda	   has	   aimed	   at	   liberalising	  product,	   and	   latterly	   service	  markets.	   At	   this	   stage,	   the	   integration	   essentially	  operated	  at	  a	  level	  which	  did	  not	  go	  far	  into	  the	  fundamental	  political	  economies	  of	   the	   member	   states.	   Thought	   of	   differently,	   the	   liberalisation	   was	   bringing	  together	  peripheral	  sectors	  of	  national	  economies,	  while	  leaving	  the	  ‘deep	  cores’	  untouched.12	  At	   the	   deep	   core	   sits	   the	   financial	   system;	   and	   the	   connections	  between	  it	  and	  the	  overall	  economy	  are	  defined	  by	  legal	  frameworks	  and	  bodies	  of	   rules	   developed	   in	   the	   national	   context.	   As	   long	   as	   integration	   stayed	   away	  from	   such	   fundamental	   arrangements,	   any	   associated	   lobbying	  was	   performed	  by	   firms	   (and	   any	   representative	   associations)	   essentially	   operating	   as	  
transnational	  capitalist	  actors;	  as	  a	  result	  lobbying	  behaviours	  remained	  shaped	  by	  ‘institutional’	  rather	  than	  ‘national’	  factors.	  This	  encouraged,	  indeed	  required,	  scholars	  to	  focus	  on	  institutional	  characteristics.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  A	   comparison	   between	   this	   and	   an	   imaginary	   product	   market	   serves	   to	   clarify	   the	   matter.	  Consider	  a	  range	  of	  widget-­‐making	  firms	  of	  varying	  sizes	  spread	  across	  the	  EU.	  The	  Commission	  wishes	   to	   integrate	   these	   separate	   national	   markets,	   and	   so	   sets	   about	   harmonising	   product	  standards.	  We	  can	  expect	  the	  lobbying	  by	  these	  firms	  (driven	  by	  the	  adjustment	  costs	  they	  face)	  to	  vary	  according	  to	  institutional	  factors,	  chiefly	  the	  resources	  they	  can	  call	  upon;	  we	  would	  not	  expect	   the	  behaviours	   to	  vary	   robustly	  according	   to	  national	  origins.	  However,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  a	  similar	  attempt	   to	   standardise	   the	   level	  of	   equity	   capital	   that	  banks	  are	   required	   to	  hold,	   their	  domicile	  is	  expected	  to	  feature	  much	  more	  prominently	  in	  explaining	  their	  lobbying	  responses	  –	  because	   of	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   finance	   capital	   is	   provided	   to	   the	   real	   economy	   among	  countries,	  and	  thus	  in	  the	  roles	  and	  structural	  positions	  of	  banks	  in	  those	  countries.	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Recently,	   however,	   the	   legislative	   agenda	   has	   turned	   to	   the	   financial	   markets,	  and	  so	  has	  begun	  to	  move	  closer	  to	  the	  deep	  cores.	  The	  Commission	  transposed	  the	  new	  Basel	  III	  accords	  into	  European	  law	  with	  a	  legislative	  package	  tabled	  in	  June	   2011.	   It	   comprised	   two	   elements:	   a	   directive	   (‘The	   Fourth	   Capital	  Requirements	  Directive’	  –	  CRDIV)	  and	  a	   regulation	   (‘The	  Capital	  Requirements	  Regulation’	  –	  CRR).	  Between	  them,	  these	  laid	  out	  rules	  raising	  capital	   levels	  for	  banks	   and	   credit	   institutions,	   specified	   new	   regulatory	   ratios	   for	   the	  management	   of	   liquidity	   and	   leverage,	   imposed	   restrictions	   on	   pay	   and	  harmonised	   supervisory	  arrangements	   (European	  Commission,	  2013a;	  2013b).	  As	  well	  as	  addressing	  the	  perceived	  causes	  of	  the	  crisis,	  the	  package	  was	  at	  least	  partly	   inspired	   by	   the	   EU’s	   long-­‐run	   ambition	   to	   integrate	   banking	   markets,	  which	   had	   been	   part	   of	   the	   intellectual	   framework	   behind	   the	   single	   currency	  but	  which	  had	  stalled	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  century	  (Grahl	  &	  Teague,	  2005;	  Grossman	  &	  Leblond,	  2011).	  	  The	   move	   was	   of	   profound	   significance	   for	   the	   shape	   and	   speed	   of	   European	  integration.	   Under	   this	   new	   package,	   the	   many	   different	   national	   frameworks	  defining	   the	   operation	   of	   financial	   systems	   were	   now	   to	   be	   combined	   into	   a	  single	  European	  rulebook.	   Importantly,	  much	  of	  the	  substantive	  material	   in	  the	  package	   was	   presented	   in	   the	   regulation,	   meaning	   that	   areas	   of	   national	  discretion	  were	  closed	  down.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  clear	  to	  see	  how	  in	  this	  new	   field	   of	   integration,	   the	   features	   of	   their	   national	   contexts	   shape	   the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  private	  actors.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  coming	  sections,	  national	  financial	  systems	  are	  configured	  in	  different	  ways,	  as	  are	  the	  associated	  regulatory	   regimes.	   The	   drive	   to	   combine	   them	   will,	   I	   argue,	   lead	   private	  
financial	  actors	  (namely	  banks)	  to	  lobby	  in	  ways	  which	  are	  distinctly	  national	  –	  as	  national	  capitalist	  actors	  they	  will	  exhibit	  behaviours	  in	  their	  lobbying	  rooted	  in	  domestic	  structures.	  	  Thus,	   the	   EU’s	   turn	   to	   closer	   integration	   of	   financial	   services	   presents	   an	  opportunity	   to	   bring	   a	   theoretical	   contribution	   to	   the	   lobbying	   literature	   by	  considering	   how	   variations	   in	   national	   origins	   (or	   more	   specifically,	   in	   the	  national	  financial	  systems)	  shape	  lobbying	  behaviours.	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2.3.2:	  European	  regulatory	  governance	  The	   second	   observation	   is	   that	   the	   extant	   literature	   has	   not	   yet	   embraced	   the	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  EU’s	  institutional	  architecture,	  and	  this	  provides	  the	  empirical	   opportunity	   on	   which	   this	   thesis	   rests.	   The	   literature	   has	   examined	  interactions	   between	   private	   actors	   and	   the	   Commission	   or	   the	   Parliament	  (Bouwen,	   2002;	   2004;	   Coen,	   1997;	   Dür	   &	  Mateo,	   2012;	   Eising,	   2007b;	   Klüver,	  2012;	   Rasmussen,	   2011),	   but	   it	   has	   not	   yet	   moved	   on	   to	   a	   coverage	   of	   such	  behaviour	  in	  the	  newly-­‐formed	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  Here,	  scholars	  have	  studied	  how	  the	  new	  bodies	  might	  be	  controlled	  by	  national	  governments	  or	  the	  Commission	  (Egeberg	  &	  Trondal,	  2011),	  or	  studied	  the	  implementation	  of	  their	  outputs	   (Maggetti	  &	  Gilardi,	  2014),	  but	  our	  knowledge	  of	  how	  they	  are	   lobbied	  remains	   undeveloped.	   To	   grasp	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   new	   arena,	   and	   to	  understand	  why	   private	   actors	  would	   lobby	   it,	   we	  must	   step	   back	   and	   briefly	  survey	  its	  development.	  	  We	  begin	   at	   the	  national	   level,	  where	  broad	   shifts	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	   state	   and	   the	   market	   have	   seen	   the	   delegation	   of	   regulatory	   authority	   to	  independent	   agencies.	   The	   overall	   transfer	   has	   been	   the	   subject	   of	   a	   wide	  literature	  on	  regulatory	  governance,	  and	   in	  a	  wider	   it	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  ‘rise	  of	  the	  regulatory	  state’:	  the	  withdrawal	  by	  the	  state	  from	  the	  public	  ownership	  of	  utilities	  or	  network	   industries,	  or	   the	  public	  provision	  of	  welfare,	  and	   their	   replacement	   with	   private	   markets	   and	   an	   associated	   regulatory	  apparatus	  (Braithwaite	  &	  Drahos,	  2000b;	  Majone,	  1994;	  Moran,	  1999;	  2001).	  13	  	  The	  rise	  of	  these	  independent	  agencies	  calls	  to	  mind	  a	  second	  ‘mode’	  of	  lobbying:	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  regulators,	  rather	  than	  legislative	  actors.	  This	  is	  concerned	  with	  calibrating,	   or	   fine-­‐tuning	   the	   regulatory	   model;	   to	   continue	   the	   earlier	  metaphor,	  the	  direction	  of	  travel	  is	  set,	  and	  discussions	  now	  centre	  on	  how	  best	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	   literature	   has	   examined	   the	   logics	   behind	   the	   delegation	   (Thatcher,	   2002a;	   Thatcher	  &	  Stone	  Sweet,	  2002),	  the	  variations	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  resulting	  agency	  (Coen	  &	  Thatcher,	  2005),	  or	   in	   its	   degree	   of	   independence	   (Maggetti,	   2009;	   Thatcher,	   2002b;	   2005).	   It	   has	   also	   taken	   a	  variety	  of	  theoretical	  perspectives:	  for	  principal-­‐agent	  analyses	  see	  Kerwer	  (2005)	  or	  Mattli	  and	  Büthe	  (2005);	  for	  historical	  institutionalist	  works	  see	  Wilks	  and	  Bartle	  (2002);	  or	  for	  a	  step-­‐wise	  comparative	  approach	  see	  Humphreys	  and	  Padgett	  (2006).	  Finally,	  Thatcher	  (2002c)	  combines	  a	  principal-­‐agent	  starting	  point	  with	  a	  consideration	  of	  contextual	  (and	  often	  historical)	  factors.	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to	   reach	   the	   destination.	   Private	   actors	   lobby	   domestic	   regulators,	   supplying	  information	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  shaping	  outcomes,	  and	  an	  interdependence	  –	  similar	  to	   that	   we	   encountered	   in	   the	   European	   context	   –	   has	   emerged	   (Coen,	   2005;	  Coen	  &	  Héritier,	  2005).	  At	  this	  level	  the	  information	  provided	  is	  subtly	  different,	  being	   a	   finer-­‐grained	   version	   of	   the	   technical	   expertise	   identified	   as	   being	  supplied	  to	  legislative	  actors.	  This	  speaks,	  in	  specific	  terms,	  to	  how	  a	  rule	  should	  be	  specified	  in	  order	  to	  function	  as	  intended.	  Furthermore,	  such	  interactions	  are	  marked	  by	  a	  flow	  of	  information	  which	  is	  not	  so	  much	  expertise	  as	  merely	  data:	  information	   about	   business	   activity,	   safety	   standards,	   and	   so	   on	   –	   part	   of	   the	  routine	  business	  of	  compliance.	  Importantly,	  these	  flows	  of	  information,	  and	  the	  interactions	   between	   the	   regulator	   and	   the	   regulated,	   are	   embedded	   in	  nationally-­‐distinct	   patterns	   of	   representation,	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   variations	   in	  financial	  systems	  the	  EU	  is	  now	  seeking	  to	  integrate.	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  supranational	  level,	  meanwhile,	  the	  EU’s	  approach	  to	  governance	  has	   long	   made	   use	   of	   fluid	   arrangements	   bringing	   together	   actors	   of	   various	  kinds	   in	   informal,	   non-­‐hierarchical	   settings	   (Kohler-­‐Koch	   &	   Eising,	   1999).	  Indeed,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   the	   earlier	   thematic	   review,	   these	   policy	   networks	  were	  often	   described	   as	   a	   defining	   feature	   of	   the	   supranational	   polity’s	   multi-­‐level	  governance	  style	  (Marks	  &	  Hooghe,	  2001).	  As	  part	  of	  this	  overall	  strategy,	  and	  in	  response	   to	   perceived	   inconsistencies	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   directives,	   the	  Commission	   convened	   networks	   of	   national	   regulatory	   agencies,	   where	   best	  practices	  and	  ideas	  could	  be	  shared	  (Coen	  &	  Thatcher,	  2008;	  Eberlein	  &	  Grande,	  2005;	   Eberlein	   &	   Newman,	   2008;	   Majone,	   1997a).	   Following	   a	   process	  combining	   formal	   delegation	   and	   institutional	   layering	   (Thatcher,	   2011;	  Thatcher	  &	  Coen,	  2008)	  these	  networks	  grew	  into	  more	  formal	  bodies,	  so	  that	  by	  the	   early	  21st	   century	   relatively	   stable	   committees	  had	  been	   formed	   in	   several	  policy	   domains.	   At	   this	   point,	   however,	   private	   actors’	   engagement	  with	   them	  remained	   limited:	   they	   lacked	   the	   authority	   and	   capacity	   to	   be	   attractive	   as	  lobbying	  targets	  (Coen	  &	  Thatcher,	  2008).	  	  	  More	   recently,	   the	   EU	   has	   crystallised	   these	   committees	   into	   fully-­‐fledged	  institutions	   in	   their	  own	  right.	  This	  constituted	  a	  vital	  step	   in	  creating	  a	   ‘single	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European	   regulatory	   space’:	   a	   supranational	   layer	   between	   the	   European	  legislative	  arena	  and	  the	  national	  regulatory	  regimes	  (Levi-­‐Faur,	  2011;	  Thatcher,	  2011).	   The	   institutions	  which	   populate	   it	   are	   ‘agencified	   networks’	   (Levi-­‐Faur,	  2011:	   810),	   which	   have	   independent	   resources,	   a	   coherent	   mandate,	   and	  concrete	   rule-­‐making	   authority.	   Prior	   to	   this	  move,	  market	   creation	  may	   have	  been	  enacted	  through	  European	  legislation,	  but	  market	  delivery	  –	  the	  writing	  of	  specific,	   detailed	   rules	   –	   remained	   a	   national	   competence	   handled	   by	   the	  independent	   agencies	   created	   at	   ground	   level	   by	   the	  waves	  of	   delegation.	  This	  meant	   that	   private	   actors’	   engagement	   was	   separated	   across	   two	   locations	   –	  with	   European	   legislative	   actors	   and	  with	   domestic	   regulators.	   Now,	   however,	  market	  creation	  and	  delivery	  have	  both	  shifted	  upwards,	  creating	  a	  distinct	  pull	  for	  private	  actors	  to	  combine	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  onto	  the	  European	  level.	  	  The	  European	  Banking	  Authority	   (EBA)	   typifies	   this	  novel	   institutional	   form.	   It	  was	   created	   in	   2011	   by	   upgrading	   the	   Committee	   of	   European	   Banking	  Supervisors,	   and	   is	   now	   a	   standalone	   body	   with	   its	   own	   budget,	   and	   with	  responsibility	   for	   writing	   the	   detailed	   rules	   which	   support	   the	   CRDIV/CRR	  package	  (Alford,	  2005;	  McPhilemy,	  2014).	  However,	  we	  must	  also	  be	  aware	  of	  its	  complex	   institutional	   form:	   it	   draws	   in	   expertise	   from	   its	   constituent	   national	  authorities	   (it	   is,	   after	   all,	   an	   ‘agencified	   network’),	   and	   requires	   agreement	  among	   them	   when	   approving	   the	   rules.	   This	   gives	   private	   actors	   wishing	   to	  influence	   it	   two	   possible	   routes:	   either	   target	   it	   directly,	   or	   take	   an	   indirect	  approach	  and	  use	  their	  national	  regulatory	  to	  act	  on	  their	  behalf	  (see	  Figure	  2.1).	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Figure	  2.1:	  Two	  paths	  to	  access	  
	  	  Overall,	   we	   have	   a	   picture	   of	   a	   distinct	   European	   regulatory	   arena,	  which	   has	  arisen	   between	   the	   supranational	   legislative	   institutions	   and	   the	   national	  contexts.	   In	   this	   layer	   sit	   distinct	   regulatory	   bodies,	   which	   now	   constitute	  important	  lobbying	  targets	  for	  private	  actors.	  Two	  aspects	  of	  this	  layer	  are	  novel	  from	   a	   theoretical	   perspective.	   First,	   the	   institutional	   form	   of	   the	   regulatory	  bodies	  marks	   them	   out	   as	   distinct	   from	   both	   the	   national	   authorities	   and	   the	  legislative	  institutions,	   which	   leads	   us	   to	   question	   how	   well	   our	   existing	  understanding	  of	  lobbying	  behaviour	  may	  apply	  to	  the	  way	  they	  are	  targeted	  by	  private	  actors.	  Second,	  their	  rule-­‐making	  function	  represents	  a	  move	  by	  the	  EU	  into	   the	   (previously	   national)	   business	   of	   market	   delivery,	   and	   so	   we	   can	  examine	  how	  the	  dynamics	  of	  regulatory	  (rather	  than	  legislative)	  policy-­‐making	  effects	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  	  
2.3.3:	  Developing	  the	  research	  question	  The	  thesis’	  central	  question	  emerges	  from	  these	  two	  parallel	  shifts	  in	  European	  regulatory	   governance:	   the	  moves,	   in	   recent	   legislation,	   to	   integrate	   the	   ‘deep	  cores’	  of	  national	  economic	  structures,	  and	  the	  centralisation	  of	  market	  delivery	  in	   institutions	   at	   the	   supranational	   level.	   Bringing	   these	   together,	   the	   research	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question	   is	   thus:	  What	  shapes	  the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  banks	   in	  the	  European	  
regulatory	  arena?	  	  In	  addressing	  this	  question,	  the	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  integrate	  these	  two	  opportunities	  and	  to	  make	  a	  distinct	  contribution	  to	  the	  European	  interest	  group	  literature:	  it	  provides	   a	   focus	   on	   how	   the	   national	   origins	   of	   actors	   shape	   their	   lobbying	  behaviours	   in	   the	   emergent	  European	   regulatory	   arena.	   It	   trains	   the	   analytical	  lens	   on	   banks,	   and	   examines	   how	   variations	   in	   their	   national	   contexts	   –	   in	  financial	  system	  and	  in	  regulatory	  environment	  –	  shape	  they	  way	  they	  navigate	  this	  complex	  institutional	  landscape	  and	  lobby	  the	  EBA.	  	  
2.3.4:	  The	  organising	  theory	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  I	  make	  use	  of	  the	  ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  approach	  (P.A.	  Hall	  &	  Soskice,	  2001)	  as	  an	  organising	  theory.	  This	  informs	  us	  that	  institutional	  structures	   vary	   robustly	   between	   national	   contexts,	   and	   so	   provides	   an	  important	   theoretical	   link	  between	  the	  gaps	   identified	   in	   the	   literature	  and	  the	  explanatory	   framework	   the	   thesis	   uses.	   I	   use	   the	   approach	   to	   generate	   two	  manifestations	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   national	   contexts.	   Firstly,	   alongside	  the	   broader	   dichotomy	   proposed	   by	   the	   literature	   –	   between	   liberal	   and	   co-­‐ordinated	  market	   economies	   –	   financial	   systems	   vary.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   countries	  exhibit	  robust	  differences	  in	  the	  ways	  their	  financial	  systems	  are	  structured,	  and	  how	   they	   are	   connected	   to	   the	   real	   economy.	   These	   variations	   then	   shape	   the	  structures	   of	   national	   banking	   sectors,	   which	   in	   turn	   drive	   the	   distribution	   of	  lobbying	   resources	   (defined	   earlier)	   among	   banks.	   Secondly,	   national	   contexts	  are	   marked	   by	   differing	   regulatory	   regimes,	   which	   in	   turn	   rest	   on	   different	  
regulatory	  paradigms.	   These	   fundamental	   ideational	   frameworks	   condition	   the	  preferences	   of	   private	   financial	   actors,	   and	   those	   of	   their	   regulators,	   over	  European	   financial	   regulation.	   Both	   the	   resources	   and	   the	   preferences	   shape	  their	  lobbying,	  and	  so	  we	  can	  link	  behaviours	  in	  the	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  back	  to	  national	  origins.	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2.4:	  The	  origins	  of	  variety	  In	   this	   section	   I	   develop	   the	   use	   of	   the	   organising	   theory	   in	   more	   detail,	  establishing	  the	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  model	  which	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  the	   factors	  shaping	  banks’	   lobbying	  behaviours.	   I	  outline	   two	  manifestations	  of	  national	  variety	  –	  in	  financial	  systems	  and	  in	  regulatory	  paradigms.	  	  
2.4.1:	  Varieties	  of	  financial	  system	  The	  first	  pathway	  builds	  on	  the	  theme,	  discussed	  in	  the	  earlier	  literature	  review,	  that	   resources	   are	   key	   drivers	   of	   lobbying	   behaviour.	   The	   holdings	   of	   such	  resources	  among	  private	  actors	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  variations	  in	  the	  national	   banking	   sectors;	   to	   construct	   this,	   I	   start	   with	   the	   theoretical	  explanation	  of	  why,	  and	  how,	  these	  differ.	  	  The	  notion	  that	  national	  economies	  display	  robust	  variations	   in	   their	   form	  and	  output	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Ricardo	  (1817).	  He	  suggested	  that	  countries	  enjoyed	  comparative	  advantages	  in	  the	  production	  of	  certain	  goods,	  and	  should	  concentrate	  their	  efforts	  accordingly.	  By	  producing	  either	  wine	  or	  cloth	  (to	  use	  his	   original	   example)	   and	   trading	  with	   each	   other,	   two	   countries	   could	   deploy	  their	  individual	  resources	  more	  efficiently,	  and	  so	  raise	  overall	  wellbeing.	  Some	  200	   years	   later,	   Hall	   and	   Soskice	   (2001)	   took	   this	   further	   by	   laying	   out	   a	  fundamental	  source	  of	  such	  advantage.	  Rather	  than	  being	  based	  on	  geographical	  or	   climatic	   good	   fortune,	   their	  model	   saw	   relative	   advantage	   arising	   from	   the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  country	  had	  forged	  the	  economy	  and	  its	  supporting	  structures	  into	  a	  set	  of	  complementary	  relationships.	  Thus,	  a	  country	  which	  had	  tailored	  its	  educational	  and	  productive	  institutions	  in	  one	  arrangement	  would	  excel	  at	  heavy	  industry	  or	  engineering,	  while	  another	  might	  establish	  a	  strength	   in	   innovative	  technology.	   The	   approach	   was	   taken	   up	   by	   many	   other	   scholars,	   and	   in	  particular	   brought	   a	   new	   analytical	   clarity	   to	   study	   of	   neo-­‐corporatist,	   or	   co-­‐ordinated	  models	  of	  capitalism	  (see	  Streeck	  &	  Yamamura,	  2001).	  	  The	   ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  model	  put	   firms	  at	   the	  centre	  of	   these	   institutional	  complementarities.	   As	   the	   engines	   of	   economic	   output	   and	   growth,	   they	   drew	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other	  essential	  components	  –	  legal	  frameworks,	  education	  systems,	  welfare	  state	  regimes	  –	  to	  their	  will.	  Such	  public	  goods,	  normally	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  shaped	  by	  ‘politics’,	  however	  defined,	  were	  now	  reconceived	  as	  being	  provided	  by	  state	  actors	   to	   satisfy	   the	   needs	   of	   firms.	   They	   were	   embedded	   in	   dense	   relational	  networks,	   interacting	   with	   other	   market	   actors	   in	   ways	   that	   were	   mutually	  beneficial	   and	   self-­‐reinforcing.	   Over	   time	   these	   networks	   stabilised	   into	  equilibria	   in	  which	   co-­‐ordination	  problems	  were	   resolved,	   and	   in	   its	   canonical	  form	   the	   literature	   proposed	   two	   such	   systems.	   In	   liberal	   market	   economies	  
(LMEs),	   compromise	   is	   achieved	   in	   contractual,	   arms-­‐length	   arrangements	  through	   market	   transactions;	   meanwhile	   in	   co-­‐ordinated	   market	   economies	  
(CMEs),	  stable	  patterns	  of	  non-­‐market	  consensus	  emerge,	  with	  economic	  actors	  forming	  closer	  and	  more	  durable	  bonds.	  	  For	   our	   purposes,	   the	   VoC	   approach	   opens	   a	   path	   towards	   understanding	   the	  structure	   of	   national	   banking	   markets.	   The	   important	   step	   is	   to	   observe	   that	  patterns	  of	  robust	  variation,	  similar	  to	  those	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  overall	  economy,	  can	   be	   identified	   in	   the	   configurations	   of	   financial	   systems.	   These	   systems	  transform	  savings	   into	   investments	  and	  allocate	   funds	  among	  competing	  users,	  and	  achieve	  this	  task	  in	  one	  of	  two	  ways:	  through	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  capital	  or	  the	  loan	  markets.	  	  In	  the	  former,	  firms	  sell	  stakes	  in	  their	  future	  profits	  to	  investors	  in	  the	  form	  of	  equity	  securities	  –	  occasionally	  directly	  but	  usually	   through	  an	  agent	  or	  broker	  (note:	  this	  need	  not	  be	  a	  bank).	  At	  this	  point	  a	  share	  in	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  firm	  is	   transferred	   from	   the	   original	   owner	   to	   external	   investors.	   Alternatively	   the	  firm	  sells	  a	  portion	  of	  debt	   to	   investors	   in	  return	   for	  a	   fixed	  annual	  return	  and	  the	   promise	   of	   the	   repayment	   of	   the	   capital	   sum	   on	   maturity.	   In	   either	   case	  savings	   are	   transferred	   into	   investments	   in	   firms,	   who	   in	   turn	   use	   them	   to	  finance	  business	  activity;	  the	  secondary	  market	  then	  allows	  investors	  to	  sell	  off	  their	   holdings	   to	   either	   crystallise	   gains	   or	   adjust	   portfolios	   to	   suit	   risk	  preferences.	  The	  price	  of	  securities	  in	  these	  primary	  and	  secondary	  markets	  acts	  as	   an	   information	   carrier,	   signalling	   the	   aggregated	   sentiment	   on	   a	   firm’s	  prospects.	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The	  second	  approach	  sees	  savers	  placing	  their	  funds	  at	  an	  institution	  (note:	  this	  
is	  a	  bank),	  which	  then	  makes	  carefully	  considered	  loans	  on	  their	  behalf.	  Such	  an	  institution	  acts	  as	  a	  long-­‐term	  intermediary	  in	  the	  way	  a	  mere	  broker	  does	  not:	  it	  collects	  the	  return	  on	  these	  investments,	  passes	  a	  portion	  back	  to	  the	  depositors	  as	   interest,	   and	   keeps	   a	   margin	   for	   itself.	   It	   also	   serves	   as	   a	   processor	   of	  information,	  screening	  investment	  choices	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  saver,	  and	  monitoring	  the	   firm’s	   performance.	   In	   a	   loan	   transaction,	   the	   intermediary	   –	   the	   bank	   –	  creates	  an	  entirely	  new	  asset	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  loan	  extended	  to	  the	  firm	  in	  its	  name	  but	  on	  behalf	  of	  its	  depositors;	  strictly	  speaking	  no	  ownership	  has	  changed	  hands.	  	  All	   national	   financial	   systems	   contain	   these	   two	  modes	   of	   financing	   economic	  activity.	   What	   matters	   for	   our	   purposes	   is	   that	   they	   contain	   these	   modes	   in	  
different	  proportions:	  that	  banks	  operate	  largely	  as	  brokers	  or	  as	  intermediaries	  in	   different	   national	   contexts.	   Following	   the	   early	   lead	   of	   Zysman	   (1983),	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  and	  Levine	  (1999)	  and	  Allen	  and	  Gale	  (2000)	  I	  identify	  two	  such	  arrangements.	   The	   first	   is	   dominated	   by	   (capital)	   market-­‐based	   finance.	   The	  major	   source	   of	   long-­‐term	   capital	   is	   the	   issuance	   of	   debt	   or	   equity	   securities;	  banks	  provide	  an	  initial	  underwriting	  service	  to	  facilitate	  such	  transactions,	  and	  play	  a	  role	  as	  short-­‐term	  lenders.	  Competitive	  capital	  markets	  connect	  investors	  with	  borrowers	  and	  ensure	  an	  efficient	  allocation	  of	   funds	  among	   firms.	  Banks	  themselves	  do	  not	  act	  as	   ‘owners’	  as	  they	  do	  not	  take	  and	  hold	  equity	  stakes	  in	  firms	  on	  their	  own	  account.14	  	  The	  model	  is	  marked	  by	  a	  clear	  separation	  among	  the	   actors	   –	   as	   Zysman	   put	   it:	   ‘[it]	   places	   banks,	   firms	   and	   governments	   in	  distinct	   spheres	   from	   which	   they	   venture	   forth	   to	   meet	   as	   autonomous	  bargaining	  partners’	  (1983:	  70)	  The	  second	  model	  relies	  heavily	  on	  bank-­‐based	  finance.	   Both	   short-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	   finance	   is	   provided	   by	   banks,	   acting	   as	  intermediaries	  in	  pooling	  savers’	  deposits	  and	  making	  loan	  investments	  on	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This	  is	  often	  restricted	  by	  law:	  in	  the	  US	  the	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  Act	  forbade	  such	  principal	  position-­‐taking	  until	  its	  repeal	  in	  1999.	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behalf.	   By	   implication	   this	   model	   is	   marked	   by	   a	   far	   stronger,	   more	   durable	  connection	  between	  banks	  and	  firms.15	  	  Importantly,	  the	  two	  systems	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  resulting	  structure	  of	  the	  banking	  markets.	  In	  a	  market-­‐based	  system,	  the	  economies	  of	  scale	  provided	  by	  having	   large	   balance	   sheets	   (and	   so	   able	   to	   manage	   more,	   and	   larger,	   capital	  market	   transactions)	   place	   a	   consolidating	   pressure	   on	   banks.	   This	   causes	   the	  banking	  sector	  to	  reduce	  down	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	   large	  firms.	  Conversely,	   in	  bank-­‐based	   system	   an	   opposite	   pressure	   exists.	   Long-­‐term	   lending	   and	   stable	  finance	   is	   based	   on	   close	   relationships	   with	   firms,	   so	   banks	   remain	   at	   a	   size	  appropriate	   to	   that	   of	   their	   institutional	   clients.	   This	   results	   in	   a	   more	  fragmented	   sector,	   populated	   by	  many	  more	   individual	   banks.	   These	   patterns	  have	  obvious	  consequences	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	   lobbying	  resources	  (outlined	  above)	  among	  the	  banks.	  	  
2.4.2:	  Varieties	  of	  regulatory	  paradigm	  The	   second	   manifestation	   of	   national	   variety	   concerns	   the	   ideational	  frameworks	  underpinning	  regulatory	  regimes.	  This	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  correct	  for	  an	   oft-­‐cited	   criticism	   of	   the	   VoC	   approach:	   that	   it	   has	   an	   excessive	   focus	   on	  private	   actors	   and	   the	   neglect	   of	   the	   state	   (see	   Howell,	   2003).	   This	   pathway	  posits	   that	   lobbying	   behaviours	   are	   driven	   by	   preferences	   over	   European	  financial	   regulation,	   and	   we	   are	   thus	   minded	   to	   examine	   the	   origins	   of	   these	  preferences.	  We	  must	  begin	  by	  taking	  a	  few	  steps	  back	  and	  examining	  briefly	  the	  study	  of	  ideas	  in	  politics.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  These	   two	  models	   also	   describe	   other	   regularities.	   For	   instance,	   in	   a	  market-­‐based	   system,	  investors	  apply	  pressure	  on	  a	   firm’s	  behaviour	   through	   the	   threat	  of	  exit:	   their	  ability	   to	   trade	  out	  of	   its	  securities	  and	  push	   their	  price	  down	  exerts	  an	   influence	  on	   it	   to	  consider	  short-­‐term	  profitability.	  In	  a	  bank-­‐based	  system,	  the	  equivalent	  pressure	  is	  brought	  to	  bear	  by	  banks’	  use	  of	  voice,	   as	   they	  work	   closely	  with	   firms	   to	   help	   guide	   longer-­‐term	   profitability.	   This	   distinction	  thus	   characterises	   different	   approaches	   to	   corporate	   governance,	   as	   well	   as	   illustrating	   the	  varying	  pressures	  firms	  face	  in	  servicing	  their	  capital:	  short-­‐term	  profit	  in	  a	  market	  system,	  and	  long-­‐term,	  patient	  returns	  in	  a	  bank	  system.	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During	   the	   late	   twentieth	   century,	   scholars	   shifted	   towards	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   ideas	   in	   shaping	   political	   phenomena	   (Mehta,	   2011;	   Schmidt,	  2011).	   Changes	   in	   institutional	   configurations,	   policy	   outcomes,	   or	   observed	  behaviours,	  were	  now	  seen	  to	  have	  been	  caused	  by	  shifts	   in	  underlying	  beliefs,	  rather	  than	  an	  expression	  of	  material	  interests.	  For	  example,	  Hall	  pondered	  what	  drove	  the	  choices	  of	  bureaucrats	  if	  –	  as	  state	  theorists	  had	  it	  –	  they	  were	  largely	  insulated	  from	  pressures	  brought	  to	  bear	  by	  political	  parties	  or	  private	  interests	  (P.A.	  Hall,	  1993).	  He	  developed	   the	   ‘policy	  paradigm’16,	  which	  contained	  a	  core	  set	  of	  ontological	  beliefs	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  at	  hand;	  integrated	  into	  a	   broader	   model	   of	   policy-­‐making,	   this	   then	   framed	   the	   selection	   of	   goals,	  techniques	  and	   instruments	  appropriate	   to	   the	  given	  situation.	  The	  contents	  of	  the	  paradigm	  spread	  among	  policy-­‐makers	  through	  a	  process	  of	  social	  learning,	  and	   then,	   as	   they	  were	  challenged	   in	  a	   revolutionary	  moment,	  profound	  policy	  change	  occurred	  (what	  Hall	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘third	  order	  change’).	  17	  	  A	  similar	  reference	   to	   ideational	  backdrops	  can	  be	   found	  as	  we	  move	   from	  the	  general	  literature	  on	  public	  policy	  to	  the	  more	  specific	  study	  of	  regulation.	  Such	  work	  often	  deploys	  the	   ‘regulatory	  regime’	  as	  an	  analytical	   tool	   to	  describe	  the	  mechanisms	  through	  which	  regulation	  is	  practiced:	  the	  form	  and	  independence	  of	   the	   regulator,	   the	   tools	   available	   to	   the	   regulator,	   and	   so	   on.	   Sitting	   behind	  these	  institutional	  regimes,	  however	  implicitly,	  are	  ideational	  structures	  defining	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  This	  drew	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Thomas	  Kuhn,	  who	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘paradigm’	  in	  explaining	  how	   science	   was	   capable	   of	   steady,	   incremental	   progress	   and	   bursts	   of	   intense	   change.	   The	  paradigm	   was	   a	   framework	   of	   fundamental	   beliefs	   about	   the	   world,	   within	   which	   ‘normal	  science’	   could	   proceed.	   This	   framework	   would	   identify	   ‘model	   problems	   and	   solutions	   to	   a	  community	  of	  practitioners’	  (1962:	  viii),	  delineating	  what	  sort	  of	  questions	  could	  be	  asked,	  how	  they	  were	  to	  be	  structured,	  and	  the	  tools	  and	  methods	  by	  which	  they	  could	  be	  answered.	  As	  new	  data	  came	  to	  light	  challenging	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  paradigm	  –	  the	  moment	  of	  ‘scientific	  revolution’	  –	  an	  alternative	  framework	  would	  emerge,	  and	  progress	  would	  begin	  anew	  (1962:	  52-­‐3).	  A	  central	  element	  of	  this	  schema	  was	  the	  subtlety	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  ideas	  (or	  beliefs)	  and	  data	  (or	   facts).	   	   Kuhn	   argued	   that	   the	   latter	  were	   constructed,	   interpreted	   and	   used	   in	   the	   context	  defined	  by	  the	  former,	  in	  a	  process	  which	  operated	  on	  a	  fragile	  epistemological	  bridge	  between	  ‘objective	  truth’	  and	  ‘socially-­‐constructed	  knowledge.’	  17	  The	  notion	  of	  sets	  of	   ideas	  has	  appeared	  in	  other	  approaches	  to	  studying	  public	  policy.	  Thus,	  Haas	   incorporated	   it	   into	   his	  model	   of	   the	   ‘epistemic	   community’:	   a	   network	   of	   professionals	  with	   ‘a	   shared	   set	   of	   normative	   and	   principled	   beliefs’	   (1992:	   3).	   Likewise,	   the	   paradigm	  appeared	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   advocacy	   coalition	   framework,	  proposed	  by	  Sabatier	   and	   Jenkins-­‐Smith	   (Sabatier	   &	   Jenkins-­‐Smith,	   1993).	   Here,	   actors	   were	   organised	   into	   coalitions	   framed	  around	   a	   shared	   ‘set	   of	   normative	   or	   causal	   beliefs’	   (Sabatier,	   1998:	   103)	   These	   beliefs	   are	  arranged	  into	  a	  set	  of	  concentric	  rings,	  with	  actors	  willing	  to	  sacrifice	  ‘softer’	  preferences	  at	  the	  periphery	  in	  exchange	  for	  seeing	  the	  overall	  aim	  actualised	  in	  a	  policy	  outcome.	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such	   fundamentals	   as	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   risk	   involved,	   the	   harm	   potentially	  caused	   by	  not	   regulating	   it,	   and	   the	   appropriate	   degree	   of	   intervention.	   These	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  more	  narrowly	  focussed	  variants	  of	  Hall’s	  ‘policy	  paradigm.’	  For	  example,	  Hood	  et	  al.	  propose	  a	  two-­‐layered	  structure	  which	  includes	  ‘control	  components’	   –	   standard-­‐setting,	   monitoring,	   and	   behaviour	   modification	   –	  embedded	  in	  a	  ‘regime	  context.’	  The	  latter	  refers	  to	  ‘…	  the	  backdrop	  or	  setting	  in	  which	  regulation	  takes	  place	  …	  such	  as	  the	  public	  preferences	  and	  attitudes	  over	  risk’	  (2001:	  21).	  Meanwhile,	  Vogel’s	  model	  uses	  ‘regime	  orientation’	  and	  ‘regime	  organisation’	   to	   connect	   ideas	   to	   institutions,	   with	   the	   former	   defining	   the	  ‘proper	   scope,	   goals,	   and	  method	   of	   government	   intervention	   in	   the	   economy’	  (1996:	   21).	   It	   contains	   the	   ontological	   beliefs	   about	   the	   risk	   involved,	   and,	  accordingly,	   the	   set	   of	   tools	   available	   to	   manage	   that	   risk.	   From	   such	  fundamental	   regulatory	   paradigms	   spring	   the	   various	   institutional	  manifestations.	  	  	  Several	   scholars	   have	   applied	   this	   theoretical	   lens	   to	   specific	   policy	   domains.	  Coen	   (2005)	   examined	   the	   differences	   in	   the	   institutional	   regimes	   governing	  utilities	   markets	   in	   Britain	   and	   Germany,	   identifying	   flexible	   and	   legalistic	  approaches	  respectively.	  Thatcher	  (2007)	  took	  a	  similar	  approach	  and	  sketched	  out	   three	   broad	   regulatory	   arrangements	   across	   Europe:	   the	   industry-­‐led,	   the	  state-­‐led,	   and	   the	   regulated	   competitive	   market	   models.	   Meanwhile,	   engaging	  perhaps	  more	   directly	  with	   underlying	   belief	   systems,	   Vogel	   (2012)	   examined	  the	   role	   of	   the	   ‘precautionary	   principle’	   (“if	   in	   doubt,	   regulate”)	   in	   shaping	  regulatory	   responses	   to	   various	   social	   and	   economic	   risks	   either	   side	   of	   the	  Atlantic.	  	  Drawing	   on	   these	   previous	   endeavours,	  we	   can	   outline	   the	   components	   of	   the	  regulatory	  paradigm	  for	  bank	  regulation.	  The	  framework	  contains	  four	  elements,	  and	  at	  each	  of	  these	  we	  can	  imagine	  two	  competing	  perspectives	  (see	  Table	  2.1).	  At	  the	  core	  is	  an	  ontological	  belief	  about	  the	  status	  of	  markets:	  whether	  they	  are	  natural	   phenomena	  which	   somehow	   pre-­‐date	   the	   rise	   of	   the	  modern	   state,	   or	  even	  human	  society,	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  socially	  constructed	  and	  exist	  under	  the	  aegis	   of	   a	   body	   of	   norms	   and	   rules.	   Relatedly,	   there	   then	   sits	   a	   second	   belief	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about	   the	   status	   of	   the	   liberty	   of	   market	   actors:	   whether	   it,	   too,	   is	   natural,	   or	  whether	   it	   is	   somehow	   granted	   by	   the	   state.	   Third,	   there	   is	   a	   belief	   about	   the	  
status	  of	  competition:	  whether	  it	  is	  a	  prime	  desideratum	  through	  which	  markets	  achieve	   allocative	   efficiency,	   or	  whether	   it	   should	   be	   constrained.	   These	   three	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  fourth,	  derived	  belief	  about	  the	  status	  of	  public	  regulation:	  whether	  it	   should	   be	   minimal,	   and	   concerned	   with	   protecting	   freedom	   of	   action	   and	  fairness	   of	   competition,	   or	   whether	   it	   should	   be	   more	   energetic,	   aimed	   at	  constraining	   competition	   and	   steering	   markets	   towards	   a	   (socially-­‐,	   or	  politically-­‐determined)	  end.	  	  
Table	  2.1:	  The	  layers	  of	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm	  
Component	   Competing	  perspectives	  The	  status	  of	  markets	   Natural	  phenomena	  which	  exist	  beyond	  the	  state	   Socially-­‐constructed	  phenomena	  The	  status	  of	  the	  liberty	  of	  market	  actors	   Natural	  and	  essential	   Liberty	  is	  granted	  by	  the	  state	  	  The	  status	  of	  competition	   Necessary	  to	  achieve	  allocative	  efficiency;	  an	  automatic	  consequence	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  market	  actors	  
Needs	  to	  be	  constrained	  to	  keep	  the	  negative	  consequence	  at	  bay	  
The	  status	  of	  public	  regulation	   Concerned	  purely	  with	  guaranteeing	  freedom,	  and	  open	  competition	   Directing,	  or	  steering	  	  These	   regulatory	  paradigms	  are	   the	   ideational	   foundations	  of	   the	   regimes,	   and	  they	  find	  expression	  in	  the	  physical	  institutional	  apparatus;	  but	  we	  can	  also	  use	  them	  to	  account	  for	  actions	  and	  behaviours	  –	  in	  our	  case,	  of	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  Doing	   so	   unpacks	   the	   fluid	   relationships	   between	   actors,	   motivations	   and	  institutions.	   Ideas,	   as	   paradigms,	   provide	   interpretive	   frameworks	   through	  which	   actors	   view	   the	  world	   and	   form	   their	  priorities.	   In	   turn,	   they	   act	   on	   the	  basis	  of	   these	  perspectives.	   Ideas	  also	  underpin,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  regulatory	  regimes,	  the	  formal	  institutional	  landscapes	  in	  which	  actors	  operate.	  Thus,	  as	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  put	  it:	  
‘…	  ideas	  give	  rise	  to	  people’s	  actions	  …	  As	  people	  interact	  with	  institutions,	  
the	   founding	   ideas	   are	   reproduced.	   Through	   repeated	   interactions	   with	  
institutions,	   people	   are	   confronted	   again	   and	   again	   with	   the	   founding	  
ideas.’	   (2011:	  9)	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In	  this	  way,	  the	  underlying	  paradigm	  shared	  by	  actors	  and	  formal	  institutions	  is	  reinforced	   through	   their	   repeated	   interactions.	   However,	   the	   link	   between	   the	  beliefs	  of	  an	  individual	  actor	  and	  her	  actions	  are	  more	  fluid,	  almost	  by	  definition,	  than	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   formal	   institution	   (such	   as	   an	   independent	   regulatory	  authority).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   we	   can	   say	   that	   either	   are	  ‘beholden’	  to	  the	  paradigm	  varies,	  and	  the	  behaviours	  of	  individual	  actors	  arise	  from	  many	  sources.	  
	  The	   preceding	   paragraphs	   have	   shown	  how	   the	   paradigm	  has	   been	   applied	   to	  the	  study	  of	  political	  phenomena.	  Like	  Hall,	  and	  many	  others,	   I	  use	  the	  term	  to	  describe	   the	   set	   of	   basic	   beliefs	   about	   financial	   markets,	   and	   about	   their	  regulation.	   	   However,	   where	   much	   of	   the	   scholarship	   has	   used	   concept	   to	  account	  for	  institutional	  (or	  policy)	  change,	  I	  use	  it	  to	  develop	  an	  understanding	  of	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  The	  fundamental	  beliefs	  encased	  in	  the	  paradigm	  shape	  the	   preferences	   of	   regulatory	   actors	   over	   European	   regulation,	   and	   these	  paradigms	   also	   vary	   robustly	   with	   national	   contexts.	   Individual	   banks	   are	  embedded	  in	  the	  regulatory	  regimes	  which	  are	  borne	  of	  these	  paradigms,	  and,	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  share	  the	  preferences	  of	  regulatory	  actors.	  It	  is	  the	  alignment	  –	  or	   otherwise	   –	   of	   these	   two	   sets	   of	   preferences	  which	   then	  drive	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  banks.	  	  
2.4.3:	  Summary	  The	   earlier	   discussion	   of	   the	   European	   interest	   group	   literature	   showed	   an	  opportunity	  to	  focus	  on	  national	  origins	  as	  drivers	  of	  lobbying	  behaviour.	  These	  two	   sections	   have	   explained	   the	   theoretical	   foundations	   behind	   two	  manifestations	  of	  variety	   in	   these	  origins.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	   financial	   systems	  vary	   between	   national	   contexts,	   just	   as	   the	   wider	   economy	   can	   be	   cast	   into	  distinctive	  institutional	  arrangements.	  We	  have	  also	  considered	  the	  components	  of	   the	   paradigmatic	   frameworks	   that	   sit	   behind	   regulatory	   regimes,	   and	   seen	  how	  those	  regimes	  themselves	  differ	  between	  national	  contexts.	  The	  next	  section	  takes	  these	  sources	  of	  variation	  and	  explains	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  they	  are	  thought	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to	  drive	  differences	  in	  lobbying	  behaviour.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  specifying	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  theoretical	  model.	  	  2.5:	  The	  theoretical	  model	  The	   theoretical	  model	   comprises	   three	   elements,	  which	   are	   laid	   out	   the	   in	   the	  following	  section.	  All	  examine	  the	  factors	  behind	  banks’	  lobbying	  behaviours:	  the	  first	   considers	   these	   to	   be	   driven	   by	   resources,	   which	   are	   linked	   back	   to	   the	  underlying	  varieties	  of	   financial	  capitalism;	   the	  second	  considers	  behaviours	   to	  be	   driven	   by	   perceptions	   and	   preferences,	   which	   derive	   from	   fundamental	  regulatory	  paradigms;	   and	   the	   third	  probes	   the	   interaction	  between	   these	   two	  alternative	  explanations.	   	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  I	  connect	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  model	   back	   to	   blocks	   of	   theoretical	   literature	   studied	   earlier:	   on	   European	  interest	   group	   lobbying,	   and	   on	   national	   varieties	   in	   financial	   system	   or	  regulatory	  paradigm.	  	  
2.5.1:	  The	  ‘varieties	  of	  financial	  capitalism’	  approach	  The	   first	   element	   examines	   how	   resources	   shape	   the	   lobbying	   behaviour	   of	  banks.	  Specifically,	  this	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  approach	  used	  (direct	  or	  associational)	  when	   lobbying	   the	   EBA.18	  Recalling	   the	   crystallisation	   of	   institutional	   capacity	  outlined	  in	  the	  review	  of	  the	  European	  regulatory	  governance	  literature	  (Alford,	  2005;	   Levi-­‐Faur,	   2011;	   McPhilemy,	   2014;	   Moloney,	   2003),	   we	   can	   begin	   by	  identifying	   the	   EBA	   as	   the	   new	   locus	   of	   rule-­‐making	   authority	   in	   the	  supranational	  regulatory	  arena.	  Banks	  detect	   the	  significance	  of	   this	  new	  body,	  and	  respond	  accordingly.	  	  Next,	  we	   can	  draw	  on	   the	  European	   interest	   group	   literature,	   and	  predict	   that	  banks’	   lobbying	   behaviour	  will	   be	   shaped	   by	   the	   informational	   resources	   that	  they	  can	  call	  upon	  (Chalmers,	  2011;	  2013;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012).	  These	  take	  two	  forms.	   Interfacing	   resources	   govern	   the	   flow	  of	   information	   into	   and	  out	  of	   the	  organisation.	  Banks	  must	  be	  able	  to	  monitor	  policy-­‐making	  discussions	  at	  many	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	  overall	  dependent	  variable	  is	  specified	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  Three.	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different	  levels:	  in	  the	  European	  legislative	  arena,	  in	  the	  newly-­‐created	  European	  regulatory	  space,	  and	  at	  home.	  This	  entails	  tracking	  items	  from	  proposal	  to	  draft	  to	   specific	   rule,	   and	   being	   aware	   of	   opportunities	   to	   provide	   input.	   It	   also	  includes	  judging	  which	  of	  the	  many	  initiatives	  will	  bring	  material	  impacts	  to	  the	  organisation,	  and	  prioritising	  efforts	  accordingly.	  	  Having	  become	  aware	  of	  an	  issue	  and	  decided	  it	  merits	  a	  response,	  a	  capacity	  for	  internal	  brokerage	  becomes	   important,	  as	   input	   into	  policy-­‐making	  discussions	  has	   to	   be	   sourced	   from	   within	   the	   organisation.	   Given	   the	   breadth	   of	   subject	  areas	  potentially	  included	  in	  financial	  regulation,	  the	  required	  expertise	  can	  exist	  in	   many	   different	   locations:	   in	   the	   business	   divisions,	   or	   indeed	   in	   support	  functions	  such	  as	  finance,	  human	  resources	  or	  general	  counsel.	  Having	  staff	  able	  to	  match	  an	  informational	  need	  with	  a	  pocket	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  to	  arrange	  the	  procurement	  efficiently,	  is	  vital.	  	  Next	   comes	   the	   ability	   to	   communicate	   this	   expertise	   back	   into	   the	   policy-­‐making	  process.	  This	  is	  fairly	  labour-­‐intensive	  work,	  since	  staff	  will	  be	  required	  to	  represent	  the	  organisation	  at	  many	  (potentially	  simultaneous)	  fora.	  At	  a	  basic	  level,	   then,	   this	   capacity	   is	   a	   straightforward	   question	   of	   manpower.	   But	   less	  tangible	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  maintain	  a	  roster	  of	  contacts	  at	  the	  relevant	  policy-­‐making	   institutions,	   and	  among	   the	  community	  of	  private	  actors.	   Such	  a	  network	  helps	  facilitate	  the	  sharing	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  representation,	  as	  it	  can	  be	  (partially	  at	  least)	  delegated	  to	  others.19	  	  	  Supporting	  these	  various	  capacities	  is	  the	  second	  category,	  describing	  the	  ability	  to	  generate	   information	   required	   by	   policy-­‐makers.	   Privileged	   insider	   status	   is	  granted	   to	   those	   who	   are	   able	   to	   answer	   different	   types	   of	   question,	   or	   to	  provide	   different	   types	   of	   information.	   This	   reminds	   us	   of	   the	   debate	   in	   the	  literature	   about	   ‘types’	   of	   information,	   and	   of	   the	   basic	   distinctions	   used	   in	  several	   studies	   (Bouwen,	   2002;	   Dür	   &	   De	   Bièvre,	   2007;	   Michalowitz,	   2004).	  Significant	   for	   lobbying	   in	   the	   regulatory	   arena	   is	   precise	   technical	   expertise,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  It	   also	   assists	   in	   the	   initial	   business	  of	  monitoring,	   as	  news	  of	  policy	   initiatives	   is	   informally	  transmitted	  through	  the	  network.	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about	  how	  a	  proposal	  will	   impact	   the	   functioning	  of	  a	  certain	  market,	  or	  shape	  the	  trading	  of	  a	  certain	  instrument.	  To	  provide	  this,	  banks	  need	  staff	  and	  internal	  resources	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  regulatory	  policy	  analysis.	  	  So	  banks	  must	  have	  significant	  endowments	  of	  these	  two	  resources	  –	  interfacing	  and	   information	   generating	   –	   to	   be	   nimble	   players	   on	   the	   European	   lobbying	  scene,	  and	  to	  be	  able	   to	  penetrate	  the	  new	  arena.	  However,	   these	  are	  costly,	   in	  both	  human	  and	   financial	   terms,	  and	  with	   that	   in	  mind	  we	  can	   take	   the	  bank’s	  size	  as	  a	  proxy	  indicator	  of	  strengths	  in	  these	  resources.	  The	  larger	  the	  bank,	  the	  better	  able	   it	   is	   to	  meet	   the	  significant	   financial	  costs	  required	  to	  sustain	   these	  information	  resource	  endowments.	  Conversely,	  smaller	  banks	  will	  cope	  with	  the	  resource	  shortfall	  by	  participating	   in	  associational	  activity	   (C.	  Mahoney,	  2007).	  In	  turn,	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  distinctions	  made	  between	  the	  different	  modes	  of	  financial	   capitalism,	   and	   so	   to	   the	   organising	   theory	   and	   the	   accompanying	  ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  literature	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  &	  Levine,	  1999;	   P.A.	   Hall	   &	   Soskice,	   2001;	   Zysman,	   1983).	   The	   distribution	   of	   banks	   of	  different	  sizes	  is	  heavily	  conditioned	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  national	  sector.	  In	  a	  market-­‐based	  system,	  economies	  of	  scale	  place	  a	  consolidating	  pressure	  on	  the	  banking	  market,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  it	  becomes	  led	  by	  a	  few	  very	  large	  players.	  These	  banks	  are	  then	  able	  to	  dominate	  the	  holdings	  of	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  lobby	  effectively.	  Conversely,	   in	  a	  bank-­‐based	  system,	  the	  diseconomies	  of	  scale	  place	  a	  fragmenting	  pressure	  on	  the	  market,	  resulting	  in	  a	  far	  larger	  number	  of	  far	  smaller	  banks.	  20	  Here,	  lobbying	  resources	  are	  far	  more	  widely	  dispersed.	  	  On	  this	  basis	  we	  can	  propose	  some	  expectations	  about	  how	  varieties	  of	  financial	  system,	  bank	  size	  and	  lobbying	  behaviours	  inter-­‐relate	  (see	  Figure	  2.2).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  exact	  specification	  of	  ‘bank	  size’	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	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Figure	  2.2:	  Financial	  systems	  and	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  
	  	  We	  can	  propose,	  as	  an	  initial	  premise,	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  banking	  markets	  does	  indeed	  shape	  the	  distribution	  of	  lobbying	  resources	  among	  the	  constituent	  banks.	  This	  tests	  the	  empirical	  validity	  of	  our	  theoretical	  connection	  between	  the	  prevailing	   variety	   of	   financial	   capitalism	   and	   the	   banks’	   resources,	   and	   can	   be	  determined	  by	  examining	  the	  empirical	  landscape,	  and	  the	  resources,	  in	  detail.	  	  	  Next,	   we	  move	   to	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours.	  We	   assume	   that	   banks	   seek	   to	  lobby	   the	   EBA,	   as	   the	   real	   locus	   of	   rule-­‐making	   authority.	  We	   can	   hypothesise	  that:	  
H1:	  Larger	  banks,	  with	  greater	  lobbying	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal,	  will	  be	  
more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  EBA,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  directly	  and	  independently.	  	  There	  is	  a	  causal	  mechanism	  operating	  behind	  this.	  Working	  from	  the	  ground	  up:	  the	   prevailing	   variety	   of	   financial	   capitalism	   conditions	   the	   size	   and	   types	   of	  banks	   in	   the	   sector;	   the	   larger	   banks	   will	   have	   greater	   financial	   resources	   to	  support	  their	  lobbying	  resources;	  these	  will	  then	  be	  best	  able	  to	  engage	  directly	  with	  the	  EBA.	  Conversely:	  
H2:	   Smaller	   banks,	   with	   fewer	   lobbying	   resources,	   will	   lobby	   the	   EBA	  
through	  their	  representative	  associations.	  	  Again,	   the	   assumption	   that	   banks	   will	   aim	   high	   is	   carried	   through.	   This	   time,	  however,	  the	  reduced	  holdings	  of	  key	  resources	  will	  lead	  these	  smaller	  banks	  to	  participate	  in	  associational	  activity	  when	  lobbying	  the	  EBA.	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Bringing	   these	   two	   hypotheses	   together,	   we	   cover	   the	   links	   of	   the	   theoretical	  chain	   –	   from	   national	   origins,	   through	   resources,	   to	   observed	   behaviours.	   The	  larger	   banks	   (from	   market-­‐based	   systems)	   will	   lobby	   the	   European	   regulator	  directly,	  while	   the	  smaller	  banks	  (particularly	  among	  bank-­‐based	  systems)	  will	  rely	  on	  substitutions.	  	  
2.5.2:	  The	  ‘varieties	  of	  regulatory	  paradigm’	  approach	  The	  second	  element	  presents	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  behind	  banks’	  lobbying	  behaviours,	   examining	   how	   they	   are	   shaped	   by	   their	   perceptions	   of,	   and	  preferences	   over,	   European	   financial	   regulation.	   This	   time,	   we	   relax	   the	  presumption	  that	  private	  actors	  will	  necessarily	  seek	  to	  aim	  high	  and	  engage	  the	  EBA,	  and	   instead	  allow	  other	   institutions	   to	  be	  seen	  as	  viable	   lobbying	   targets.	  Recalling	  the	  review	  of	  the	  European	  interest	  group	  literature,	  we	  can	  begin	  by	  asserting	  that	  lobbying	  is	  a	  dynamic	  activity:	  studies	  of	  venue-­‐shopping	  in	  the	  EU	  highlight	   how	   private	   actors	   are	   able	   to	   strategically	   select	   between	   various	  points	   in	   their	   opportunity	   structure	   (Beyers	   &	   Kerremans,	   2011;	   Guiradon,	  2000;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006).	  In	  our	  empirical	  context,	  the	  novel	  institutional	  form	  of	  the	  EBA	  itself	  presents	  two	  such	  points,	  in	  that	  banks	  can	   lobby	   it,	   or	   seek	   to	   work	   with	   their	   own	   national	   authority.	   Thus,	   the	  dependent	   variable	   concerns	   the	   venue	   selected.	   Next,	   banks’	   perceptions,	   or	  preferences	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation	   are	   rooted	   in	   domestic	  regulatory	   paradigms,	   and	   this	   returns	   us	   to	   the	   theory	   of	   robust	   national	  variations	   and	   the	   accompanying	   literature.	   The	   overall	   arrangement	   of	   these	  preferences	  is	  best	  demonstrated	  by	  a	  simple	  schematic	  (see	  Figure	  2.3).	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Figure	  2.3:	  Regulatory	  paradigms	  and	  lobbying	  behaviours	  
	  	  At	   the	   very	   top	   is	   the	   European	   level,	   where	   legislation	   is	   written	   and	   the	  supporting	   rules	   are	   crafted.	   Here	   the	   prevailing	   paradigm	   that	   drives	   much	  international	   financial	  regulation	  also	  applies:	   in	   favour	  of	   liberalising	  markets,	  but	   also	   of	   imposing	   regulation	   on	   the	   banks	   in	   those	   markets.21	  	   Below	   this	  supranational	   layer	   sit	   the	   national	   contexts,	   where	   deep-­‐rooted	   regulatory	  paradigms	   show	   greater	   or	   lesser	   congruence	   with	   European	   regulatory	  liberalism.	  National	   authorities	   constitute	   the	   formal	   institutional	   apparatus	   of	  the	  regulatory	  regimes,	  and	  have	  national	  regulatory	  preferences	  over	  the	  shape	  of	  European	  financial	  regulation.	  Next,	  the	  banking	  sectors	  and	  their	  prominent	  constituent	   parts	   have	   equivalent	   preferences	   –	   but	   these	   are	   clearly	   far	  more	  fragmented,	   as	   different	   banks,	   or	   types	   of	   bank,	   seek	   different	   regulatory	  outcomes.	  Although	  the	  sectors	  are	  embedded	  in	  domestic	  regulatory	  systems,	  it	  is	   possible	   –	   indeed	   plausible	   –	   for	   sub-­‐sectors	   or	   individual	   players	   to	   have	  preferences	  distinctly	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  national	  regulatory	  actors.	  	  	  At	  an	  ideational	  level	  these	  preferences	  reflect	  beliefs	  about	  the	  suitable	  role	  of	  regulation	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  banking	  markets;	  at	  a	  more	  detailed	  level	  they	  are	  focussed	   on	   the	   shape	   of	   specific	   rules22.	   They	   can	   thus	   be	   cast	   along	   two	  dimensions.	   The	   first	   describes,	   simply,	   ‘more’	   or	   ‘less’	   regulation:	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  contents	  of	  this	  European	  paradigm	  is	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	  22	  The	  contents	  of	  these	  paradigms	  are	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	  
	   60	  
activities	   the	   bank	   is	   not	   permitted	   to	   do,	   or	   more	   conditions	   around	   the	  business	   it	   is	   allowed	   to	   undertake.	   This	   also	   includes	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	  intrusiveness	   of	   supervision.	   The	   second	   relates	   to	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   such	  regulation	  is	  harmonised	  across	  the	  banking	  markets	  of	  Europe:	  whether	  a	  given	  rule	   should	   apply	   uniformly	   to	   all	   participants,	   or	   whether	   certain	   national	  regulators	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   soften	   it	   or	   toughen	   it.	   Within	   this	   generic	  classification,	   we	   can	   obviously	   conceive	   of	   specific	   preferences:	   calling	   for	   a	  certain	  aspect	  of	  a	  new	  rule	  to	  be	  altered,	  for	  example.	  	  We	  can	  now	  use	  all	  of	  this	  to	  construct	  some	  predictions.	  Again,	  we	  begin	  with	  an	  initial	   premise	   that	   the	   perceptions	   and	   preferences	   of	   the	   banks	   will	   derive	  from	   their	  domestic	  paradigms;	  we	   test	   the	  empirical	   validity	  of	   this	   theorised	  connection	   by	   examining	   the	   paradigms,	   and	   the	   banks’	   perceptions	   and	  preferences,	  in	  detail.	  	  Next,	  we	  can	  propose	  a	  hypothesis	  concerning	  their	  venue	  selection:	  
H3:	   Banks	   will	   lobby	   their	   domestic	   regulator,	   or	   the	   EBA,	   based	   the	  
alignment	   of	   their	   preferences	   over	   a	   given	   issue.	   The	   greater	   the	  
alignment,	   the	   greater	   the	   likelihood	   that	   a	   particular	   venue	   will	   be	  
targeted.	  	  The	   causal	  mechanism	   operating	   here	   rests	   on	   the	   assumption,	   stated	   earlier,	  that	   banks	   can	   choose	   to	   lobby	   either	   domestic	   or	   European	   venues.	   The	  selection	  rests	  on	  a	  subtle	  implication	  of	  the	  European	  interest	  group	  literature:	  that	  ‘the	  goal	  of	  lobbying	  is,	  on	  balance,	  not	  to	  change	  the	  minds	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	   agree	  with	   you,	   but	   rather	   to	   subsidise	   the	  work	  of	   those	  who	  already	  do’	  (Chalmers,	   2011:	   474;	   R.L.	   Hall	   &	   Deardorff,	   2006).	   The	   various	   regulatory	  paradigms	   at	   play	   shape	   banks’	   preferences,	   and	   those	   of	   their	   regulatory	  counterparts;	  and	  in	  deciding	  where	  to	  lobby	  the	  banks	  will	  scan	  these	  positions	  and	  act	  accordingly.	  As	  with	  the	  previous	  part	  of	  the	  model,	  the	  intention	  here	  is	  to	   examine	   the	   entire	   length	   of	   the	   theoretical	   chain:	   from	   national	   origins	  (expressed	   as	   regulatory	   paradigms),	   through	   preferences,	   and	   to	   observed	  behaviours.	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The	   perceptions,	   founded	   in	   the	   underlying	   domestic	   paradigms,	   are	   naturally	  reflected	   in	   the	   input	   deployed	   by	   the	   banks	   in	   the	   course	   of	   their	   lobbying.	  However,	   we	   should	   again	   consider	   an	   important	   element	   of	   interest	   group	  literature:	  that	  different	  venues	  have	  different	  needs	  for	  informational	  input,	  and	  feature	   different	   discursive	   rules	   (Bouwen,	   2002;	   Dür	   &	   De	   Bièvre,	   2007;	  Michalowitz,	   2004).	   Private	   actors	   wishing	   to	   penetrate	   these	   venues	   must	  therefore	  adapt	  their	  informational	  input	  accordingly.	  This	  gives	  a	  second	  aspect	  to	   the	   dependent	   variable	   –	   the	   informational	   good	   supplied	   to	   the	   various	  venues.	  We	  can	  propose	  a	  hypothesis	  concerning	  their	  informational	  input:	  
H4:	  Banks	  will	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  various	  regulatory	  venues,	  
and	  will	  adapt	  their	  input	  accordingly.	  	  This	  draws	  on	  a	  similar	   implication	  of	  the	   literature:	  that	  different	   institutional	  venues	  have	  different	  information	  demands,	  or	  tastes,	  and	  private	  actors	  must	  be	  sensitive	  to	  these	  when	  deciding	  how	  to	  lobby.	  In	  this	  way,	  when	  targeting	  either	  the	  domestic	  or	   the	  European	   regulatory	  arena,	  banks	  will	   obey	   the	  discursive	  rules	   of	   the	   different	   fora,	   and	   flex	   their	   input	   accordingly.	   Building	   on	   the	  distinction	   between	   ‘types	   of	   information’	   established	   while	   specifying	   the	  lobbying	   resources	   (in	   Section	   2.5.1),	   we	   can	   put	   forward	   some	   expectations	  about	   these	   tastes.	   As	   regulatory	   actors,	   both	   potential	   targets	   will	   have	   an	  institutional	  need	  for	  technical	  expertise,	  as	  opposed	  to	  higher-­‐level,	   ‘direction-­‐setting’	   input	  favoured	  by	   legislative	  actors.	  However,	   the	  supranational	  role	  of	  the	   EBA	   generates	   a	   different	   set	   of	   discursive	   rules	   from	   those	   present	   in	  domestic	   regulatory	   venues	   –	   meaning	   that	   input	   framed	   around	   national	  impacts	  of	  regulatory	  change	  will	  not	  be	  welcomed.	  	  
2.5.3:	  The	  interaction	  effect	  The	  final	  element	  of	  the	  model	  concerns	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  interaction	  between	  these	   two	   proposed	   causal	   pathways:	   that	   resources	   and	   preferences	   may	  combine	  to	  bring	  about	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  It	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  theorise	  about	  the	  operation	  of	  such	  an	  interactive	  process	  a	  priori,	  since	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  act	  in	   a	   highly	   complex	   and	   contingent	  matter.	   Nonetheless,	   we	   hypothesise,	   as	   a	  route	  into	  the	  morass,	  that:	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H5:	   The	   greater	   a	   bank’s	   resources,	   the	  more	   likely	   it	   is	   to	   able	   to	   lobby	  
according	  to	  its	  preferences.	  	  This	   rests	   on	   the	   intuition	   that	   resources	   are	   in	   fact	   a	   constraining	   factor,	   and	  that	  without	   adequate	   capacities	   for	   lobbying	   the	   ability	   to	   strategically	   select	  venues	   according	   to	   preferences	   will	   be	   severely	   constricted.	   In	   the	   overall	  schema	   of	   the	   empirical	   chapters	   this	   analysis	   comes	   last,	   as	   we	   must	   first	  examine	  the	  operation	  of	  ‘resources’	  and	  ‘preferences’	  independently.	  	  2.6:	  Conclusion	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  private	  actors	   in	  the	  emergent	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  The	  bodies	  in	  this	  layer	  are	  distinct	  from	  those	  in	  the	  legislative	  sphere,	  which	  have	  existed,	  and	  been	  lobbied,	  for	  several	  decades.	  In	  this	  new	  arena,	  I	  argue,	  actors’	  lobbying	  is	  shaped	  by	  their	  national	  origins.	  	  This	   chapter	   began	   by	   reviewing	   the	   EU	   lobbying	   literature,	   drawing	   out	   key	  insights	  which	  were	   later	  used	   to	  underpin	  parts	  o	   the	  causal	  model.	  Thus,	  we	  have	  a	  picture	  of	  lobbying	  as	  being	  centred	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  information,	  which	  in	  turn	  rests	  on	  a	  set	  of	  informational	  resources;	  and	  of	  private	  actors	  being	  able	  to	   navigate	   intricate	   and	   dynamic	   opportunity	   structures.	   This	   discussion	   also	  established	   the	   research	   question,	   and	   identified	   the	   case	   of	   banks,	   and	   the	  European	   Banking	   Authority,	   as	   the	   analytical	   focus	   of	   the	   thesis.	   Deploying	   a	  ‘varieties	   of	   capitalism’	   approach,	   a	   theoretical	   framework	  was	   constructed	   to	  specify	   two	   manifestations	   of	   national	   variety	   which	   shape	   banks’	   lobbying	  behaviours.	   Variations	   in	   the	   model	   of	   financial	   capitalism	   prevailing	   in	   the	  national	  contexts	  conditions	  the	  distribution	  of	  lobbying	  resources	  among	  banks,	  and	   these	   shape	   how	   they	   approach	   the	   EBA.	   Similarly,	   different	   national	  regulatory	   paradigms	   influence	   banks’	   preferences	   over	   European	   financial	  regulation,	  which	  then	  shape	  whether	  they	  direct	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  the	  EBA	  or	  at	   their	  home	   regulator.	   Finally,	   three	  elements	  of	   the	   causal	  model,	   each	  with	  containing	  hypotheses,	  were	   laid	  out.	  Our	  next	   step	   is	   to	   examine	   in	  detail	   the	  research	  design	  this	  thesis	  employed,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  next	  chapter.	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Chapter	  3:	  Research	  design	  
3.1:	  Introduction	  The	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   generated	   the	   research	  question:	   What	   shapes	   the	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	   banks	   in	   the	   European	  
regulatory	  arena?	  	  This	  research	  opportunity	  was	  afforded	  by	  the	  recent	  changes	  to	   the	  European	   institutional	   apparatus	   for	   regulatory	  governance.	   Some	  years	  ago,	  studies	  of	  the	  landscape	  suggested	  that	  private	  actors’	  engagement	  with	  the	  loose	   networks	   of	   regulators	   was	   minimal	   (Coen	   &	   Thatcher,	   2008).	   Now,	  however,	   the	  upgrading	  of	   these	   into	  concrete	  bodies,	  and	  the	  centring	  of	  rule-­‐making	  authority	  at	  the	  European	  level,	  mean	  that	  private	  actors	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  lobby	  there.	  To	  date,	  although	  the	  extensive	  European	  interest	  group	  literature	   has	   focussed	   on	   the	   established	   actors	   (the	   Commission	   and	   the	  Parliament)	  little	  has	  been	  conducted	  with	  regard	  to	  these	  new	  bodies.	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  build	  an	  in-­‐depth	  understanding	  of	  the	  factors	  shaping	  lobbying	   behaviours	   in	   this	   new	   setting.	   In	   that	   sense	   it	   is	   an	   exploratory	  exercise	   –	   the	   lobbying	   literature	   has	   not	   yet	   ventured	   into	   studying	   the	  behaviours	  of	  private	  actors	  in	  the	  emergent	  European	  regulatory	  arena,	  and	  so	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  apply	  (and	  possibly	  refine)	  existing	  theories	  to	  this	  new	  empirical	  context.	  	  Insights	   taken	  from	  the	  review	  of	   the	  European	   interest	  group	   literature	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter	   showed	   the	   many	   factors	   which	   could	   explain	   behaviour;	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  institution’s	  material	  resources	  (Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	  2007;	  Eising,	   2007a),	   its	   form	   (Klüver,	   2012)	   or	   its	   ability	   to	   gather	   and	   transmit	  information	   (Chalmers,	   2011).	   The	   current	   study	   draws	   on	   these	   insights,	   but	  also	   puts	   forward	   an	   argument	   that	   lobbying	   behaviours	   in	   the	   European	  regulatory	  arena	  are	  shaped	  by	  private	  actors’	  national	  origins:	  these	  condition	  the	  way	  they	  engage	  with	  domestic	  regulatory	  actors,	  and	  feed	  forward	  into	  the	  way	  they	  lobby	  the	  emergent	  European	  regulators.	  To	  structure	  this	  argument,	  a	  ‘varieties	   of	   capitalism’	   approach	   (P.A.	   Hall	   &	   Soskice,	   2001)	   is	   used	   as	   an	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organising	   theory,	   helping	   to	   operationalize	   the	   relevant	   aspects	   of	   variety	   in	  national	  origins.	  	  Overall	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  chapter	  also	  revealed	  something	  that	  is	  key	  to	  the	   way	   I	   approach	   this	   subject:	   that	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   explain	   behaviours	   with	  reference	  to	  a	  simple	  set	  of	  factors;	  instead,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  the	  interaction	  between	  factors	  which	  determine	  where,	  and	  how,	  private	  actors	  conduct	  their	  lobbying.	  As	  I	  argue	  below,	  capturing	  this	  complexity	  was	  an	  important	  reason	  behind	  the	  methodological	  choices	  I	  made	  when	  planning	  this	  study.	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   lay	   out	   the	  methodology	   and	   research	  design	   adopted	  by	   the	  project.	   I	  begin	  by	  explaining	   the	  choice	  of	   the	  overall	  method,	  by	  presenting	  a	  stylised	  discussion	  between	  two	  approaches:	  the	  qualitative,	  case-­‐oriented,	  and	  the	  quantitative,	  variable-­‐oriented.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  use	  this	  dichotomy	  to	  highlight	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  former	  to	  this	  project,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  provide	  some	  sense	  of	  the	   methodological	   concerns	   that	   mark	   it.	   I	   then	   outline	   the	   research	   design,	  continuing	  to	  use	  this	  comparison	  to	  explain	  the	   logic	  of	  case	  selection.	  Section	  four	  details	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  variables	  of	  the	  causal	  model,	  including	  how	  they	   are	   operationalised,	   and	   reiterates	   the	   hypotheses	   developed	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter.	   From	   there,	   I	   lay	   out	   the	   data	   sources,	   and	   describe	   the	  analysis	   techniques	   to	  which	   they	  were	   subjected.	  Finally,	   in	   section	   six	   I	  offer	  some	  concluding	  remarks.	  	  3.2:	  Methodology	  In	   order	   to	   address	   the	   research	   question	   I	   employ	   an	   approach	   which	   is	  
qualitative,	  and	  case-­‐oriented	  and	  comparative.	  In	  the	  social	  sciences,	  qualitative	  approaches	   employ	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  qualities	   of	   phenomena;	   as	   Berg	   puts	   it,	  they	  are	  concerned	  with	  ‘the	  what,	  how,	  when,	  and	  where	  of	  a	  thing	  –	  its	  essence	  and	   ambience’	   (2009:	   3).	   They	   are	   further	   recognised	   for	   their	   strength	   in	  shedding	  light	  on	  causal	  mechanisms,	  or	  processes	  (George	  &	  Bennett,	  2005:	  21;	  Gerring,	  2004:	  348;	  Lin,	  1998).	  Mahoney	  and	  Goertz	  describe	  how	  using	  such	  an	  approach	   enables	   the	   researcher	   to	   establish	   the	   ‘causes	   of	   effects,’	   remarking	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that	  this	  is	  ‘consistent	  with	  normal	  science	  as	  conventionally	  understood’	  (2006:	  230),	  in	  which	  the	  researcher	  begins	  with	  an	  observed	  phenomenon	  and	  works	  backwards	  to	  establish	  its	  causes.	  However,	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  the	  choice	  of	  overall	  approach	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   complexity	   encountered	   during	   the	  development	   of	   the	   theoretical	   framework.	   From	  an	   empirical	   perspective,	   the	  policy-­‐making	   process	   is	   clearly	   complex:	   it	   is	   spread	   over	   many	   layers	   and	  institutions	  and	  is	  ever-­‐changing.	  But	  from	  a	  theoretical	  perspective	  this	  is	  also	  true:	   	   synthesising	   the	   works	   of	   the	   various	   scholars	   who	   have	   tackled	   the	  drivers	   of	   lobbying	   behaviour,	  we	   can	   see	   a	   complex	   story	   of	   overlapping	   and	  interacting	  causal	  conditions.	  To	  understand	  this	   in	  more	  detail,	  we	  first	   take	  a	  brief	  examination	  of	  the	  central	  notion	  of	  causality.	  	  The	  understanding	  of	  causality	  marks	  a	  key	  difference	  between	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	   approaches.	   The	   quantitative	   researcher	   assumes	   additivity	   and	  
uniformity	  –	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  given	   factor	   is	  expected	   to	  bring	  about	   the	  same	  incremental	   change	   in	   outcome	   across	  all	  cases	   (Berg-­‐Schlosser	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   J.	  Mahoney	  &	  Goertz,	  2006).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  qualitative	  researcher	  begins	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  can	  be	  several	  different	  paths	  to	  the	  same	  outcome,	  and	  it	  is	  her	   job	   to	  parse	   through	   these	  and	   lay	  out	  distinct	  narrative	   threads.	  Such	  a	  standpoint	  is	  evident	  in	  much	  qualitative	  work	  in	  political	  science,	  and	  appears	  in	   various	   guises.	   Thus,	   della	   Porta	   refers	   to	   it	   as	   ‘plural	   causality’,	  whereby	   a	  certain	   outcome	   can	   have	   different	   causes	   in	   different	   contexts	   (2008:	   205).	  Berg-­‐Schlosser	  et	  al.	   label	   it	   ‘multiple	  conjunctural	  causation’,	  suggesting	  that	   it	  is	  varying	  combinations	  of	  conditions	  which	  interact	  in	  bringing	  about	  outcomes	  (2009:	  8).	  	  	  This	  discussion	  can	  be	  cast	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  perspective,	  focusing	  on	  ‘case-­‐’	  and	   ‘variable-­‐oriented’	   approaches	   –	   aligned	   with	   qualitative	   and	   quantitative	  endeavours	   respectively.	   In	   the	   latter,	   the	   researcher	   analyses	   concomitant	  
variation	  (della	  Porta,	  2008:	  204).	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  factors	  vary	  together	  across	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases.	  Variables	  not	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  part	  of	  the	  causal	   relation	  (‘parameters’)	  are	  eliminated	  (‘controlled	   for’),	  allowing	   the	  researcher	   to	   establish,	   in	   precise	   terms,	   the	   power	   of	   the	   ones	   that	   remain.	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Conversely,	   in	   a	   case-­‐oriented	   comparative	  design,	   the	   researcher	  pursues	  and	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  a	   small	  number	  of	   cases.	  Elements	  within	   those	  cases	   (the	  values	   of	   certain	   variables,	   or	   their	   combinations	   and	   configurations)	   are	  compared	  across	  these	  cases,	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  causal	  pathways	  (in	  the	  plural)	  (Ragin	  &	  Amoroso,	  2011).	  	  The	   two	   approaches	   described	   above	   produce	   different	   types	   of	   knowledge.	  Large-­‐scale,	   quantitative	   inquiry	   aims	   at	   generalizable	   knowledge	   of	   relations	  among	  variables,	  allowing	  the	  researcher	  to	  make	  claims	  about	  the	  wider	  world	  based	  on	  her	  work.	  It	  establishes	  an	  ‘average	  effect’:	  as	  Lin	  puts	  it,	   ‘…	  the	  effect	  that	   one	  might	   imagine	   a	   variable	   having	   if	   the	   world	   allowed	   for	   a	   series	   of	  replications	  of	  the	  observation’	  (1998).	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  procedures	  by	  which	  the	  research	  is	  conducted	  allow	  it	  to	  be	  replicated	  by	  others	  with	  the	  same	  results,	  meaning	   its	   conclusions	   can	   be	   said	   to	   have	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   ‘reliability’	   (Yin,	  2009:	  45).	   In	  contrast,	  by	  poring	  over	   the	  detail	  of	   the	  causal	  mechanisms	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  cases,	   the	  qualitative	  researcher	  aims	   for	  rich	  empirical	  detail	  and	  a	  high	  degree	  of	   internal	  validity:	   this	   refers	   to	   the	   ‘fullness’	  of	   the	  study’s	  explanation,	   or	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   it	   accounts	   for	   the	   observed	   variation	   and	  copes	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  spuriousness	  (Yin,	  2009:	  42).	  This	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  correspondingly	  narrow	  external	  generalizability,	  and	  so	  findings	  can	  be	  said	  to	  strive	   for	   analytical	   generalizability:	   the	   more	   circumspect	   applicability	   of	  conclusions	   to	   other	   cases	   which	   are	   theoretically	   similar	   but	   empirically	  different	  (Flyvbjerg,	  2006;	  Yin,	  2009).	  	  	  This	   project	   will	   strive	   for	   internal	   validity	   by	   building	   on	   a	   set	   of	   theory-­‐inspired	   hypotheses	   (drawn	   largely	   from	   the	   EU	   lobbying	   literature),	   and	   by	  using	  an	  array	  of	  data	  sources	  and	  analytical	  techniques	  to	  capture	  the	  complex	  interaction	   among	   the	   variables.	   These	   are	   detailed	   in	   further	   sections	   of	   this	  chapter.	  	  The	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   generated	   a	   theoretical	  position	   that	   drives	   this	   thesis:	   that	   the	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	   banks	   in	   the	  European	   regulatory	   arena	   can	   be	   explained	   with	   reference	   to	   causal	   factors	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relating	   to	   their	   resources	  and	  preferences,	  and	   that	  both	  of	   these	   link	  back	   to	  the	   underlying	   national	   contexts.	   The	   aim	   of	   the	   project	   is	   to	   draw	   out	   and	  explain	  these	  patterns.	  The	  preceding	  methodological	  discussion	  highlighted	  key	  strengths	  of	  the	  qualitative	  approach:	  first,	  it	  is	  attuned	  to	  the	  discovery	  of	  causal	  mechanisms	   –	   the	   uncovering	   of	   processes	   which	   link	   together	   observed	  variations	   in	   phenomena.	   Second,	   it	   is	   particularly	   able	   to	   grasp	   causal	  complexity	  –	  the	  possibility	  that	  these	  processes	  may	  indeed	  exist	  in	  the	  plural,	  and	   that	   it	   may	   be	   varying	   combinations	   of	   factors	   which	   bring	   about	   an	  outcome.	  Connecting	  these,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  method	  chosen	  accords	  with	  the	  ambitions	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  3.3:	  Research	  design	  
3.3.1:	  Casing	  With	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  overall	  approach	  explained,	  we	  move	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  research	   design,	   beginning	   with	   case	   selection.	   As	   a	   route	   into	   this	   we	   can	  consider	  a	  further	  difference	  between	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  methods	  –	  in	  the	  role	  of	  theory.	  Both	  begin	  with	  a	  theoretical	  grounding	  in	  some	  conjectured	  set	  of	  ideas	  about	  relationships	  between	  empirical	  phenomena;	  in	  this	  way	  social	  science	   proceeds	   via	   an	   interplay	   between	   theory	   and	   data	   (Gerring,	   2004).	  Operating	  with	  a	  quantitative	  approach,	  the	  researcher	  moves	  from	  this	  starting	  point	  and	  selects	  some	  measures	  to	  represent	  variation	  in	  these	  phenomena,	  and	  then	   draws	   in	   a	   (preferably	   large)	   set	   of	   cases	   from	   the	   empirical	   world.	  Importantly,	   the	   specification	   of	   the	   variables	   is	   fixed	   at	   this	   point,	   and	   the	  selection	  of	  cases	  is	  not	  conducted	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  value	  on	  these	  measures.	  Conversely,	  the	  qualitative	  researcher	  begins	  with	  a	  theoretical	  inspiration,	  and	  then	   uses	   it	   to	   actively	   select	   cases	   for	   study	   –	   a	   process	   Ragin	   describes	   as	  ‘casing’	  (1992).	  Similarly,	  although	  the	  initial	  theory	  may	  indicate	  some	  variables	  tentatively	   thought	   to	   be	   causal,	   these	   are	   not	   ‘locked	   down’;	   rather,	   over	   the	  course	   of	   the	   study,	   the	   researcher	   is	   able	   to	   embrace	   new,	   previously	  unconsidered,	   variables	   and	   fine-­‐tune	   the	   causal	   story.	   This	   leads	   to	   ‘an	  extensive	   dialogue	   between	   the	   researcher’s	   ideas	   and	   the	   data	   in	   an	  examination	  of	   each	   case	   as	   a	   complex	   set	   of	   relationships’	   (della	  Porta,	   2008:	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207).	  This	  active	  use	  of	  theory	  –	  in	  driving	  case	  selection	  and	  in	  allowing	  a	  more	  dynamic	   relationship	   with	   variables	   –	   has	   provoked	   vigorous	   debate	   among	  methodological	   scholars:	   King,	   Keohane	   and	   Verba	   (1994),	   for	   example,	  famously	  argued	  that	  research	  which	  focussed	  purely	  on	  cases	  which	  had	  been	  selected	  to	  all	  share	  the	  same	  outcome	  were	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  Nonetheless,	  the	   practice	   has	   become	   a	  mainstream	   part	   of	   the	   qualitative	   approach	   to	   the	  conduct	  of	  inquiry.	  	  With	   the	   strategic,	   deliberate	   selection	   of	   cases	   taking	   such	   an	   important	   role,	  the	  procedure	  by	  which	   the	  choices	  are	  made	  must	  be	   transparent.	   In	   the	   first	  instance,	  the	  selection	  of	  a	  single	  case	  for	  analysis	   is	  driven	  by	  the	  researcher’s	  aim	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  underlying	  theory,	  and	  by	  a	  concern	  for	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  case	  to	  the	  research	  aim	  (della	  Porta,	  2008;	  George	  &	  Bennett,	  2005).	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  a	  case	  can	  be	  chosen	   for	  being	   ‘typical’	   (representative	  of	  a	   larger	  class)	   or	   ‘deviant’	   (being	   an	   outlier	   from	   that	   class).	   These	   align	   with	   the	  researcher’s	   aim	   to	   either	   expose	   a	   theory’s	   weakness	   (by	   applying	   it	   to	   a	  ‘perfect’	  case	  and	  showing	  it	  to	  fail),	  or	  to	  demonstrate	  its	  strength	  (by	  applying	  it	   to	   an	   extreme	   case	   and	   showing	   it	   to	   succeed)	   (Seawright	  &	  Gerring,	   2008).	  Alternatively,	   the	   researcher	   can	   choose	   to	   bring	   in	   several	   cases,	   with	   the	  intention	  of	  conducting	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  to	  illuminate	  a	  causal	  relationship	  behind	  some	  observed	  covariation.	  Unlike	  designs	  based	  purely	  on	  a	  single	  case	  (the	   typical	   or	   the	   deviant,	   say),	   the	   aim	  here	   is	   to	   use	   a	   comparison	   between	  cases	  to	  study,	  and	  account	  for,	  diversity	  (Ragin	  &	  Amoroso,	  2011:	  135)	  	  According	   to	   Gerring,	   such	   research	   designs	   should	   be	   thought	   as	   being	  constructed	  over	  several	  layers	  (2004:	  343).	  At	  the	  upper-­‐most	  level	  there	  may	  be	  a	   single	  case,	   selected	   to	  be	   representative	  of	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  units.	  Within	  this,	  however,	  are	  embedded	  units	  of	  analysis,	  which	  between	  them	  demonstrate	  variation	  in	  certain	  key	  dimensions,	  and	  with	  which	  the	  researcher	  can	  construct	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  Such	  units	  can	  be	  spatial	   (offering	  a	  comparison	  between	  two	   communities,	   perhaps)	   or	   temporal	   (examining	   the	   same	   community	   at	  several	  points	  in	  time).	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  English	  working	  class	  can	  be	  re-­‐cast	  as	  an	  examination	  of	  one	  of	  a	  larger	  class	  of	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units	  (‘class	  consolidations’),	  conducted	  across	  several	  distinct	  phases	  of	  time.	  In	  each,	   the	   researcher	   draws	   out	   variations	   in	   actors,	   or	   processes,	   in	   order	   to	  construct	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  	  	  The	  selection	  of	  these	  cases	  (at	  whichever	  level	  they	  may	  sit	  in	  the	  logical	  model)	  is	  intended	  by	  the	  researcher	  to	  facilitate	  the	  building	  of	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  In	  a	  similar	  way	  that	  a	  quantitative	  design	  controls	   for	  and	  eliminates	  extraneous	  variables,	  so	  the	  qualitative	  researcher	  assembles	  her	  cases	  in	  such	  a	  manner	  as	  to	   focus	   attention	   on	   a	   hypothesised	   set	   of	   factors	   (notwithstanding	   the	  possibility	   that	   others	  may	   emerge	   as	   the	   project	   progresses).	   Practically,	   this	  involves	  arranging	  the	  cases	  according	  to	  Mill’s	  ‘most-­‐similar’	  or	  ‘most-­‐different’	  designs	  (1872).	  Each	  enables	  the	  research	  to	  precisely	  identify	  the	  causal	  power	  of	  one	  or	  more	   factors,	  depending	  on	  their	  presence	  or	  absence	   in	   the	  selected	  cases.	  The	  entire	  exercise	  is	  underpinned,	  della	  Porta	  suggests,	  by	  a	  prior	  set	  of	  ideal	  types:	   ‘abstract	  models,	  with	  an	  internal	   logic,	  against	  which	  real	  complex	  cases	  can	  be	  measured’	  (2008:	  206).	  Again,	   this	  highlights	   the	  role	  of	   theory	   in	  qualitative	   endeavours:	   it	   is	   theory	   which	   inspires	   the	   ideal	   types	   and	   which	  suggests	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  connecting	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  model,	  and	  then	  these	  ideal	  types	  which	  drive	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  cases	  for	  comparison.	  	  This	   project	   follows	   these	   established	   routines	   of	   case	   study	   design	   in	   two	  regards:	  in	  applying	  Gerring’s	  approach	  to	  constructing	  logical	  frameworks,	  and	  in	  using	  an	  underlying	   theory	   to	  drive	   the	  selection	  of	   the	  cases	  and	   the	   initial	  specification	   of	   the	   variables.	   Beginning	   with	   the	   logical	   model,	   the	   project	   is	  constructed	  over	  three	  layers.	  The	  outer-­‐most	  layer	  constitutes	  the	  overall	  case	  –	  the	   activity	   of	   lobbying	   by	   banks	   in	   the	   EU.23	  The	   second	   comprises	   a	   paired	  analysis	   of	   two	   countries.	   Variation	   is	   thought	   to	   exist	   among	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	   of	   actors	   drawn	   from	   these	   two	   cases,	   building	   on	   the	   theoretical	  framework	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Finally,	  a	  third	  layer	  contains	  a	  set	  of	  embedded	  units	  of	  analysis	  –	  the	  cast	  of	  actors	  on	  which	  the	  detailed	  analysis	  is	   focussed.	   The	   overall	   schematic	   is	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3.1,	   and	   the	   following	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	   sits	   as	   a	   case	   in	   the	   wider	   universe	   of	   units,	   comprising	   ‘the	   lobbying	   of	   European	  regulators	  (in	  general)	  by	  private	  actors.’	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sections	  specify	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  cases,	  and	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  variables,	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
Figure	  3.1:	  The	  three	  layers	  of	  nested	  cases	  
	  	  
3.3.2:	  Choosing	  the	  cases	  In	   choosing	   the	   candidates	   for	   the	   comparative	   study,	   I	   followed	   della	   Porta’s	  primary	  concern	  for	  relevance	  (della	  Porta,	  2008;	  George	  &	  Bennett,	  2005).	  The	  review	   of	   the	   lobbying	   literature	   revealed	   an	   opportunity	   to	   contribute	   an	  understanding	  of	  how	  actors’	  national	  origins	  shaped	  behaviour.	  This	  led,	  in	  the	  first	   instance,	   to	  a	  need	   to	  construct	  a	  case	  design	  which	   took	   two	  countries	   as	  the	   units	   of	   comparison.	   That	   would	   enable	   me	   to	   study	   how	   country-­‐level	  variations	   impacted	   upon	   individual	   institutions	   in	   shaping	   their	   lobbying	  activities.	  	  Next,	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  was	  based	  on	  the	  application	  of	  a	  set	  of	  considerations,	   inspired	   by	   the	   underlying	   theory.	   The	   initial	   universe	   was	  obviously	   restricted	   to	   those	   countries	   which	   are	   members	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   (and	   so	  potentially	  players	   in	   the	   lobbying	  game).	  Within	   this	   set,	   I	  was	  keen	   to	   frame	   the	   comparison	   around	   countries	  which	   had	   been	  members	   for	  similar	  lengths	  of	  time.	  This	  ruled	  out,	  for	  example,	  the	  accession	  countries	  of	  the	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2004	  EU	  enlargement,	  since	  we	  could	  imagine	  their	  banks’	  lobbying	  efforts	  being	  marred	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  experience	  in	  the	  European	  arena.	  	  The	  most	   important	  consideration,	  however,	  was	  to	  follow	  della	  Porta’s	  call	   for	  case	  selections	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  congruence	  with	  theoretical	   ideal	  types	  (2008:	  206).	   The	   theoretical	   framework	   chapter	   identified	   two	   key	   dimensions	   of	  variation	  in	  national	  contexts:	  in	  financial	  systems	  and	  in	  regulatory	  paradigms.	  It	   was	   the	   influence	   of	   this	   variety	   that	   I	   was	   seeking	   to	   test	   through	   my	  comparative	  analysis;	  in	  other	  words,	  if	  the	  central	  argument	  was	  that	  lobbying	  behaviours	  are	  shaped	  by	  national	  origins,	  and	  national	  origins	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  terms	  of	  varieties	  of	  financial	  system	  and	  regulatory	  paradigm,	  I	  needed	  two	  countries	  which	  displayed	  variation	  along	  these	  key	  dimensions.	  	  The	  candidate	  countries	  were	  grouped	  into	  two	  broad	  clusters:	  the	  ‘liberal’	  (UK,	  Holland,	   Ireland	  and	  Scandinavia)	  and	   the	   ‘continental’	   (Germany,	  France,	   Italy	  and	  Spain).	  Common	  to	  the	   ‘varieties	  of	   financial	  capitalism’	   literature	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  &	  Levine,	  1999;	  Story	  &	  Walter,	  1997;	  Zysman,	  1983)	  is	   the	   identification	   of	   the	   former	   as	   having,	   to	   varying	   degrees,	  market-­‐based	  financial	  systems,	  with	  liquid	  capital	  markets	  and	  consolidated	  banking	  sectors.	  The	   latter,	   conversely,	   have	   financial	   systems	   more	   reliant	   on	   bank	  intermediation,	  and	  more	  fragmented	  banking	  sectors.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  literature	  on	  European	  financial	  regulation,	  and	  comparative	  regulatory	  governance	  more	  broadly,	   has	   classified	   the	   liberal	   group	   as	   subscribing	   to	   a	   ‘market-­‐trusting’	  paradigm,	   with	   beliefs	   in	   light-­‐touch	   and	   pro-­‐competition	   regulation	  underpinning	   their	   domestic	   regimes	   (Quaglia,	   2010;	   2011;	   2012;	   Thatcher,	  2007).	  The	  continentals	  have	  a	  more	  circumscribed	  view	  of	  markets,	  and	  employ	  more	   prescriptive,	   legalistic	   and	   steering	   approaches	   to	   regulation.	   These	   two	  sets	  of	  countries	  were	  thus	  shown	  to	  display	  the	  required	  variety	  along	  the	  key	  dimensions	  specified	  by	  the	  theoretical	   framework.	  Using	  one	  from	  each	  would	  allow	  me	   to	   test	   the	   theoretical	   argument	   in	   a	   comparison	   between	   two	   ‘ideal	  type’	  countries.	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However,	   it	   seemed	   sensible	   to	   follow	   established	   practice	   in	   the	   varieties	   of	  capitalism	  literature	  and	  concentrate	  on	  the	  two	  –	  Britain	  and	  Germany	  –	  which	  have	  most	  often	  been	  held	  up	  as	  exemplars	  of	  these	  theoretical	  ideal	  types	  (P.A.	  Hall	   &	   Soskice,	   2001).	   As	   will	   be	   shown	   in	   Chapter	   Four,	   these	   two	   countries	  have	  very	  different	  banking	  landscapes,	  and	  ‘liberal’	  and	  ‘ordo-­‐liberal’	  paradigms	  underpinning	  their	  regulatory	  regimes.	  Using	  these	  two	  also	  avoided	  the	  issue	  of	  certain	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours	   being	   shaped	   by	   entirely	   circumstantial	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  collapse,	  or	  near-­‐collapse,	  of	  their	  banking	  sectors	  (in	  Ireland	  and	  Spain,	  respectively).24	  	  	  Finally,	  I	  did	  consider	  including	  France	  as	  a	  third	  case.	  This	  would	  have	  been	  to	  move	  France	   from	   the	   ‘continental’	   cluster	   and	   treat	   it	   –	   along	  with	  other	  VoC	  scholars	  –	  as	  a	  ‘median’	  case,	  following	  a	  distinctive	  dirigiste	  model	  of	  economic	  organisation	   (see	  Schmidt,	  2012).	  However,	   concerns	   for	  practicality	   ruled	   this	  out:	   it	  would	  have	  imposed	  a	  heavy	  burden	  on	  data	  gathering	  and	  analysis	  and	  would	  not	  have	  brought	  much	  additional	  analytical	  leverage.	  	  Following	  this	  procedure	  I	  selected	  Britain	  and	  Germany	  as	  exemplars	  of	  the	  two	  aspects	  of	  variation	  I	  sought	  to	  study.	  This	  most	  closely	  followed	  a	  ‘most-­‐similar’	  design,	  in	  that	  the	  two	  countries	  were	  broadly	  similar	  on	  the	  ‘control’	  variables,	  but	  very	  different	   in	   their	   financial	   system	  and	   regulatory	  paradigm.	  However,	  this	   represents	   a	   slight	   adaptation	   of	   Mill’s	   design.	   In	   his	   original	   schema,	  variations	  in	  outcomes	  and	  causal	  conditions	  are	  observed	  at	  the	  same	  level:	  it	  is	  
countries	   that	   do	   or	   do	   not	   have	   revolutions,	   and	   that	   do	   or	   do	   not	   have	  oppressive	  monarchies	  and	  agrarian	  societies.	   In	  my	  design,	   the	  variables	  used	  to	   select	   the	   cases	   are	   at	   the	   level	   of	   countries,	   but	   the	   observed	   outcomes	  (variations	   in	   lobbying	   behaviours)	   are	   at	   the	   level	   of	   private	   actors.	   The	  motivation	   behind	   this	   is	   a	   desire	   to	   maintain	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   the	  comparative	  approach,	  while	  extracting	  analytical	  leverage	  by	  focusing	  attention	  on	   behaviours,	   and	   decisions	   behind	   them,	   at	   the	  micro	   level	   –	   at	   the	   level	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  in	  passing,	  that	  in	  this	  way	  this	  research	  follows	  a	  long	  tradition	  of	  Anglo-­‐German	   comparisons.	   For	   example,	   see	   Coen	   (2005)	   on	   utilities	   regulation,	   Lütz	   (2004)	   or	  Zimmerman	  (2010)	  on	  financial	  regulation;	  Moran	  (1999)	  on	  healthcare:	  or	  Thatcher	  (2007)	  on	  network	  industries.	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individual	   actors	   operating	   in	   overarching	   national	   contexts.	   This	   aligns	   with	  similar	   procedures	   adopted	   in	   the	   comparative	   public	   policy	   literature	   (see	  Engeli	  &	  Allison,	  2014;	  Levi-­‐Faur,	  2006).	  	  
3.3.3:	  Embedded	  case	  selection	  Within	  these	  two	  country-­‐cases,	  I	  aimed	  to	  study	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  the	  banks,	   and	   the	   factors	   shaping	   those	   behaviours.	   The	   selection	   of	   these	  embedded	   cases,	   or	   units	   of	   analysis,	   was	   again	   primarily	   motivated	   by	   a	  consideration	   of	   relevance.	   Secondary	   material	   analysing	   the	   two	   banking	  sectors	   was	   used	   to	   build	   a	   general	   picture	   of	   their	   structure,	   and	   to	   identify	  prominent	   sub-­‐sectors	   or	   strata.	   Then,	   reports	   published	   by	   the	   central	   banks	  and	  regulatory	  authorities	  of	   the	  two	  countries	  gave	  an	   indication	  of	   the	  banks	  which	   were	   particularly	   significant	   –	   because	   of	   their	   dominance	   of	   domestic	  markets,	  perhaps,	  or	  their	  international	  activity.	  This	  gave	  a	  more	  specific	  list	  of	  banks	  on	  which	   to	   focus	   the	  empirical	  analysis.	  From	  this	  point,	   the	  procedure	  for	   bringing	   in	   further	   banks	   –	   or	   indeed	   actors	   such	   as	   representative	   trade	  associations	  –	  into	  the	  units	  of	  analysis	  was	  fairly	  open:	  I	  examined	  registers	  of	  attendance	  at	  public	   consultations,	   for	  example,	   and	  used	   the	   information	   they	  contained	  to	  widen	  the	  sample.	  I	  also	  allowed	  interviewees	  to	  suggest	  others	  to	  be	   covered.	   This	   rolling,	   iterative	   procedure	   allowed	  me	   to	   include	   a	   suitable,	  and	  relevant,	  set	  of	  units.	  	  3.4:	  Variables	  and	  hypotheses	  Despite	   this	   being	   a	   case-­‐oriented,	   qualitative	   project	   framed	   around	   a	  comparison	   of	   the	   UK	   and	   Germany,	   certain	   variables	   and	   hypotheses	   were	  specified	  a	  priori.	  These	  were	  based	  on	  intuitions	  drawn	  from	  the	  literatures	  –	  on	  interest	  group	  lobbying	  and	  on	  varieties	  of	  capitalism	  –	  and	  were	  developed	  to	  provide	  a	  route	  into	  the	  empirical	  morass.	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3.4.1:	  Dependent	  variable	  The	   dependent	   variable	   adopted	   by	   this	   study	   captures	   the	   observed	   actions	  undertaken	  by	  banks	   in	   their	   lobbying	  efforts.	  These	  can	  be	  disaggregated	   into	  three	   aspects.	   First	   is	   the	   approach	   taken:	   whether	   the	   individual	   bank	  undertook	  its	  own	  representation,	  or	  participates	  in	  associational	  lobbying.	  This	  draws	   on	   the	   realisation	   from	   the	   literature	   that	   lobbying	   is	   costly,	   and	   that	  private	  actors	  face	  resource	  constraints	  in	  their	  behaviour	  (Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	  2007;	  Eising,	  2007a;	  Lowery,	  2007).	  The	  second	  concerns	  the	  venue	  at	  which	  the	  bank	  targeted	  its	  lobbying	  effort:	  a	  national	  regulator,	  the	  EBA.	  This	  builds	  on	  the	  theory	   of	   venue-­‐shopping	   we	   encountered	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   by	   which	  actors	   can	   vary	   their	   effort	   according	   to	   opportunities	   or	   pressures	   in	   their	  institutional	   environment	   (Baumgartner	   &	   Jones,	   1993;	   Beyers	   &	   Kerremans,	  2011;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006).	  The	   third	   focuses	  on	   information	  conveyed,	  and	   follows	   the	   lead	  of	   the	   literature	   in	  highlighting	   information,	   and	  different	  types	   of	   information,	   as	   a	   valuable	   currency	   in	   European	   lobbying	   (Bouwen,	  2002;	   Dür	   &	   De	   Bièvre,	   2007;	   Michalowitz,	   2004).	   The	   variable	   differentiates	  between	  high-­‐level	  intelligence,	  or	  detailed	  technical	  expertise,	  and	  examples	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.1.	  	  	  
Table	  3.1:	  Examples	  of	  information	  input	  
Coding	   Example	  ‘Political’	   ‘What	  is	  more,	  national	  supervisors	  know	  the	  specificities	  of	  their	  
respective	   national	   banking	   market	   better	   than	   a	   European	  
supervisor	  could	  ever	  do	  and	  have	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  of	  national	  
accounting	   rules.	   A	   European	   solution	   just	   for	   the	   sake	   of	  
comparability	   that	   cannot	   be	   achieved	   in	   any	   case	   therefore	  
merely	  imposes	  an	  unnecessary	  additional	  burden.’	  (Bundesverband	  deutscher	  Banken,	  2012)	  ‘Technical’	   ‘As	  a	  threshold	  0.25%	  of	  CET1	  capital	  seems	  very	  low	  if	  the	  aim	  is	  
to	   assess	   materiality.	   By	   definition	   this	   is	   1/400	   of	   one	   type	   of	  
capital	  which	  an	  institution	  may	  hold.	  However,	  a	  criterion	  based	  
on	   a	   measure	   such	   as	   this	   would	   not	   address	   those	   leveraged	  
products	  which	  utilise	   less	   capital	  but	  may	   in	   fact	   carry	  greater	  
risk.’	   (Barclays	  Bank,	  2013)	  	  The	   distinction	   here	   is	   marked	   by	   references	   to	   ‘national	   supervisors’	   and	  ‘national	  markets’	   in	   the	   first	   category;	   in	   comparison,	   the	   second	   avoids	   such	  appeals,	   and	   instead	   focuses	   on	   more	   neutral,	   and	   technical,	   expertise.	   This	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aligns	  with	  the	  basic	  separation	  common	  to	  the	  lobbying	  literature	  and	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  Together,	  these	  form	  a	  set	  of	  ‘bundles,’	  on	  which	  the	  task	  of	  uncovering	  activity	  can	   be	   based.	   	   They	   also	   provide	   a	   way	   of	   easily	   viewing	   the	   variation	   in	   the	  activity	  of	  lobbying,	  and	  so	  open	  the	  way	  to	  building	  a	  causal	  explanation.	  	  
3.4.2:	  Independent	  variables	  These	  variations	  in	  lobbying	  behaviour	  are	  hypothesised	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  factors	  pertaining	   to	   the	   banks.	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   theoretical	  framework	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  these	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  variations	  in	  the	  underlying	  financial	  system,	  and	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm.	  In	  this	  way,	  then,	  we	  have	  a	   link	  between	  the	   ‘country-­‐level’	  variables	  (on	  which	  the	  two	  cases	  were	  selected)	  and	  the	  embedded	  units	  of	  analysis	  (the	  banks).	  These	  variables	  were	  used	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   guiding	   the	   empirical	   research:	   they	   largely	   framed	   the	  development	   of	   the	   narrative	   threads.	   In	   the	   following	   sections	   I	   specify	  what	  these	  variables	  are,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  operationalised.	  	  
3.4.2.1:	  Resources	  At	   this	   point,	  we	   can	   recall	   the	   theme	   identified	   in	   the	   review	   of	   the	   lobbying	  literature:	  that	  resources	  matter	  in	  determining	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   chapter,	   the	   key	   resources	   are	   informational	   and	  centre	   on	   the	   ability	   to	   interface	  with	  policy-­‐making	   fora,	   and	   to	   generate	   and	  communicate	   expertise.	   However,	   these	   are	   very	   difficult	   to	   observe	   for	   the	  external	  researcher,	  since	  banks	  rarely	  disclose	   information	  on	  such	  resources.	  Still	  more	  rarely,	  we	  must	  add,	  do	  they	  publish	  details	  of	  their	  spend	  on	  lobbying.	  	  I	  therefore	  took	  two	  approaches	  to	  operationalising	  this	  variable,	  and	  capturing	  data	  pertaining	   to	   it.	  The	   first	  was	   to	   take,	  as	  a	  proxy,	  a	  simple	  measure	  of	   the	  bank’s	   size.	   Admittedly	   this	   was	   a	   crude	   indicator,	   but	   it	   worked	   on	   the	  assumption	  that	  a	  larger	  bank	  would	  have	  more	  financial	  resources	  to	  commit	  to	  developing	   informational	   resources.	   Furthermore,	   the	   approach	   sufficed	   given	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that	  I	  was	  only	  using	  this	  variable	  as	  a	  route	  into	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  (rather	  than,	  for	  example,	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  detailed	  regression	  analysis).	  	  To	   define	   this,	   I	   considered	   two	   dimensions	   of	   banks’	   activity:	   the	   services	  offered	  and	  the	  geographical	  focus.	  Information	  on	  these	  dimensions	  was	  taken	  from	  websites,	  or	  published	  financial	  statements.	  From	  these	  sources	  I	  also	  took	  figures	  relating	  to	  banks’	  net	  assets,	  as	  a	  simple	  indicator	  of	  raw	  size.	  Thse	  were	  combined	  to	  give	  a	  qualitative	  and	  numerical	  representation	  of	  a	  bank’s	  size	  and	  so	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   financial	   resources	   it	   could	   commit	   to	   lobbying.	   The	  output	  of	  the	  procedure	  can	  be	  symbolized	  graphically	  using	  a	  simple	  schematic,	  as	  shown	  in	  figure	  3.2.25	  	  	  
Figure	  3.2:	  Stylised	  portrayal	  of	  four	  UK	  banks	  
	  	  Secondly,	  I	  obtained	  specific	  information	  about	  banks’	  holdings	  of	  informational	  resources	   from	   the	   interview	   data.	   Questions	   were	   included	   in	   the	   interview	  script	   to	   gather	   information	   about	   how	   banks	   monitored	   policy-­‐making	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The	  same	  approach	  was	  taken	  to	  analysing	  banking	  sectors	  at	  an	  aggregate	  level.	  See	  Chapter	  Four.	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processes,	  or	  how	  they	  went	  about	  developing	  the	  required	  expertise.	  Through	  these	   processes	   I	   was	   able	   to	   construct	   clear	   pictures	   of	   the	   banks’	   sizes	   and	  resource	   endowments,	   which	   could	   then	   be	   used	   to	   link	   to	   their	   lobbying	  behaviours.	  	  
3.4.2.2:	  Preferences	  The	   second	   hypothesised	   variable	   captured	   the	   bank’s	   preferences	   over	  European	  financial	  regulation.	  Again,	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  chapter	  showed	  how	   these	   are	   grounded	   in	   the	   underlying	   national	   regulatory	   paradigms.	  Indeed,	   this	   variable	   hints	   at	   the	   complexity	   I	   identified	   at	   the	   start	   of	   this	  chapter,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  alignment	  of	  preferences	  between	  banks	  and	  public	  actors	  which	  are	  thought	  to	  drive	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  	  Nonetheless,	  these	  preferences	  had	  to	  be	  operationalised.	  Following	  the	  lead	  of	  scholars	  engaged	  in	  the	  research	  of	   ideas	  in	  politics,	  I	  concede	  that	  preferences	  can	  never	  be	  externally	  known	  with	  full	  certainty;	  to	  paraphrase	  Béland	  and	  Cox	  slightly:	   ‘[preferences]	   cannot	   be	   seen	   and	   are	   sometimes	   hard	   to	   track	   down’	  (2011:	   13).	   Instead	   they	   must	   be	   extrapolated	   from	   statements	   or	   utterances	  made	  by	  the	  actors	  in	  question,	  and	  so,	   in	  order	  to	  capture	  this	  variable,	  I	  used	  markers	  –	  in	  all	  data	  sets	  –	  which	  portrayed	  a	  preference	  on	  European	  financial	  regulation,	   or	   which	   referred	   (in	   some	   way)	   to	   the	   underlying	   regulatory	  paradigm.	  The	  preferences	  were	  cast	  along	  two	  dimensions.	  The	  first	  describes,	  ‘more’	   or	   ‘less’	   regulation,	   and	   the	   second	   relates	   to	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   such	  regulation	  is	  harmonised	  across	  the	  banking	  markets	  of	  Europe:	  whether	  a	  given	  rule	   should	   apply	   uniformly	   to	   all	   participants,	   or	   whether	   certain	   national	  regulators	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   soften	   it	   or	   toughen	   it.	   Examples	   of	   material	  coded	  on	  this	  basis	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.2.	  At	  a	  more	  granular	   level,	  naturally,	  the	   preferences	   can	   feature	   calls	   for	   a	   specific	   aspect	   of	   a	   regulation	   to	   be	  changed.	  Meanwhile,	   a	   similar	  procedure	  was	  used	   to	  gather	   information	   from	  the	   data	   showing	   reflections	   of	   the	   underlying	   paradigms.	   For	   example,	  comments	   made	   by	   interview	   respondents	   referring	   specifically	   to	   aspects	   of	  their	  national	  regulatory	  model,	  and	  its	  ideational	  foundations,	  were	  coded	  and	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used	   as	   identifiers	   of	   the	   paradigms	   showing	   through	   in	   discourse.	  During	   the	  analysis	  stage,	  the	  markers	  collected	  from	  private	  actors	  were	  calibrated	  against	  those	   of	   national	   regulators,	   to	   give	   a	   sense	   of	   diverging	   preferences,	   and	  diverging	  perceptions	  of	  the	  national	  regulatory	  paradigm.	  	  
Table	  3.2:	  Examples	  of	  material	  coded	  as	  preferences	  over	  European	  regulation	  
Coding	   Example	  ‘More	  Europeanisation’	   “And	  I	  think,	  you	  know,	  be	  really	  clear	  about	  this:	  firms	  and	  banks	  
want	  a	  single	  rulebook,	  it	  makes	  everyone’s	  life	  a	  lot	  easier,	  and	  so	  
that	  mandate	  that	  the	  EBA	  has	  is	  broadly	  very,	  very	  supported.”	  (Interview,	  4th	  April	  2014,	  London)	  ‘Less	  Europeanisation’	   “…	  under	   CRDIV	   there	  was	   this	   belief,	   or	   even	   fetish,	   but	   it’s	   not	  
appropriate	  way,	  or	   it’s	  not	  consistent	  with	   the	  cultures	  of	  every	  
country	  effected.	  It	  can’t	  be.	  It	  cannot	  possibly	  be…”	  (Interview,	  17th	  September	  2014,	  London)	  	  Like	   the	   selection	   of	   the	   country-­‐cases	   before	   them,	   the	   specification	   of	   these	  variables	  drew	  heavily	  on	  the	  underlying	  theory.	  The	  theoretical	  proposition	  that	  national	   origins	   (modelled	   as	   variations	   in	   financial	   capitalism	   or	   regulatory	  paradigm)	  drove	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  UK	  and	  Germany;	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  lobbying	  is	  shaped	   by	   resources	   and	   preferences	   inspired	   the	   choice	   of	   these	   variables.	  Together,	  then,	  the	  overall	  logical	  model,	  the	  cases,	  and	  these	  variables	  form	  the	  research	   design:	   the	   pragmatic	   blueprint	   according	   to	   which	   the	   project	   was	  conducted.	  	  
3.4.3:	  Hypotheses	  As	  with	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  variables,	  the	  hypotheses	  were	  developed	  to	  be	  used	   as	   guides,	   or	   as	   a	  means	   to	   parse	   through	   the	   empirical	   complexity	   and	  organise	  the	  findings.	  They	  too	  drew	  on	  intuitions	  taken	  from	  the	  literatures,	  and	  were	  constructed	  so	  as	  to	  provide	  a	  theorised	  causal	  chain	  from	  the	  varieties	  in	  fundamental	   national	   contexts,	   through	   the	   variables,	   and	   to	   the	   observed	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  	  The	  hypotheses	  arise	  from	  the	  three	  elements	  of	  the	  causal	  model,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  The	   first	  element	  has	  banks	  responding	  to	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  EBA	   as	   a	   supranational	   rule-­‐making	   authority	   and	   lobbying	   it;	   and	   so	   the	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hypotheses	  examine	  the	   link	  between	  the	  approach	  used	  and	  the	  informational	  resources	  which	  banks	  have	  at	  their	  disposal.	  The	  hypotheses	  are	  laid	  out	  below:	  
	  ‘The	  resource	  hypothesis’	  
H1:	  Larger	  banks,	  with	  greater	  lobbying	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal,	  will	  be	  
more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  EBA,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  directly	  and	  independently.	  	  
‘The	  associational	  hypothesis’	  
H2:	   Smaller	   banks,	   with	   fewer	   lobbying	   resources,	   will	   lobby	   the	   EBA	  
through	  their	  trade	  associations.	  	  	  The	   second	   element	   presents	   an	   alternative	   explanation,	   relaxing	   the	   earlier	  assumption	  and	  allowing	  banks	  to	  deliberately	  lobby	  their	  national	  regulator.	  It	  focuses	   instead	   on	   their	   preferences,	   and	   how	   these	   shape	   venue	   choices	   and	  rhetoric	  deployed:	  
‘The	  alignment	  hypothesis’	  
H3:	   Banks	   will	   lobby	   their	   domestic	   regulator,	   or	   the	   EBA,	   based	   the	  
alignment	   of	   their	   preferences	   over	   a	   given	   issue.	   The	   greater	   the	  
alignment,	   the	   greater	   the	   likelihood	   that	   a	   particular	   venue	   will	   be	  
targeted.	  	  
‘The	  informational	  matching	  hypothesis’	  
H4:	  Banks	  will	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  various	  regulatory	  venues,	  
and	  will	  adapt	  their	  input	  accordingly.	  	  The	  final	  element	  probes	  the	  interaction	  between	  these	  two	  causal	  pathways:	  
‘The	  interaction	  hypothesis’	  
H5:	   The	   greater	   a	   bank’s	   resources,	   the	  more	   likely	   it	   is	   to	   able	   to	   lobby	  
according	  to	  its	  preferences.	  	  With	  these	  in	  place,	  we	  now	  proceed	  to	  examining	  the	  sources	  of	  data	  the	  project	  used,	  and	  how	  they	  were	  treated.	  	  3.5:	  Data	  The	   following	  data	  sets	  were	  gathered	  and	  analysed	   in	  order	   to	   investigate	   the	  factors	  that	  shaped	  banks’	  lobbying	  behaviours:	  
• Consultation	  requests	  issued	  by	  the	  EBA,	  2011-­‐15	  
• Responses	  to	  these	  requests,	  submitted	  by	  various	  stakeholders	  
• Stakeholder	  interviews	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• Notes	  taken	  at	  public	  events	  
• Media	  reports	  
• Stakeholder	   position	   documents,	   not	   submitted	   to	   formal	   consultation	  processes	  	  These	  are	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  
3.5.1:	  Data	  sets	  and	  sources	  The	   first	   data	   set	   gathered	   contained	   the	   consultations	   requests	   issued	   by	   the	  EBA.	  The	  EBA	  carried	  out	  over	  a	  hundred	  consultations	  over	  the	  period	  studied.	  In	   each	   case,	   the	   process	   began	   with	   the	   publication	   of	   a	   formal	   request	  document,	   explaining	   the	   context	   of	   the	   rule	   or	   policy	   being	   drafted,	   and	  containing	   a	   set	   of	   specific	   questions.	   It	   also	   specified	   the	   duration	   of	   the	  consultation	  period,	  and	  contained	  details	  of	  any	  scheduled	  public	  hearings.	  The	  documents	  covered	  a	  range	  of	  topics,	  based	  around	  five	  key	  policy	  areas:	  capital	  (including	   definitions	   of	   capital	   and	   the	   treatments	   of	   exposures),	   leverage,	  liquidity,	   supervision	   and	   remuneration.	   Together	   these	   constituted	   the	   main	  pillars	  of	  the	  CRDIV/CRR	  legislative	  package.	  The	  questions	  in	  these	  documents	  covered	  a	  similarly	  broad	  scope,	  calling	  for	  input	  on	  high-­‐level	  points	  of	  design,	  and	  for	  more	  detailed	  points	  of	  calibration.	  Examples	  of	  these	  sorts	  of	  questions	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.2.	  I	  gathered	  these	  documents	  –	  115	  in	  all	  –	  from	  the	  EBA’s	  website,	  and	  they	  provided	  a	  canvas	  on	  which	  the	  research	  was	  conducted.	  	  
Table	  3.3:	  Examples	  of	  questions	  asked	  in	  EBA	  consultation	  papers	  
Type	   Example	  High-­‐level	  points	  of	  design	   “Do	   institutions	   agree	   with	   the	   use	   of	   existing	   and	   prudential	  
measures?”	   (European	  Banking	  Authority,	  2012a)	  Calibration	   “Are	  there	  additional	  sub-­‐categories	  of	   inflows	  and	  outflows	  that	  
are	   consistent	   with	   the	   specification	   of	   the	   liquidity	   coverage	  
requirement	   in	   the	   CRR	   and	   would	   inform	   policy	   options	   that	  
should	  be	  reported?”	   (European	  Banking	  Authority,	  2012b)	  	  The	   second	   data	   set	   contained	   the	   responses	   to	   these	   requests	   provided	   by	  stakeholders;	   again,	   these	   were	   made	   available	   on	   the	   EBA’s	   website.	   The	  response	   documents	   ranged	   from	   a	   few	   paragraphs	   to	   over	   50	   pages,	   and	  
	   81	  
contained	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   types	   of	   response.	   Stakeholders	   took	   issue	   with	  design	  points,	  and	  railed	  against	  ineffective	  calibration;	  or	  they	  behaved	  far	  more	  positively,	   expressing	   support	   for	   the	   EBA’s	   goals	   and	   providing	   constructive	  input.	   I	   extracted	   all	   documents	   submitted	   by	  British	   or	  German	   stakeholders:	  banks,	  trade	  bodies	  and	  regulators	  (408	  in	  total).	  In	  this	  sense,	  beyond	  this	  focus	  on	  the	  two	  case-­‐study	  countries,	  no	  sampling	  technique	  was	  used	  to	  restrict	  the	  selection	   of	   the	   documents.	   They	   were	   initially	   used	   to	   establish	   patterns	   in	  response	  rates,	  and	  later	  their	  contents	  were	  more	  explicitly	  analysed.	  	  These	   two	   sets	   of	   textual	   data	   led	   to	   the	   third	   source:	   I	   conducted	   semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  representatives	  of	  the	  institutions	  identified	  from	  the	  list	   of	   documents.	   These	   were	   conducted	   between	   March	   2013	   and	   January	  2015,	   in	   person	   in	   London	   and	   Brussels,	   or	   via	   the	   telephone	   or	   Skype.	   They	  were,	   on	   average,	   between	   45	   and	   60	  minutes	   long	   (although	   the	   longest	  was	  over	  two	  hours),	  and	  were	  conducted	  in	  English.	  I	  transcribed	  them	  all	  myself.	  It	  should	   be	   noted	   at	   this	   stage	   (and	   the	   full	   explanation	   of	   this	  will	   be	   covered	  during	  the	  later	  empirical	  analysis)	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  imbalance	  in	  the	  
types	   of	   institutions	   involved.	   For	   the	   UK,	   responses	   were	   spread	   among	  prominent	  banks	  and	  a	  few	  trade	  associations,	  whereas	  for	  Germany	  they	  were	  dominated	  by	  trade	  associations.	  The	  sources	  of	  the	  interviews	  are	  summarised	  in	  table	  3.4.	  	  
Table	  3.4:	  Interviews	  grouped	  by	  type	  
UK	   Germany	  	   Institutions	   Number	  of	  interviews	   	   Institutions	   Number	  of	  interviews	  Banks	   7	   11	   Banks	   2	   3	  Trade	  bodies	   4	   7	   Trade	  bodies	   3	   7	  
	   18	   	   10	  	  
Public	  institutions	   Others	  EBA	   3	   Law	  firms	   1	  National	  regulators	   2	   Consultants	   8	  European	  Commission	   1	   Third	  country	  banks	   6	  	   Journalists	   2	  European	  /	  other	  national	  trade	  bodies	   4	  
	   6	   	   21	  	  
Overall	  total	   55	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The	   documents	   established	   the	   initial	   set	   of	   interview	   targets,	   and	   from	   this	   I	  expanded	   the	   coverage	   to	   other	   relevant	   actors.	   Thus,	   I	   also	   interviewed	  representatives	  of	  professional	  lobbying	  firms,	  consultancies,	  regulators	  and	  law	  firms.	  The	  same	  snow-­‐balling	  approach	  brought	  me	  to	  interview	  representatives	  of	  other	  banks	  and	  trade	  associations	  (neither	  British	  nor	  German).	  Across	  all	  of	  these	  secondary	  categories	  interviews	  often	  proved	  very	  useful:	  either	  as	  general	  background	  to	  the	  subject,	  or	  because	  the	  individual	  interviewed	  had	  previously	  been	   employed	   by	   one	   of	   the	   key	   stakeholders	   and	   so	   could	   provide	   valuable	  input.	   The	   most	   common	   person	   of	   this	   type	   was	   the	   ‘poacher-­‐turned-­‐gamekeeper’:	   an	   individual	   who	   had	   previously	   worked	   for	   a	   regulatory	  authority	  and	  was	  now	  employed	  by	  a	  bank,	  trade	  association	  or	  consultancy.	  In	  all	  55	  interviews	  were	  conducted.	  	  I	   also	  attended	  a	  number	  of	   events	   at	  which	   I	  was	  able	   to	  observe	   lobbying	   in	  action	   in	  various	  guises.	   I	  was	  present	  at	  nine	  public	  hearings	  convened	  by	  the	  EBA	   to	   support	   consultation	   processes,	   where	   I	   observed	   often	   heated,	   and	  extremely	   technically	   detailed,	   discussions	   between	   representatives	   of	   the	  private	   sector	   stakeholders,	   the	   key	   regulatory	   institutions	   and	   the	   EBA.	   I	  attended	   round-­‐table	   fora	  between	  banks	   and	   regulators	  hosted	  by	   the	  British	  Bankers	   Association,	   and	   a	   briefing	   session	   organised	   shortly	   before	   the	  European	  Parliament	  elections	  in	  May	  2014.	  I	  also	  attended	  media	  events,	  such	  as	   the	   launch	  of	  a	  report	  on	  the	  UK’s	  role	  as	  a	  European	  financial	  centre.	  At	  all	  these	  events	  I	  gathered	  extensive	  field	  notes	  on	  what	  I	  saw	  and	  heard:	  who	  was	  present,	  what	  arguments	  were	  deployed,	  and	  so	  on.	  	  Finally,	  I	  supported	  these	  data	  sources	  with	  a	  range	  of	  position	  papers,	  or	  other	  such	  documents,	  written	  by	  stakeholders	  during	  the	  period.	  These	  often	  took	  the	  form	  of	  ‘briefing	  papers’	  written	  for	  members	  of	  trade	  associations,	  or	  for	  clients	  in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   consultancies.	   These	  were	   either	   picked	   up	   in	   hard	   copy	   at	  events,	   or	   obtained	   from	   the	   institutions’	  websites	   (or,	   occasionally,	   passed	   to	  me	   via	   email	   by	   interview	   respondents).	   In	   addition,	   I	   also	   gathered	   media	  reports	   on	   the	   policy	   discussions,	   which	  were	   useful	   in	   providing	   background	  information	  and	  commentary.	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3.5.2:	  Interview	  procedure	  The	   procedure	   by	   which	   the	   interviews	   were	   conducted	   merits	   some	   further	  explanation.	  Given	  the	  overall	  aim	  of	  the	  project,	  these	  had	  two	  purposes.	  First,	  clearly,	   the	   interviews	   served	   as	   a	   means	   of	   gleaning	   data	   from	   respondents	  regarding	  the	  lobbying	  activities	  of	  their	  institutions.	  They	  were	  used	  as	  a	  source	  of	  information	  about	  venues	  targeted,	  approaches	  used	  and	  informational	  input	  deployed;	  and	  also	  information	  pertaining	  to	  the	  independent	  variables	  –	  such	  as	  the	  human	  or	  financial	  resources	  committed,	  and	  descriptions	  of	  the	  institution’s	  preferences.	  	  They	  also	  had	  a	  second,	  more	  inductive	  purpose,	  however,	  in	  that	  I	  used	   them	   to	   gather	   rich	   data	   on	   the	   causes	   of	   these	   lobbying	   efforts.	  Respondents	  explained	  to	  me	  the	  detailed	  processes	  which	  sat	  behind	  lobbying	  behaviours:	  how	  options	  were	  evaluated,	  how	  allegiances	  were	  forged	  or	  broke	  down,	  how	  contacts	  were	  established	  with	  regulatory	  institutions,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  this	  way,	   the	   interviews	  were	  also	  extremely	  valuable	   in	  obtaining	   information	  on	  stakeholders’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm,	  and	  their	  preferences.	  	  These	  twin	  aims	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  protocol	  which	  drove	  the	  interviews.	  At	  the	   start	   of	   the	   project	   I	   obtained	   the	   appropriate	   ethical	   approval	   from	   my	  university.	  I	  then	  arranged	  the	  early	  interviews	  by	  contacting	  staff	  at	  the	  banks	  I	  had	  identified	  by	  reviewing	  the	  consultation	  responses;	  and	  in	  a	  few	  cases	  I	  was	  able	  to	  approach	  them	  personally	  at	  EBA	  hearings.	  In	  each	  interview,	  I	  started	  by	  introducing	   myself	   and	   my	   work,	   and	   asking	   for	   permission	   to	   record	   the	  interview	  on	  a	  dictaphone.	  From	   there,	   I	  had	   two	  sets	  of	  questions	  prepared.	   I	  used	  ‘grand	  tour’	  questions	  (Leech,	  2002)	  as	  a	  route	  into	  the	  discussion,	  asking	  respondents	   to	   describe	   their	   ‘typical’	   lobbying	   efforts.	   The	   conversation	   was	  then	   diverted	   towards	   specific	   policy	   areas	   –	   for	   which	   I	   had	   prepared	   by	  reviewing	  the	  institutions	  public	  submissions	  (where	  possible).	  Secondly,	  I	  had	  a	  set	   of	   structural	   questions	   (Leech,	   2002:	   667),	   which	   asked	   respondents	   to	  structure	  their	  perceptions	  of	  lobbying	  efforts	  by	  describing	  the	  venues	  in	  order	  of	  their	  ‘usefulness’;	  or	  tapped	  into	  their	  perceptions	  of	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm	  by	   asking	   to	   describe	   –	   in	   order	   –	   the	  priorities	   of	   their	   regulator.	   A	   third	   set,	  which	   could	   not	   be	   prepared	   in	   advance,	   comprised	   the	   ‘probing’	   questions	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(Berg,	   2002:	   681),	   which	   were	   deployed	   to	   steer	   the	   discussion	   into	   deeper	  territory.	  An	  example	  of	  a	  such	  a	  script	  is	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  	  As	  I	  have	  pointed	  out,	  interview	  respondents	  (that	  is,	  the	  institutions)	  were	  not	  chosen	   randomly,	   but	   rather,	   they	  were	   drawn	   from	   the	   set	   of	   submissions	   to	  EBA	   consultations.	   In	   that	   sense,	   a	   form	  of	   purposive	   sampling	  was	   employed.	  This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  established	  practice	   in	   the	  use	  of	  élite	   interview	   in	  political	  science	  research,	  where,	  as	  Tansey	  points	  out:	  
‘the	   aim	   is	   not	   to	   draw	  a	   representative	   sample	   of	   a	   larger	   population	   of	  
political	  actors	   that	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	   to	  make	  generalisations	  about	  
the	   full	  population,	  but	   to	  draw	  a	  sample	  that	   include	  the	  most	   important	  
political	  players	  who	  have	  participated	  in	  the	  political	  events	  being	  studied.’	  	  (2007:	  765)	  	  I	   also	   employed	   a	   snowballing	   technique	   to	   garner	   more	   interview	  appointments,	   asking	   each	   respondent	   at	   the	   end	   of	   our	  meeting	   if	   they	   could	  recommend	   anybody	   else	   I	   should	   speak	   to.	   This	  was	   greatly	   aided,	   at	   certain	  junctures,	  by	  having	  the	  fortune	  to	  recruit	  a	  few	  ‘gatekeepers’	  (Goldstein,	  2002):	  well-­‐connected	   individuals	   who	   were	   happy	   to	   broker	   further	   meetings.	   This	  meant	   that	  only	  very	  occasionally	  did	   I	  have	   to	  solicit	   interviews	  by	  contacting	  respondents	   directly.	   In	   arranging	   meetings	   I	   was	   careful,	   where	   possible,	   to	  interview	  individuals	  who	  could	  give	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  perspectives.	  This	  meant	  targeting	  staff	  at	  fairly	  senior	  levels	  (often	  directors	  and	  above),	  and	  obtaining	  a	  balance	   between	   those	   in	   public	   affairs	   or	   government	   relations,	   those	   in	  regulatory	  liaison,	  and	  specialists	  in	  technical	  policy.	  It	  also	  involved	  –	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  list	  of	  respondents	  in	  Appendix	  2	  –	  interviewing	  several	  staff	  from	  the	  same	  institution	  in	  certain	  cases.	  	  Throughout	   the	   entire	   process	   I	   was	   also	   greatly	   aided	   by	   own	   status	   as	   an	  ‘insider’,	   arising	   from	   the	   time	   I	   spent	   as	   an	   employee	   of	   a	   global	   investment	  bank	  before	  undertaking	  my	  doctoral	  studies.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  pilot,	  and	  finesse,	  my	  interview	  script	  on	   former	  colleagues,	  and	  several	  of	   them	  also	  helped	  arrange	  interviews	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  research.	  But	  this	  position	  was	  perhaps	  most	  useful	  for	  building	  a	  rapport	  with	  my	  research	  participants	  –	  a	  condition	  seen	  as	  vital	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for	  enabling	  productive	  interviews	  (Leech,	  2002).	  It	  helped	  ‘break	  the	  ice’	  at	  the	  start	   of	   the	   interview,	   meant	   I	   was	   au	   fait	   with	   the	   terminology	   used,	   and	  enabled	   me	   to	   keep	   pace	   with	   technical	   explanations	   behind	   the	   institutions	  lobbying	  positions.	  My	  proximity	  to	  the	  industry,	  and	  to	  the	  subject	  matter,	  also	  helped	  me	  to	  maximise	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  interviews,	  as	  I	  was	  able	  to	  see	  through	  biased	  or	  inaccurate	  responses	  and	  separate	  genuine	  data	  from	  ‘noise.’	  However,	  as	   ever	   with	   qualitative	   research,	   this	   advantage	   brought	   with	   it	   a	   need	   for	  reflexivity,	  in	  that	  I	  had	  to	  be	  particularly	  careful	  not	  to	  let	  my	  background	  (and	  my	  prior	  suppositions)	  influence	  my	  data	  gathering.	  	  
3.5.3:	  Analysis	  
3.5.3.1:	  Content	  analysis	  The	   data	   were	   analysed	   using	   qualitative	   content	   analysis.	   The	   documents,	  interview	   transcripts,	   and	   other	   textual	   data	   were	   loaded	   into	   nVivo,	   where	   I	  used	   its	   functionality	   to	   conduct	   two	   stages	   of	   coding.	   The	   first	   was	   ‘closed	  coding’	  (Halperin	  &	  Heath,	  2012:	  323),	  whereby	  a	  preconfigured	  coding	  scheme	  was	  applied	  to	  the	  data.	  This	  was	  used	  to	  draw	  out	  ‘manifest	  content’	  (Aberbach	  &	  Rockman,	  2002:	  675):	  information	  pertaining	  to	  the	  model’s	  variables	  which	  I	  expected	   to	   find	   in	   the	  data.	   For	   each	   submission	  document,	   interview	  or	   field	  journal	  entry	  I	  also	  uploaded	  into	  nVivo	  basic	  information	  about	  the	  institution,	  such	   as	   its	   domicile,	   its	   size	   or	   type,	   or	   its	   business	   focus.	   Using	   the	   software	  package’s	  tools,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  cross-­‐reference	  between	  these	  piece	  of	  information,	  and	  establish	  high-­‐level	  themes	  –	  of	  the	  sort	  “All	  small	  UK	  banks	  did	  x.”.	  	  	  The	  next	  stage	  took	  a	  more	  ‘grounded’	  approach	  (Halperin	  &	  Heath,	  2012:	  323).	  Here	   I	   reviewed	   the	   individual	   pieces	   of	   data	   inductively,	   allowing	   ‘latent	  content’	   (Aberbach	   &	   Rockman,	   2002:	   675)	   to	   emerge.	   This	   second	   approach	  was	   particularly	   fruitful	  when	   gathering	   findings	   on	   actors’	   perceptions	   of	   the	  regulatory	  paradigm,	  and	  their	  preferences.	  It	  was	  also	  used,	  more	  generally,	  to	  gather	   subjective,	   attitudinal	   information	   relating	   to	   topics	   such	   as	   financial	  regulation	  (either	  national	  or	  European),	  lobbying,	  or	  the	  institutional	  landscape.	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For	   both	   stages	   of	   coding,	   the	   level	   at	   which	   the	   frames	   were	   applied	   varied,	  from	  individual	  words,	   to	  short	  phrases,	   to	  entire	  paragraphs.	  Across	   the	  two	  I	  was	   able	   to	   build	   a	   collection	   of	   discrete	   themes:	   common	   expressions	   which	  arose	   in	   several	   interviews,	   or	   similar	   references	   to	   the	   same	   position	   or	  preference.	  Examples	  of	  these	  themes	  –	  captured	  through	  both	  rounds	  of	  coding	  –	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.5.	  	  
Table	  3.5:	  Examples	  of	  themes	  extracted	  from	  the	  data	  
Theme	   Quotes	  /	  References	  Round	  1	  (closed):	  “We	  lobbied	  the	  EBA.”	   “So	  we	  had	  the	  proper	  formal	  meeting	  with	  the	  EBA,	  with	  all	  the	  supervisors	  there,	  and	  the	  board	  were	  there,	  and	  we	  had	  a	  formal	  presentation	  and	  then	  we	  had	  Q&A	  …”	  	   (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  Round	  1	  (closed):	  “Resources	  are	  important”	   ‘We	  regret	  we	  have	  neither	  the	  time	  nor	  in-­‐house	  expertise	  to	  provide	  [such	  figures]	  –	  and	  believe	  many	  of	  our	  members	  are	  in	  the	  same	  position.’	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2010)	  Round	  2	  (open):	  “Retrenchment”	   “And	   now,	   it’s	   one,	   at	   most	   it’s	   two	   meetings	   a	   year,	   and	   all	   of	   these	  meetings,	   the	   BaFin	   has	   to	   be	   forced	   to	  make	   an	   appointment.	   So	  we	   ask	  
them,	   ‘Please,	   it’s	   time	   for	   another	   appointment,	   because	   all	   these	   papers,	  
all	  the	  EBA	  papers,	  all	  the	  topics,	  we	  need	  to	  talk	  about	  it.’	  They	  don’t	  want	  
to	  talk	  about	  it.”	  	   (Interview,	  17th	  September	  2014,	  London)	  Round	  2	  (open):	  “We	  don’t	  lobby”	   “Yeah,	  and	  that’s	   the	  way	   I	  would	  see	   it,	   it’s	  not	   lobbying	  per	   se,	   it’s	  more	  ‘OK,	   I’ve	   agreed	   with	   the	   overall	   direction,	   but	   let’s	   work	   on	   the	   detail,	  
because	  that’s	  usually	  where	  the	  problem	  starts.’”	  	  (Interview,	  14th	  August	  2014,	  London) 	  Combining	   all	   of	   these,	   I	  was	   able	   to	   construct	   a	   richly-­‐detailed	   picture	   of	   the	  factors	   shaping	   lobbying	   behaviour.	   However,	   my	   ability	   to	   assemble	   these	  themes,	   and	   interpret	   their	   significance,	   was	   greatly	   aided	   by	   my	   insider’s	  knowledge	   of	   the	   subject	  matter,	   and	   as	  with	   the	   interviewing,	   this	   privileged	  status	  demanded	  reflexivity	  on	  my	  part.	  	  A	   particular	   area	   of	   difficulty	   came	   in	   assessing	   the	   ‘type	   of	   information’	  conveyed	   in	   the	   submission	  documents.	  The	  documents	   I	   read	  often	   contained	  both	   types:	   a	   piece	   of	   distinctly	   political	   argumentation	   (perhaps	   referring	   to	  national	  circumstances)	  would	  precede	  an	  in-­‐depth	  technical	  analysis	  of	  the	  rule	  change.	  However,	  although	  difficult	   to	  code	  on	  a	  binary	  basis,	  such	  a	  document	  was	  not	  entirely	  problematic	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  my	  causal	  model,	  since	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  initial	  piece	  of	  political	  input	  in	  a	  document	  submitted	  to	  the	  EBA	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was	   in	   itself	   of	   interest	   (given	   our	   theoretical	   expectations	   of	   the	   discursive	  norms	  of	  this	  technical,	  regulatory	  venue).	  	  Thus,	   the	   documents	   were	   not	   coded	   as	   either	   ‘political’	   or	   ‘technical’,	   but	  detailed	  data	  about	  their	  content,	  and	  their	  provenance	  (British	  or	  German,	  bank	  or	   trade	   association,	   et	   cetera)	   were	   captured.	   This	   was	   used	   to	   support	   the	  detailed	  causal	  narrative	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapters.	  	  
3.5.3.2:	  Process-­‐tracing	  To	  explore	  the	  causal	  relationships	  in	  these	  patterns	  I	  then	  employed	  the	  method	  of	  process-­‐tracing.	  Process-­‐tracing	  analysis	   allows	   the	   researcher	   to	   ‘get	   inside	  the	  box’	   (Gerring,	  2008),	   and	   to	   identify	   the	  key	  events	  and	  decisions	   that	   link	  the	  independent	  variables	  to	  the	  outcome.	  It	  was	  thus	  deployed	  for	  its	  strength	  in	   finding	   causal	   pathways:	   it	   ‘helps	  us	   to	  understand	   the	  meaning	   and	   role	  of	  established	   regularities,	   and	   can	   help	   suggest	   ways	   to	   uncover	   previously	  unknown	  relations	  between	  factors’	  (Checkel,	  2006;	  Vennesson,	  2008:	  234).	  It	  is	  also,	   as	   George	   and	   Bennett	   argue,	   particularly	   useful	   when	   dealing	   with	  equifinality:	  it	  ‘offers	  the	  possibility	  of	  identifying	  different	  causal	  paths	  that	  lead	  to	  a	  similar	  outcome	  in	  different	  cases’	  (George	  &	  Bennett,	  2005:	  215).	  	  The	  method	  shares	  some	  epistemological	  roots	  with	  critical	  realist	  approaches	  to	  empirical	   research,	   which,	   as	   Jackson	   explains,	   contain	   the	   ‘notion	   that	   valid	  knowledge-­‐claims	   reach	   beyond	   experiences	   to	   grasp	   the	   deeper	   generative	  causal	  properties	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  those	  experiences’	  (2010:	  74).	  Here	  he	  refers	  to	   the	  distinct	   (but	   frequently	  unobservable)	  properties	  of	  entities	  which	  cause	  outcomes;	   for	   our	   purposes,	   the	   equivalent	   is	   a	   focus	   on	   the	  mechanisms	   by	  which	  factors	  (such	  as	  resources,	  or	  preferences)	  cause	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  At	  a	   philosophical	   level	   the	   concern	   is	   similar:	   in	   both	   cases,	   empirical	   inquiry	   is	  concerned	   with	   identifying	   the	   intangible	   and	   the	   difficult-­‐to-­‐observe.	   By	  deploying	  process	   tracing	  we	  can	  step	  carefully	   through	   the	  data	  and	  generate	  plausible	  explanations	  as	  to	  causal	  mechanisms.	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The	  process-­‐tracing	  exercise	  was	  based	  on	  specific	  instances	  of	  banks’	  lobbying.	  This	  was	  done	  to	  enable	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  to	  be	  constructed	  around	  a	  causal	  narrative	   in	  a	  way	  which	   linked	  the	  variables	  and	  the	  hypotheses	  to	  the	  data.	   I	  took	   the	  European	   legislative	  package	  (CRDIV/CRR)	  and	  broke	   it	  down	   into	   its	  main	   issue	   areas;	   at	   a	   high	   level	   these	   were	   capital,	   liquidity,	   leverage,	  remuneration	   and	   supervision.	  Within	   each	   of	   these	   I	   then	   identified	   discrete	  instances	  of	  regulatory	  policy	  change,	  and	   looked	   for	  references	   to	   them	  in	   the	  data	  sources.	  For	  example,	  the	  issues	  represented	  in	  the	  consultation	  responses	  of	  the	  banks	  gave	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  the	  issues,	  and	  I	  also	  asked	  interview	  respondents	  –	  via	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  –	  which	  had	  animated	  their	  own	  banks	  the	  most.	  In	  this	  way	  I	  was	  able	  to	  inductively	  build	  a	  picture	  of	  which	   areas	   of	   change	   impacted	   which	   sorts	   of	   banks,	   and	   then	   to	   focus	   the	  process-­‐tracing	   at	   uncovering	   the	   causal	   stories	   behind	   the	   resultant	   lobbying	  efforts.	  These	  narratives	  form	  the	  core	  of	  Chapter	  Six.	  	  In	   constructing	   this	   framework	   I	   had	   two	   key	   intentions.	   First	   I	   wanted	   to	  portray	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  issues	  arising	  from	  the	  legislative	  package,	  and	  so	  to	  highlight	   the	   workings	   of	   (and	   lobbying	   efforts	   in)	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   policy	  debates.	  The	  second	  was	  coherence:	   I	  was	  concerned	   to	  explain	   these	  complex	  causal	  stories	  in	  a	  clear	  and	  accessible	  manner.	  	  
3.5.3.3:	  Summary	  The	   two	   analytical	   tools	   described	   above	   are	   congruent	   with	   the	   aims	   of	   the	  project.	  The	  content	  analysis	  allowed	  data	  to	  be	  summarised	  into	  themes,	  which	  described	  the	  regularities	  in	  the	  lobbying	  behaviour	  of	  banks,	  or	  certain	  classes	  of	   bank.	   Next,	   the	   process	   tracing	   exercise	   allowed	   the	   reasons	   behind	   these	  common	  behaviours	   to	   be	   extracted,	  with	   a	   particular	   focus	   on	   comparing	   the	  operation	  of	  resources	  or	  preferences	  across	  the	  two	  country-­‐cases.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  see	   how,	   for	   example,	   a	   resource	   shortfall	   among	   a	   set	   of	   banks	   linked	  backwards	   into	   their	   domestic	   milieu,	   and	   forwards	   into	   their	   European	  lobbying.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	   approach	   adopted	   by	   the	   project	   follows	   the	   lead	   of	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Falletti	  and	  Mahoney,	  who	  argue	  forcefully	  for	  a	  balancing	  of	  cross-­‐	  and	  within-­‐case	  analysis	  in	  examining	  causal	  processes	  (2015).	  	  3.6:	  Conclusion	  The	   review	   of	   the	   literature	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   generated	   the	   research	  question,	  and	  also	  provided	  a	   theoretical	   framework	  with	  which	   to	  account	   for	  the	  ways	  banks	  lobby	  the	  EBA.	  This	  chapter	  has	  laid	  out	  the	  research	  design	  –	  or	  the	  blueprint	  by	  which	  the	  thesis	  sets	  about	  answering	  the	  question.	  It	  explained	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  qualitative,	  case-­‐oriented	  approach,	  established	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  getting	   to	   the	   causal	   processes	   sitting	   behind	   banks’	   behaviours.	   Next,	   the	  various	   components	   of	   the	   model	   were	   outlined:	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   two	  manifestations	   of	   national	   variety	   were	   operationalised	   as	   variables,	   and	   how	  they	  were	  linked	  to	  behaviours	  via	  a	  set	  of	  hypotheses.	  Thirdly,	  the	  chapter	  laid	  out	   the	   sources	   of	   the	   data	   drawn	   into	   the	   study,	   and	   described	   the	   analytical	  techniques	  they	  were	  subjected	  to.	  By	  deploying	  this	  research	  design,	  the	  thesis	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  lobbying	  literature	  by	  developing	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	   private	   actors’	   national	   origins	   shape	   their	   behaviours	   in	   the	   emergent	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	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Chapter	  4:	  Context	  
4.1:	  Introduction	  The	   British	   and	   German	   banking	   landscapes,	   and	   their	   associated	   regulatory	  regimes,	  vary	  significantly.	  Differences	  in	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  banking	  markets	  drive	  the	  distribution	  of	  lobbying	  resources	  among	  banks,	  and	  their	  preferences	  are	   conditioned	  by	   the	  prevailing	   regulatory	   regimes;	   under	   our	   causal	  model,	  both	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  then	  thought	  to	  shape	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  To	  facilitate	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  this	  lobbying,	  we	  must	  first	  acquaint	  ourselves	  with	  the	  two	  national	  contexts,	  and	  the	  overall	  European	  level,	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  This	   chapter	   sets	   out	   to	   add	   some	   empirical	   flesh	   to	   the	   theoretical	   notion	   of	  ‘varieties	  of	  capitalism’	  (P.A.	  Hall	  &	  Soskice,	  2001)	  encountered	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  and	   to	   lay	   out	   the	   exogenous	   landscape	   in	   which	   the	   investigation	   of	   banks’	  lobbying	   takes	   place.	   It	   proceeds	   as	   follows.	   I	   begin	   by	   briefly	   reprising	   the	  theory	   of	   variation,	   and	   by	   proposing	   descriptive	   frameworks	   to	   guide	   our	  review	  of	  the	  two	  countries.	  Then,	  section	  three	  deploys	  the	  first	  of	  these	  to	  the	  study	  of	   the	  banking	   landscapes:	   I	  outline	   the	  current	  structure	  of	   the	  markets	  and	  identify	  key	  players,	  give	  a	  short	  history	  of	  their	  development,	  and	  comment	  on	   recent	   developments.	   In	   section	   four	   I	   repeat	   the	   process	   for	   the	   two	  regulatory	   regimes.	   I	   examine	   their	   underlying	   paradigms,	   and	   review	   the	  institutions	   and	   practices	   through	   which	   regulation	   is	   delivered.26 	  Next,	   in	  section	   five	   I	   turn	   to	   the	   European	   context,	   studying	   the	   development	   of	   its	  regulatory	   regime.	   This	   aims	   to	   provide	   an	   overall	   backdrop:	   a	   picture	   of	   the	  European	  opportunity	  structure	  and	  the	  body	  of	  policy,	  on	  which	  the	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  banks’	  lobbying	  behaviours	  will	  be	  laid	  out	  in	  later	  chapters.	  Finally,	  in	  section	  six	  I	  offer	  some	  concluding	  remarks.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Across	   these	   sections,	   the	   focus	   is	   on	   an	   explicit	   comparison	   between	   the	   UK	   and	   Germany	  across	   each	  dimension;	  hence	   the	   rationale	   for	   splitting	   the	  analysis	   into	   ‘banking	   sectors’	   and	  ‘regulatory	  regimes’,	  rather	  than	  proceeding	  country	  by	  country.	  
	   91	  
4.2:	  Banking	  sectors	  and	  regulatory	  regimes:	  Reprising	  the	  theory	  In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  survey	  of	  the	  two	  national	  contexts,	  we	  must	  first	  briefly	  revisit	  the	  theoretical	  discussions	  we	  encountered	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	  This	  section	  uses	  these	  to	  develop	  simple	  descriptive	  frameworks,	  which	  will	  later	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  banking	  sectors	  and	  regulatory	  regimes.	  We	  begin	  with	  financial	  systems,	  and	  then	  turn	  to	  regulatory	  paradigms.	  	  
4.2.1:	  Financial	  systems	  and	  banking	  sectors	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	   financial	  systems	  sit	  at	   the	  very	  core	  of	  economies:	  they	  allocate	   funds	  among	  competing	  users,	  effect	  maturity	  transformation	  and	  fuel	   output	   and	   growth.	   The	   institutional	   arrangements	   through	   which	   this	   is	  achieved	   falls	   into	   two	  moulds	   (Allen	   &	   Gale,	   2000;	   Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   &	   Levine,	  1999;	   Story	   &	   Walter,	   1997;	   Zysman,	   1983),	   which	   in	   turn	   play	   a	   role	   in	  determining	   the	   structure	   of	   banking	   sectors.27	  Banking	   sectors,	   or	   markets,	  form	   part	   of	   the	   institutional	   landscape	   of	   financial	   systems,	   and	   they	   vary	  alongside	   the	   broader	   distinctions	   outlined	   above.28	  	   To	   accurately	   grasp	   the	  nature	  of	  this	  variation,	  a	  simple	  descriptive	  framework	  is	  needed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  A	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  have	  been	  deployed	  in	  studying	  the	  development	  of	  financial	  systems.	  One	  approach	  has	  been	  to	  ground	  them	  in	  different	  over-­‐arching	  legal	  frameworks	  (La	  Porta	  et	  al.,	   1997;	   1998).	   In	   this	   analysis,	   English	   common	   law	  afforded	   greater	   protection	   to	   creditors	  than	   continental	   civil-­‐law	   traditions,	   allowing	   equity	  markets	   to	   flourish	   and	   bringing	   about	   a	  financial	  system	  based	  on	  arm’s-­‐length	  interactions	  in	  capital	  markets.	  An	  alternative	  view	  is	  that	  financial	   systems	   were	   forged	   in	   countries’	   industrial	   transformations:	   thus,	   British	  industrialisation	   was	   driven	   by	   private	   actors	   and	   financed	   through	   capital	   markets,	   while	  Germany’s	  was	  later,	  more	  centralised,	  and	  financed	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  loan	  capital	  co-­‐ordinated	   by	   large	   banks	   (Deeg,	   1999;	  Geschenkron,	   1962;	   Zysman,	   1983).	   These	   structuralist	  and	  historical	  institutionalist	  interpretations	  are	  countered	  by	  a	  set	  which	  emphasise	  the	  role	  of	  societal	   interests.	  Rajan	  and	  Zingales	  (2003)	  argued	  that	  entrenched	  élites	  –	  both	   financial	  and	  industrial	  –	  used	   their	  position	   to	   forestall	   the	  development	  of	  equity	  markets,	   such	   that	   some	  financial	  systems	  remained	  predominantly	  bank-­‐based	  (and	  thus,	  that	  financial	  power	  remained	  concentrated	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  these	  élites).	  Kroszner	  and	  Stahan	  (1999)	  took	  a	  similar	  approach	  –	  focussing	   on	   arrangements	   of	   key	   interest	   groups	   –	   in	   studying	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   bank	  branching	   restrictions	   in	   20th	   century	   America.	   Finally,	   Grittersová	   (2013)	   found	   empirical	  verification	   of	   the	   theoretical	   link	   between	   corporatist	   modes	   of	   interest	   intermediation	   and	  bank-­‐based	   financial	   systems:	   non-­‐market	   co-­‐ordination	   mechanisms,	   which	   operate	   to	   bring	  about	   greater	   social	   insurance	   and	   labour	   protection,	   are	   also	   strongly	   correlated	   with	   a	  prevalence	  of	  bank-­‐based	  financial	  systems,	  and	  comparatively	  under-­‐developed	  capital	  markets.	  28	  Other	   non-­‐bank,	   or	   even	   quasi-­‐bank,	   actors	   are	   also	   present:	   pension	   and	   hedge	   funds,	  insurance	  companies,	  and	  so	  on.	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The	   framework	   comprises	   two	   elements.	   The	   first	   is	   a	   simple	   quantitative	  assessment	   of	   the	   degree	   of	   consolidation,	   or	   fragmentation,	   displayed	   by	   the	  sector.	   A	   pair	   of	   measures	   is	   used:	   the	   Herfindahl	   index	   captures	   intra-­‐sector	  competition,	   and	   the	   CR-­‐5	   ratio	   denotes	   the	   percentage	   share	   of	   the	   entire	  sector’s	  assets	  held	  by	  the	  five	  largest	  institutions.29	  	  The	  second	  element	  is	  a	  more	  detailed	  qualitative	  review	  of	  the	  salient	  features	  of	   the	   sector.	   This	   involves	   categorising	   the	   banks,	   or	   sub-­‐sectors,	   into	   broad	  groupings	   based	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   services	   they	   provide	   and	   the	   form	   they	  take.	   Beginning	   with	   the	   former,	   we	   can	   distinguish	   between	   several	   areas	   of	  business.	   Retail	   banking	   is	   the	   provision	   of	   basic	   services	   (current	   accounts,	  overdrafts,	  credit	  cards	  and	  mortgages)	  to	  members	  of	  the	  public.30	  Very	  similar	  services	   are	   extended	   to	   businesses	   under	   the	   banner	   of	   commercial	   banking,	  together	   with	   more	   specialised	   functions	   such	   as	   trade	   finance	   and	   payroll	  management.	  Finally,	  the	  breadth	  of	  offering	  opens	  up	  when	  we	  reach	  investment	  
banking:	   this	   includes	   advisory	   services	   on	   mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   or	  corporate	  finance,	  as	  well	  as	  capital	  markets	  activity,	  such	  as	  underwriting	  bond	  or	  equity	  issuances.	  The	  key	  difference	  is	  in	  the	  source	  of	  revenue,	  in	  that	  retail	  and	  (most)	  commercial	  banking	  generates	  interest	  income,	  where	  as	  investment	  banking	  generates	  fee	  income.31	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  Herfindahl	  index	  calculates	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  squares	  of	  all	  the	  banks’	  market	  shares,	  in	  terms	  of	   their	   proportion	   of	   the	   total	   sector’s	   assets.	   HI	   scores	   range	   from	   0	   to	   10,000,	   with	   low	  numbers	   indicating	   greater	   fragmentation.	   Scores	   above	   2,500	   are	   generally	   taken	   to	   indicate	  ‘high	  concentration.’	  30	  Where	  such	  services	  are	  provided,	  along	  with	  investment	  advice	  and	  portfolio	  management,	  to	  the	  very	  wealthy,	  the	  business	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  private	  banking.	  31	  At	   a	   higher	   level,	   we	   can	   distinguish	   between	   these	   types	   of	   business,	   and	   the	   functions	   a	  banking	   system	   performs	   as	   part	   of	   the	   broader	   economy.	   The	   latter	   can	   be	   thought	   of	  mechanically.	   Firstly,	   in	   underwriting	   issuances	   of	   securities	   or	   extending	   loan	   finance,	   they	  perform	  the	  function	  of	  maturity	  transformation:	  helping	  firms	  gain	  access	  to	  long-­‐term	  financial	  capital	  to	  fund	  investments	  while	  satisfying	  savers’	  need	  to	  short-­‐term	  returns.	  Secondly,	  banks	  act	  as	  conduits	  of	  monetary	  policy,	   in	   that	   the	   rates	  at	  which	   they	  can	  borrow	   from	  the	  central	  banks	   govern	   the	   rates	   that	   they	   charge	   for	   the	   use	   of	   that	  money,	  which	   in	   turn	   helps	   either	  stimulate	   or	   dampen	   economic	   activity.	   Third,	   they	   collectively	   provide	   a	   secure	   and	   stable	  
payments	  system	  for	   the	  public	   and	   for	   firms;	   and	   fourth,	   they	   facilitate	   the	   transfer	  of	   liquidity	  around	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  financial	  system	  through	  their	  interactions	  in	  the	  wholesale	  money	  markets	  (Turner,	  2010).	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From	   this	   we	   can	   move	   to	   considering	   banks’	   forms,	   captured	   over	   the	  dimensions	  of	  size,	  breadth	  of	  focus	  and	  of	  ownership.	  Size	  is	  typically	  measured	  with	   reference	   to	   the	   size	   of	   their	   assets	   relative	   to	   some	   aggregate	   total	   –	  usually	  the	  assets	  of	  the	  entire	  banking	  sector.32	  Alternatively	  we	  can	  think	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bank’s	  branch	  network	  (where	  relevant),	  or	  the	  number	  of	  employees.	  Next,	  banks	  can	  focus	  on	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  business,	  or	  offer	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  services	  (becoming	  a	   ‘universal’	  bank).	  The	  distinction	   is	  often	  historical:	  some	  banks	  have	  retained	  a	  specialism	  while	  others	  have	  chosen	  to	  diversify.	  Likewise,	  they	   may	   concentrate	   on	   a	   certain	   geographical	   market,	   or	   may	   have	   an	  international	  client	  base.	  Lastly,	  banks	  may	  be	  privately	  owned,	  with	  their	  equity	  capital	   held	  by	   individuals	   or	   institutional	   investors.	  Alternatively,	   they	   can	  be	  mutually-­‐owned	  by	  members	  (usually	  staff	  and	  depositors)	  or	  by	  the	  public.	  	  	  Taking	  these	  together	  we	  can	  build	  a	  simple	  graphical	  representation	  to	  describe	  the	  features	  of	  a	  banking	  sector	  (see	  Figure	  4.1).	  	  
Figure	  4.1:	  Categories	  of	  bank	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Thus	   the	  ECB	  establishes	   classes	   of	   bank	  by	   size	  based	  on	   three	  proportions	  of	   the	   total	   EU	  banking	  sector’s	  assets:	  0.5%	  (‘large’),	  0.5%	  -­‐	  0.005%	  (‘medium’)	  and	  less	  than	  0.005%	  (‘small’	  (European	  Central	  Bank,	  2010a).	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4.2.2:	  Regulatory	  regimes	  Banking	  markets	  are	  subject	   to	  state	  regulation,	  and	  our	  next	   task	   is	   to	   lay	  out	  the	   framework	   for	   studying	   the	   arrangements	   through	  which	   this	   is	   delivered.	  Again,	   we	   begin	   by	   stepping	   back	   into	   the	   theory	   momentarily.	   Regulatory	  regimes	  are	  intellectual	  constructs	  used	  to	  facilitate	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	   risks	   in	   society	   (Coen	   &	   Héritier,	   2005;	   Levi-­‐Faur,	   2006).	   Their	   exact	  specification	   varies	   depending	   on	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   researcher:	   the	   legal	   scholar	  may	  focus	  on	  formal	  rules,	  or	  an	  institutional	  economist	  on	  incentive	  structures	  (Hood	  et	  al.,	  2001:	  12).	  However,	   looking	  across	  various	   instances	  of	   their	  use,	  we	  can	  observe	  a	  common	  approach	  of	  distinguishing	  between	  an	  underlying	  set	  of	  beliefs,	  and	  their	  physical	  manifestation	  (Hood	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  S.K.	  Vogel,	  1996).	  Following	  this,	  I	  adopt	  a	  descriptive	  framework	  comprising	  three	  elements.	  	  At	   the	   foundation	   sits	   the	   regulatory	   paradigm.	   This	   is	   the	   fundamental	  ideational	  framework	  for	  the	  entire	  regime.	  It	  contains	  the	  beliefs	  about	  the	  risks	  (and	  associated	  impacts)	  the	  regime	  seeks	  to	  control,	  and	  therefore	  the	  societal	  good	  it	  seeks	  to	  provide.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  specifies	  appropriate	  ‘levels’	  of	  regulatory	  burden,	   or	   degrees	   of	   intrusiveness,	   according	   to	   a	   weighting	   of	   costs	   and	  benefits.	  	  	  Chapter	   Two	   described	   how,	   in	   bank	   regulation,	   these	   desiderata	   are	   framed	  around	   a	   quartet	   of	   beliefs.	   At	   the	   very	   centre	   is	   an	   ontological	   belief	   about	  markets,	  as	  either	  a	  natural	  phenomenon,	  or	  as	  a	  human	  construct	  embedded	  in	  a	   legal	   framework.	   Next	   there	   is	   a	   related	   belief	   about	   the	   liberty	   of	   market	  actors:	   whether	   it	   is	   similarly	   natural,	   or	   whether	   it	   depends	   on	   the	   state	  providing	   a	   prevailing	   order.	   Third	   is	   the	   belief	   in	   the	   status	   of	   competition:	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  allocative	  efficiency	  is	  achieved,	  or	  whether	  it	  gives	   rise	   to	   the	   exploitation	   of	   consumers	   (and	   perhaps	   contributes	   to	  generating	  unwanted	  risk	  in	  the	  banking	  system),	  and	  so	  should	  be	  constrained.	  These	   three	   combine	   to	   give	   a	   fourth,	   about	   the	   role	   of	   public	   regulation:	   the	  degree	   of	   intrusiveness	   in	   supervision;	   the	   degree	   of	   ‘steering’	   of	   banks’	  behaviours,	  or	  lending	  policies;	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  discretion	  (and	  thus	  potential	  arbitrariness)	  permitted	  of	  the	  regulator.	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Sitting	   in	   front	   of	   this	   is	   perhaps	   the	  most	   visible	   element	   of	   the	   regime	   –	   the	  
regulatory	   institutions.	   These	   are	   the	   authoritative	   bodies	   charged	   with	  actualising	   the	   paradigm.	   They	   can	   take	   diverse	   forms:	   standalone	   agencies	   or	  commissions,	  branches	  of	  government	  departments,	  or	  even	  private	  associations	  such	  as	  guilds	  or	  trade	  bodies.	  Likewise	  the	  terms	  by	  which	  regulatory	  authority	  is	  delegated	  to	  them	  by	  political	  principals,	  and	  their	  resulting	  independence,	  can	  vary	   (Maggetti,	   2009;	   Thatcher	   &	   Stone	   Sweet,	   2002).	   These	   aspects	   of	   their	  form	   and	   function	   stem	   from	   the	   tenets	   of	   the	   underlying	   paradigm.	   The	   final	  element	  is	  the	  set	  of	  regulatory	  practices.	  This	  describes	  the	  tools	  available	  to	  the	  regulatory	   authority	   in	   exercising	   its	   designated	   role:	   the	   ability	   to	   grant	  licences,	  to	  impose	  fines,	  or	  to	  pursue	  legal	  proceedings.	  But	  it	  also	  describes	  the	  division	   of	   labour	   between	   the	   front-­‐line	   regulator	   and	   other	   bodies.	   For	  example,	   responsibility	   for	  policy-­‐making	  can	  sit	  with	   political	   actors,	  with	   the	  regulator	   just	   tasked	  with	   implementation;	  or	  both	  can	  be	  delegated	  wholesale	  to	   the	   independent	   body.	   Again,	   these	   derive	   from	   the	   fundamental	   ideational	  framework.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  in	  linking	  the	  second	  and	  third	  elements	  back	  to	   the	   first.	   This	   resolves	   a	   difficulty	   evident	   in	   many	   extant	   analyses	   of	   the	  regimes	  for	  bank	  regulation:	  they	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  physical	  manifestations	  of	  authority,	  and	  to	  overlook	  their	  ideational	  underpinnings	  (see	  Barth	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Rosenbluth	   &	   Schaap,	   2003;	   Sousa,	   2008).	   However,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  study,	   it	   is	   exactly	   the	   paradigms	   which	   are	   important:	   as	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	  British	   and	   German	   cases,	   many	   observable	   aspects	   of	   the	   institutional	  apparatus	   and	   the	   set	   of	   practices	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   the	   tenets	   of	   the	  underlying	  paradigm.	  	  	  
4.2.3:	  Summary	  This	   section	   has	   reprised	   some	   of	   the	   theory	   encountered	   in	   chapter	   two.	  We	  have	   looked	   at	   how	   banking	   systems	   –	   as	   manifestations	   of	   the	   underlying	  financial	  system	  –	  vary,	  and	  how	  regulatory	  regimes	  are	  structured.	  We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  deploy	  this	  understanding	  to	  the	  two	  empirical	  contexts.	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4.3:	  The	  Banking	  sectors	  The	   British	   and	   German	   sectors	   have	   long	   been	   the	   most	   starkly	   different	   in	  Europe.	   Although	   both	   have	   undergone	   subtle	   changes	   in	   the	   recent	   past	   –	  particularly	  as	  a	   result	  of	   the	  crisis	  –	   these	  differences	  persist.	   In	   this	   section	   I	  deploy	   the	   descriptive	   framework	   laid	   out	   earlier	   to	   these	   two	   sectors,	  commenting	  on	  their	  characteristics,	  and	  roots,	  in	  detail.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  draw	  out	  key	  features	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  each	  sector.	  	  
4.3.1:	  The	  British	  banking	  sector	  Our	  study	  of	  the	  British	  context	  begins	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  overall	  financial	  sector,	  which	   is	   said	   to	   typify	   the	   market-­‐based	  model	   (Allen	   &	   Gale,	   2000;	   Zysman,	  1983).	   Stock	   and	   bond	  market	   capitalisations	   as	   a	   ratio	   of	   GDP	   are	   far	   higher	  than	  most	  continental	  European	  countries	   (Vitols,	  2004),	  and	  banks	  operate	  as	  conduits	   between	   non-­‐financial	   firms	   and	   these	   markets.	   The	   banking	   sector,	  meanwhile,	  displays	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  consolidation:	  its	  Herfindal	  Index	  score	  was	  467	  in	  2009,	  and	  its	  CR-­‐5	  ratio	  was	  41%.	  There	  were	  389	  banks	  operating	  in	  the	  UK	   that	   year,	   with	   12,360	   branches;	   their	   total	   combined	   assets	   were	   €9.4	  trillion	  (European	  Central	  Bank,	  2010b).	  
	  The	  UK	  sector	  is	  arranged	  into	  three	  distinct	  layers.	  At	  the	  top	  it	  is	  dominated	  by	  a	   small	   number	   of	   very	   large	   (by	   assets)	   domestic	   banks;	   namely	  HSBC,	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland,	  Barclays,	  Lloyds	  Banking	  Group,	  and	  Standard	  Chartered	  (the	  ‘Big	   Five’).	   Of	   these	   the	   first	   three	   are	   universal	   banks:	   they	   offer	   retail	   and	  commercial	   banking	   to	   (mainly)	   domestic	   clients,	   but	   also	   have	   extensive	  international	   investment	   banking	   divisions.	   Lloyds	   focuses	   on	   retail	   and	  commercial	   banking	   –	   the	   latter	   operating	   internationally	   as	   well	   as	  domestically.	   Standard	   Chartered	   is	   a	   universal	   bank	   but	   despite	   being	   based	  and	   incorporated	   in	   London	   operates	   almost	   entirely	   in	   Southeast	   Asia.	   The	  second	   tier	   comprises	   a	   small	   set	   of	   banks	  which	   concentrate	  more	   closely	   on	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retail	   services,	   such	   as	   Santander	   and	   TSB.33	  The	   third	   contains	   the	   mutually-­‐owned	   building	   societies	   providing	   mortgages	   and	   savings	   products	   to	   retail	  customers.	   Waves	   of	   de-­‐mutualisation	   and	   consolidation	   have	   reduced	   this	  group	   down	   to	   45	   firms	   –	   almost	   all	   of	   which	   are	   small	   regional	   businesses	  providing	   mortgage	   finance	   and	   limited	   savings	   products	   to	   members	   of	   the	  public.	  	  The	  largest	  of	  these	  is	  the	  Nationwide	  Building	  Society,	  with	  assets	  larger	  than	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   building	   society	   sector	   combined	   (Building	   Societies	  Association,	   2013a).	   Among	   these	   various	   tiers	   the	   UK	   has	   no	   public	   banks,	  although	  both	  Lloyds	  and	  RBS	  were	  part-­‐nationalised	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008-­‐9.	  	  Where	  the	  UK	  banking	  sector	  is	  most	  remarkable	  is	  the	  extensive	  penetration	  of	  
foreign	   banks	   into	   its	   market.	   Such	   entities	   operate	   either	   as	   branches	   (legal	  offshoots	   of	   their	   parent	   bank	   and	   not	   independently	   capitalised)	   or	   as	  subsidiaries	  (incorporated	  and	  capitalised	  in	  the	  UK).	  In	  2009	  46%	  of	  the	  banks	  operating	   in	   London	   were	   of	   one	   of	   these	   types,	   compared	   to	   only	   5%	   in	  Germany	   (European	   Central	   Bank,	   2010b).	   Overall	   we	   can	   effectively	   identify	  two	   ‘bank	   circuits’	   in	   the	   UK:	   we	   see	   the	   provision	   of	   retail	   and	   commercial	  services	  by	  domestic	  banking	  groups	  (described	  above),	  and	  of	   investment	  and	  wholesale	  services	  by	  foreign	  banks	  (Quaglia,	  2006:	  10).	  	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  UK	  sector	  followed	  two	  distinct	  phases.	  The	  ancestors	  of	  the	  Big	  Five,	  and	  of	   the	  building	  societies,	  historically	  operated	  as	   two	  cartels	  until	  the	   1970s,	   dominating	   the	   clearing34	  and	   mortgage	   markets	   respectively.	   This	  arrangement	  began	   to	   fracture	  with	   the	   introduction	  of	   credit	  and	  competition	  control	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  in	  1971,	  which	  granted	  access	  to	  the	  wholesale	  money	  markets	  to	  firms	  outside	  these	  two	  groups	  (R.	  Davies	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  tight	  regulation	  by	  the	  US	  Federal	  Reserve	  limited	  the	  interest	  rates	  available	   on	   dollar	   deposits,	   and	   British	   banks	   positioned	   themselves	   to	   take	  advantage	   of	   this	   restriction.	   The	   City	   of	   London	   became	   a	   major	   conduit	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  The	   former	   is	   a	   UK	   arm	   of	   Banco	   Santander,	   a	   large	   Spanish	   universal	  which	   bought	   Abbey	  (formerly	  a	  building	  society)	   in	  2004.	  The	   latter	  emerged	   from	  Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	   in	  2014,	  and	  in	  2015	  it	  was	  purchased	  by	  Banco	  Sabadell.	  34	  The	  clearing	  banks	  facilitated	  cashless	  payments	  by	  processing	  cheques.	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dollars	   in	   the	   global	   currency	   markets,	   and	   by	   1979	   British	   banks	   held	   non-­‐sterling	   assets	   of	   around	   60%	   of	   national	   GDP	   (R.	   Davies	   et	   al.,	   2010:	   322).35	  Through	   this	   exposure	   to	   international	   currency	   markets	   the	   British	   sector	  absorbed	   the	   policies	   and	   behaviours	   of	   the	   American	   banks	   –	   furthering	   its	  characteristic	  capital	  markets-­‐based	  arrangement	  (Story	  &	  Walter,	  1997).	  
	  The	  next	  major	  transition	  occurred	  with	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  era.	  The	  Thatcher	   government	   de-­‐regulated	   British	   banking	   in	   1986	  with	   the	   Big	   Bang	  reforms,	   removing	   the	   restrictions	   on	   capital	   markets	   activity	   (notably	   the	  separation	   of	   brokering	   and	   jobbing).	   This	   opened	   the	   way	   for	   a	   mass	  consolidation	  of	  the	  sector,	  and	  in	  particular	  for	  the	  large-­‐scale	  takeover	  of	  many	  (and	   eventually	   all)	   British	   investment	   banks	   by	   foreign	   firms.	   This	   solidified	  London’s	   pre-­‐eminence	   as	   an	   international	   financial	   powerhouse:	   the	   City	  became	   the	   European	   centre	   for	   dealing	   in	   securities,	   currencies	   and	   early	  derivatives	  (Augar,	  2000).36	  	  Following	  this	  period	  of	  consolidation	  and	  internationalisation,	   the	  structure	  of	  the	   British	   sector	   stabilised.	   The	   changes	   it	   has	   undergone	   in	   the	   recent	   past	  have	   pertained	   more	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   it	   provides	   capital	   to	   the	   real	  economy.	   For	   example,	   the	   decades	   following	   the	   mass	   privatisations	   of	   the	  Thatcher	   era	   saw	   the	   enormous	   expansion	   of	   the	   SME	   sector,	  which	   relied	   on	  banks	  for	  finance,	  rather	  than	  capital	  markets.	  To	  respond	  to	  this	  new	  demand,	  the	   banks	   began	   in	   turn	   to	   draw	   on	  wholesale	  money	  markets,	   funding	   these	  loans	   with	   short-­‐term	   borrowings	   (Shabani	   et	   al.,	   2015).	   This	   has	   been	  characterised	  as	  a	  transition	  towards	  market-­‐based	  banking	  (Hardie	  &	  Howarth,	  2013):	   under	   this	   interpretation,	   banks	   no	   longer	   lend	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  painstakingly-­‐gathered	   and	   privately-­‐held	   information,	   but	   on	   external	   signals	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Indeed,	   this	  role	  began	  far	  earlier,	  as	  British	  banks	  offered	  depository	  services	  to	  Soviet	  Bloc	  governments,	  who	  needed	  to	  store	  the	  proceeds	  from	  the	  export	  of	  raw	  materials	  (Shabani	  et	  al.,	  2015:	  10).	  36	  In	   a	   confluence	   of	   these	   two	   trends,	   the	   (former)	   clearing	   banks	   also	   acquired	   investment	  banking	   operations	   in	   this	  manner,	   growing	   to	   become	   the	  modern	   universals.	   Thus:	   Barclays	  bought	   Zoete	   and	  Bevan	   in	   1986,	   and	   eventually	   based	   its	   global	   investment	   bank	   around	   the	  merged	  entity.	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available	  in	  the	  marketplace,	  such	  as	  the	  standardised	  measures	  of	  default	  risk	  in	  the	  client’s	  industry	  or	  sector.	  	  Furthermore,	  these	  various	  shifts	  –	  de-­‐regulation,	  internationalisation	  and	  a	  turn	  towards	   the	   wholesale	   markets	   –	   came	   together	   to	   constitute	   an	   overall	  financialisation	  of	  the	  UK	  economy	  over	  these	  decades.	  This	  was	  marked	  by	  the	  increasing	   complexity,	   specialisation	   and	   interconnectedness,	   of	   financial	  markets,	  fuelled	  by	  the	  growth	  in	  private	  pension	  funds.	  It	  also	  featured	  the	  de-­‐coupling	   of	   banks’	   profitability	   (and	   those	   of	   other	   financial	   firms)	   from	   the	  businesses	  they	  served,	  such	  that	  as	  industrial	  activity	  waned	  through	  the	  1990s,	  financial	   sector	  profits	   continued	   to	   rise.	  As	   a	   result,	   not	   only	  did	   the	   absolute	  size	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  rise	  (in	  terms	  of	  its	  net	  assets,	  or	  the	  number	  of	  people	  it	  employed),	  but	   so	  did	   its	   relative	   importance	   to	   the	  national	  GDP	  –	   reaching	  more	   than	  500%	   in	  2009	   (R.	  Davies	   et	   al.,	   2010:	  325).	   Later,	   in	   the	  post-­‐crisis	  years,	   analyses	   of	   this	   trend	  were	   to	   expose	   the	   fact	   that	  much	   of	   this	   rise	   in	  profitability	  was	  not	   the	   result	  of	   genuine	   improvements	   in	  efficiency,	  but	  of	   a	  long-­‐run	  build-­‐up	  of	  leverage	  and	  of	  risk	  (Haldane	  &	  Brennan,	  2010).	  	  This	   review	  of	   the	  British	   sector	  has	   traced	   its	   roots	   into	   the	   last	   century,	   and	  shown	  how	  it	  is	  now	  a	  highly	  concentrated	  market.	  A	  small	  number	  of	  British	  (in	  ownership,	   at	   least)	   universal	   banks	   match	   a	   dominance	   of	   domestic	   retail,	  commercial	   and	  SME	  markets	  with	  extensive	   international	   investment	  banking	  operations.	  An	  equally	  small	  number	  of	  banks	  compete	  with	  these	  on	  all	  but	  the	  investment	  banking	  fronts,	  and	  alongside	  these	  a	  layer	  of	  building	  societies	  offer	  retail	   banking,	   savings	   products	   and	   mortgage	   lending.	   This	   structure	   can	   be	  represented	  in	  a	  fairly	  simple	  graphical	  form	  –	  see	  Figure	  4.2.	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Figure	  4.2:	  Simplified	  view	  of	  the	  UK	  sector	  
	  Notes:	  	  A:	  RBS,	  Lloyds,	  HSBC,	  Barclays,	  Standard	  Chartered	  B:	   Nationwide,	   TSB,	   Santander;	   and	   recent	   new	   entrants	   such	   as	  Metro,	   Tesco	   and	  Marks	   and	  Spencer.	  Nationwide	   is	   included	   in	   this	  category	  (although	   it	   is	  a	  building	  society)	   to	  reflect	   its	  size.	  C:	  This	  contains	  the	  45	  regional	  building	  societies	  D:	  This	  contains	  the	  layer	  of	  specialist	  commercial	  banks	  E:	  These	  are	  the	  UK	  branches	  or	  subsidiaries	  of	  foreign	  investment	  banks.	  	  
4.3.2:	  The	  German	  banking	  sector	  We	  now	  move	  to	  the	  second	  of	  our	  empirical	  cases.	  At	  an	  overall	  financial	  system	  level,	   Germany	   typifies	   the	   bank-­‐based	   model	   (Allen	   &	   Gale,	   2000;	   Story	   &	  Walter,	  1997;	  Zysman,	  1983):	  its	  banks	  have	  close	  relationships	  with	  firms,	  and	  provide	  the	  majority	  of	  their	  external	   finance	  in	  form	  of	   long-­‐term	  loan	  capital.	  Households’	   financial	  assets	  prioritise	  bank	  deposits	  over	  direct	   investments	   in	  equities	   (Detzer	   et	   al.,	   2013:	   184);	   a	   fact	   reflected	   in	   the	   relatively	   weak	  capitalisation	   of	   German	   equity	   markets	   –	   at	   around	   30%	   of	   GDP	   in	   2002,	  compared	  to	  over	  100%	  in	  the	  UK	  (Vitols,	  2004:	  13).	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The	   German	   banking	   sector	   is	   the	   least	   consolidated	   in	   Europe.	   Counts	   of	   the	  population	   of	   individual	   institutions	   consistently	   report	   in	   the	   thousands:	   for	  example,	   in	   2012	   the	   Bundesbank	   identified	   1,988	   banks	   (Detzer	   et	   al.,	   2013:	  75).	  In	  2013	  the	  ECB	  computed	  a	  Herfindahl	  index	  score	  of	  266	  and	  a	  CR-­‐5	  ratio	  of	   31%	   -­‐	   both	   of	   which	   were	   the	   lowest	   recorded	   across	   the	   EU	   (European	  Central	  Bank,	  2014:	  61).	  	  Most	   German	   banks	   are	   universals,	   offering	   a	   range	   of	   retail,	   commercial	   or	  investment	  banking	  services	  to	  clients.	  They	  are	  organised	   into	  three	  distinct	  –	  and	   legally	   separate	   –	   pillars.	   The	   first	   contains	   the	   privately	   owned	   banks,	  which	  operate	   to	  a	  profit-­‐making	   incentive;	   they	  are	  often	   (rather	  confusingly)	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘commercial	  banks’	  in	  official	  Bundesbank	  statistics.	  At	  the	  top	  of	   this	   pillar	   are	   a	   small	   number	   of	   very	   large	   universals	   –	   the	  Großbanken	   –	  which	   serve	   retail	   customers	   through	   branch	   networks	   across	   Germany.	   Of	  these,	  Deutsche	  Bank	   is	   the	   largest,	  with	  assets	  of	  €1.9	   trillion,	  or	  nearly	   three	  times	   more	   than	   the	   nearest	   competitor	   (Detzer	   et	   al.,	   2013:	   74).	   It	   is	   an	  internationally	   active	   firm,	   and	   an	   important	   player	   on	   the	   global	   market	   in	  asset-­‐backed	   securities.	   Below	   this	   are	   Commerzbank	   and	  HypoVereinsbank37,	  with	   assets	   of	   €754	   billion	   and	   €372	   billion	   respectively.	   Next	   there	   are	   the	  joint-­‐stock,	   specialist	   banks	   which	   focus	   on	   specific	   types	   of	   lending	   (such	   as	  shipping	  finance),	  or	  certain	  regions.	  Lastly	  there	  are	  the	  branches	  of	  the	  foreign	  banks,	  which	  remain	  a	  very	  small	  part	  of	  the	  overall	   landscape;	  their	  combined	  holdings	  amounted	  to	  only	  3.6%	  of	  the	  entire	  banking	  sector	  in	  2010	  (Detzer	  et	  al.,	  2013:	  75).	  	  The	   other	   pillars	   are	   best	   viewed	   from	   the	   ground	   up.	   The	   second	   contains	  Germany’s	  almost	  unique	  public	  sector	  banks,	  and	  at	  the	  bottom	  are	  the	  primary	  savings	   banks,	   or	   Sparkassen.	   These	   are	   owned	   by	   local	   or	   municipal	  governments,	   and	   are	   obliged	   to	   serve	   the	   public	   interest	   of	   their	   local	  community.	  There	  are	  several	  hundred	  of	  these,	  and	  despite	  functioning	  under	  a	  common	   brand	   name	   and	   corporate	   image	   they	   do	   not	   operate	   –	   or	   indeed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  This	  has	  been	  a	  wholly-­‐owned	  subsidiary	  of	  the	  Italian	  UniCredit	  since	  2005.	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compete	   –	   across	   state	   borders.	   At	   the	   federal	   state	   level,	   meanwhile,	   the	  
Landesbanken	   serve	   as	  wholesale	   banks	   for	   the	   Sparkassen	   operating	   on	   their	  turf.	  Alongside	  this	  role	  they	  also	  undertake	  commercial	  lending,	  and	  the	  largest	  have	  recently	  diversified	  into	  international	  investment	  banking	  activity.	  They	  too	  have	  an	  explicit	  public	   interest	  raison	  d’être,	  but	   increasingly	  compete	  with	   the	  larger	  of	   the	   regional	  private	  banks.	  Across	   these	   two	  groups	  –	   the	   small	   local	  and	   the	   larger	   state-­‐level	  –	   there	  were	  436	  banks	   in	  2010	   (Detzer	  et	  al.,	  2013:	  75).	  	  The	  final	  pillar	  is	  the	  most	  populous,	  and	  contains	  Germany’s	  co-­‐operative	  banks.	  These	  are	  mutually-­‐owned	  by	   their	  members	  and	  do	  not	  serve	  a	  profit	  motive.	  Again,	  there	  are	  a	  large	  number	  of	  primary	  banks	  –	  1,121	  in	  2010	  (Detzer	  et	  al.,	  2013:	  75)	  –	  which	  provide	  various	  banking	  services	  to	  local	  communities.	  Above	  these	   sit	   two	   regional	   institutions,	   which	   act	   as	   central	   banks	   for	   the	   smaller	  units:	  DZ	  Bank	  and	  WGZ	  Bank.	  The	  overall	   share	  of	   the	   sector’s	  assets	  held	  by	  this	   pillar	   stood	   at	   around	  12%	   in	  2010	   (Detzer	   et	   al.,	   2013:	   75).	   The	  German	  structure	  can	  be	  represented	  graphically,	  using	  the	  simple	  illustration	  in	  Figure	  4.3.	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Figure	  4.3:	  Simplified	  view	  of	  the	  German	  sector	  
	  Notes:	  	  *	   The	   Landesbanken	   and	   the	   regional	   co-­‐operative	   banks	   perform	   clearing	   services	   for	   their	  smaller	  constituents,	  as	  well	  as	  commercial	  lending.	  	  This	  arrangement	  has	  deep	  roots.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  bank-­‐based	  model	  has	  been	   associated	   with	   Germany’s	   comparatively	   late	   industrialisation	  (Geschenkron,	   1962;	   Zysman,	   1983:	   72),	  with	   large	  universal	   banks	   serving	   to	  internalise	  many	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  capital	  markets.	  Meanwhile	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  co-­‐operative	  sector	  lie	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century:	  in	  the	  mountainous	  Rhineland,	  a	   local	   administrator	   named	   Freidich	  Wilhelm	   Raiffeisen	   formed	   rural	   lending	  institutions	  to	  help	  local	  farmers	  finance	  their	  agricultural	  production,	  and	  many	  modern	   co-­‐operatives	   are	   still	   called	   Raiffeisenbanken.	   In	   the	   west,	   a	   similar	  initiative	   –	   the	   Volksbanken	   –	   was	   launched	   by	   Herman	   Schultz-­‐Delitzsch.	   His	  institutions	  were	  based	  in	  small	  towns,	  and	  existed	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  craftsmen	  and	   small	   traders.	   Now	   these	   banks	   share	   a	   public	   interest	   ethos,	   their	  fundamental	   objective	   being	   ‘to	   support	   the	   economic	   activities	   of	   their	  members’	   (Ayadi	  et	  al.,	  2010:	  32).	  Over	   time	   firms	  and	  banks	  have	  come	   to	  be	  joined	   in	   a	   complementary	   institutional	   structure,	   and	   later	   path-­‐dependent	  processes	   layered	   other	   secondary	   aspects	   –	   such	   as	   corporate	   governance	  arrangements,	  co-­‐ordination	  mechanisms	  and	  state	  regulation	  –	  atop	  this	  set	  of	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stable	   relationships.	   Later,	   during	   the	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction,	   reform	   of	   this	  structure	   was	   consciously	   eschewed	   as	   policy-­‐makers,	   particularly	   in	   the	  Bundesbank,	  sought	  to	  ensure	  monetary	  stability	  and	  to	  use	  the	  banking	  sector	  to	  ‘steer’	  Germany	  growth	  strategy	  (Story	  &	  Walter,	  1997:	  162).	  	  The	  closing	  stages	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  saw	  efforts	  at	  reforming	  the	  financial	  sector	   (Deeg,	   1999;	   Vitols,	   2004).	   The	   commercial	   banks	   sought	   to	   diversify	  away	   from	   their	   heavy	   reliance	   on	   lending	   activity,	   as	   their	   interest	   margins	  were	  squeezed	  by	  the	  slow	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  ‘90s.	  	  Meanwhile	  policy-­‐makers	   were	   anxious	   about	   the	   growing	   fiscal	   burden	   imposed	   on	   the	  German	   state	   by	   the	   public	   pension	   scheme,	   and	   were	   also	   keen	   to	   promote	  Frankfurt	   as	   a	   financial	   centre	   to	   rival	   London,	   Paris	   or	   New	   York.	   These	  intentions	  were	  partially	   realised	   in	   the	  modernisation	   laws	  of	   the	  Finanzplatz	  
Deutschland	   and	   Reister	   Rente	   initiatives.	   	   The	   first	   of	   these	   created	   a	   single	  German	   stock	   exchange	   (where	   several	   smaller	   ones	   had	  previously	   existed	   in	  each	  of	  the	  Länder),	  loosened	  regulations	  around	  listing,	  and	  allowed	  the	  public	  to	  buy	  directly	  into	  a	  series	  of	  traded	  investment	  funds;	  much	  later	  –	  in	  2003	  –	  hedge	   funds	  were	   also	  permitted	   to	  operate.	  The	   second	   focussed	  on	   reducing	  the	   role	   of	   the	   German	   federal	   state	   in	   providing	   public	   pensions,	   instead	  encouraging	   individuals	   to	   save	   for	   their	   retirement	   via	   a	   range	   of	   investment	  vehicles	   (some	   administered	   by	   employers).	   Together	   these	   policies	   helped	   to	  slightly	  weaken	  the	  bank-­‐based	  model	   in	  Germany,	  promoting	  more	  active	  and	  liquid	   stock	   markets.	   However,	   the	   model	   has	   largely	   endured,	   as	   historic	  patterns	   representing	   the	   sources	   of	   firms’	   finance,	   and	   of	   household	  investments,	   persist	   (Bijlsma	   &	   Zwart,	   2013;	   Detzer	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Perez	   &	  Westrup,	   2008;	  Vitols,	   2004).	   Finally,	   despite	   some	   consolidations,	   particularly	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  crisis,	  the	  sector	  remains	  clearly	  segmented	  into	  its	  three	  pillars,	  and	  densely	  populated	  by	  a	  great	  many	  individual	  banks.	  	  
4.3.3:	  Summary:	  National	  models	  endure	  Looking	  across	  the	  two	  sectors	  we	  can	  see	  evidence	  of	  subtle	  changes	  in	  recent	  years.	   In	   the	  British	   context,	   these	  have	  been	   focussed	  on	   the	  way	  banks	  have	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operated,	   with	   an	   observed	   move	   towards	   intermediation	   reliant	   on	  international	   wholesale	   markets,	   and	   to	   a	   steady	   (and	   ultimately	   very	  dangerous)	  agglomeration	  of	  risk	  and	  leverage.	   In	  Germany,	  meanwhile,	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  stoke	  up	  capital	  markets,	  and	  to	  encourage	  both	  savers	  and	  users	  of	  finance	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  banks.	  However,	  in	  both	  national	  contexts	  the	  structures	   of	   the	   banking	   markets	   have	   remained	   largely	   stable,	   and	   very	  different	  from	  each	  other.	  	  	  The	  features	  of	  these	  banking	  landscapes	  are	  important	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  lobbying	   behaviours,	   as	   under	   our	   theoretical	   model	   the	   condition	   the	  distribution	   of	   lobbying	   resources.	  With	   this	   review	   of	   the	   banking	   sectors	   in	  place	  we	  can	  now	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  regulatory	  regimes.	  	  4.4:	  The	  Regulatory	  regimes	  Just	   as	   the	   two	   banking	   markets	   vary,	   so	   too	   do	   their	   respective	   regulatory	  regimes	   –	   but	   here	   the	   differences	   in	   the	   outward	  manifestations	   are	   perhaps	  less	  striking.	  For	  example,	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  Germany,	  regulation	  is	  carried	  out	  by	  standalone	  bodies	   independent	  of	  government,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  actual	  tools	  they	   employ	   are	   alike.	   Yet	   as	   we	   dig	   beneath	   this	   superficial	   similarity	  distinctions	  emerge	  –	  in	  the	  way	  the	  independence	  is	  constructed,	  or	  regulatory	  authority	   is	  exercised.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	   these	  variations	  are	   founded	  on	  the	  very	  different	   regulatory	   paradigms,	   and	   it	   is	   at	   this	   fundamental	   level	   that	  distinctions	  are	  the	  most	  robust	  and	  significant.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  deploy	  the	  second	  descriptive	  framework	  developed	  earlier,	   in	  order	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  these	  arrangements.	  This	  involves	  surveying	  the	  regimes	  from	  their	  underlying	  paradigms	  through	  to	  their	  physical	  institutions	  and	  their	  regulatory	  practices.	  	  
4.4.1:	  Comparing	  the	  paradigms	  The	   UK’s	   regulatory	   regime	   derives	   from	   a	   paradigm	   of	   classical	   liberalism.	  Markets	  are	  thought	  to	  exist	  in	  a	  realm	  separate	  from	  the	  state,	  and	  to	  be	  natural	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phenomena.	  Market	  actors	  are	  held	  to	  be	  rational,	  utility-­‐maximising	  beings	  who	  contract	   freely	   in	   open	   exchange,	   following	   economic	   liberties	   which	   mirror	  established	   political	   freedoms.	   This	   rationality	   and	   freedom,	   coupled	   with	   the	  pressure	  of	  fair	  competition,	  allows	  markets	  to	  achieve	  an	  equilibrium	  around	  a	  true	  price,	  and	   to	  be	  self-­‐correcting	   (returning	   to	  stability	  after	   the	   input	  of	  an	  exogenous	   shock).	   In	   turn,	   this	   equilibrium	   generates	   an	   efficient	   allocation	   of	  capital	   among	  competing	  users	   in	   the	   real	   economy,	   in	  a	  way	  which	   is	   socially	  optimal.	   In	   this	   schema	   the	   regulation	   of	   banking	  markets	   should	   be	   aimed	   at	  ensuring	   that	   competitive	   conditions	   prevail	   in	   the	   marketplace:	   that	  information	  on	  which	  decisions	  are	  made	  is	  publicly	  available	  and	  accurate,	  that	  barriers	  to	  entry	  are	  kept	  low,	  and	  so	  on.	  Going	  beyond	  this	  would	  be	  to	  infringe	  liberty,	   to	   cloud	   the	   rational	   utility-­‐maximisation	   of	   actors,	   and	   to	   distort	   the	  allocative	  efficiency	  of	  markets.	  Likewise	  the	  explicit	  direction	  of	  lending	  by	  state	  authority	  is	  out	  of	  the	  question,	  since	  that	  would	  be	  to	  over-­‐ride	  the	  accumulated	  judgement	  of	  private	  market	  actors.	  Finally,	  regulatory	  power	  should	  be	  vested	  in	  an	  authority	   independent	  of	  government,	  which	   is	  afforded	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  discretion	   in	   carrying	   out	   its	   duties.	   This	   prevents	   political	   contestation	  interfering	  with	  the	  minutiae	  of	  regulatory	  governance.	  	  Various	  aspects	  of	  this	  paradigm	  were	  challenged	  during,	  and	  after,	  the	  financial	  crisis.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   prominent	   regulatory	   thinkers	   such	   as	   Adair	   Turner	  criticised	   the	   core	  assumption	  of	   the	   rationality	  of	  market	  actors,	   and	   thus	   the	  efficiency	   of	   financial	  markets	   (Financial	   Services	  Authority,	   2009).	   Elsewhere,	  as	   the	   UK	   reconsidered	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   financial	   sector	   and	   the	  economy,	  there	  were	  calls	  for	  banks	  –	  particularly	  those	  in	  public	  ownership	  –	  to	  be	   directed	   towards	   supporting	   the	   national	   recovery.	   But	   as	   discussions	   over	  the	   reform	   of	   financial	   regulation	   played	   out,	   the	   paradigm	   held	   strong.	   The	  belief	  in	  the	  efficacy	  of	  competition	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  ensuring	  discipline	  was	  retained,	  and	   became	   matched	   with	   a	   more	   direct	   and	   intrusive	   supervisory	   approach	  aimed	   at	   ensuring	   banks	   were	   stable	   and	   well	   run.	   Likewise	   the	   belief	   in	   the	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rationality	  of	  market	  actors	  was	  not	  abandoned	  wholesale,	  but	  softened	  slightly	  to	  allow	  for	  their	  irrational	  behaviour	  in	  times	  of	  market	  stress.38	  	  German	  bank	  regulation	  is	  grounded	  in	  an	  ordoliberal	  regulatory	  paradigm.	  This	  can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   particular	   expression	   of	   a	   much	   broader	   philosophical	  approach	  to	  conceiving	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market.	  It	  arose	   from	   the	  work	   of	   economists	   and	   jurists	   at	   the	   university	   of	   Freiburg	   –	  chiefly	   Walter	   Eucken,	   Franz	   Böhm	   and	   Hans	   Großmann-­‐Doerth	   –	   and	   later	  played	   a	   central	   role	   as	   the	   guiding	   principle	   behind	   the	   post-­‐war	   economic	  miracle	   (Wirtschaftswunder)	   and	   as	   the	   theoretical	   roots	   of	   the	   social	   market	  economy	  (Bonefeld,	  2012;	  Vanberg,	  2004).	  During	  this	  period	  it	  had	  its	  clearest	  exposition	   in	   the	   writings	   of	   economist	   and	   finance	   minister	   Ludwig	   Erhard.	  Perhaps	   its	   central	   tenet	   is	   the	   importance	   of	   order:	   economic	   success	   arises	  from	  organised	  competition,	  integrated	  with	  political,	  social	  and	  legal	  stability.	  It	  rejects	  a	  separation	  between	  state	  and	  market,	  and	  holds	  instead	  that	  the	  market	  is	  a	  social	  construct.	   	  Market	  actors	  are	  still	   rational,	  utility-­‐maximising	  beings,	  but	   their	   freedom	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   state’s	   participation	   in	   the	   marketplace.	  Similarly,	  competition	  is	  subtly	  constrained	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  unfettered	   laissez-­‐faire	   capitalism,	  which	  may	   disturb	   the	   social	   order.	   Finally,	  regulation	  of	   banking	  markets	   is	   conducted	   so	   as	   to	   set	   the	  boundaries	  within	  which	   the	   market	   is	   allowed	   to	   operate,	   and	   to	   direct	   bank	   lending	   towards	  predetermined	   and	   socially	   beneficial	   ends.	   This	   task	   should	   be	   separated	  between	   the	   ‘guiding’	   function,	  which	   is	   the	  preserve	  of	  democratically	  elected	  political	   actors;	   and	   a	   purely	   administrative,	   supervisory	   function,	   which	   is	  delegated	  to	  a	  separate	  body	  isolated	  from	  political	  interference.	  	  This	  particular	  perspective	  –	  on	   the	  role	  of	   the	  state	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  market	  –	  has	  been	  manifested	  in	  several	  aspects	  of	  Germany’s	  actions	  on	  the	  European	  stage.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  as	  the	  financial	  crisis	  gave	  way	  to	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  in	  the	   Eurozone,	   the	   problem	  was	   constructed	   (and	   so	   the	   solution	   specified)	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  For	  this,	  and	  a	  broader	  account	  of	  the	  institutional	  change	  which	  followed	  the	  crisis,	  see	  Johal	  
et	  al.	  (2012).	  
	   108	  
distinctly	  ordo-­‐liberal	  terms	  –	  focussing	  on	  fiscal	  austerity	  and	  strict	  adherence	  to	  rules	  (Matthijs	  &	  McNamara,	  2015).	  	  We	   can	   capture	   the	   differences	   between	   these	   national	   paradigms	   in	   two	  dimensions.	   First,	   for	   the	   liberal	   paradigm,	   competition	   is	   heralded	   as	   the	  ultimate	   good,	   and	   as	   the	   condition	   which	   arises	   from	   the	   open	   and	   fair	  interaction	   among	   free	   agents.	   In	   contrast,	   Eucken	   held	   competition	   as	  something	  to	  be	  managed:	  	  in	  extremis,	  it	  was	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  principle	  of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   (Rechtsstaat),	   since	   it	   had	   the	   potential	   to	   threaten	   society,	  causing	   social	   strife	   among	   the	  working	   classes,	   or	   enabling	   exploitative	   cartel	  behaviour	   among	   firms	   (Hutchinson,	   1981:	   163).	   The	   basis	   for	   this	   constraint	  was	   a	   strong	   legal	   and	   institutional	   framework,	   which	   he	   called	  
Ordnungspolitik39,	  and	  which	  exposes	  the	  second	  dimension	  of	  contrast.	  For	  the	  liberal	  regulatory	  paradigm,	   the	  state	  should	  exist	  as	  a	  night-­‐watchman,	   tasked	  only	  with	  ensuring	  the	  basic	  conditions	  under	  which	  competition	  can	  operate	  in	  the	  market.	   Including	   the	   later	  contributions	  of	   social	  market	   theorists	   such	  as	  Müller-­‐Armack,	   Röpke	   and	   Rüstow,	   the	   ordoliberal	   conception	   of	   the	   state	  affords	   it	  a	   far	  greater	  role.	   It	   serves	  as	   the	   ‘guardian	  of	   the	  competitive	  order’	  (Vanberg,	  2004:	  16),	  but	  also	   interacts	  with	   the	  market,	   stepping	   in	   to	  provide	  welfare	  services	   in	  the	  case	  of	  distress.40	  In	  this	  sense,	  public	  regulation	  is	  thus	  concerned	  with	   the	   scope	  of	  market	  activity	   (deciding	  what	   can	  and	  cannot	  be	  traded),	  and	  its	  overall	  direction	  (establishing	  the	  public	  good	  towards	  which	  it	  should	  be	  directed);	  the	  equivalent	  metaphor	  is	  the	  state	  as	  ‘gardener.’	  We	  now	  come	  to	  the	  second	  and	  third	  elements	  of	  the	  regimes,	  and	  proceed	  by	  examining	  each	  national	  context	  in	  turn.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  ‘Ordnung’	  and	  ‘ordo’	  are	  the	  German	  and	  Latin,	  respectively,	  for	  ‘order.’	  40	  This	  exposes	  a	  subtle	  difference	  between	  Eucken	  and	  the	  latter	  three.	  For	  Eucken,	  the	  market	  was	   an	   ethical	   force	   in	   itself,	   and	   so	   the	   state	   provision	   of	  welfare	   should	   be	   avoided	   since	   it	  would	  interfere	  with	  its	  efficacy.	  For	  the	  later	  social	  market	  theorists,	  the	  market	  was	  a	  merely	  a	  mechanism	  for	  attaining	  growth,	  which	  the	  state	  should	  seek	  to	  go	  beyond	  –	  by	  offering	  generous	  public	  welfare	  benefits.	  See	  Vanberg	  (2004).	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4.4.2:	  The	  British	  regulatory	  regime	  For	  most	  of	   the	  modern	  era,	  bank	  regulation	   in	   the	  UK	  operated	  under	  a	   ‘club’	  arrangement	   (Moran,	   1991):	   the	   central	   bank	   kept	   the	   sector	   in	   check	   using	  various	   ‘soft’	   controls,	   most	   notably	   (and	   probably	   apocryphally)	   with	   the	  expression	   of	   censure	   through	   the	   ‘raising	   of	   the	   governor’s	   eyebrow.’	   After	   a	  period	  of	  meso-­‐corporatist	  self-­‐regulation	  under	  a	  set	  of	  industry	  bodies	  (Moran,	  1994:	   163),	   the	   shift	   to	   a	   formal,	   statutory	   regulatory	   structure	   came	   in	   1997,	  when	   the	   newly	   elected	   Labour	   government	   created	   the	   Financial	   Services	  Authority	   (FSA).41	  It	   was	   established	   as	   an	   integrated	   regulator	   (H.	   Davies	   &	  Green,	   2008),	   combining	   the	   functional	   roles	   of	   prudential	   and	   conduct-­‐of-­‐business	   regulation,	  and	  overseeing	  banks,	   insurance	  companies	  and	  securities	  firms.	   This	   new	   authority	   regulated	   the	   financial	   sector	   for	   around	   a	   decade,	  until	   its	   credibility	   was	   undermined	   by	   the	   crisis	   of	   2007-­‐9.	   At	   that	   point	   the	  existing	   framework	  was	   seen	   by	   the	   incoming	   coalition	   government	   as	   having	  been	  at	  fault	  before	  and	  during	  the	  crisis.	  In	  2013,	  the	  FSA	  was	  abolished	  and	  the	  Prudential	   Regulatory	   Authority	   (PRA)	   took	   on	   responsibility	   for	   prudential	  oversight	  –	  with	  a	  separate	  body	  handling	  conduct	  of	  business	  regulation	  (Johal	  et	  al.,	  2012).4243	  	  Prudential	  regulation	  is	  now	  clearly	  delegated	  to	  the	  PRA,	  under	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  revised	  Financial	  Services	  and	  Markets	  Act,	  passed	  in	  2013.	  This	  act	  lays	  out	  the	  objectives	   of	   the	   PRA,	   and	   the	   several	   principles	   of	   good	   regulation	   it	  must	   to	  adhere	  to,	  including	  efficiency;	  proportionality;	  the	  desirability	  of	  sustainable	  UK	  economic	  growth;	  the	  responsibility	  of	  firms’	  senior	  management;	  transparency;	  disclosure	   of	   information;	   and	   the	   general	   principle	   of	   consumers	   taking	  responsibility	   for	   their	   decisions	   (Prudential	   Regulatory	   Authority,	   2014a).	  Importantly,	  the	  legislation	  gives	  the	  PRA	  the	  freedom	  to	  largely	  define	  its	  own	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  broader	  political	  context	  of	  the	  FSA’s	  creation,	  see	  Westrup	  (2007).	  42	  The	  new	  structure	  took	  a	  ‘twin	  peaks’	  approach:	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  safety	  and	  soundness	  of	  the	   sector	   was	   placed	   with	   the	   PRA,	   while	   the	   regulation	   of	   the	   conduct	   of	   its	   business	   was	  moved	  into	  the	  Financial	  Conduct	  Authority.	  This	  was	  in	  response	  to	  a	  perceived	  weakness	  of	  the	  FSA	   regime	   –	   that	   it	   had	   struggled	   to	   balance	   the	   objectives	   of	   prudential	   supervision	   and	  consumer	  protection.	  See	  Davies	  &	  Green	  (2008)	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  this	  regulatory	  model.	  43 	  This	   study	   focuses	   on	   the	   PRA,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   body	   charged	   primarily	   responsible	   for	  implementing	  the	  EU’s	  legislation	  aimed	  at	  harmonizing	  prudential	  regulation.	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approach	   to	   meeting	   these	   principles,	   and	   to	   establish	   its	   own	   tools	   and	  regulatory	  practices.	  Its	  features	  and	  resources	  are	  aligned	  with	  this	  model:	  it	  is	  embedded	   in	   the	   independent	   central	   bank,	   and	   its	  management	   board	   (along	  with	   that	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England)	   is	   accountable	   to	   Parliament.	   It	   draws	   its	  funding	  from	  its	  regulatees	  (as	  did	  the	  FSA	  before	  it)	  –	  a	  design	  feature	  intended	  to	  secure	  its	  political	  independence.	  It	  has	  a	  staff	  of	  around	  1,000,	  and	  operating	  costs	  of	  £202m	  (Prudential	  Regulatory	  Authority,	  2014b:	  46).	  
	  Its	   statutory	   objectives	   are	   to	   promote	   the	   safety	   and	   stability	   of	   the	   UK’s	  financial	   system,	   and	   to	   promote	   effective	   competition	   within	   it.	   The	   PRA’s	  regulatory	  practices	  centre	  on	  a	  set	  of	  powers	  it	  holds:	  it	  grants	  licences	  to	  firms	  and	   can	   revoke	   them,	   it	   issues	   warnings	   or	   notes	   of	   censure,	   and	   imposes	  penalties;	  in	  extreme	  situations	  it	  can	  also	  directly	  intervene	  in	  a	  firm’s	  business,	  requiring	   it	   to	   cease	   a	   certain	   activity.	   Its	   chief	   regulatory	   tool	   is	   the	   ability	   to	  demand	   that	   banks	   hold	   high	   capital:	   this	   involves	   either	   increasing	  shareholders’	  equity	  or	  retaining	  more	  profits	  in	  reserves.44	  	  More	   broadly,	   the	   PRA’s	   approach	   in	   exercising	   its	   statutory	   duties	   ‘relies	  significantly	  on	   judgement’	   (Prudential	  Regulatory	  Authority,	  2014a:	  5),	   in	   two	  regards.	  Firstly,	  it	  assesses	  whether	  banks	  are	  conducting	  their	  business	  in	  a	  safe	  and	  sound	  manner,	  and	  does	  so	  by	  examining	  their	  management	  and	  governance	  structures,	  internal	  policies,	  and	  the	  suitability	  of	  key	  staff.	  It	  tailors	  the	  depth	  of	  this	   examination	   according	   to	   the	   type,	   and	   perceived	   riskiness,	   of	   the	   firm	   in	  question.	  	  Secondly,	  if	  is	  not	  satisfied	  following	  such	  a	  review,	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  require,	   entirely	   at	   its	   own	   discretion,	   that	   the	   bank	   holds	   higher	   capital	  reserves.	   Importantly,	  enforcement	   is	  oriented	  to	  outcomes:	   the	  PRA	  highlights	  an	  area	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  bank’s	  management	  but	  leaves	  the	  resolution	  to	  them;	  only	   where	   this	   is	   later	   found	   to	   be	   unacceptable	   are	   formal	  measures	   taken.	  This	  arrangement	  creates	  a	  discursive	  climate	  between	   it	   and	   its	   charges,	  with	  frequent	  communication	  on	  the	  fine-­‐tuning	  of	  the	  solutions.	  Further	  dialogue	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  For	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  capital	  adequacy	  ratios	  as	  a	  regulatory	  tool,	  see	  Barth	  et	  al.	  (2006).	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conducted	   via	   a	   statutory	   practitioner	   panel,	   as	   well	   as	   through	   more	   ad	   hoc	  consultation	  exercises	  (Prudential	  Regulatory	  Authority,	  2014a:	  38).	  	  The	   overall	   format	   of	   the	   regime	   is	   identifiable	   as	   a	   version	   of	   the	   ‘regulated	  competitive	  market’	  model	  (Thatcher,	  2007:	  151):	  control	  over	  banks’	  behaviour	  is	   largely	   exercised	   by	   the	   pressure	   of	   private	   shareholder	   ownership	   and	  competitive	   market	   forces,	   with	   regulators	   adjusting	   capital	   ratios	   in	   specific	  cases.	   In	   these	   features	   we	   see	   many	   reflections	   of	   the	   underlying	   regulatory	  paradigm.	  Even	  with	  the	  changes	  in	  regulatory	  thinking	  following	  the	  crisis,	  the	  PRA	  retains	  as	  a	  statutory	  objective	  the	  promotion	  of	  competition	  among	  banks.	  Similarly,	   its	  approach	  eschews	  overt	   interference	   in	  banks’	  operations,	   leaving	  responsibility	  for	  resolving	  issues	  with	  their	  management.	  Lastly,	  the	  regulatory	  authority	   has	   retained	   considerable	   independence	   and	   discretion	   in	   exercising	  its	  statutory	  duties,	  commensurate	  with	  a	  paradigmatic	  belief	  in	  the	  limited	  role	  of	  politics	  in	  regulation.	  	  
4.4.3:	  The	  German	  regulatory	  regime	  In	  a	  broadly	  similar	  pattern	  to	  the	  UK	  regime,	  German	  bank	  regulation	  has	  long	  been	   practiced	   through	   a	   corporatist	   arrangement	   involving	   the	   peak	  associations	   representing	   the	   three	   pillars.	   Dating	   back	   to	   the	   mid-­‐twentieth	  century,	   they	   perform	   a	   range	   of	   quasi-­‐regulatory	   and	   disciplinary	   functions:	  shared	   deposit	   protection	   schemes,	   rescue	   operations,	   liquidity	   management,	  and	  so	  on.	  They	  were	  integrated	  into	  the	  Central	  Credit	  Market	  Committee	  (the	  
Zentraler	   Kreditausschuss	   –	   recently	   renamed	   the	   German	   Banking	   Industry	  Committee),	  a	  coordinating	  body	  and	  interest	  rate	  cartel	  (Lütz,	  2004).	  In	  1961,	  a	  federal	   banking	   regulator	   –	   the	   Bundesaufsichtsamt	   für	   das	   Kreditwesen	  (BAKred)	   –	   was	   created,	   which	   shared	   standard	   setting	   roles	   with	   the	   ZKA;	  meanwhile	   monitoring	   and	   enforcement	   was	   largely	   delegated	   to	   the	   peak	  associations.	  In	  2001,	  BAKred,	  along	  with	  other	  bodies	  responsible	  for	  insurance	  markets	  and	  securities	   firms,	  was	   integrated	   into	  a	  single,	  unified	  agency	  –	   the	  
Bundesanstalt	   für	   Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht	   (BaFin).	   There	   followed	   a	   turf	  war	  between	   the	   federal	   states	   (the	  Länder)	   and	   the	  Bundesbank	  –	  which	  was	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keen	  to	  take	  on	  regulatory	  duties	  having	  lost	  control	  over	  monetary	  policy	  after	  the	   adoption	  of	   the	   euro.	  Eventually	   a	   compromise	  was	   reached,	  with	   the	  new	  body	  issuing	  licences	  and	  the	  central	  bank,	  via	  its	  regional	  branches	  in	  the	  states,	  carrying	   out	   supervision.	   The	   BaFin	   survived	   the	   financial	   crisis:	   a	   protracted	  debate	  about	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  dual-­‐institutional	  arrangement	  came	  to	  nothing,	  as	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  German	  policy-­‐making,	  with	   its	  many	  veto	  points	  and	  interlocking	   institutions,	   frustrated	   attempts	   to	   bring	   about	   change	   (Handke,	  2012a;	  Zimmermann,	  2012).	  	  The	   BaFin	   was	   established	   as	   a	   unit	   of	   the	   Federal	   Finance	   Ministry.	   It	   is	  monitored	  by	  a	  21-­‐seat	  administrative	  council,	  comprising	  representatives	  from	  the	  finance,	  justice	  and	  economics	  and	  labour	  ministries,	  the	  parliament,	  and	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Furthermore,	  an	  advisory	  board,	  consisting	  of	  representatives	  of	  the	   financial	   sector,	   consumer	   associations,	   academics	   and	   officials	   from	   the	  Bundesbank,	   provides	   policy	   input	   (Schüler,	   2004).	   Notwithstanding	   this	  complex	  oversight	  mechanism,	  BaFin	  has	  developed	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  functional	  autonomy	  (Handke,	  2012b)45.	  It	  has	  around	  2,400	  staff,	  and	  an	  operating	  budget	  of	  €191m	  (BaFin,	  2014:	  192).	  	  The	  BaFin’s	  key	  objective	  is	  to	  ensure	  the	  stability	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  country’s	  financial	  system.	  The	  tools	  available	  to	  the	  BaFin	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  UK	  regulator:	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  grant	  and	  revoke	  licences,	  to	  order	  special	  audits,	  to	  impose	  higher	  capital	  requirements	  on	  individual	  banks,	  and	  to	  issue	  fines.	  In	  exercising	   its	   statutory	   duties	   BaFin	   takes	   a	   forward-­‐looking,	   preventive	  approach	   (BaFin,	  2014):	   it	   seeks	   to	  work	  closely	  with	   firms	   to	   identify	   risks	   in	  advance,	   and	   to	   implement	   mitigation	   strategies.	   This	   process	   is	   aided	   by	  frequent	  consultation	  with	  industry	  stakeholders:	  policy	  proposals	  are	  subject	  to	  ‘notice-­‐and-­‐comment’	   processes	   and	   often	   discussed	   at	   public	   hearings.	  However,	   there	   is	   a	  pronounced	  division	  of	   labour	  between	   it	   and	   the	  Finance	  Ministry.	  Regulatory	  policy-­‐making,	  in	  a	  broad	  sense,	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  law,	  decided	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  This	   has	   not	   always	   been	   an	   easy	   relationship,	   however.	   In	   2008	   the	  ministry	   changed	   the	  management	   structure	   of	   BaFin	   from	   a	   single	   president	   to	   a	   collegiate	   board,	   to	   break	   the	  dominance	  of	  its	  then	  head,	  Jochen	  Sanio	  (Handke,	  2012b:	  243).	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upon	   by	   legislators.	   The	   German	   Banking	   Act	   (Gesetz	   über	   das	   Kreditwesten	   –	  KWG)	  lays	  out	  definitions	  of	  ‘banking	  business’,	  but	  also	  specifies	  such	  details	  as	  capital	  and	  liquidity	  requirements,	  large	  exposure	  limits,	  and	  banks’	  governance	  procedures.	  Actual	  implementation	  is	  delegated,	  within	  quite	  narrow	  bounds,	  to	  the	  BaFin,	  and	  the	  terms	  of	  its	  engagement	  with	  the	  banking	  sector	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  over-­‐arching	  law.	  	  This	  time,	  the	  format	  of	  the	  regime	  is	  akin	  to	  the	  ‘industry	  model	  of	  coordination’	  (Thatcher,	   2007:	   151):	   discipline	   is	   exerted	   partly	   through	   operation	   of	  competitive	  capital	  markets,	  but	  also	  through	  consensual	  and	  stable	  discussions	  structured	  around	  cooperation	  between	  state	  actors	  and	  industry	  groups.	  Again,	  we	   can	   detect	   signs	   of	   the	   underlying	   paradigm	   in	   this	   set	   of	   institutional	  structures	   and	   practices.	   To	   begin	   with,	   there	   is	   an	   ordoliberal	   preoccupation	  with	   placing	   the	   scoping	   and	   direction	   of	   markets	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   politicians.	  Thus,	   the	   Finance	   Ministry	   integrates	   the	   banking	   sector’s	   performance,	   and	  competitiveness,	   into	   an	   overall	   industrial	   and	   economic	   policy.	   Public	  regulation	  of	  banks	  extends	  to	  the	  formal,	  and	  legal,	  separation	  of	  the	  sector	  into	  three	  pillars,	  and	  at	  a	  state	  and	   local	   level	  allows	  public	   (political)	  authority	   to	  direct	  bank	   lending	   to	  meet	   a	   social	   benefit.	  The	  division	  of	   labour	   referred	   to	  above	  reflects	  an	  ordoliberal	  concern	  to	  separate	  the	  political	  business	  of	  policy-­‐making	  (with	  its	  distributional	  consequences)	  from	  the	  technocratic	  function	  of	  supervision	  (where	  political	  intervention	  is	  problematic)	  (Bonefeld,	  2012).	  	  
4.4.4:	  Summary:	  Differences	  remain	  Looking	  across	  these	  two	  regimes	  we	  can	  see	  certain	  similarities.	  In	  both	  cases,	  an	   independent	   authority	   has	   a	   statutory	   duty	   to	   ensure	   the	   stability	   of	   the	  country’s	  financial	  system:	  in	  one,	  this	  body	  is	  based	  in	  the	  Central	  Bank,	  and	  in	  the	  other,	   in	   the	  Finance	  Ministry.	   In	  both	   cases	   the	   regulator	   is	   able	   to	   take	  a	  flexible,	  judgement-­‐based	  approach	  to	  managing	  its	  supervision	  of	  banks,	  scaling	  the	  degree	  of	  oversight	  according	  to	  its	  perception	  of	  the	  bank’s	  riskiness.	  Both	  regulators’	   primary	   tools	   lie	   in	   the	   ability	   to	   impose	   variable	   capital	  requirements	  on	  banks.	  
	   114	  
However,	   in	   important	   respects	   significant	   differences	   remain.	   In	   the	   UK,	  regulation	   of	   banks	   is	   restricted	   to	   ensuring	   their	   individual	   soundness	   and	  stability,	   and	   that	   a	   healthy	   degree	   of	   competition	   exists	   among	   them.	   In	  Germany,	   authority	   extends	   to	   enforcing	   a	   legal	   separation	   between	   the	   sub-­‐sectors	   of	   the	   banking	   landscape;	   and	   political	   actors	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   the	  governmental	  hierarchy	  have	   the	  power	   to	  steer	  banks’	   lending	  behaviours.	  So	  while	   the	   ‘intrusiveness’	   of	   supervision	   can	   vary	   in	   either	   context	   (as	   both	  regulators	   are	   able	   to	   scale	   up	   or	   down	   the	   extent	   of	   their	   investigations),	  German	   regulation	   as	   a	  whole	   involves	   far	   greater	   intervention	   in	   the	  banking	  sector.	   Secondly,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   two	   regulators	   use	   their	   primary	   tool	  varies.	   The	   PRA	   has	   complete	   discretion,	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   its	   framing	  legislation,	   in	  deciding	  what	   to	   impose	  and	  on	  whom;	  whereas	   the	  BaFin	  must	  follow	   guidelines	   laid	   down	   by	   its	   political	   principals.	   For	   the	   BaFin,	   a	   certain	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  banks’	  behaviour	  is	  achieved	  not	  through	  variable	  equity	  capital	  ratios,	  but	  through	  stable	  interactions	  with	  industry	  groups.	  	  These	   features	   are	   important	   for	   our	   empirical	   study	   of	   banks’	   lobbying	  behaviours.	  The	  banks	  are	  subjects	  of	  these	  regulatory	  regimes,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  based	   in	   a	   distinct	   paradigm.	   These	   bodies	   of	   ideas	   shape	   the	   way	   banks	   see	  regulation:	  what	  they	  understand	  its	  objectives	  to	  be,	  how	  it	  should	  be	  practiced,	  and	   how	   regulatory	   institutions	   should	   be	   configured.	   These	   perceptions	  influence	  their	  preferences	  over	  European	  regulation,	  and	  it	  is	  to	  a	  review	  of	  this	  European	  regulatory	  context	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  4.5:	  The	  European	  context	  With	   the	   reviews	   of	   the	   two	   countries	   in	   place,	   our	   final	   task	   is	   to	   shift	   the	  perspective	  upwards	  to	  the	  European	  level,	   in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  overall	   opportunity	   structure	   in	   which	   lobbying	   takes	   place.	   This	   entails	  examining	  the	  European	  regulatory	  regime.	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4.5.1:	  European	  financial	  regulation:	  Legislation	  The	   story	   of	   European	   financial	   regulation	   is	   of	   two	   over-­‐lapping	   strands:	   the	  unfolding	   of	   successive	   waves	   of	   legislation,	   and	   the	   gradual	   development	   of	  institutional	   capacity.	   We	   begin	   with	   the	   former,	   and	   in	   order	   to	   trace	   the	  legislation	   back	   to	   its	   intellectual	   origins	   we	   move	   up	   a	   level,	   and	   study	   the	  hegemonic	   discourse	   which	   underpins	   financial	   regulation	   at	   the	   global	   level	  (Germain,	  2012).	  	  
4.5.1.1:	  The	  global	  level:	  Regulatory	  liberalism	  and	  the	  Basel	  Accords	  Global	   financial	   regulation	   represents	   the	   output	   of	   a	   dominant	   paradigm	  described	   by	   the	   term	   regulatory	   liberalism	   (G.	   Jackson	   &	   Deeg,	   2012;	   Major,	  2012;	   Mügge,	   2011).	   This	   is	   a	   concept	   which,	   as	   Major	   observes,	   is	   much	  misunderstood,	   implying	   as	   it	   does	   both	   less	   and	  more	   regulation	   (2012).	   	   To	  unpack	  it	  we	  can	  review	  its	  genealogy	  in	  brief.	  	  	  We	   begin	  with	   the	   transformation	   of	   international	   financial	  markets	   following	  the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   system.	   Here	   the	   Keynesian	   structures	   of	  capital	   controls	   and	   managed	   exchange	   rates	   were	   replaced	   by	   free	   currency	  markets,	  and	  the	  state	  began	  to	  be	  extracted	  from	  the	  direct	  governance	  of	   the	  international	  financial	  system.	  Across	  Europe	  this	  move	  was	  paralleled	  in	  other	  sectors	   with	   the	   privatisation	   of	   state-­‐owned	   industrial	   capacity	   (Majone,	  1997b),	  and	  in	  the	  US	  there	  was	  an	  equivalent	  dismantling	  of	  regulation	  around	  utilities	  provision	  (Derthick	  &	  Quirk,	  1985).	  These	  trends	  were	  later	  reinforced	  as	   sets	   of	   norms	   exported	   by	   transnational	   financial	   powerhouses	   such	   as	   the	  IMF	   and	   the	   World	   Bank.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   way	   that	   we	   most	   often	   connote	  ‘liberalisation’	  with	  ‘de-­‐regulation.’	  	  Yet	  moves	  away	  from	  the	  direct	  involvement	  of	  the	  state	  brought	  about	  a	  need	  to	  instil	  a	  new	  source	  –	  or	  even	  form	  –	  of	  regulation.	  The	  outcome	  was	  a	  large-­‐scale	  shift	  to	  the	  depoliticization	  of	  regulation,	  witnessed	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  by	  the	  vesting	  of	  regulatory	  authority	  in	  agencies	  isolated	  from	  direct	  political	  pressure	  and	   the	   associated	   rise	   of	   the	   ‘regulatory	   state’	   (Braithwaite	  &	  Drahos,	   2000b;	  
	   116	  
Majone,	  1994;	  Moran,	  2001).	  Not	  only	  was	  regulation	  moved	  further	  away	  from	  the	  public	  sphere	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  was	  also	  ‘de-­‐centred’	  and	  reconfigured	  so	  as	  to	  include	   a	   far	   larger	   cast	   list	   of	   actors	   (Black,	   2003).	   This	   is,	   manifestly,	   re-­‐regulation,	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘second	  face	  of	  neoliberalism’	  (Major,	  2012:	  541).	  	  These	   twin	   transformations	   came	   together	   to	   form	   the	   policy	   paradigm	  underpinning	  global	  financial	  regulation.	  It	  aims	  at	  liberalisation,	  which	  we	  often	  equate	  with	  the	  colloquial	  aphorism	  of	  ‘rolling	  back	  the	  state’;	  and	  at	  regulation	  to	  govern	   the	   competitive	  behaviour	  of	   firms.	   It	  has	  a	   fundamental	   faith	   in	   the	  efficiency	  of	  markets,	  and	  calls	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  systemic	  stability	  and	  the	  guaranteeing	  of	  smooth	  functioning	  to	  be	  delegated	  to	  market	  actors.	  Lastly,	  in	  a	  move	  away	   from	   the	   formal	   regulatory	   approach	  of	   the	  Keynesian	  days	  of	   old,	  the	  paradigm	  relies	  on	  the	  use	  of	   flexible	  standards	  rather	   than	   legally-­‐binding	  rules	  (Kerwer,	  2005),	  and	  on	  implementation	  through	  local	  channels.46	  	  This	  paradigm	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  Basel	  Accords	  –	  the	  set	  of	  soft	  laws	  which	  govern	  global	  bank	  regulation	  (Mosley,	  2010).	  The	  work	  was	  initiated	  by	  US	  regulators	  who	   were	   nervous	   of	   competitive	   pressures	   on	   their	   domestic	   market	   from	  comparatively	  lesser-­‐capitalised	  Japanese	  banks	  (Lall,	  2012;	  Major,	  2012).	  Basel	  I,	   signed	   in	   1988,	   based	   capital	   adequacy	   on	   establishing	   a	   minimum	   ratio	  between	   a	   bank’s	   equity	   base	   and	   a	   risk-­‐weighted	   measure	   of	   its	   assets.	   The	  fraction	  was	  set	  at	  2%	  for	  ‘Tier	  1’	  capital	  –	  corresponding	  to	  the	  purest	  form	  of	  equity	  issuance	  –	  with	  a	  further	  6%	  buffer	  allowable	  for	  other	  forms	  of	  capital.	  	  After	   less	   than	   a	   decade	   the	   Asian	   financial	   crisis	   exposed	   the	   weaknesses	   of	  these	  risk	  weighting	  procedures.	  The	  classes	  of	  asset	  were	  too	  crudely	  defined,	  meaning	   that	   banks	  were	   incentivised	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   riskier	   end	  of	   business	  within	  each	  given	  band.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  secondary	  motivation	  to	  move	  assets	  off	  the	  balance	  sheet	  altogether,	  by	  parcelling	  them	  up	  into	  securities	  and	  selling	  them	  to	  institutional	  investors.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  first	  Basel	  accord	  was	  intrinsically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  As	   we	   will	   see,	   there	   is	   an	   irony	   here:	   the	   global	   paradigm	   calls	   for	   flexible	   standards	   and	  national	  discretions	  –	  both	  of	  which	  were	  eschewed	  by	  European	  legislation.	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linked	  with	  to	  the	  oft-­‐cited	  structural	  shift	   in	  banking	  from	  ‘originate-­‐and-­‐hold’	  to	  ‘originate-­‐and-­‐distribute’	  (Major,	  2012).	  	  Basel	   II	   responded	   by	   refining	   the	   categories	   of	   exposure	   and	   adjusting	   the	  various	  capital	  charges	  to	  be	  taken	  against	  each.	  	  It	  also	  set	  out	  three	  ‘pillars’	  of	  regulatory	   coverage:	   capital	   levels	   were	   to	   be	   held	   above	   a	   standardised	  minimum	  (‘Pillar	  One’),	  on	  top	  of	  which	  local	  regulators	  had	  discretion	  to	  apply	  bank-­‐specific	   buffers	   (‘Pillar	   Two’).	   In	   a	   sign	   of	   the	   continuing	   faith	   the	  underlying	   paradigm,	   the	   strongest	   regulatory	   pressure	   was	   expected	   to	   be	  exerted	  by	  market	  discipline	  (‘Pillar	  Three’):	  great	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  transparency	   of	   publicly	   available	   information,	   which	   would	   be	   digested	   by	   a	  dispersed	   array	   of	   investors	   who	   could	   then	   punish	   bad	   banks	   in	   the	  marketplace.	  	  In	  2010	  Basel	  III	  strengthened	  the	  regime	  yet	  further.	  It	  kept	  the	  basic	  format	  of	  three	  pillars,	  but	  increased	  the	  overall	  levels	  of	  capital	  required	  and	  created	  new	  buffers	   to	   allow	   regulators	   to	   counter	   the	   pro-­‐cyclical	   tendencies	   of	   banking	  risks.	  Additionally	  it	  tightened	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  instruments	  that	  counted	  as	  ‘capital’	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Behind	   these	   detailed	   rules	   it	   introduced	   a	   ‘rule-­‐of-­‐thumb’	   backstop	   measure	   based	   on	   overall	   (i.e.	   not	   risk-­‐weighted)	   leverage.	  Finally	   is	   set	   out	   provisions	   for	   the	   management	   of	   banks’	   holdings	   in	   liquid	  reserves.	   Its	   contents	   can	   thus	   be	   traced	   to	   an	   incremental	   adjustment	   to	   the	  previous	  accords	  in	  response	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  by	  ensuring	  better	  coverage	  of	  the	  specific	  risks	  that	  were	  seen	  to	  have	  caused	  it.	  	  
4.5.1.2:	  European	  Legislation	  The	   EU’s	   legislative	   drive	   in	   this	   domain	   has	   followed	   the	   twin	   aims	   of	  liberalising	   and	   regulating.	  The	  Banking	  Directives	  of	  1977	  and	  1989	   removed	  restrictions	  on	  establishing	  branches	   in	   foreign	   jurisdictions	  by	   instituting	   two	  principles:	   ‘home	   country	   control’	   gave	   domestic	   regulators	   supervisory	  responsibility	  over	  the	  foreign	  activities	  of	  their	  banks,	  and	  ‘mutual	  recognition’	  required	   them	  to	  observe	   the	  equivalence	  of	  each	  other’s	   rules.	  Meanwhile	   the	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regulatory	   aim	  was	  met	   by	   iterations	   of	   the	   Capital	   Adequacy	  Directive	   (1993	  and	   1998),	   which	   transposed	   the	   Basel	   accords	   into	   binding	   European	   law	   –	  commensurate	   with	   the	   extension	   and	   completion	   achieved	   in	   other	   markets	  since	  Maastricht.	  	  	  The	  pace	  of	   legislative	  activity	  accelerated	  considerably	  around	   the	   turn	  of	   the	  century.	   A	   growing	   sense	   had	   emerged	   among	   European	   policy-­‐makers	   that	  integration	   was	   not	   taking	   hold,	   with	   the	   sheer	   complexity	   of	   the	   policy	   area	  stymieing	   the	   delivery	   of	   workable	   rules	   (Grahl	   &	   Teague,	   2005;	   Grossman	   &	  Leblond,	   2011:	   416).	   The	   Cardiff	   European	   Council	   asked	   the	   Commission	   to	  draw	  up	   a	   strategy	   to	   resolve	   the	  problem,	   and	   in	  1999	   the	  Financial	   Services	  Action	  Plan	  was	  tabled.	  It	  was	  an	  ambitious	  package	  of	  42	  measures	  intended	  to	  integrate	  financial	  markets	  in	  Europe,	  covering	  three	  topics:	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  wholesale	  securities	  markets,	  the	  integration	  of	  retail	  financial	  markets,	  and	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  prudential	  regulation	  for	  banks.	  	  	  The	   last	   of	   these	  marked	   a	   turn	   towards	   not	   only	   liberalising	   and	   integrating	  financial	  markets,	  but	  also	  regulating	  them	  more	  forcefully.	  Thus,	  amid	  a	  host	  of	  other	   pieces	   of	   legislation,47	  significant	   efforts	   were	   devoted	   to	   the	   task	   of	  transposing	  the	  newly-­‐minted	  Basel	  III	  into	  European	  law.	  The	  resulting	  package	  took	  a	  distinctive	  form	  compared	  to	  previous	  pieces	  of	  legislation,	  comprising	  a	  fourth	   revision	   of	   the	   Capital	   Requirements	   Directive	   (European	   Commission,	  2013a)	   and	   an	   entirely	   new	   Capital	   Requirements	   Regulation	   (European	  Commission,	   2013b).	   The	   combined	   package	   covered	   four	  main	   policy	   areas	   –	  	  capital,	  liquidity,	  leverage	  and	  remuneration	  –	  and	  a	  fifth	  element	  was	  more	  of	  an	  implementing	   approach	   than	   a	   discrete	   area	   of	   policy,	   but	   nonetheless	   proved	  contentious.	   These	   five	   formed	   the	   policy	   backdrop	   against	   which	   banks’	  lobbying	  efforts	  have	  been	  directed,	  and	  so	  we	  explore	  them	  in	  some	  detail.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47 	  These	   included:	   the	   Alternative	   Investment	   Fund	   Managers	   Directive,	   European	   Market	  Infrastructure	   Regulation,	   the	   Deposit	   Guarantee	   Scheme	   Directive,	   Markets	   in	   Financial	  Instruments	  Directive	  II.	  See	  Buckley	  &	  Howarth	  (2011),	  or	  Buckley,	  Howarth	  &	  Quaglia	  (2012)	  for	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  their	  passing.	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4.5.1.2.1	  Capital	  In	  this	  area,	  European	  policy-­‐makers	  followed	  the	  lead	  of	  Basel	  III	  in	  three	  areas.	  Firstly,	  the	  minimum	  ratio	  for	  core	  capital	  was	  raised	  from	  2%	  to	  4.5%,	  and	  the	  additional	   layers	  were	  adjusted	  such	  that	  the	  overall	  threshold	  was	  maintained	  at	  8%	  (see	   figure	  4.4).	  These	   limits	  were	   include	   in	   the	  CRR	  component	  of	   the	  package.	  	  
Figure	  4.4:	  Capital	  ratios	  under	  BII	  and	  BIII	  
Additional	  Items	  
8%	   	   Additional	  Items	  
8%	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   Tier	  1	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	  
Common	  Equity	  
4.5%	  
Tier	  1	   4%	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  
Core	  Capital	  
2%	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  Basel	  II	   	   	   Basel	  III	   	  	  The	  second	  was	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  what	  had	  been	  perceived	  as	  an	   important	  weakness	   in	   the	   previous	   definition	   of	   capital.48	  The	   Commission	   sought	   to	  ‘purify’	   capital,	   and	   to	   ban	   all	   instruments	   but	   the	   simplest,	   cleanest	   form	   of	  equity	  capital	  from	  the	  core	  layer	  –	  including	  public	  ownership,	  and	  convertible	  or	   subordinated	   debt.	   The	   benefit	   sought	   through	   these	   rules	   formed	   perhaps	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Basel	  II	  had	  allowed	  certain	  forms	  of	  convertible	  debt	  (which	  switches	  into	  equity	  in	  times	  of	  stress)	   to	   be	   classed	   as	   ‘core	   capital’;	   but	   the	   market	   turmoil	   of	   2008-­‐9	   had	   exposed	   their	  ineffectiveness	  as	  truly	  loss-­‐absorbing	  capital.	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the	  most	  prominent	  aim	  of	  both	  Basel	   III	  and	  CRDIV/CRR:	  to	   increase	  both	  the	  absolute	  levels,	  and	  the	  quality,	  of	  capital	  held	  by	  the	  banks.	  	  On	   top	   of	   this	   minimum	   level	   of	   capital	   BIII	   proposed,	   and	   the	   legislation	  adopted,	   a	   pair	   of	   additional	   surcharges.	   The	   capital	   conservation	  buffer	   (CCB)	  was	  a	  response	  to	  problems	  encountered	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  when	  banks’	  already	  weakened	  capital	  positions	  were	  further	  undermined	  by	  their	  continued	  payment	   of	   discretionary	   distributions	   of	   earnings	   –	   such	   as	   bonuses	   or	  dividends.	  Now,	  banks	  whose	  capital	   ratio	   fell	  below	  10.5%	  (the	  minimum	  8%	  plus	   a	   2.5%	   buffer)	   would	   face	   restrictions	   on	   such	   payments.	   The	  
countercyclical	  capital	  buffer	  (CyCB)	  allowed	  regulators	  to	  impose	  a	  further	  2.5%	  during	  periods	  of	   ‘excessive	  credit	  growth’	   (European	  Commission,	  2013c:	  11),	  which	   could	   then	   be	   released	   during	   times	   of	   stress	   so	   that	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  credit	  cycle	  could	  be	  smoothed.	  	  
4.5.1.2.2	  Liquidity	  At	   the	   Basel	   level	   the	   rules	   on	   the	   management	   of	   liquidity	   represented	   an	  addition	   into	   the	   established	   corpus	   of	   the	   accords.49	  Banks	   would	   now	   be	  required	  to	  hold	  pools	  of	  readily-­‐marketable	  assets	  (such	  as	  high-­‐quality	  bonds)	  which	   could	   be	   sold	   off	   (or	   placed	   with	   central	   banks	   as	   collateral)	   and	  converted	   into	   cash	   in	   order	   to	   finance	   outflows.	   The	   liquidity	   coverage	   ratio	  (LCR)	  would	   ensure	   that	  banks	  had	   sufficient	   stocks	  of	   such	  assets	   to	  meet	   all	  cash	  outflows	  over	  a	  30-­‐day	  period	  of	   stress,	  while	   the	  net	  stable	  funding	  ratio	  (NSFR)	   enforced	   a	   longer-­‐term	   view	   of	   the	   same	   solution	   and	   applied	   a	   less	  granular	  view	  of	  the	  assets	  involved.	  The	  former	  was	  set	  to	  be	  implemented	  over	  four	  years	  from	  2015	  to	  2019,	  while	  latter	  was	  due	  to	  take	  effect	  from	  2018.	  	  The	   Commission	   moved	   to	   soften	   both	   ratios	   in	   their	   transposition	   into	   the	  legislative	  texts.	  For	  the	  30-­‐day	  version,	  the	  original	  Basel	  version	  had	  required	  that	  assets	  held	  were	  of	  a	  particularly	  high	  quality	  –	  specifically	  that	  they	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  These	   responded	   to	   a	  particular	  dimension	  of	   the	   financial	   crisis:	   a	   key	  part	   of	   its	   unfolding	  was	  banks’	  reliance	  on	  short-­‐term	  wholesale	  money	  market	  funding	  to	  manage	  their	  cash	  flows.	  In	  times	  of	  stress	  these	  markets	  seized	  up,	  meaning	  that	  banks	  very	  rapidly	  became	  illiquid	  (even	  if	  they	  were	  not	  insolvent).	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‘low	   credit	   and	   market	   risk’	   instruments	   (Basel	   Committee	   of	   Banking	  Supervisors,	  2010a:	  5).	  However,	  the	  European	  legislation	  allowed	  all	  European	  sovereign	  bonds	  to	  be	  treated	  equally,	  regardless	  of	  their	  underlying	  quality.	  An	  even	  worse	  fate	  befell	  the	  net	  stable	  funding	  ratio:	  the	  regulation	  failed	  to	  make	  any	  commitment	  other	  than	  to	  make	  it	  a	  ‘basic	  disclosure	  standard’,	  and	  to	  delay	  even	  a	  discussion	  on	  full	  implementation	  until	  2018	  (Ayadi	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
4.5.1.2.3	  Leverage	  A	  particular	  feature	  of	  the	  period	  running	  up	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis	  was	  the	  build-­‐up	   of	   what	   was	   seen	   as	   excessive	   leverage	   in	   the	   banking	   sectors	   of	   many	  advanced	   economies.50 	  	   In	   response	   to	   this	   Basel	   III	   introduced	   a	   simple,	  unweighted	   leverage	   ratio	   as	   a	  means	   of	   identifying	   the	   aggregate	   riskiness	   of	  banks.	  The	  limit	  was	  set	  at	  3%,	  meaning	  that	  a	  bank	  would	  still	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  leverage	  of	  33	  times	  (Basel	  Committee	  of	  Banking	  Supervisors,	  2010b:	  61).	  	  This	   leverage	   ratio	   (LR)	   was	   adopted	   into	   the	   text	   of	   the	   CRR.	   However,	  admitting	  that	  this	  measure	  was	  a	  wholly	  new	  regulatory	  tool,	  the	  Commission’s	  text	  proposed	  a	  lengthy	  phased	  implementation	  timetable:	  a	  consultation	  period	  would	   first	  be	   run,	   and	   it	  would	  become	  a	  binding	   regulation	  as	  of	  2018.	  Until	  then,	   firms	   would	   merely	   be	   required	   to	   report	   their	   ratios,	   rather	   than	   face	  sanction	  for	  breaching	  the	  3%	  level.	  	  
4.5.1.2.4	  Remuneration	  The	   provisions	   in	   the	   European	   legislation	   on	   remuneration	   were	   a	   complete	  addition	   to	   the	   standards	   laid	   out	   in	   Basel	   III.	   The	   new	   rules,	   included	   in	   the	  directive,	  built	  on	  those	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  capital	  requirement	  directive	  (CRDIII),	  which	  required	  that	  a	   large	  proportion	  of	   the	  variable	  element	  of	  pay	  (the	  bonus)	  should	  be	   in	   the	   form	  of	  shares	   (or	  similar	  non-­‐cash	   instruments),	  and	  that	  these	  be	  deferred	  over	  a	  period	  of	  three	  to	  five	  years.	   	  CRDIV	  added	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Many	  commentators	  traced	  this	  back,	   ironically,	   to	   the	  encouragement	  given	  to	  banks	  under	  the	  previous	  Basel	  rules:	  the	  boundaries	  between	  risk	  classes	  and	  the	  associated	  capital	  charges	  were	  being	  gamed,	  and	  banks	  were	  gathering	  vast	  holdings	  of	  certain	  assets	  atop	  ever-­‐narrower	  capital	  bases	  (Major,	  2012).	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further	  restriction:	  that	  this	  variable	  component	  should	  not	  exceed	  100%	  of	  the	  underlying	   fixed	  element	  (or	   the	  salary).	  The	  reach	  was	  significant,	  applying	  to	  all	  staff	   identified	  as	   ‘material	  risk-­‐takers’,	  and	  impacting	  both	  banks	  domiciled	  in	  the	  EU	  and	  branches	  of	  external	  banks	  based	  in	  the	  EEA.	  The	  stated	  intention	  was	  to	  ensure	  that:	  
‘…	   remuneration	   policies	   do	   not	   give	   incentives	   to	   take	   risks	   which	  
undermine	   sound	   and	   effective	   risk	   management	   and	   which	   exacerbate	  
excessive	  risk-­‐	  taking	  behavior	  …’	   (European	  Commission,	  2013c:	  18)	  51	  	  
4.5.1.2.5	  Maximum	  harmonisation	  An	  important	  deviation	  between	  Basel	  III	  and	  the	  European	  legislation	  lay	  in	  the	  area	   of	   national	   discretions:	   the	   Commission	   felt	   that	   the	   ability	   of	   individual	  member	  states	  to	  ‘gold-­‐plate’	  any	  capital	  rules	  would	  distort	  the	  single	  market	  in	  financial	  services,	  and	  so	  CRR	  took	  a	  more	  prescriptive	  approach	  and	  imposed	  a	  maximum	   harmonisation	   rule.	   The	   text	   also	   called	   for	   the	   ‘establishment	   of	   a	  European	   single	   rule	   book	   applicable	   to	   all	   financial	   institutions	   in	   the	   Single	  Market’	  (European	  Commission,	  2013c:	  4).	  This	  would	  contain	  a	  standard	  set	  of	  definitions	  on	  exposure	  classes,	  risk-­‐weightings,	  types	  of	  instrument	  suitable	  for	  liquidity	   management,	   and	   the	   myriad	   other	   detailed	   rules.	   This	   was	   to	   be	  followed	   by	   all	   national	   authorities,	   to	   prevent	   pockets	   of	   risk	   developing	  (through	  more	  lax	  regulation	  or	  inconsistent	  application)	  in	  certain	  geographical	  markets	  and	  then	  being	  transmitted	  to	  others.	  In	  this	  way	  it	  removed	  large	  areas	  of	  freedom	  they	  previously	  enjoyed	  in	  establishing	  such	  definitions	  themselves.52	  	  This	   review	  has	  charted	   the	  origins	  of	   the	  most	   recent	  European	   legislation,	   in	  the	   Basel	   Accord	   and	   ultimately	   the	   prevailing	   paradigm.	   It	   has	   also	   given	   a	  flavour	   of	   the	   issues	   which	   formed	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   lobbying	   activities	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Notably	   the	   European	   Parliament’s	   press	   release	   accompanying	   the	   passing	   of	   the	   directive	  placed	  the	  remuneration	  provisions	  above	  the	  rules	  on	  capital,	  liquidity	  and	  leverage	  (European	  Parliament,	  2013).	  52	  For	   example,	   national	   regulators	   in	   the	   UK	   had	   previously	   –	   in	   accordance	   with	   long-­‐held	  traditions	  –	  not	  treated	  retail	  mortgages	  as	  ‘in	  default’	  until	  the	  payments	  reached	  arrears	  of	  180	  days.	   This	   meant	   that	   homeowners	   had	   more	   grace,	   but	   also	   that	   banks	   effectively	   had	   a	   far	  longer	  period	  before	  they	  had	  to	  write	  off	  bad	  loans	  and	  crystallise	  losses.	  The	  single	  rule	  book	  changed	  this,	  bringing	  the	  ‘in-­‐arrears’	  window	  back	  to	  only	  90	  days	  (Masters	  &	  Barker,	  2012).	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empirical	  chapters	  will	  focus	  on.	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  parallel	  development	  of	  the	  EU’s	   institutional	   framework	   through	   which	   this	   policy-­‐making	   exercise	   was	  conducted,	  and	  through	  which	  the	  resulting	  rules	  are	  implemented.	  	  
4.5.2:	  European	  financial	  regulation:	  The	  institutional	  apparatus	  All	   this	   legislative	   activity	   has	   occurred	   in	   parallel	   with	   a	   steady	   evolution	   of	  regulatory	   authority	   at	   the	   European	   level.	   It	   is	   to	   this	   institutional	   landscape	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  The	   same	   concerns	   over	   sluggish	   progress	   that	   led	   to	   the	   FSAP	   inspired	   the	  formation	  of	  a	  review	  panel	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  scattered	  institutional	  structure,	  and	  the	  associated	  policy-­‐making	  process.53	  In	  2001,	  the	  Committee	  of	  Wise	  Men,	  chaired	  by	  Baron	  Alexandre	  Lamfalussy,	  issued	  a	  report	  highlighting	  the	  issues:	  	  the	   legislative	   process	   was	   too	   slow,	   with	   too	   little	   co-­‐ordination	   among	   the	  various	  advisory	  committees,	  draft	   texts	  were	  becoming	  over-­‐complicated	  by	  a	  desire	   to	   accommodate	   national	   positions,	   and	   the	   resulting	   preference	   for	  directives	   over	   regulations	   threatened	   to	   cause	   inconsistent	   implementation.	  The	   report	   also	   recommended	   instead	   that	   a	   novel	   approach	   to	   drafting	  legislation	   be	   adopted	   for	   financial	   sector	   policy.	   The	   Commission,	   Parliament	  and	   Council	   would	   issue	   ‘Level	   1	   texts’	   which	   contained	   the	   core	   political	  principles	   on	   the	  proposal	   at	   hand.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   various	   advisory	   groups	   in	  existence	  would	  be	  formalised	  into	  committees	  over	  two	  layers	  –	  ‘Level	  Two’	  and	  ‘Level	  Three’	  –	  with	  clearly	  defined	  responsibilities	  and	  procedures	  linking	  them	  back	   to	   main	   policy-­‐making	   process.	   These	   would	   provide	   advice	   on	   the	  technical	  rules	  to	  complete	  the	  legislation,	  and	  the	  Commission	  would	  adopt	  the	  finalised	   text.	   (Alford,	   2005;	   De	   Visscher	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Moloney,	   2003).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  For	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  last	  century,	  the	  drafting	  of	  financial	  legislation	  in	  the	  EU	  followed	  the	  standard	  process:	  the	  Commission	  prepared	  the	  text,	  and	  then	  technical	   input	  was	  provided	  by	  the	   specialist	   committees	   during	   the	   comitology	   stage.	   To	   facilitate	   this	   a	   Banking	   Advisory	  Committee	   had	   been	   formed	   in	   1978	   under	   the	   First	   Banking	   Directive,	   with	   responsibly	   for	  supplying	   expertise	   and	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   forum	   for	   exchanging	   views	   among	  national	   supervisors	  (European	  Commission,	  2000:	  4).	  It	  had	  minimal	  involvement	  in	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  supervision	  (as	   opposed	   to	   policy	   advice),	   and	   was	   explicitly	   not	   to	   discuss	   cases	   concerning	   individual	  banks.	  The	  only	   forum	  for	   the	  discussion	  of	   such	  matters	  remained	   the	  Groupe	  de	  Contact	   –	  an	  informal	  network	  of	  national	  supervisors	  dating	  back	  to	  1972	  with	  a	  very	  weak	  statutory	  basis.	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Significantly,	   the	   consultative	   stages	   of	   this	   process	   were	   to	   involve	   extensive	  engagement	  with	  key	  stakeholders	  –	  such	  as	  banks	  and	  their	  trade	  associations	  –	  who	  would	  provide	  the	  expertise	  necessary	  for	  drafting	  policy	  in	  this	  extremely	  complex	   regulatory	   domain.	   Although	   the	   third-­‐level	   committee	   would	   also	  oversee	   compliance	   at	   the	   national	   level	   –	   making	   sure	   implementation	   was	  consistent	  –	  they	  were	  still	  not	  intended	  to	  centralise	  supervisory	  activity	  (Grahl	  &	  Teague,	  2005;	  Lastra,	  2003).	  	  	  This	   legislative	   process	   was	   originally	   intended	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   writing	   of	  regulation	   to	   govern	   the	   issuance	  and	   trading	  of	   securities,	   and	  as	   a	   result	   the	  first	   groups	   created	   were	   the	   European	   Securities	   Committee	   (ESC)	   and	   the	  Committee	   of	   European	   Securities	   Regulators	   (CESR).	   Shortly	   afterwards	   the	  Council	   approved	   the	   extension	   of	   this	   approach	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   financial	  sector,	  and	  these	  bodies	  were	  followed	  by	  the	  Committee	  of	  European	  Insurance	  and	  Occupational	  Pension	  Supervisors	  (CEIOPS)	  and	  the	  Committee	  of	  European	  Banking	  Supervisors	  (CEBS).	  	  The	   EU	   was	   spurred	   into	   reforming	   this	   institutional	   landscape	   following	   the	  financial	  crisis.	  The	  unfolding	  of	   the	  events	  showed	  how	   inadequate	   the	  home-­‐country-­‐control	   principle	   was	   in	   action:	   many	   of	   the	   banks	   that	   had	   failed	   or	  needed	   drastic	   support	   measures	   had	   been	   overseen	   by	  multiple	   supervisors,	  and	   during	   the	   panic	   co-­‐ordination	   among	   them	   had	   broken	   down	   (Lannoo,	  2008).	  In	  2009	  the	  de	  Larosière	  report	  advised	  that	  the	  existing	  architecture	  be	  upgraded,	  and	  that	  new	  institutions	  be	  created	  at	  the	  European	  level	  with	  direct	  supervisory	   authority	   –	   rather	   than	   merely	   an	   advisory	   function.	   The	   report	  noted:	  
‘we	  have	  two	  alternatives:	  the	  first	  “chacun	  pour	  soi”	  beggar-­‐thy-­‐neighbour	  
solutions;	  or	  the	  second	  –	  enhanced,	  pragmatic	  European	  co-­‐operation	  for	  
the	  benefit	  of	  all	  to	  preserve	  the	  world	  economy.	  This	  will	  bring	  undoubted	  
economic	  gains,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  we	  favour.	  
	  
We	  must	  begin	  work	  immediately.’	   (2009:	  4)	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Acting	  on	   this	   advice	   a	  new	   institutional	   architecture	  was	   implemented	  by	   the	  EU	   in	  2010.	  A	  European	  Systemic	  Risk	  Board	  was	   created,	   tasked	  with	  macro-­‐prudential	   supervision	   of	   the	   financial	   system	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   mitigating	   the	  impact	   of	   future	   crises.	   Alongside	   it,	   the	   Lamfalussy	   Level	   Three	   committees	  were	   crystallised	   into	   European	   Supervisory	   Authorities.	   They	   retained	   their	  roles	   supporting	   the	   legislative	   process,	   becoming	   (for	   banking,	   at	   least)	   the	  authors	  of	  the	  Single	  Rule	  Book.	  Importantly,	  they	  were	  also	  to	  manage	  to	  the	  co-­‐ordination	   among	   national	   supervisors	   of	   complex,	   cross-­‐border	   financial	  institutions,	  and	  assumed	  binding	  powers	  over	  individual	  supervisors	  in	  cases	  of	  disagreement.	   In	   other	  words,	   through	   these	  measures	   the	   EU	   took	   significant	  steps	  towards	  the	  direct	  supervision	  of	  financial	  firms	  –	  something	  that	  had	  been	  lacking	  from	  the	  institutional	  framework	  at	  the	  supranational	  level	  for	  decades.	  	  Under	  this	  set	  of	  reforms	  the	  European	  Banking	  Authority	  was	  formed	  in	  2011.	  It	  is	   a	   ‘hub-­‐and-­‐spoke’	   body	   (Enria,	   2011)	   –	   a	   model	   of	   the	   institutional	   form	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘agencified	  network’	  (Levi-­‐Faur,	  2011)	  in	  the	  earlier	  theoretical	  chapter.	   It	  has	  a	  division	  responsible	   for	  producing	  regulation,	  and	  another	   for	  overseeing	   supervision	   by	   national	   authorities.	   Importantly,	   it	   also	   has	   an	  internal	  bureaucracy,	  responsible	  for	  procurement,	  IT,	  human	  resources,	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  central	  secretariat	  supported	  by	  a	  workforce	  of	  secondees	  drawn	  from	  national	   regulators.	   The	   EBA	   has	   a	   staff	   of	   over	   a	   hundred,	   and	   an	   operating	  budget	   of	   €24m	   (European	   Banking	   Authority,	   2014).	   This	   represents	   a	  considerable	  ratcheting	  up	  of	  resources	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  arrangement:	  the	  CEBS	  had	  only	  a	  minimal	  secretariat	  and	  very	  few	  of	  its	  own	  resources.	  	  Its	   core	   role	   is	   to	   support	   the	   legislative	   process	   by	   writing	   the	   technical	  standards	  that	  sit	  beneath	  the	  framework	  legislation	  passed	  by	  the	  higher-­‐level	  supranational	  bodies.	  Taking	  the	  fourth	  Capital	  Requirements	  Directive	  (CRDIV),	  for	   example,	   we	   see	   frequent	   instructions	   to	   the	   EBA	   to	   “develop	   draft	  implementing	   technical	   standards	   …	   by	   31	   December	   2014”	   (European	  Commission,	  2013b:	  35).	  These	  ‘Binding	  Technical	  Standards’	  are	  backed	  by	  the	  legal	   force	   of	   the	   Commission,	   and	   automatically	   become	   law	   in	   the	   member	  states	   on	   adoption	   through	   a	   modified	   version	   of	   the	   co-­‐decision	   procedure.	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Aside	   from	   this	   central	   rule-­‐making	   responsibility,	   the	   EBA	   is	   charged	   with	  investigating	   alleged	   incorrect	   or	   insufficient	   application	  of	   these	   standards	  by	  national	  authorities,	  and	  with	  improving	  the	  consistency	  of	  national	  supervision	  among	   member	   states.	   It	   also	   has	   responsibility	   for	   mediating	   in	   disputes	  between	   regulators	   over	   issues	   pertaining	   to	   cross-­‐border	   banks.	   Finally,	   it	  provides	  input	  to	  the	  European	  System	  Risk	  Board’s	  monitoring	  of	  aggregate	  risk	  in	  the	  financial	  system	  by	  performing	  stress	  testing	  exercises.	  	  In	   carrying	   out	   its	   main	   role	   the	   EBA	   consults	   extensively	   with	   the	   financial	  sectors	  of	  the	  EU’s	  constituent	  markets.	  This	   is	  done	  by	  issuing	  draft	  standards	  and	  calling	  for	  input;	  some	  of	  these	  requests	  are	  discussed	  at	  public	  hearings	  at	  the	  EBA’s	  London	  headquarters.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  a	  statutory	  stakeholder	  panel	  (the	   Banking	   Stakeholder	   Group	   –	   specified	   in	   the	   EBA’s	   founding	   legislation)	  provides	   input	  drawn	  from	  a	  balance	  of	   interests:	  corporate	  and	  retail	  users	  of	  financial	  services,	  banks	  and	  senior	  academics.	  Finally,	  decisions	  are	  made	  by	  a	  central	  committee	  which	  comprises	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  various	  national	  authorities	  from	  the	  member	  states.	  
	  
4.5.3:	  Summary:	  European	  intentions	  This	  review	  has	  outlined	  the	  extension	  of	  European	  financial	  regulation	  –	  both	  in	  terms	   of	   the	   body	   of	   legislation	   passed	   and	   the	   development	   of	   institutional	  capacity.	  This	  extension	  has	  encouraged	  the	  development	  of	  European	  markets	  in	  financial	  services,	  and	  has	  also	  stimulated	  the	  import	  of	  financial	  services	  from	  non-­‐EU	  countries	  (Dür,	  2011).	  The	  development,	  invigorated	  at	  certain	  junctures	  (such	   as	   by	   the	   Lamfalussy	   and	   De	   Larosière	   reports)	   has	   had	   the	   effect	   of	  removing	   national	   discretion,	   by	   centralising	   the	   writing	   of	   detailed	  implementing	  standards	  at	   the	  European	   level,	  and	  by	  moving	   towards	  greater	  supranational	  involvement	  in	  supervision.	  The	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  transposition	  of	  the	  Basel	   Accords	   have	   been	   matched	   by	   the	   steady	   formalisation	   of	   European	  regulatory	  authority,	  such	  that	  the	  flexible,	  pragmatic	  approach	  of	  old	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	   tight	   co-­‐ordination	   and	   a	   strict,	   almost	   dogmatic	   adherence	   to	   the	  underlying	  policy	  paradigm	  (Mügge,	  2011).	   In	   this	   sense	   the	  EU	  has	  acted	  as	  a	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‘hardening	  agent’,	  embedding	  the	  soft	   law	  outputs	  of	   the	  global	  regulatory	   fora	  into	   statute	   at	   the	   supranational	   level,	   and	   from	   there	   implanting	   it	   into	   the	  national	  (Newman	  &	  Bach,	  2014).	  	  Looking	   behind	   this	   development	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   detect	   three	   sets	   of	  motivations.	  The	  first,	  clearly,	  was	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis:	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  future	  crashes	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  future	  bail-­‐outs	  on	  the	  public	  purse	   (Buckley	   &	   Howarth,	   2010;	   Hodson	   &	   Quaglia,	   2009;	   Quaglia,	   2013).	  Included	  in	  this	  was	  an	  intention,	  particularly	  on	  the	  part	  of	  political	  actors	  in	  the	  Parliament,	  to	  ‘punish’	  those	  seen	  to	  have	  caused	  the	  crisis	  –	  those	  described,	  for	  example,	  as	  ‘vultures’	  (Buckley	  &	  Howarth,	  2011).	  Thus	  the	  efforts	  were	  directed	  towards	   making	   the	   regulations	   tougher,	   harmonising	   their	   application	   to	   all	  market	  participants,	  and	  strengthening	  the	  associated	  institutional	  architecture.	  	  The	   second	  was	   a	   deeper-­‐set	   intention	   to	   continue	   the	   task	   of	   completing	   the	  single	  market	   in	   financial	   services.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   this	   was	   by	   now	   a	   long-­‐running	   project	   which	   had	   suffered	   periods	   of	   sluggishness,	   and	   European	  policy-­‐makers	   saw	   the	   crisis	   as	   a	   catalyst	   to	   reinvigorate	   integration.	  Thus	   the	  efforts	   took	   a	  more	   interventionist	   approach,	   as	   Europe	  moved	   towards	   using	  public	   authority	   to	   manage	   the	   risks	   inherent	   in	   financial	   markets	   in	   a	   more	  direct	  way	   (Posner,	   2010).	   The	   grand	   battle	   between	   the	   ‘market-­‐making’	   and	  the	   ‘market-­‐shaping’	   coalitions	   had	   played	   out,	   with	   the	   latter	   apparently	  claiming	  victory	  (Quaglia,	  2010;	  2012).	  	  Naturally,	   these	   two	   intentions	  became	   intertwined	   as	   the	   financial	   crisis	   gave	  way	  to	  the	  later	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis,	  and	  as	  European	  policy-­‐makers	  sought	  to	  construct	  the	  regulatory	  framework	  behind	  the	  nascent	  banking	  union	  (Howarth	  &	   Quaglia,	   2013a).	  Meanwhile,	   the	   third	   intention	   related	   to	   the	   EU’s	   external	  projection	   on	   the	   global	   stage.	   Here,	   integration	   was	   about	   creating	   a	   strong,	  stable	   financial	   bloc	   able	   to	   play	   on	   global	   capital	   markets;	   but	   also	   the	  tightening	  of	   regulation	  was	   intended	   to	   signal	   to	   international	   regulatory	   fora	  that	  the	  EU	  would	  not	  be	  embroiled	  in	  a	  global	  race	  to	  the	  bottom	  (Mügge,	  2014;	  Quaglia,	  2014).	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4.6:	  Conclusion	  Chapter	  Two	  identified	  an	  opportunity	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  lobbying	  literature	  by	  building	  an	  understanding	  of	  banks’	  national	  origins	  shape	  their	  lobbying	  in	  the	  European	   regulatory	   arena.	   It	   then	   established	   two	   important	   dimensions	   of	  variety	   in	   their	  national	   contexts:	   in	   the	   financial	   system	  and	   in	   the	  associated	  regulatory	   paradigm.	   This	   chapter	   has	   added	   further	   empirical	   flesh	   to	   these,	  examining	   first	   the	  British	  and	  German	  banking	  sectors	  and	  showing	  how	  very	  different	   structures	   continue	   to	   be	   present.	   It	   also	   studied	   the	   national	  regulatory	   regimes,	   paying	   particular	   attention	   to	   the	   differences	   in	   the	  underlying	   paradigms,	   and	   how	   they	   are	   each	   represented	   in	   the	   institutional	  apparatuses	  of	  Britain	  and	  Germany.	  This	  has	  provided	  us	  with	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  two	  national	  contexts.	  	  Next,	   the	   review	   turned	   up	   a	   level,	   and	   examined	   the	   steady	   development	   of	  European	  financial	  regulation.	  The	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  this	  were	  shown	  to	  lie	  in	  the	  Basel	  Accords,	  and	  tracing	  these	  through	  the	  European	  legislation	  we	  saw	  how	   the	  CRDIV/CRR	  package	  now	  contains	  many	  areas	  of	  policy	  of	  which	  directly	  impact	  British	  and	  German	  banks,	  and	  their	  domestic	  markets.	  	  We	   also	   reviewed	   the	   gradual,	   but	   pronounced,	   crystallisation	   of	   regulatory	  authority	  at	  the	  supranational	  level.	  In	  the	  new	  European	  regulatory	  arena,	  there	  now	   sits	   the	   EBA:	   a	   distinct,	   rule-­‐making	   body	   with	   a	   clear	  mandate	   from	   its	  political	   principals.	   It	   has	   a	   set	   of	   broad	   powers	   (to	   write	   rules,	   to	   enforce	  decisions,	  and	  so	  on),	  and	  its	  own	  resources.	  In	  short,	  this	  centralised	  European	  regulator	   now	   represents	   a	   prime	   target	   for	   banks’	   lobbying	   efforts;	   it	   is,	   to	  paraphrase	   Mazey	   and	   Richardson,	   ‘where	   the	   ducks	   now	   are’	   (Mazey	   &	  Richardson,	  2015:	  419).	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  task	  of	  analysing	  how	  banks’	  resources	  shape	  the	  way	  they	  approach	  this	  new	  body.	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Chapter	  5:	  Resources	  
5.1:	  Introduction	  The	   recent	   developments	   in	   the	   EU’s	   institutional	   landscape	   have	   changed	   the	  opportunity	   structure	   in	   which	   banks	   lobby.	   The	   centralisation	   of	   regulatory	  authority	  has	  created	  a	  standalone	  institution	  –	  the	  European	  Banking	  Authority	  (EBA)	  –	  with	  its	  own	  resources	  and	  powers,	  and	  which	  crafts	  the	  detailed	  rules	  that	  govern	  banking	  markets.	  Banks,	   in	  turn,	  respond	  to	  this	  centralisation	  and	  seek	   to	   lobby	   the	  EBA.	   In	   this	  chapter	   I	  present	  data	  which	  show	  how	  the	  way	  they	   do	   this	   is	   shaped	   by	   their	   holdings	   of	   information	   resources.	   The	  distribution	  of	  these	  lobbying	  resources,	  in	  turn,	  arises	  from	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  domestic	   banking	  markets;	   and	   so,	   bringing	   these	   together,	   I	   argue	   that	   there	  exists	  a	  link	  between	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  banks	  and	  their	  national	  origins.	  	  	  This	  chapter	  analyses	  the	   first	  element	  of	   the	  causal	  model	  outlined	   in	  Chapter	  Two.	   As	   an	   initial	   premise,	   we	   take	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   resource	   distributions	  reflect	   the	   structures	   of	   the	  banking	  markets,	   and	   so	   the	  underlying	   variety	   of	  financial	   capitalism.	   Second,	   we	   can	   take	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviour	   as	   a	  dependent	   variable,	   expressed	   as	   the	   approach	   taken	   (direct	   or	   associational)	  when	   lobbying	   the	   EBA.	   The	   independent	   variable	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   banks’	  lobbying	  resources:	  the	  capacities	  to	  monitor	  policy-­‐making	  discussions,	  gather	  the	   required	   information	   and	   represent	   their	   interests	   in	   the	   appropriate	   fora.	  Finally,	   we	   can	   predict	   that	   the	   larger	   banks	  will	   have	   the	   resources	   to	   do	   so	  directly,	  and	  the	  smaller	  banks,	  with	  weaker	  resources,	  will	  instead	  fall	  back	  on	  lobbying	   through	   their	   representative	   associations.	   This	   gives	   us	   two	  hypotheses,	  which	  are	  laid	  out	  below.	  
‘The	  resource	  hypothesis’	  
H1:	  Larger	  banks,	  with	  greater	  lobbying	  resources	  at	  their	  disposal,	  will	  be	  
more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  the	  EBA,	  and	  to	  do	  so	  directly	  and	  independently.	  	  
‘The	  associational	  hypothesis’	  
H2:	   Smaller	   banks,	   with	   fewer	   lobbying	   resources,	   will	   lobby	   the	   EBA	  
through	  their	  trade	  associations.	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These	   hypotheses	   help	   us	   understand	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours,	   and	   also	  connect	   this	   study	   back	   to	   the	   European	   interest	   group	   literature	   on	  which	   it	  rests.	   Thus,	   several	   studies	   have	   focussed	   on	   the	   resources	   involved,	   and	  highlighted	   their	   informational	   (rather	   than	   explicitly	   financial)	   nature	  (Chalmers,	  2011;	  2013;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012).	  Furthermore,	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ability	   of	   unitary	   actors	   to	   forge	   coalitions,	   or	   operate	   through	   associations	   to	  overcome	  shortfalls	  in	  these	  resources	  (C.	  Mahoney,	  2007)	  helps	  us	  understand	  how	  the	  smaller	  banks	  may	  cope.	  We	  thus	  have	  an	  entire	  chain	  to	  examine:	  from	  variations	   in	   the	  underlying	   financial	  system,	   through	  resources,	  and	   to	   factors	  shaping	  behaviour	  taken	  from	  the	  European	  interest	  group	  literature.	  	  This	   chapter	   proceeds	   as	   follows.	   Firstly,	   I	   briefly	   review	   the	   categories	   of	  resources	   which	   were	   described	   in	   Chapter	   Two.	   Then,	   in	   three	   sections	   I	  examine	   the	   stories	   of	   the	   large	   banks	   (taken	   as	   one	   group),	   and	   then	   the	  remainders	  of	   the	  British	  and	  German	  sectors.	   In	  each	  case,	   I	  examine	  how	  the	  resources	  are	  held	  by	  the	  banks,	  and	  how	  these	  patterns	  reflect	   the	  underlying	  market	   structure.	   I	   then	  study	  how	   these	  were	  put	   to	  use	   in	   the	   lobbying	  over	  CRDIV/CRR:	  how	  efforts	  were	  directed	  at	  the	  EBA	  –	  as	  well	  as	  other	  institutional	  venues	  in	  the	  opportunity	  structure.	  	  5.2:	  Resources	  reprised	  Before	   embarking	   on	   an	   examination	   of	   banks’	   lobbying	   activities,	   it	   is	  worthwhile	   reminding	   ourselves	   of	   the	   resources.	   As	   has	   been	   argued	   in	   the	  European	  interest	  group	  literature,	  the	  primary	  resource	  is	  essentially	  financial	  –	  running	   lobbying	   operations	   is	   costly,	   and	   requires	   substantial	   financial	  commitment	   (Beyers	   &	   Kerremans,	   2007;	   Eising,	   2007a;	   Klüver,	   2010).	   But	  looking	  beyond	  this,	  Chapter	  Two	  also	  identified	  subtler	  information	  resources,	  which	   banks	   use	   to	   facilitate	   their	   lobbying	   efforts.	   These	   separate	   into	   two	  groups.	  	  First	  are	  the	  resources,	  or	  capacities,	  concerned	  with	  interfacing	  with	  regulatory	  fora,	   or	   policy-­‐making	   venues	   more	   generally.	   Within	   this	   category	   falls	   the	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ability	  to	  monitor	  goings-­‐on	  in	  these	  fora,	  and	  to	  keep	  pace	  with	  such	  discussions	  as	   they	  progress.	  Next	   is	   the	  obverse	  of	   this:	   the	   ability	   to	   represent	   the	  bank,	  and	   communicate	   its	   input	   into	   these	   discussions.	   This	   entails	   having	   staff	   to	  attend	   hearings	   and	   consultations,	   for	   example.	   Finally,	   there	   is	   a	   capacity	   for	  internal	   brokerage,	   or	   an	   ability	   to	   source	   relevant	   expertise	   from	   within	   the	  organisation	  in	  order	  to	  match	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  venue	  being	  targeted.	  	  The	   second	   category	   contains	   the	   resources	   dedicated	   to	   generating	   this	  information	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  This	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  staff	  engaged	  in	  research,	  or	   as	   experts	   across	   several	   fields:	   high-­‐level	   political	   or	   economic	   analysis;	  tighter,	  more	  specific	  commentary	  on	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  regulatory	  standards	  (how	   they	   are	   constructed,	   problems	   with	   implementation,	   and	   so	   on),	   or	   on	  legal	   aspects	   of	   regulation;	   and	   finally,	   the	   production	   of	   data	   required	   by	  authorities	   as	   part	   of	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   business	   of	   supervision.	   The	   distinction	  between	  these	  categories	  is	  drawn	  from	  similar	  classifications	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  European	   interest	   group	   literature	   (Bouwen,	   2002;	   Chalmers,	   2011;	   Dür	  &	  De	  Bièvre,	   2007;	   Michalowitz,	   2004).	   These	   various	   elements	   can	   be	   brought	  together	  into	  an	  overall	  taxonomy,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5.1.	  	  
Figure	  5.1:	  A	  taxonomy	  of	  resources	  	  
	  Cutting	   across	   these	   resources	   are	   even	   subtler	   factors	   which	   are	   difficult	   to	  detect	   externally,	   but	   which	   we	   might	   think	   are	   an	   important	   element	   of	   the	  causal	   story	   behind	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours.	   For	   example,	   we	   should	  consider	   their	   institutional	   memory	   –	   or	   the	   degree	   of	   expertise	   they	   have	  accumulated	   from	   navigating	   the	   policy-­‐making	   processes	   of	   European	  regulatory	   governance.	   Likewise,	  what	  matters	   as	  much	   as	   the	   holdings	   of	   the	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individual	  resources	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  banks	  integrate	  them	  into	  a	  coherent,	  structured	  lobbying	  operation.	  The	   holdings	   of	   these	   resources,	   and	   the	  way	   banks	   organise	   them	   internally,	  shape	  their	  lobbying	  behaviour;	  in	  turn,	  the	  causal	  model	  links	  these	  back	  to	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  underlying	  banking	  markets.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  empirical	  analyses	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  5.3:	  The	  large	  banks	  We	  begin	  the	  empirical	  coverage	  with	  an	  examination	  of	   the	   large	  banks	  of	   the	  British	  and	  German	  sectors.	  These	  will	  be	   taken	   together	  since,	  as	  will	  become	  clear,	   they	   are	   similar	   to	   each	   other	   in	   their	   resources	   and	   their	   lobbying	  behaviours.	  	  
5.3.1:	  Resource	  holdings	  The	  banks	  in	  this	  category	  are	  the	  largest	  in	  the	  two	  national	  sectors,	  and	  their	  type	   and	   number	   reflect	   the	   layout	   of	   the	   national	   landscapes.	   In	   Britain,	   the	  prevailing	   market-­‐based	   system	   has	   created	   a	   small	   set	   of	   very	   large	   firms,	  namely	   the	   Royal	   Bank	   of	   Scotland,	   HSBC,	   Barclays,	   Standard	   Chartered	   and	  Lloyds.	   We	   encountered	   these,	   and	   their	   place	   in	   the	   British	   sector,	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter.	   The	   first	   four	   are	  multi-­‐national	   and	   cross-­‐border	   in	   several	  senses:	   their	   ownership	   base	   extends	   beyond	   the	   UK;	   they	   operate	   in	   many	  different	   national	   jurisdictions;	   and	   they	   source	   funding	   from	   international	  wholesale	  markets	  as	  much	  as	  they	  do	  from	  domestic	  retail	  deposits.	  The	  fourth,	  despite	   being	   incorporated	   in	   the	   UK,	   is	   predominantly	   focussed	   on	   southeast	  Asian	  markets,	  and	  the	  fifth	  has	  a	  much	  smaller	  international	  operation	  than	  the	  others.	   They	   are,	   to	   varying	   degrees,	   universal	   banks,	   with	   activities	   in	   retail,	  commercial	  and	  investment	  banking.	  	  In	   Germany,	  meanwhile,	   the	   bank-­‐based	   system	   has	   brought	   about	   a	   different	  market	   structure.	   Here,	   two	   very	   large	   banks	   sit	   atop	   the	   commercial	   pillar:	  Deutsche	  Bank	   and	  Commerzbank.	   Like	   the	  British	   equivalents	   these	   began	   as	  domestic	   institutions,	  which	  grew	  through	  acquisitions	  to	  become	  cross-­‐border	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banks.	  They	  are	  universals,	  but	  –	  owing	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  public	  and	  co-­‐operative	   banks	   in	   their	   home	   markets	   –	   their	   retail	   presence	   is	   far	   less	  extensive	  than	  those	  of	  the	  large	  British	  banks.	  It	  is	  also	  significant	  to	  note	  that	  there	  are	  other	  large	  banks	  in	  Germany:	  these	  are	  the	  Landesbanken,	  which	  are	  the	   apex	   of	   the	  publicly-­‐owned	  pillar,	   and	   are	   a	   fraction	  of	   the	   size	   of	   the	   two	  privately-­‐owned	  behemoths.	  However,	   as	  will	   become	   clear	   over	   the	   course	  of	  the	  coming	  chapter,	  they	  are	  far	  less	  visible	  in	  lobbying	  activities.	  	  At	  this	  first	  stage,	  then,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  underlying	  market	  structures	  reflected	  in	  the	   characters	   of	   these	   large	   banks.	   From	   this	   position	   we	   can	   move	   to	  examining	   how	   these	   patterns	   are	   also	   evident	   in	   the	   holdings	   of	   lobbying	  resources	   among	   these	   large	   banks.	   We	   now	   combine	   our	   attention	   onto	   the	  banks	  of	  both	  sectors.	  	  These	   large	   banks	   have	   staff	   dedicated	   to	   monitoring	   the	   outputs	   of	   various	  regulatory	  fora,	  and	  are	  constantly	  aware	  of	  what	  is	  being	  discussed	  and	  where.	  One	  interview	  subject	  described	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  resource	  in	  action:	  
“I	   remember	  meeting	   somebody	   from	  Bank	  X,	   and	  all	   he	   did	  was	   this	   one	  
particular	  topic.	  It	  wasn’t	  particularly	  a	  big	  issue,	  but	  they	  were	  able	  to	  put	  
one	  person	  on	  this	  thing,	  who	  would	  then	  be	  able	  to	  go	  to	  Brussels,	  and	  the	  
regulator,	  and	  so	  on.”	   (Interview,	  29th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  Highly-­‐experienced	   regulatory	   or	   public	   affairs	   functions	   monitor	   these	  processes,	   and	  perform	  an	   internal	  prioritising	   role,	  helping	   to	  establish	  which	  concern	   is	   the	  most	   pressing,	   or	   which	   consultation	   paper	   warrants	   the	  most	  immediate	  attention.	  Staff	  in	  these	  offices	  I	  interviewed	  also	  stated	  that	  their	  role	  involves	  balancing	  the	  bank’s	  regulatory	  advocacy	  work	  against	  its	  rapport	  with	  supervisors:	  performing	  a	  sort	  of	  ‘relationship	  management’	  that	  sees	  regulators	  as	  stakeholders	  akin	  to	  shareholders	  or	  investors	  (Interview,	  27th	  January	  2014,	  London).	  	  The	  reverse	  side	  of	  this	  interfacing	  activity	  is	  representing	  the	  bank	  at	  the	  policy-­‐making	   venues.	   Many	   of	   these	   large	   banks	   have	   established	   presences	   in	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Brussels	   to	   facilitate	   contact	   with	   the	   Commission	   or	   the	   Parliament;	   and	   the	  German	  banks	  deployed	  staff	  to	  London	  to	  handle	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  EBA.	  One	  interview	  subject	  remarked	  to	  me	  that	  this	  work	  extends	  to	  overseeing	  and	  managing	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   informational	   product	   that	   goes	   out	   to	   the	   policy-­‐making	  fora:	  letters	  are	  carefully	  crafted	  so	  as	  to	  conform	  to	  a	  ‘house	  style’,	  and	  in	  one	  case	  a	  manager	  was	  coached	  in	  “how	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  reg	  discussion	  …	  how	  to	   speak	   to	   these	  people”	   (Interview,	  3rd	   June	  2014,	  London).	  The	   two	  sides	  of	  this	  extensive	  capacity	  have	  been	  nurtured	  over	  time,	  as	  these	  banks	  have	  long	  been	  accustomed	  to	  operating	  in	  several	   jurisdictions	  –	  and	  so	  needing	  to	  keep	  abreast	  of	  regulatory	  developments	  in	  each	  of	  their	  locations.	  	  	  Turning	  to	  their	  information-­‐generating	  capacity,	  we	  see	  a	  similar	  sophistication	  and	  strength.	  These	  banks	  have	  teams	  of	  specialists	  in	  regulatory	  policy,	  and	  in-­‐house	   lawyers	   who	   are	   experts	   in	   the	   precise	   details	   of	   financial	   regulation.	  Beyond	   this	   technical	   regulatory	   expertise,	   analysis	   is	   often	   contributed	   to	  lobbying	  papers	  by	  staff	  in	  the	  banks’	  business	  divisions,	  who	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  substantive	   input	   about	   unintended	   consequences	   of	   proposals.	   Similarly,	  further	   depth	   is	   occasionally	   added	   by	   banks’	   macroeconomic	   research	   units	  (Interview,	  23rd	  April	  2013,	  London).	  	  Aside	   from	   this	   sort	   of	   input	   –	   about	   the	   details	   and	   consequences	   of	   policy	  proposals	   –	   these	   large	   banks	   are	   able	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	   hugely	   technical	  discussions	   regarding	   the	   specification	   of	   valuation	  models.	   They	   use	   these	   to	  calculate	  (for	  example)	  their	  risk-­‐weighted	  asset	  positions,	  and	  thus	  their	  capital	  adequacy	   ratios,	   and,	   importantly,	   are	   developed	   by	   the	   banks	   themselves.	  Regulators	   constantly	   scrutinise	   these	   models	   to	   validate	   their	   inputs	   and	  processes;	   but	   since	   the	   technical	   expertise	   behind	   their	   construction	   and	  calibration	  resides	  with	  the	  banks,	  they	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  discussions.	  	  	  The	   large	   banks,	   then,	   have	   extensive	   resources	   for	   interfacing	   with	   public	  actors,	  and	  for	  generating	  the	  information	  which	  serves	  as	  the	  key	  to	  accessing	  these	  fora.	  But	  perhaps	  their	  most	  significant	  capacity	  is	  their	  ability	  to	  connect	  these	  together	  into	  a	  co-­‐ordinated	  lobbying	  operation.	  Firstly,	  these	  large	  banks	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have	   grown	   the	   ‘interfacing’	   function	   into	   an	   internal	   brokerage,	   with	   staff	  dedicated	  to	  bridging	  between	  the	  various	  departments	  or	  divisions	  involved	  in	  lobbying	  efforts.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  these	  staff	  who	  source	  high-­‐quality	  information	  from	  within	   the	  bank,	   located	   in	  pockets	  of	   the	  bank’s	   support	  divisions,	  or	   from	   its	  business	  areas.	  They	  also	  serve	  as	  gatekeepers	  into	  the	  bank	  for	  policy-­‐makers:	  	  
“So	   if	   I	  was	  an	  MEP	  assistant	   and	   I	  was	  going	   to	   call	   JP	  Morgan,	   I	  would	  
know	  there	  was	  about	  two	  people	  I’d	  go	  to	  …	  And	  who	  we	  then	  bring	  in,	  the	  
experts	   in	   the	   bank	   will	   be	   wide-­‐ranging,	   and	   we’re	   happy	   to	   bring	   in	  
anyone	  if	  they	  know	  the	  biscuits.”	   (Interview,	  3rd	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  These	  banks	  have	  taken	  this	  a	  step	  further	  and	  implemented	  strategies	  referred	  to	  as	   ‘three	   lines	  of	  defence’	  or	   ‘firm	  management’,	  which	  seek	   to	   integrate	   the	  management	   of	   all	   their	   various	   risks	   into	   a	   coherent	   structure.	  The	   ‘first	   line’	  represents	  the	  business	  areas	  themselves:	  the	  trading	  desks	  and	  banking	  teams	  are	  expected	  to	  keenly	  monitor	  their	  risks	  and	  manage	  them	  appropriately.	  Next,	  the	  ‘second	  line’	  is	  situated	  in	  the	  bank’s	  over-­‐arching	  risk-­‐management	  function,	  which	   provides	   independent	   oversight	   of	   the	   aggregate	   positions.	   Lastly,	   the	  ‘third	   line’	   refers	   to	   the	   internal	   audit	   team,	   which	   reports	   on	   the	   overall	  supervision	   to	   the	  senior	  management	  board.	   Importantly,	   the	  entire	  approach	  embeds	   regulatory	   compliance	   into	   a	   consolidated	   framework	   which	   treats	  regulatory	   risks	   (that	   is,	   the	   risk	   of	   sanction)	   as	   being	   on	   a	   par	  with	   credit	   or	  market	  risk.	  In	  other	  words,	  these	  large	  banks	  are	  now	  as	  careful	  about	  ensuring	  compliance	  as	  they	  are	  about	  the	  credit	  quality	  of	  their	  clients	  (for	  example).	  As	  one	  interviewee	  put	  it:	  	  
“…	   it’s	   a	   bit	   more	   than	   that,	   because	   we	   are	   creating	   the	   framework	   in	  
which	   all	   the	   functions,	   the	   control	   functions	   –	   being	   operational	   risk,	  
compliance,	   legal,	   etc	   –	   will	   operate,	   and	   to	   ensure	   alignment	   with	  
regulation,	   and	   also	   make	   sure	   that	   it’s	   fit	   for	   purpose	   for	   pure	   risk	  
management	  in	  the	  firm…	  “	   (Interview,	  14th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  This	  defensive	  strategy	  may	   focus	  on	   integrating	  elements	  of	   risk-­‐management	  into	   a	   coherent	   framework,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   significant	   for	   the	   story	   of	   lobbying	  efforts.	  By	  taking	  such	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  their	  risks,	  and	  by	  including	  regulatory	  risk	   in	   the	   mix,	   the	   banks	   are	   able	   to	   significantly	   leverage	   their	   lobbying	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resources.	  Thus,	  in	  constructing	  their	  responses	  to	  a	  given	  issue,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  draw	   on	   the	   connections	   established	   by	   this	   internal	   framework	   to	   source	  appropriate	  expertise,	  and	  to	  aid	  representation.	  	  From	  this	  empirical	  study,	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  two	  domestic	  banking	   markets	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   different	   casts	   of	   actors	   representing	   the	  ‘large	  bank	  layer’	  of	  the	  two	  countries.	  In	  the	  UK	  we	  have	  a	  set	  of	  universal	  banks	  with	   strong	   domestic	   roots,	   and	   strong	   international	   perspectives,	   which	  together	  account	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  sector’s	  assets.	  In	  Germany,	  we	  have	  just	   two	   banks,	   which	   together	   hold	   a	   far	   smaller	   share	   of	   the	   sector’s	   assets	  compared	   to	   their	  British	  counterparts.	  Next,	  we	  have	  seen,	   in	   turn,	  how	  these	  banks	   have	   significant	   holdings	   of	   lobbying	   resources,	   and	   how	   they	   have	  worked	   to	   integrate	   them	   into	   coherent	   operations.	   This	   has	   confirmed	   the	  initial	   premise	   raised	   earlier,	   linking	   resource	   distributions	   to	   underlying	  varieties	   of	   financial	   system.	   Our	   next	   task	   is	   to	   study	   how	   these	   large	   banks	  have	   put	   these	   resources	   to	   use	   in	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   in	   the	   European	  regulatory	  space,	  and	  so	  to	  examine	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  against	  the	  empirical	  data.	  	  
5.3.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses:	  how	  the	  resources	  were	  used	  
H1:	  The	  resource	  hypothesis	  The	  large	  banks	  used	  these	  resources	  to	  enable	  their	  lobbying	  strategies.	  Before	  examining	  these	  in	  detail,	  however,	  three	  themes	  emerged	  during	  the	  inductive	  content	   analysis	   of	   the	   data	   which	   are	   worthy	   of	   note,	   because	   they	   gave	   an	  overall	   context	   to	   the	   review	   of	   these	   banks’	   lobbying	   activities.	   Firstly,	   there	  was	  a	  marked	  tendency	  among	  interviewees	  to	  firmly	  identify	  their	  work	  as	  not	  being	  lobbying	  –	  indicating	  a	  nervousness	  about	  being	  seen	  to	  be	  exerting	  undue	  influence	  over	  regulators.	  For	  instance,	  one	  stated	  that:	  
“I	   think	   the	   idea,	   that	   is	   actually	   quite	   damaging,	   is	   that	   banks	   lobby	  
because	  they	  wake	  up	  one	  day	  and	  say	  ‘We	  want	  to	  change	  this	  rule	  because	  
it’s	  not	  good	  for	  us.’	  It’s	  not	  that.	  The	  first	  we	  hear	  about	  it,	  is	  when	  I	  hear	  
somebody	   talking	  about	   it,	   or	   I	   see	  a	  white	  paper,	   or	   I	   see	   something	   like	  
that.	  So	  we	  engage	  at	  the	  very	  first	  minute	  that	  that	  topic	  becomes	  a	  public	  
dialogue.	  But	  again,	  I	  think	  that	  there’s	  this	  notion	  that	  banks	  lobby,	  and	  all	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this	   stuff	   –	   you	   know,	   it’s	   a	   dialogue,	   and	   it’s	   a	   dialogue	   that	   we	   do	   not	  
start.”	   (Interview,	  4th	  April	  2014	  (b),	  London)	  	  Another,	   putting	   it	   rather	   succinctly,	   remarked,	   “it	   wasn’t	   lobbying,	   it	   was	  education”	  (Interview,	  26th	  March	  2014,	  London).	  Nonetheless,	  we	  can	  set	  these	  objections,	   or	   this	   reluctance,	   aside,	   and	   recall	   the	   definition	   of	   lobbying	  established	   in	   Chapter	   Two:	   for	   our	   purposes,	   this	   ‘education’	   –	   providing	  expertise	  to	  help	  craft	  regulation	  –	  is	  lobbying.	  	  Secondly,	  respondents	  were	  also	  extremely	  conscious	  of	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  a	  positive	   image	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   policy-­‐makers,	   and	   so	   to	   manage	   their	   lobbying	  activities	  very	  carefully.	  Thus,	  as	  one	  commented:	  	  
“Because	  a	  lot	  of	  it	  comes	  down	  to	  …	  people	  who	  are	  in	  front	  line	  in	  public	  
policy,	  or	  government	  affairs,	  having	  conversations	  with	  key	  officials,	  and	  if	  
they	  mess	  it	  up,	  they	  mess	  it	  up	  for	  the	  bank	  for	  a	  while.	  So	  you’ve	  got	  some	  
very,	   very	   high	   quality	   people	   out	   there,	   carrying	   the	   weight	   of	   huge	  
organisations’	  ability	  to	  be	  a	  respected	  voice,	  and	  some	  of	  them	  have	  messed	  
it	   up.	   And	   don’t	   ask	  me	   to	   say	  who,	   but	   you	   know	  …	   some	   big	   UK	   banks	  
messed	  it	  up	  really,	  really	  badly,	  and	  effectively	  kind	  of	  closed	  the	  door	  for	  
them	  having	  any	  influence	  …”	   (Interview,	  14th	  May	  2013,	  London)	  	  This	  built	  on	  the	  previous	  theme,	  as	  respondents	  stressed	  how	  their	  work	  with	  policy-­‐makers	   constituted	   ‘constructive	   engagement’	   rather	   than	   ‘lobbying.’	  Thirdly,	  when	  describing	  how	  lobbying	  decisions	  were	  made,	  many	  alluded	  to	  an	  approach	  which	   I	   labelled	   ‘following	   the	   pen’.	   For	   example,	   when	   I	   asked	   one	  about	  the	  logic	  behind	  lobbying	  choices,	  he	  replied:	  
“Well,	   you	   know,	   one	   way	   of	   answering	   that	   is	   to	   say	   ‘It	   totally	   depends	  
who’s	  got	  the	  power	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  who’s	  the	  decision-­‐maker.’”	  (Interview,	  4th	  April	  2014	  (b),	  London)	  	  As	  we	  will	   see,	   the	   large	  banks	  were	   able	   to	   track	   the	  progress	   of	   a	   particular	  initiative	  from	  its	  origins	   in	  the	  framework	  discussion	  at	  the	  Commission,	  right	  through	   to	   the	  minutely	   detailed	   conversations	   at	   the	   EBA	   –	   and	   to	   engage	   in	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  each	  of	  these	  steps.	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5.3.2.1:	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  The	   large	  banks	  embraced	   the	  EBA,	  absorbing	   it	   into	   their	   roster	  of	   regulatory	  interlocutors.	   However,	   the	   various	   data	   revealed	   that	   this	  was	   not	   an	   instant	  and	   smooth	   transition;	   rather,	   their	   engagement	   rose	   from	   an	   early,	   and	   very	  low,	   starting	   point.	   In	   its	   previous	   incarnation	   (as	   the	   Committee	   of	   European	  Banking	  Supervisors)	  it	  was	  merely	  a	  loose	  network	  of	  national	  regulators,	  and	  so	   the	   large	   banks	   paid	   it	   scant	   attention,	   focussing	   their	   regulatory	   lobbying	  efforts	  on	  domestic	  actors.	  As	  the	  network	  crystallised,	  their	  resources	  dedicated	  to	   monitoring	   European	   developments	   identified	   its	   importance.	   Their	  perception	  of	   it	   shifted,	  and	   though	  they	  now	  recognised	   its	  significance	  as	   the	  driver	   of	   the	   standardisation	  of	  European	   rules,	   they	   approached	   it	  with	   some	  trepidation.	   They	   understood	   that	   it	   now	  had	   a	   distinct	   physical	   presence	   and	  that	  it	  could	  now	  be	  lobbied	  directly,	  but	  as	  a	  new	  European	  regulator	  –	  and	  as	  a	  complex	  one	  at	   that	  –	   they	  were	  unsure	  how	  to	  do	  so.	  A	  particular	   issue	  about	  which	  interviewees	  expressed	  concern	  was	  the	  various	  routes	  they	  had	  into	  the	  institution,	  and	  how	  to	  cut	  through	  its	  impenetrability:	  
“…	   it’s	   so	   …	   their	   decision-­‐making	   process	   is	   so	   opaque.	   For	   example,	   we	  
know	  that	  they	  have	  working	  groups	  on	  different	  topics.	  It’s	  quite	  difficult	  to	  
identify	  who’s	  on	  those	  working	  groups,	  sometimes…”	  (Interview,	  17th	  June	  2013,	  London)	  	  Early	  attempts	  by	  the	  large	  German	  banks	  to	  forge	  contact	  with	  it	  –	  to	  establish	  similar	   relations	   with	   it	   as	   were	   enjoyed	   with	   the	   BaFin	   –	   were	   met	   with	   a	  sensitive	  reaction.	  As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  EBA’s	  staff	  put	  it:	  	  
“…	  they	  were	  here	  even	  before	  the	  paint	  was	  dry	  …	  already	  telling	  us	  what	  
to	  do	  and	  how.”	  	   (Interview,	  1st	  March	  2013,	  London)	  	  Later,	  these	  perspectives	  matured,	  and	  the	  large	  banks	  came	  to	  regard	  it	  as	  vital	  in	  establishing	   the	  unified	  market	   in	  banking	  services:	   in	  developing	   the	  single	  set	  of	  rules	  and	  ensuring	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  for	  all	  European	  banks.	  	  Almost	  immediately	  after	  its	  formation,	  the	  EBA	  set	  to	  work	  issuing	  consultation	  documents	   and	   requesting	   input	   from	   the	  banking	   sectors	  of	  Europe.	   Studying	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the	   pattern	   of	   responses	   from	   the	   large	   British	   and	   German	   banks	   to	   these	  requests,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  picture	  of	  how	  the	  engagement	  grew	  (see	  Table	  5.1).	  	  
Table	  5.1:	  Responses	  to	  EBA	  consultations	  by	  large	  British	  and	  German	  banks,	  2011-­‐15	  
Year	   British	   German	  2011-­‐12	   3	   1	  2012-­‐13	   7	   10	  2013-­‐14	   31	   22	  2014-­‐15	   13	   14	  
Source:	  Documents	  downloaded	  from	  EBA	  website.	  Those	  captured	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  analysis	  
are	  from	  consultations	  relating	  only	  to	  the	  CRDIV/CRR	  package;	  these	  declined	  during	  2014.	  	  These	  rising	  responses	  were	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  increasing	  interfacing	  resources	  banks	   were	   committing	   to	   the	   task	   of	   representation	   at	   this	   new	   European	  regulatory	   venue.	   They	   employed	   staff	   specifically	   to	   manage	   the	   relationship	  with	   the	   EBA,	   bolstering	   their	   capacity	   for	   horizon-­‐scanning	   and	   external	  representation.	  The	  large	  German	  firms,	   for	  their	  part,	  based	  staff	   in	  London	  to	  facilitate	   attendance	   at	   EBA	   hearings. 54 	  As	   well	   as	   such	   formal,	   public	  engagement,	  the	  banks	  used	  these	  staff	  to	  try	  to	  replicate	  the	  personal	  contacts	  they	  had	  with	  their	  domestic	  regulators,	  and	  were	  able	   to	  broker,	  with	  varying	  success,	  individual	  meetings	  with	  EBA	  staff.	  	  Into	   these	   consultation	   exercises	   the	   large	   banks	   submitted	   very	   precise,	  technical	   input.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   overall	   process	  meant	   that	   the	   high-­‐level	  points	   of	   design	  were	   established	   in	   the	   framework	   texts	   (at	   ‘Level	   One’)	   and	  then	   the	   EBA	   would	   draft	   the	   substantive	   implementing	   measures.	   An	  interviewee	  gave	  me	  a	  flavour	  of	  some	  typical	  points	  raised	  in	  this	  venue:	  
“What’s	  the	  settlement	  currency	  of	  the	  trade?	  Is	  it	  the	  trade	  currency	  you’ve	  
got?	  Because	  that’s	  not	  a	  legally	  defined	  term.	  The	  trade	  currency	  on	  an	  FX	  
swap,	   you’ve	   got	   two	   currencies	   there.	   Is	   it	   the	   close-­‐out	   currency	   of	   the	  
ISDA?	  Is	  it	  one	  of	  the	  listed	  currencies	  you’re	  allowed	  to	  pledge	  as	  collateral	  
under	  the	  CSA?”	   (Interview,	  26th	  March	  2014,	  London)	  	  This	   reveals	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   informational	   goods	   supplied	   into	   the	   EBA’s	  consultation	   requests,	   and	   so	   the	   banks’	   use	   of	   their	   information	   resources	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Indeed,	  until	  recently,	  Deutsche	  Bank’s	  global	  head	  of	  regulatory	  policy	  was	  based	  in	  London,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  bank’s	  Frankfurt	  headquarters.	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their	   direct	   lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA.	   Here,	   the	   banks	   were	   able	   to	   draw	   on	   their	  significant	  holdings	  of	   regulatory	  expertise:	   they	  had	   technical	   specialists	  well-­‐versed	  in	  such	  matters,	  who	  provided	  speedy	  and	  detailed	  answers	  to	  the	  EBA’s	  questions.	   For	   example,	   the	   CRDIV/CRR	   text	   created	   a	   new	   ratio	   to	   allow	  regulators	  to	  monitor	  banks’	  liquidity:	  banks	  now	  had	  to	  hold	  cash	  reserves,	  and	  pools	  of	   assets	  which	   could	   easily	  be	   sold	   to	   generate	   cash,	   to	   satisfy	  outflows	  over	   various	   time	   horizons.	   But	   it	  was	   up	   to	   the	   EBA	   to	   specify	   exactly	  which	  assets	   could	   be	   marked	   as	   ‘readily	   saleable’,	   and	   what	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	  outflows	   might	   be.	   The	   holistic,	   highly	   integrated	   approach	   to	   regulatory	  engagement,	   arising	   from	   the	   ‘three	   lines	   of	   defence’	   programme,	   meant	   that	  such	  expertise	  could	  be	  drawn	  in	  from	  various	  areas	  of	  the	  bank,	  supported	  with	  precise	  data	  showing	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  rule,	  and	  then	  fed	  to	  the	  outward-­‐facing	  representatives	  to	  be	  communicated	  to	  the	  EBA.	  The	  extract	  below	  shows	  a	  common	  example	  of	  this	  input:	  
‘Q3.	  Do	  you	  agree	  with	  the	  list	  of	  liquidity	  metrics	  under	  consideration	  to	  be	  
used	  in	  the	  EBA	  assessment,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  this	  section?	  	  
The	  EBA	  should	  avoid	  using	  metrics	  that	  are	  so	  restrictive	  that	  they	  would	  
eliminate	   assets	   which	   are	   generally	   considered	   liquid	   in	   the	  market,	   but	  
fail	   to	   meet	   a	   ‘litmus	   test’	   of	   metric	   compatibility.	   In	   particular,	   those	  
metrics	   which	   focus	   on	   bid	   ask	   differentials	   will	   be	   a	   useful	   indicator	   of	  
asset	   liquidity	   for	   some	   assets	   but	   not	   others,	   such	   as	   fixed	   income	  
instruments.	  We	  offer	  the	  following	  comments	  on	  specific	  indicators	  where	  
additional	  caution	  may	  be	  necessary	  when	  drawing	  conclusions:	  	  
Trading	  volume	  and	  turnover:	  although	  the	  trading	  volume	  of	  a	  specific	  
security	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  indicator	  of	  how	  buoyant	  asset	  liquidity	  might	  be,	  it	  
is	   important	   that	   the	  metric	   is	  used	   in	   the	  correct	  context.	  For	  example,	  a	  
market	   for	   which	   there	   are	   2	   sellers	   and	   2	   buyers	   will	   have	   a	   trading	  
volume	  of	  2.	  A	  second	  market	  for	  which	  there	  are	  4	  sellers	  and	  4	  buyers	  will	  
have	  a	  trading	  volume	  of	  4.	  These	  markets	  have	  the	  same	  relative	  liquidity	  
value	   attributed	   to	   that	   security,	   yet	   the	   absolute	   trading	   volumes	   differ	  
substantially.	   Furthermore,	   when	   calculating	   the	   total	   trading	   volume	  
metric,	   the	   time	   interval	   must	   be	   appropriately	   set	   so	   as	   to	   capture	   the	  
liquidity	  effect	  of	  quarter	  end	  when	  many	  banks	  sell	  off	  large	  proportions	  of	  
liquid	  inventory	  to	  meet	  balance	  sheet	  constraint	  requirements.’	  (Deutsche	  Bank,	  2013:	  5)	  	  This	   response	   shows	   the	   technical	   nature	   of	   the	   information	   provided	   by	   the	  large	  banks	  to	  the	  EBA.	  But	  equally	  significant,	  in	  this	  case,	  was	  the	  provenance	  of	  this	  input:	  it	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  bank’s	  head	  of	  liquidity	  management,	  rather	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than	   a	  member	   of	   the	   public	   affairs	   team.	   This	   shows	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  internal	  recruitment	  was	  able	  to	  work.	  	  Another	  area	  in	  which	  the	  large	  banks	  contributed	  heavily	  was	  in	  the	  design	  of	  the	   reporting	   templates,	   through	   which	   information	   on	   these	   new	   regulatory	  metrics	  would	  be	  gathered.	  Draft	  versions	  of	  these	  were	  issued	  by	  the	  EBA,	  and	  the	   banks	   performed	   an	   incredibly	   minute	   examination	   of	   them.	   They	  commented	   on	   their	   internal	   integrity	   and	   coherence,	   their	   relationship	   with	  other	   templates,	   and	   on	   ambiguity	   in	   the	   language	   used.	   For	   example,	   in	  commenting	  on	  a	  template	  established	  to	  gather	  data	  on	   levels	  of	   liquid	  assets,	  one	  bank	  advised	  thus:	  
‘Q:	   Are	   there	   additional	   sub-­‐categories	   of	   inflows	   or	   outflows	   that	   are	  
consistent	  with	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  LCR	  in	  the	  CRR?	  
A:	   EBA	   should	   consider	   breaking	   down	   the	   categories	   of	   outflows	   and	  
inflows	   in	   more	   detail,	   for	   example,	   Trade	   Finance	   inflows,	   large	  
corporate/small	   corporate	   outflows,	   as	   well	   as	   some	   of	   the	   additional	  
information	   that	   is	   currently	   submitted	  as	  annex	   to	   the	  QIS	   form,	   such	  as	  
information	  on	  collateral	  swaps	  where	  different	  asset	  levels	  are	  exchanged.	  
Above	  all,	  the	  reporting	  form	  should	  be	  flexible	  to	  allow	  further	  information	  
to	  be	  gathered	  if	  deemed	  necessary	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  observation	  period.’	  (Standard	  Chartered	  Bank,	  2012:	  3)	  	  Again,	  these	  extracts	  show	  the	  type	  of	  technical	   input	  these	  banks	  were	  able	  to	  marshal,	  making	  use	  of	  their	  significant	  internal	  expertise.	  	  
5.3.2.2:	  European	  legislative	  arena	  Although	   our	   causal	   model	   focussed	   on	   banks’	   lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA,	   the	   data	  revealed	  that	  the	  large	  banks	  were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  activity	  in	  the	  legislative	  arena.	   Representatives	   of	   all	   the	   banks	   interviewed	   admitted	   to	   extensive	  coverage	  of,	  and	  contact	  with,	  the	  main	  institutions	  at	  this	  level.	  They	  had	  long-­‐held	  connections	  with	  the	  Commission,	  dating	  back	  to	  its	  role	  as	  the	  initiator	  of	  previous	   iterations	   of	   European	   financial	   regulation.	   More	   recently,	   they	  developed	   contacts	   with	   the	   Parliament,	   sensitive	   to	   its	   rise	   in	   important	  following	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty:	  they	  were	  easily	  able	  to	  make	  contact	  with	  British	  and	   German	   MEPs,	   but	   also	   forged	   links	   with	   parliamentarians	   from	   other	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countries,	  focussing	  attention	  on	  those	  with	  significant	  legislative	  roles	  (such	  as	  
rapporteurs),	  or	  on	  whichever	  country	  held	  the	  revolving	  presidency	  (Interview,	  29th	   January	   2015,	   London).	   Beyond	   this	   Lloyds,	   HSBC,	   Deutsche	   Bank	   and	  Commerzbank	  all	  had	  staff	  accredited	  to	  enter	  the	  Parliament	  (EU	  Transparency	  Register).	   The	   approach	   to	   targeting	   this	   venue	   also	   included	   focussing	   on	  specific	  staff:	  
“But	  you	  know,	  in	  terms	  of	  who	  we	  want	  to	  see	  …	  you	  kind	  of	  know	  who	  the	  
rapporteur	   is,	   the	   assistant,	   who	   can	   be	   helpful.	   But	   often	   you	   know	   the	  
assistants	  can	  be	  quite	  good	  to	  get	  to	  as	  well,	  because	  you	  kind	  of	  know	  that	  
some	   of	   the	   rapporteurs	   or	   MEPs	   rely	   on	   the	   assistants	   to	   help	   them	  
understand	  some	  of	  these	  things	  –	  they	  may	  have	  some	  more	  –	  maybe	  not	  
experience	  but	  they	  can	  maybe	  get	  to	  understand	  it.	  The	  MEPs	  can’t	  know	  
everything,	   so	   the	  assistants	   can	  be	  very	   important	   to	  get	   to,	  and	   some	  of	  
them	  are	  quite	  smart.”	   (Interview,	  18th	  March	  2014(b),	  London)	  	  Elsewhere,	   interviewees	  explained	  how	  the	  banks	  specifically	  sought	  out	  MEPs	  with	  backgrounds	   in	   financial	  services	  or	   law,	  and	  directed	  special	  attention	  at	  them.	  They	  also	  explained	  how	  at	   this	  stage,	   their	  aim	  was	   to	  steer	   the	  debate,	  and	   so	   their	   engagement	   with	   these	   legislative	   actors	   naturally	   involved	  providing	   high-­‐level,	   policy-­‐shaping	   information.	   For	   example,	   they	   supplied	  recommendations	  on	  how	  the	  legislation	  should	  be	  crafted:	  
‘We	  support	  the	  direction	  of	  prudential	  reform	  outlined	  by	  the	  Commission	  
Services	   in	   this	   paper.	   As	   we	   have	   indicated	   in	   response	   to	   earlier	  
consultations,	  we	  agree	  with	  the	  principle	  that	  prudential	  capital	  standards	  
for	   the	   banking	   sector	   needed	   to	   be	   raised.	  …	   [However]	   the	   analysis	   and	  
vision	   need	   to	   consider	   the	   conflicting	   objectives	   of	   limiting	   bank	   risk,	  
maintaining	  the	  supply	  of	  credit	  to	  the	  real	  economy	  at	  an	  acceptable	  price,	  
and	   ensuring	   banks	   are	   sufficiently	   profitable	   to	   continue	   to	   attract	   the	  
necessary	  supply	  of	  capital	  from	  private	  investors	  to	  meet	  the	  new	  level.’	  (Barclays	  Bank,	  2010:	  1)	  	  The	   distinguishing	   feature	   of	   this	   example,	   compared	   to	   the	   input	   to	   the	   EBA	  shown	  earlier,	   is	  a	  much	  broader	  perspective,	   and	   in	  particular	   the	  mention	  of	  ‘competing	  objectives.’	  It	  also	  reveals	  how	  the	  large	  banks	  were	  able	  to	  turn	  their	  information-­‐generating	  resources	  to	  the	  production	  of	  political	  input,	  to	  support	  their	  direct	  lobbying	  in	  the	  European	  legislative	  arena.	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5.3.2.3:	  Domestic	  venues	  The	   large	   banks’	   extensive	   contacts	   also	   enabled	   them	   to	   continue	   active	  engagement	  with	  domestic	  actors.	  The	  large	  British	  banks,	  for	  their	  part,	  worked	  their	  established	  contacts	  with	  the	  Treasury	  to	  arrange	  frequent	  meetings	  with	  senior	   staff,	   and	   representatives	   met	   officials	   on	   at	   least	   a	   quarterly	   basis	  (Interview,	  16th	  July	  2014,	  London).	  Part	  of	  this	  focus	  on	  domestic	  venues	  came	  from	  their	  overall	  ploy	  of	   ‘following	  the	  pen’,	  and	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  relevant	  actors	  in	  sequence.	  Thus:	  
“…	  we	  do	   engage	  with	   the	  PRA,	  with	   the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  with	  Treasury,	  
depending	   upon	   …	   what	   step	   we’re	   at	   in	   implementation,	   so	   for	   …	   when	  
you’re	  negotiating	  we	  would	  engage	  quite	  a	  lot	  with	  Treasury,	  and	  tend	  to	  
keep	   them	  abreast	  of	  what	  we’re	  arguing	  and	  vice	   versa.	   I	  mean	  we	  have	  
gotten	  some	  pretty	  positive	  and	  discursive	  places	  on	  a	  lot	  of	  these	  things	  …”	  (Interview,	  7th	  May	  2014,	  London) 	  The	   large	  German	  banks	   also	   conducted	   a	   similar	   lobbying	   of	   domestic	   actors,	  working	  with	  staff	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  departments	  of	  the	  Finance	  Ministry,	  and	  using	   contact	   with	   the	   supervisory	   teams	   as	   the	   BaFin	   to	   apply	   pressure.	  Significantly,	  Deutsche	  Bank	  also	  extensively	  lobbied	  British	  actors	  –	  showing	  the	  extent	  of	   the	  crossover	  at	   this	   level	  of	   the	   two	  sectors.	  Significantly,	  as	  we	  will	  see	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   much	   of	   this	   engagement	   with	   domestic	   actors	   was	  undertaken	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   using	   them	   to	   exert	   pressure	   higher	   up	   the	  European	  chain	  –	  rather	  than	  to	  lobby	  over	  the	  domestic	  implementation	  of	  the	  rules.	   This	   reflected	   a	   deliberate	   use	   of	   a	   ‘pass-­‐through’	   strategy,	   and	   so	   an	  awareness	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  European	  rule-­‐making	  institution.	  	  
5.3.3:	  Trade	  associations	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   then,	   the	   banks	   made	   extensive	   use	   of	   their	   resources	   to	  conduct	  their	  own	  lobbying	  efforts.	  However,	  the	  data	  revealed	  something	  of	  an	  oddity,	  in	  that	  trade	  associations	  turned	  out	  to	  pay	  a	  significant	  role	  –	  against	  the	  expectations	   of	   the	   ‘resource’	   hypothesis.	   The	   large	   banks	   were	   involved	   in	  associational	  activity,	  but	  this	  often	  represented	  a	  more	  instrumental	  use	  of	  the	  trade	  association	  channel	  than	  an	  honest	  participation.	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There	  were	  two	  prominent	  associations	  which	  were	  involved	  in	  representing	  the	  banks	  at	   this	   layer,	  both	  British	  and	  German.	  The	   first	  was	   the	  British	  Bankers	  Association	   (BBA),	   whose	   primary	   function	   was	   to	   act	   as	   a	   lobbyist	   for	   the	  London	  banking	  community:	  it	  established	  preferences	  at	  an	  aggregate	  level	  and	  communicated	  them	  to	  the	  relevant	  policy-­‐makers.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  drew	  upon	  the	  opinions	  of	  its	  200	  or	  so	  members,	  which	  covered	  banks	  of	  different	  sizes,	  types	  and	   indeed	   national	   origins.	   The	   second	   was	   the	   Association	   for	   Financial	  Markets	   in	  Europe	  (AFME),	  which	  was	  descended	  from	  the	  London	  Investment	  Banking	  Association.	  It	  was	  more	  explicitly	  international	  in	  its	  membership	  and	  its	  orientation,	  and	  represented	  the	  largest	  wholesale,	  universal	  and	  investment	  banks	  in	  Europe.	  These	  two	  associations	  competed	  for	  a	  finite	  set	  of	  membership	  resources,	   but	   also	   –	   more	   importantly	   –	   for	   the	   attention	   of	   domestic	   and	  European	   regulatory	   policy-­‐makers.	   Importantly,	   the	   large	   German	   banks	   –	  especially	  Deutsche	  Bank	  –	   routed	  much	  of	   their	   associational	   activity	   through	  these	  two	  London-­‐based	  groups.	  	  The	   interview	  data	   showed	   that	   a	   key	   factor	  which	   drove	   the	   extent	   of	   banks’	  involvement	  with	   these	   two	   groups	  was	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	   issue	   at	   stake.	  First	  was	  the	  ‘common	  and	  minor	  problem’:	  an	  issue	  which	  effected	  many	  peers,	  and	   did	   not	   have	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   bank	   itself.	   	   For	   example,	   as	   one	  subject	  put	  it:	  
“I	   think,	   first	   of	   all,	   there’s	   a	   view	   on	   sensitivity:	   ‘Do	   we	   think	   that	   it	   is	  
particularly	  sensitive?’	  If	  not	  then,	  then	  our	  reaction	  would	  be	  ‘Do	  we	  think	  
it’s	  something	  that	  the	  BBA	  would	  want	  to	  get	  involved	  in?	  Do	  we	  think	  that	  
they	   think	   that	   there	  would	  be	   sufficient	   interest	   around	   the	   industry?’	   In	  
other	  words,	  do	  we	   think	   it’s	  going	   to	   impact	  everybody,	  or	   is	   it	  a	   specific	  
thing	   for	  us?	  Because	   if	  we	  were	   the	  outlier	  …	   there	  may	  be	   little	  point	   in	  
raising	  it	  at	  the	  BBA.”	   (Interview,	  18th	  March	  2014	  (a),	  London)	  	  This	  concern	  for	  ‘sensitivity’	  was	  echoed	  elsewhere,	  and	  a	  common	  view	  among	  interview	   respondents	  was	   that	   banks	   had	   to	   be	   careful	  when	   participating	   in	  such	  channels	   in	  case	  certain	  specific	   information	  regarding	  their	  own	  position	  became	  public.	  For	  example:	  
“Although	   clearly	   the	   banks	   themselves	   are	   only	   able	   to	   share	   a	   certain	  
amount	  at	  AFME	  and	  BBA.	  Certainly	  if	  it	  gets	  into	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  impact	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on	  our	  bank	  people	  can	  sometimes	  be	  a	  bit	  cagey	  about	  sharing	  too	  much	  of	  
those	  details	  …”	   (Interview,	  18th	  March	  2014	  (a),	  London)	  	  In	  this	  situation	  involvement	  was	  minimal,	  perhaps	  only	  extending	  to	  dialling	  in	  to	  conference	  calls,	  contributing	  loosely	  to	  a	  discussion	  and	  signing	  up	  to	  a	  joint	  response.	  Instead,	  the	  associations	  bore	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  work	  in	  establishing	  the	  common	   position	   and	   co-­‐ordinating	   the	   response.	   A	   similar	   approach	  characterised	  responses	   to	  problems	  which	  were	   less	  common	   in	   their	   impact:	  minimal	  engagement,	  matched	  with	  higher	  individual	  activity.	  Thus:	  
“If	  you	  look	  at	  something	  more	  like	  fundamental	  review	  of	  the	  trading	  book,	  
there’s	  a	  lot	  less	  industry	  consensus.	  So	  you’ll	  support	  what	  you	  can	  support	  
via	  the	  industry,	  but	  you’ll	  make	  sure	  you	  get	  your	  messages	  in	  bilaterally	  as	  
well.”	   (Interview,	  26th	  March	  2014,	  London)	  	  The	  banks	  increased	  their	  involvement	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  problem	  was	  common	  and	  more	  individually	  harmful.	  Staff	  were	  sent	  to	  working	  groups	  or	  discussions,	  and	   resources	   committed	   to	   providing	   material	   to	   aid	   decision-­‐making	   or	  support	   a	   combined	   response.	  Where	   appropriate,	   staff	  were	   also	   sent	   to	   help	  present	   the	   response	   to	   policy-­‐makers,	   often	   taking	   part	   in	   road	   shows	   in	  Europe.	   Importantly,	   in	  working	  on	  such	   issues	  the	  major	  banks	  often	  drew	  on	  their	  extensive	  personal	  networks	  and	  met	  outside	   the	  trade	  association	  forum,	  in	  order	  to	  ‘pre-­‐cook’	  an	  initial	  position:	  	  
“…	  there	  are	  quite	  regular	  get-­‐togethers,	  mainly	  over	  the	  phone,	  where,	  it’s	  
really	  kind	  of	  ‘open	  agenda’,	  anyone	  can	  ask	  any	  questions,	  firms	  can	  chose	  
to	  answer	  it,	  sometimes	  we’ll	  speak	  bilaterally	  to	  other	  firms,	  you	  know	  –	  if	  
we’ve	   got	   a	   particular	   concern	   on	   something,	   or	   if	   we’re	   not	   too	   sure,	   or	  
whatever	  it	  is	  –	  there’s	  almost	  too	  big	  a	  range	  to	  even	  think	  about	  it	  –	  we’ll	  
always	  speak	  to.”	   (Interview,	  18th	  March	  2014(b),	  London)	  	  This	   meant	   that	   when	   it	   came	   to	   preference-­‐forming	   discussions	   back	   at	   the	  association,	   a	   set	   of	   already-­‐congruent	   opinions	   were	   presented,	   and	   taken	  forward.	  This	   tactic	  was	  deployed	   in	  order	   to	  reduce	   the	   time	  spent	  discussing	  the	  issue	  in	  the	  formal	  venue,	  and	  to	  decrease	  the	  volatility	  in	  the	  discussion.	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Through	  such	  active	  participation	  –	  more	  active,	  at	  least,	  than	  simply	  signing	  up	  to	  a	  letter	  –	  banks	  helped	  in	  the	  position-­‐shaping	  and	  communicative	  activities	  of	  the	   associations.	   Papers	   were	   submitted	   by	   the	   two	   main	   associations	   to	   the	  early	   legislative	   discussions;	   but	   they	   also	   provided	   extensive	   input	   into	   the	  EBA’s	   later	   technical	   rule-­‐making	   procedures.	   In	   this	   second	   venue,	   such	  associational	  channels	  were	  used	  rather	  deliberately	  by	  the	  banks	  to	  amplify	  the	  strength	   of	   their	   concerns	   over	   certain	   issues.	   Indeed,	   this	   brings	   us	   to	   an	  important	  qualification	  about	  banks’	  participation	  in	  trade	  association	  lobbying:	  there	  was	  often	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo	  motivation	  at	  play,	  with	  banks	  consciously	  trading	  the	  commitment	  of	  resources	  to	  one	  discussion	  in	  return	  for	  the	  extraction	  of	  a	  private	  gain	  in	  another.	  	  Thus,	   banks	   often	   used	   trade	   associations	   to	   convey	   a	   message	   that	   was	  somehow	  politically	  awkward,	  or	  to	  overcome	  reputational	  damage	  sustained	  in	  the	  public	  domain	   (Interview,	  3rd	   June	  2014,	  London).	  For	  example,	  during	   the	  discussions	  on	  remuneration,	   the	  banks	  routinely	  chose	   to	  work	   through	   trade	  associations,	  in	  order	  to	  cleanse	  or	  anonymise	  their	  message:	  	  
“All	  of	  the	  remuneration	  stuff	  was	  …	  because	  we	  didn’t	  want	  to	  come	  out	  …	  
you	  know,	  we	  always	  go	  through	  trade	  associations	  if,	   if	  there’s	  something	  
we	  don’t	  want	  to	  stand	  up	  and	  say	  ourselves,	  we’re	  not	  going	  to	  be	  popular.”	  (Interview,	  7th	  May	  2014,	  London)	  	  Here,	   the	   ‘pre-­‐cooking’	  of	  positions	  was	  particularly	  common,	  as	  banks	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  the	  difficulty	  caused	  by	  uncomfortable	  disagreements	  during	  position-­‐forming	  workshops	  hosted	  by	  the	  trade	  associations.	  	  	  Elsewhere,	  a	  use	  for	  the	  associational	  channel	  was	  to	  help	  broker	  meetings	  with	  otherwise	  inaccessible	  European	  actors.	  For	  example,	  a	  British	  bank	  sent	  staff	  to	  join	   a	   trade	   association	   delegation	   to	   an	   MEP	   specifically	   to	   foster	   an	   initial	  contact,	  so	  that	  the	  bank	  could	  later	  follow	  it	  up	  on	  a	  personal,	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  basis	  (Interview,	  26th	  March	  2014,	  London).	  	  The	  large	  banks’	  engagement	  with	  trade	  associations	  shows	  a	  distinctly	  selective,	  and	  often	  rather	  selfish,	  use.	  This	  tendency	  towards	  rather	  bad	  behaviour	  in	  turn	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reduced	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   associations	   to	   produce	   co-­‐ordinated	   and	   coherent	  responses.	   For	   example,	   a	   representative	   of	   the	   BBA	   remarked	   to	   me	   that	  Deutsche	  Bank	   staff	   in	  London	   frequently	  blocked	   the	   association’s	   letters	   and	  joint	  positions,	  causing	  delays	  in	  representation	  and	  an	  inevitable	  diluting	  of	  the	  message.	   	   Similarly,	   one	   described	   the	   chaos	   that	   often	   characterised	   these	  attempts	  to	  forge	  common	  priorities:	  	  
“So	   it’d	   be	   like,	   ‘Well	   we’ve	   got	   a	  meeting	  with	   the	   Irish	   finance	  minister	  
next	   week	   –	   what	   should	   our	   priorities	   be?’	   and	   all	   hell	   breaks	   loose	   –	  
should	  it	  be	  pre-­‐trade	  transparency,	  should	  it	  be	  x,	  y	  or	  z;	  on	  CRDIV,	  then	  it	  
was	   like	   ‘Well	  what	  about	   the	  bonuses,	  do	  we	  mention	   that?’	   some	  people	  
would	  say	   ‘Yes,	  absolutely,’	   some	  would	  say	   ‘No	  –	   it’s	   too	  technical.’	   It	  was	  
hard	   to	   get	   agreement.	   I	   have	   great	   sympathy	   for	   trade	   associations	   in	  
trying	  to	  get	  that	  consensus.”	   (Interview,	  3rd	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  So	   overall,	   then,	  we	   return	   to	   a	   recognition	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   resources	   as	  drivers	  of	  their	  lobbying	  behaviour:	  these	  large	  banks	  had	  sufficient	  holdings	  of	  resources	   to	   run	   their	   own	   work,	   and	   only	   deployed	   any	   effort	   towards	  associational	  contact	  when	  they	  needed	  to.	  	  
5.3.4:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  large	  banks	  How	  does	   the	  story	  of	   the	   large	  banks	  stand	  up	  against	  our	   theory	  of	   lobbying	  behaviours?	  As	  we	  saw	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  section,	  the	  structures	  determined	  by	  the	  national	  modes	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  were	  indeed	  reflected	  in	  the	  resource	  holdings	   of	   the	   banks.	   Hence,	   there	   were	  more	   large	   British	   banks	   than	   large	  German	   banks	   present	   in	   this	   top	   layer,	   and	   between	   them	   they	   all	   had	  significant	  endowments	  of	   lobbying	  resources.	  This	  satisfies	  the	  initial	  premise,	  linking	  underlying	  national	  contexts	  to	  resources.	  	  Next,	  H1	  performed	  well.	  The	  large	  banks’	  view	  of	  the	  EBA	  developed	  from	  early	  hesitance	  to	  a	  clear	  recognition	  of	  its	  role	  as	  a	  centralised	  rule-­‐making	  body,	  and	  having	  seen	  this	  crystallisation	  of	  regulatory	  authority,	  they	  used	  their	  extensive	  resources	   –	   the	   ability	   to	   monitor	   developments	   in	   European	   regulatory	  governance	   and	   to	   generate	   technical	   information	   –	   to	   lobby	   the	   EBA.	   Their	  engagement	  with	  it	  rose	  from	  a	  halting	  start	  to	  a	  near-­‐constant	  interaction	  by	  the	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middle	  of	  2013.	   In	  this	  sense,	   the	  theorised	  causal	  process	  has	  been	  borne	  out:	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  national	  banking	  markets	  drove	  the	  resources	  towards	  two	  very	  different	  sets	  of	  banks,	  who	  then	  used	  them	  to	  direct	  regulatory	  lobbying	  at	  the	  EBA.	  	  However,	   in	   two	   important	   regards	   this	   story	   takes	   us	   beyond	   the	   ‘resource	  hypothesis.’	  The	  larges	  banks	  were	  almost	  as	  active	  in	  other	  arenas	  as	  they	  were	  at	   the	   EBA:	   they	   lobbied	   European	   legislative	   actors,	   directing	   effort	   at	  Commission	   staff	   and	  MEPs;	   and	  continued	   to	   target	  domestic	   regulators.	  That	  this	   occurred	   in	   parallel	   with	   their	   lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA	   perhaps	   shows	   the	  fractious	   and	   complex	   natures	   of	   this	   policy	   dossier.	   Furthermore,	   the	   large	  banks	   did	   employ	   associational	   approaches	   –	   not	   to	   overcome	   a	   resource	  shortfall,	  but	  rather	  to	  help	  cleanse,	  or	  anonymise,	  politically-­‐awkward	  message	  and	  to	  help	  penetrate	  European	  venues.	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  bringing	  all	  these	  various	  findings	  together,	  the	  key	  implication	  of	  
H1	   still	   stands:	   the	   large	  banks	  had	   the	  ability	   to	  generate	   informational	  goods	  (the	  precise,	  detailed	  technical	  input)	  required	  by	  the	  new	  regulatory	  venue,	  and	  the	  interfacing	  resources	  to	  penetrate	  it.	  This	  chimes	  with	  key	  implications	  of	  the	  European	   interest	   group	   literature.	   First,	   this	   has	   shown	   that	   holdings	   of	  informational	  resources	  are	  key	  determinants	  of	  lobbying	  behaviours	  (Chalmers,	  2011;	   2013;	   Dür	   &	   Mateo,	   2012);	   and	   we	   have	   seen	   how	   banks’	   extensive	  resources	  enabled	  them	  to	  absorb	  the	  EBA	  as	  a	  target.	  Second,	  despite	  extending	  further	  than	  our	  causal	  model,	  the	  revealed	  patterns	  of	  lobbying	  in	  the	  legislative	  arena	  and	  on	  the	  home	  front	  themselves	  support	  a	  wider	  theme	  in	  the	  literature:	  namely	  that	  private	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  run	  extensive	  lobbying	  strategies	  targeting	  several	   venues	   concurrently	   (Mazey	   &	   Richardson,	   2006).	   But	   overall,	   the	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  large	  banks’	   lobbying	  also	  provides	  important	  support	  for	   the	   central	   argument	   of	   this	   thesis:	   the	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	   the	   large	  British	   and	   German	   banks	   reveal	   the	   role	   played	   by	   their	   respective	   national	  contexts	   –	   specifically,	   their	   financial	   systems	   –	   in	   shaping	   their	   resource	  holdings.	   In	   other	  words,	   the	  way	   these	   banks	   lobbied	   the	  EBA	  was	   related	   to	  features	  of	  their	  underlying	  national	  contexts.	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5.4:	  The	  British	  sector	  At	   this	   point	  we	  move	   from	   a	   combined	   review	   of	   the	   two	   sectors,	   to	   a	  more	  specific	   examination	  of	   the	  British	   context.	  Here,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	  Chapter	  Four,	   a	  market-­‐based	   financial	   system	  has	   long	   prevailed,	  with	   banks	   providing	   credit	  into	   the	   real	   economy	   chiefly	   by	   acting	   as	   facilitators	   of	   capital	   market	  transactions.	  The	  nature	  of	  this	  business	  has	  put	  the	  sector	  under	  a	  consolidating	  pressure,	  and	  historical	  processes	  of	  amalgamation	  have	  reduced	  the	  population	  of	  banks	  down	  to	  three	  distinct	  layers.	  The	  five	  banks	  at	  the	  very	  top	  (Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland,	  HSBC,	  Barclays,	  Standard	  Chartered	  and	  Lloyds)	  have	  already	  been	  covered.	  Below	  these	  a	  set	  of	  more	  ‘pure’	  retail	  banks,	  such	  as	  Nationwide,	  TSB	  and	  Santander	  compete	  on	  the	  domestic	  market.55	  At	  the	  very	  bottom	  sits	  a	  layer	  of	   often	   very	   small	   building	   societies,	   whose	   business	   models	   concentrate	   on	  mortgage	  lending	  and	  retail	  banking.	  This	  section	  examines	  each	  of	  these	  tiers	  in	  turn.	  	  
5.4.1:	  The	  domestic	  retail	  banks	  Here,	  we	  examine	  the	  resources	  and	  lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  the	  domestic	  retail	  banks,	  which	  we	  can	  think	  of	  as	  ‘mid-­‐tier’	  institutions.	  	  
5.4.1.1:	  Resource	  holdings	  Despite	   being	   far	   smaller	   than	   the	   major	   universal	   banks,	   these	   banks	   have	  sufficient	  material	  resources	  to	  finance	  fairly	  well	  developed	  lobbying	  capacities.	  They	  have	  moderately	  strong	  monitoring	  and	  external	  representation	  capacities,	  and	  are	  able	  to	  keep	  abreast	  of	  developments	  in	  regulatory	  discussions	  on	  their	  own	   –	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   second-­‐hand	   information	   from	   a	   trade	   body.	  Several	   have	   an	   ‘EU	   Affairs’	   team,	   which	   is	   responsible	   for	   watching	   policy-­‐making	   activity	   at	   the	   European	   level.	   However,	   these	   are	   often	   very	   young	  teams:	   Nationwide,	   for	   example,	   only	   established	   a	   specific	   European	   policy	  function	  in	  2012,	  and	  it	  continues	  to	  be	  under-­‐resourced	  compared	  to	  the	  public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Even	  this	  roll-­‐call	  demonstrates	   the	  difficulty	   in	  categorizing	   the	  UK’s	  banks.	  Nationwide	   is	  a	  large	   building	   society;	   TSB	   is	   the	   recently-­‐floated	   element	   of	   Lloyds;	   and	   Santander	   is	   the	  UK-­‐based	  retail	  unit	  of	  a	  Spanish	  firm	  which	  includes	  and	  investment	  banking	  arm.	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affairs	   team	   that	   conducts	   equivalent	   work	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene	   (Interview,	  12th	   August	   2014,	   London).	   Domestic	   engagement,	   meanwhile,	   is	   handled	   by	  established	   public	   and	   government	   affairs	   teams,	   and	   by	   groups	   of	   regulatory	  specialists.	  The	  former	  are	  often	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  TSB)	  combined	  with	  the	  more	  generic	  public	  relations	  function.	  	  These	  banks	  have	  information	  generating	  capacities,	  albeit	  with	  a	  limited	  focus.	  Their	  strengths	  lie	  in	  a	  rather	  specific	  area:	  they	  have	  particular	  expertise	  in	  the	  UK	  retail	  market,	  and	  so	  are	  equipped	  to	  provide	   information	  on	   the	   impact	  of	  regulatory	   changes	  on	  domestic	   lending,	   but	  not	  on	   larger	   issues	  pertaining	   to	  the	   functioning	   of	   wholesale	   markets.	   Their	   regulatory	   policy	   specialists	   are	  similarly	  focussed	  primarily	  on	  domestic	  rules,	  and	  on	  ensuring	  compliance	  with	  the	  PRA’s	  regime.	  	  Overall,	   a	   key	   distinguishing	   feature	   between	   these	   banks	   and	   their	   larger	  cousins	   is	   the	   lack	   of	   integration	   in	   their	   lobbying	   capacities.	   The	   engagement	  with	   European	   actors	   is	   handled	   separately	   from	   similar	   interactions	   with	  domestic	   policy-­‐makers,	   with	   different	   staff	   looking	   after	   each.	   The	   ability	   to	  recruit	   expertise	  and	   input	   from	  various	  pockets	  within	   the	   institutions	   is	   also	  less;	   as	   one	   subject	   put	   it,	   staff	   beyond	   the	   core	   public	   affairs	   and	   regulatory	  policy	  functions	  are	  simply	  not	  thought	  of	  as	  sources	  of	  expertise	  (Interview,	  2nd	  October	   2014,	   London).	   This	   rather	   disconnected	   approach	   reflects	   a	  material	  resource	  constraint:	  they	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  financial	  resources	  to	  develop	  a	  sophisticated,	   integrated	   lobbying	   machine.	   A	   representative	   of	   one	   of	   these	  firms	  described	  their	  European	  engagement	  thus:	  
“…	  at	  board	  level	  it	  had	  been	  quite	  broadly	  felt	  that	  [we	  were]	  very	  reactive	  
…	  when	  it	  came	  to	  issues	  coming	  from	  the	  EU.	  So	  they	  thought	  there	  was	  an	  
urgent	  need	  for	  us	  to	  feel	  much	  more	  on	  top	  of	  …	  that.	  Before	  that	  we	  were	  
just	  engaged	  in	  a	  very	  reactive	  way.”	  (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  As	   with	   the	   larger	   banks,	   we	   see	   support	   here	   for	   the	   theoretical	   expectation	  linking	  structures	  of	  the	  national	  markets	  to	  the	  resources.	  These	  smaller	  firms	  occupy	   a	   tier	   below	   the	   universals,	   and	   tend	   to	   operate	   with	   far	   more	   of	   a	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domestic	  focus.	  They	  have	  less	  to	  devote	  to	  supporting	  lobbying	  resources,	  and	  –	  perhaps	  more	   significantly	   –	   simply	  do	  not	   integrate	  what	   they	  do	  have	   into	   a	  coherent	  operation.	  	  
5.4.1.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses:	  how	  the	  resources	  were	  used	  
H2:	  The	  associational	  hypothesis	  Like	  the	  larger	  banks,	  the	  British	  banks	  in	  this	  tier	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  European	  policy-­‐making	  process,	  and	  so	  knew	  how	  to	  conduct	  their	  lobbying	  strategies	  according	  to	  a	  sequence.	  However,	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  ‘associational	  hypothesis’	   –	   and	   a	   key	   theme	   of	   this	   section	   –	   is	   that	   these	   smaller	   firms	  engaged	  with	   the	  EBA	  via	   their	   representative	  bodies.	  Again,	   to	  make	   sense	  of	  their	   activities	   we	   trace	   their	   efforts	   across	   the	   institutional	   venues,	   showing	  how	  their	  resource	  constraints	  shaped	  their	  behaviour.	  	  
5.4.1.2.1:	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  Like	   the	   large	   banks,	   these	   firms	   quickly	   became	   aware	   of	   the	   important	   role	  played	  by	  the	  EBA	  in	  writing	  implementing	  standards.	  One	  respondent	  explained	  how	  the	  new	  European	  regulator	  was	  seen	  in	  her	  organisation:	  
“…	  relationships	  with	  the	  EBA	  are	  really	  important,	  and	  will	  be	  increasingly	  
so.	  So,	  in	  the	  past	  year,	  we’ve	  had	  a	  lot	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  EBA,	  at	  all	  
sorts	   of	   levels.	   Starting	   at	   the	   top	   with	   Andrea	   Enria,	   and	   working	   level	  
meetings,	  so	  quite	  a	  few.	  Quite	  a	  few.”	  (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  However,	   examining	   their	   input	   into	   consultation	   exercises	   we	   can	   see	   a	   far	  lower	  level	  of	  engagement	  over	  the	  period:	  	  
Table	  5.2:	  Responses	  to	  EBA	  consultations	  by	  British	  mid-­‐tier	  banks,	  2011-­‐15	  
Year	   British	  retail	  banks	  2011-­‐12	   1	  2012-­‐13	   	  2013-­‐14	   4	  2014-­‐15	   	  
Source:	  Documents	  downloaded	  from	  EBA	  website	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Into	   these	   open	   events	   the	   mid-­‐sized	   banks	   supplied	   technical	   information	   in	  support	  of	  the	  rule-­‐making	  process.	  For	  example,	  one	  firm	  advised:	  
‘Q4b)	  Are	  the	  thresholds	  set	  in	  the	  criterion	  appropriate?	  	  
A:	  A	  threshold	  of	  EUR	  75	  000	  represents	  a	  comparatively	  small	  amount	   in	  
the	   context	   of	   typical	   practice	  amongst	  UK	   financial	   institutions	  and	   so	   is	  
not	   considered	   a	   helpful	   way	   of	   identifying	   risk	   takers.	   If	   a	   monetary	  
threshold	   of	   this	   type	   is	   included	  within	   the	   final	   regulations,	   it	  would	   be	  
helpful	   if	   national	   regulators	  were	   able	   to	   set	   an	   equivalent	   level	   in	   their	  
applicable	   currency	   to	   avoid	   year	   on	   year	   fluctuation	   in	   the	   level	   of	   this	  
threshold	  due	  to	  exchange	  rate	  movements.’	  (Nationwide	  Building	  Society,	  2013a:	  2)	  	  This	   example	   represents	   a	  wider	   set	   of	   such	   responses,	   and	  overall	   they	   show	  how	   these	   banks	   put	   their	   internal	   capacities	   to	   use	   in	   delivering	   regulatory	  expertise.	  However,	  looking	  across	  their	  responses,	  what	  was	  significant	  was	  the	  narrowness	   of	   their	   input:	   they	   restricted	   their	   participation	   to	   a	   small	   set	   of	  discussions,	   demonstrating	   how	   their	   internal	   expertise	   was	   focussed	   on	   a	  certain	  policy	  areas.	  This	  limited	  engagement	  is	  significant,	  given	  that	  across	  this	  time	   period	   many	   issues	   were	   being	   deliberated	   over	   at	   the	   supranational	  regulatory	  level	  which	  directly	  effected	  such	  banks.	  Similarly,	  the	  interview	  data	  indicated	   that	   the	   frequency,	   and	   richness,	   of	   their	   input	   was	   very	   weak	   in	  comparison	   with	   their	   larger	   British	   cousins,	   and	   this	   was	   related	   to	   the	  difficulty	  they	  had	  in	  marshalling	  the	  detailed	  technical	  expertise	  required	  by	  the	  EBA.	  What	  was	  happening	  was	  that	  on	  many	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  retail	  banking	  –	  such	   as	   the	   minute	   rules	   around	   liquidity	   metrics	   –	   the	   conversations	   were	  dominated	  by	  the	  larger	  universal	  banks	  (RBS,	  HSBC,	  Barclays,	  et	  cetera).	  Within	  these	  larger	  banks,	  staff	  from	  the	  retail	  units	  were	  able	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  entire	  firm’s	  lobbying	  resources,	  and	  so	  had	  access	  to	  far	  greater	  information-­‐gathering	  capacity.	  	  For	  the	  mid-­‐sized	  banks,	  perhaps	  the	  key	  problem	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  integration	  in	  their	   lobbying	  activities.	  What	  in-­‐house	  expertise	  they	  did	  have	  could	  not	  be	  as	  effectively	   recruited	   (compared	   to	   the	   larger	   banks),	   and	   the	   segmented	  approach	   to	   interfacing	  meant	   that	   representation	  on	   the	  European	   regulatory	  stage	  was	  hampered:	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“…	  we	  have	  a	   special	   regulatory	   liaison	   team,	  and	   they	  deal	  with	   the	  FCA	  
and	  the	  PRA,	  they	  own	  the	  relationship,	  they	  manage	  it,	  they	  …	  supervise	  it	  
as	   well.	   The	   EBA	   is	   different,	   and	   I	   think	   this	   goes	   back,	   I	   guess,	   to	   the	  
newness	  of	  our	  EU	   team	  …	  and	   so	  a	   lot	  of	   it	   is	  actually	  done	   through	  me,	  
when	  dealing	  with	   the	  EBA,	   but	   that’s	   I	   guess,	   just	  …	   it’s	   an	   ad	   hoc	   thing	  
that’s	  just	  arisen,	  it’s	  not	  anything	  that	  was	  planned	  out.”	  
	  (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  Likewise	  the	  EU	  Affairs	  teams	  had	  their	  time	  divided	  between	  the	  EBA	  and	  the	  other,	  more	   established	   European	   venues.	   This	  meant	   that	   shifting	   interfacing	  resources	   towards	   the	  EBA	  had	   to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  careful	  consideration	  of	  costs	  and	  likely	  returns:	  
“We	   have	   to	  make	   sure	  we’re	   focussing	   our	   attention	  where	   it’s	   going	   to	  
have	  the	  right	  impact,	  with	  the	  resource	  we	  have	  available	  to	  us.	  With	  the	  
volume	  and	  pace	  [of	  regulatory	  change]	  the	  resources	  are	  spent	  on	  reacting.	  
To	  add	  resource	  to	  be	  pro-­‐active,	  in	  relationship	  management	  at	  that	  level,	  
that’s	  another	  hit	  to	  the	  bottom	  line.”	  (Interview,	  2nd	  October	  2014,	  London)	  	  This	   also	   affected	   the	   banks’	   ability	   to	   broker	   consistent,	   stable	   relationships	  with	   EBA	   staff,	   as	   the	   European	   affairs	   were	   under-­‐resourced	   and	   frequently	  over-­‐committed	  to	  the	  lobbying	  European	  legislative	  actors.	  	  The	  mid-­‐tier	  banks	  sought	  to	  overcome	  these	  weaknesses	  by	  delegating	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  the	  domestic	  trade	  bodies.	  The	  key	  group	  involved	  was	  the	  BBA	  (which	  we	  have	  already	  encountered),	  and	   it	   contributed	   to	  several	  EBA	  consultations	  over	  the	  period:	  	  	  
Table	  5.3:	  Responses	  to	  EBA	  consultations	  by	  the	  British	  Bankers’	  Association,	  2011-­‐15	  
Year	   British	  Bankers’	  Association	  2011-­‐12	   3	  2012-­‐13	   8	  2013-­‐14	   20	  2014-­‐15	   14	  
Source:	  Documents	  downloaded	  from	  EBA	  website	  	  However,	   the	  diluting	  effect	  of	   this	   channel	  on	   the	  quality	  of	   the	   informational	  input	  was	  problematic	  for	  the	  banks.	  An	  EBA	  representative	  explained	  to	  me	  that	  while	  it	  appreciated	  hearing	  a	  unified	  voice,	  it	  really	  prized	  clarity	  and	  precision;	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however,	   like	   these	  banks’	   individual	   efforts,	   their	   associational	   activity	   lacked	  the	   detail	   and	   high-­‐quality	   expertise	   which	   could	   be	  marshalled	   by	   the	   larger	  universals.	   In	   combining	   industry	   positions	   to	   prepare	   consultation	   responses,	  the	  BBA	  frequently	  struggled	  to	  attain	  consensus	  among	  its	  diverse	  membership,	  and	   so	   could	   only	   produce	   rather	   generic	   input.	   One	   respondent	   outlined	   his	  view	  on	  the	  situation:	  
“And	  you’ll	  say	  ‘That	  bit	  there	  is	  not	  something	  that	  we	  can	  sign	  our	  names	  
to.	  As	  members	  that	  pay	  you	  a	  lot	  of	  money	  we	  want	  it	  removed.’	  And	  I	  think	  
everyone	  does	  the	  same.	  It	  seems	  like	  it’s	  a	  miracle	  these	  documents	  ever	  say	  
more	  than	  the	  bare	  minimum…”	   (Interview,	  11th	  March	  2014	  (a),	  London)	  	  Indeed,	   this	   weakness	   reveals	   a	   further	   important	   dynamic	   relating	   to	   the	  associational	   activity,	   as	   indicated	   by	   a	   statement	  made	  by	   a	   representative	   of	  one	  of	  the	  banks	  in	  this	  layer:	  
“And	   Nationwide	   is	   quite	   unique,	   as	   you	   probably	   know,	   in	   financial	  
services,	   because	  we	   compete	  with	   the	   big	   banks	   but	  we’re	   very	   different,	  
with	  the	  way	  we’re	  governed	  and	  how	  we’re	  financed,	  the	  way	  we’re	  funded	  
…	   so	   we’re	   not	   properly	   represented	   neither	   by	   the	   British	   Bankers	  
Association	   –	  which	  we’re	  members	   of	   –	   neither	   by	   the	   Building	   Societies	  
Association	  –	  which	  we’re	  also	  members	  of…”	  
	  (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  As	   the	   largest	   building	   society	   by	   far,	   Nationwide	   found	   itself	   caught	   between	  two	  groups:	  the	  Building	  Societies	  Association	  often	  felt	  that	  it	  was	  ‘large	  enough	  to	   fight	   its	   own	  battles’	   (Interview,	   4th	   June	  2014,	   London),	  while	   the	   fact	   that	  Nationwide	   was	   mutually-­‐,	   rather	   than	   privately-­‐owned,	   meant	   the	   BBA’s	  support	  was	  similarly	  muted.	  Likewise,	  Santander	  had	  difficulty	  drawing	  on	  the	  active	  support	  of	  the	  BBA	  in	  European	  discussions	  –	  the	  problem	  coming	  from	  its	  ownership	   and	   history.56	  Such	   factors	   combined	   to	   weaken	   the	   associational	  representation	  of	  these	  mid-­‐tier	  banks	  at	  the	  EBA.	  	  
5.4.1.2.2:	  European	  legislative	  arena	  Like	   the	   larger	  banks,	   the	  data	   for	   this	   layer	   showed	   the	  extensive	   lobbying	  of	  legislative	   actors.	   During	   the	   earlier	   development	   of	   the	   CRDIV/CRR	   package	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  See	  previous	  footnote.	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these	   banks	   were	   well-­‐connected	   to	   the	   European	   policy-­‐making	   machinery.	  Their	   European	   teams	   were	   used	   to	   monitor	   the	   outputs	   of	   the	   Commission	  during	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   drafting	   of	   the	   legislation.	   At	   this	   level	   they	  provided	  input	  into	  consultations	  on	  the	  universal	  application	  of	  European	  rules	  to	   national	   banking	   sectors:	   both	   the	   Co-­‐Operative	   Bank	   and	   Nationwide	  submitted	   responses	   to	   the	   Commission’s	   consultation	   exercise	   of	   February	  2010.	   The	   latter,	   discussing	   proposed	   changes	   to	   the	   definitions	   of	   allowable	  capital	  instruments,	  remarked	  that:	  	  
“Neither	  of	  these	  options	  is	  palatable	  and	  both	  raise	  fundamental	  questions	  
in	   relation	   to	   the	   on-­‐going	   viability	   of	   an	   important	   sector	  within	   the	  UK	  
financial	  services	  market	  place.”	   (Nationwide	  Building	  Society,	  2010:	  4)	  	  This	  typifies	  the	  input	  deployed	  by	  the	  banks	  at	  this	  legislative	  level:	  they	  were	  arguing	  forcefully	  for	  national	  derogation	  to	  the	  proposed	  legislation,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  certain	  features	  of	  the	  domestic	  regime.	  The	  same	  activity	  was	  continued	  in	   the	   Parliament,	   and	   several	   of	   the	   banks	   established	   independent	   access	   to	  European	   actors:	   Nationwide,	   for	   example,	   had	   good	   relations	   with	   the	  representative	   for	   the	   south-­‐east	   of	   England,	   Kay	   Swinburne	   (Interview,	   12th	  August	  2014,	  London).	  	  However,	   it	   should	  be	  noted	  again	   that	  at	   this	   level	   their	   involvement	  was	   less	  extensive	   than	   that	   of	   the	   larger	   UK	   banks.	   With	   their	   limited	   capacity	   for	  external	  representation	  they	  often	  had	  difficulty	  balancing	  attendance	  at	  various	  European	   fora.	   As	   at	   the	   EBA,	   their	   strategy	   for	   overcoming	   this	   weakness	  involved	   relying	   on	   the	   support	   of	   trade	   associations.	   This	   marked	   them	   out	  compared	   the	   larger	  banks,	  who,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  used	   the	   trade	  bodies	  more	  selfishly	   than	   out	   of	   necessity.	   However,	   just	   as	   with	   the	   larger	   banks,	   their	  engagement	   was	   also	   fairly	   rather	   issue-­‐driven;	   for	   example,	   one	   responded	  stated:	  
“…	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  issues	  we	  had	  concerns	  about	  were	  common	  throughout	  the	  
industry,	   so	   we’d	   be	   very	   confident	   in	   engaging	   with	   the	   BBA	   and	   then	  
feeding	   into	   the	   BBA’s	   position,	   et	   cetera.	   But	   one	   or	   two	   issues	   were	  
effecting	  us	   in	  a	  very	  different	  way,	   so	  …	   from	  that	  perspective,	   there	  was	  
quite	  a	  bit	  of	  push	  back	  from	  some	  of	  the	  bigger	  banks…”	  (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	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  To	   counter	   this,	   several	   of	   the	   retail	   banks	   in	   this	   layer	   turned	   to	   a	   more	  transnational	   approach:	   Nationwide,	   for	   example,	   worked	   heavily	   with	   the	  European	   Association	   of	   Co-­‐operative	   Banks,	   where	   it	   found	   stronger	   allies	  among	  the	  similarly-­‐sized	  continental	  European	  mutual	  firms,	  such	  as	  the	  Dutch	  Rabobank	   (Interview,	   12th	   August	   2014,	   London).	   It	   used	   these	   channels	   to	  strengthen	  its	  lobbying	  efforts	  directed	  at	  the	  Commission	  or	  the	  Parliament.	  	  
5.4.1.2.3:	  Domestic	  venues	  With	   resource	   constraints	   holding	   them	   back	   at	   the	   European	   level,	   the	   mid-­‐sized	   banks	   focussed	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene.	   Their	   local	  interfacing	  resources	  –	   in	  particular	   their	  staff	  dedicated	   to	  government	  affairs	  and	   regulatory	   liaison	   –	   were	   more	   far	   more	   developed	   than	   the	   European	  equivalents,	  giving	  them	  far	  greater	  ability	  to	  contact	  domestic	  actors.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  they	  held	  frequent	  meetings	  with	  senior	  Treasury	  staff,	  and	  had	  strong	  relationships	  with	  the	  PRA.	  	  In	   this	   lobbying	   of	   domestic	   actors,	   there	   was	   a	   subtle	   difference	   in	   intent	  compared	   to	   the	   larger	  banks.	  Where	   the	   latter	  explicitly	   sought	   to	  engage	   the	  PRA	  (for	  example)	  as	  a	  mouthpiece	  on	  the	  European	  stage,	  the	  mid-­‐sized	  banks	  sought	   to	   eke	   out	   pockets	   of	   implementation	   by	   the	   British	   regulator	   in	  ways	  which	   supported	   them.	  This	  meant	   convincing	   the	  PRA	   to	   use	  what	   remaining	  discretion	   it	   had	   under	   the	   European	   legislative	   framework	   to	   allow	   certain	  interpretations	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   domestic	   banks.	   Indeed,	   this	   represented	   the	  distinctive	   national	   self-­‐image	   of	   these	   banks:	   they	   saw	   greater	   advantage	   in	  lobbying	   the	   PRA	   over	   discretionary	   treatment	   than	   in	   engaging	  with	   the	   EBA	  over	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  rules:	  
“The	  view	  is	  it’s	  directives	  and	  regulations	  in	  which	  we	  have	  no	  choice.	  And	  
so	  we	  …	  are	  not	   looking	   influence	  decision-­‐makers	   in	  Europe	  …	  but	  not	   to	  
work	  at	  home.”	   (Interview,	  2nd	  October	  2014,	  London)	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5.4.1.3:	  Summary:	  The	  mid-­‐tier	  banks	  At	  this	  juncture	  we	  can	  review	  the	  story	  of	  these	  mid-­‐tier	  banks	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  overall	  theory.	  First,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  British	  sector	  can	  be	  seen	  in	   these	   banks’	   resources	   holdings:	   they	   are	   weaker,	   and	   less	   organised,	   than	  their	   larger	  cousins.	  This	  confirms	  the	   initial	  premise,	   linking	  national	  contexts	  with	  resources.	  	  Next,	  H2	   performed	  well.	   Their	   lack	   of	   resources,	   and	  more	   importantly	   their	  segmented	  approach	   to	  managing	   their	   resources,	   left	   them	  over-­‐shadowed	  by	  the	   large	   banks	   when	   lobbying	   the	   EBA.	   For	   the	   middle	   tier,	   lobbying	   was	   a	  question	  of	  making	  up	  for	  such	  resource	  shortfalls	  by	  delegating	  representation	  to	  trade	  bodies	  –	  which	  confirms	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  ‘associational	  hypothesis.’	  However,	  the	  tensions	  in	  the	  domestic	  associational	  landscape	  meant	  these	  trade	  bodies	  struggled	  to	  matched	  the	  informational	  needs	  of	  the	  EBA;	  so	  overall,	  the	  mid-­‐tier	  banks’	  representation	  at	  this	  venue	  was	  weak.	  	  
5.4.2:	  The	  building	  societies	  Next,	   we	   turn	   to	   the	   building	   societies,	   which	   constitute	   the	   ‘long	   tail’	   of	   the	  sector.	  There	  is	  a	  significant	  and	  rapid	  drop-­‐off	  in	  size	  across	  this	  group,	  with	  the	  largest	  accounting	  for	  more	  in	  assets	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  layer	  combined.	  	  
5.4.2.1:	  Resource	  holdings	  The	  larger	  players	  in	  this	  sub-­‐sector	  have	  sufficient	  financial	  resources	  to	  sustain	  the	  capacities	  required	  for	   lobbying.	  Thus,	  the	  Yorkshire	  and	  Coventry	  building	  societies,	   have	   staff	   engaged	   in	   ‘regulatory	   policy’,	   who	   monitor	   outputs	   of	  policy-­‐making	   fora.	  While	   these	   are	   primarily	   focussed	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene,	  they	  have	  recently	  turned	  their	  attention	  up	  to	  the	  European	  level,	  and	  so	  such	  staff	   have	   been	   partially	   reassigned	   to	   representing	   the	   societies	   at	   European	  policy-­‐	   or	   rule-­‐making	   discussions.	   However,	   unlike	   the	   retail	   banks,	   these	  societies	  have	  no	  specific	  teams	  solely	  dedicated	  to	  European	  lobbying:	  
“…	  the	  majority	  can’t	  afford	  to	  employ	  somebody	  whose	  basic	  job	  is	  to	  keep	  
to	   track	   of	   the	   cascade	   of	   [European]	   regulation,	   and	   interface	   with	   the	  
regulators.	  That’s	  part	  of	  somebody	  else’s	  job.	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I	   think,	  unless	  you’re	   large	  you	  don’t	  have	   the	   time	   to	   think	  about	  Europe	  
independently,	  because	  …	  you’ve	  got	  a	  business	  to	  run.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  The	  smaller	  societies,	  below	  this	  threshold,	  have	  virtually	  no	  interfacing	  capacity	  at	  all.	  As	  one	  interviewee	  put	  it:	  
“[these	  firms	  have]	  assets	  of	  a	  few	  hundred	  million	  and	  pre-­‐tax	  profits	  of	  a	  
few	  hundred	  thousand,	  or	  the	   low	  millions.	  The	  amount	  of	  spare	  cash	  that	  
the	  Loughborough	  Building	  Society	  has	  for	  their	  European	  lobbying	  is	  zero.”	  (Interview,	  9th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  Any	  monitoring	  of	  regulatory	  developments	  these	  firms	  manage	  is	  performed	  by	  the	   staff	   responsible	   for	   compliance	   and	   reporting,	   and	   their	   perspective	   is	  limited	   to	   interpreting	  and	   implementing	   the	  rules,	   rather	   than	  contributing	   to	  discussions	   in	   order	   to	   shape	   them.	   These	   firms’	   engagements	  with	   regulators	  are	  therefore	  essentially	  reactive.	  	  However,	  examining	  the	  information-­‐generating	  capacities	  of	  the	  sub-­‐sector	  as	  a	  whole	   tells	   a	   subtly	   different	   story.	   Naturally,	   the	   larger	   ones	   have	  more	   staff	  capable	  of	  opining	  on	  regulatory	  policy	  at	  a	  high	  level,	  across	  several	  issue	  areas.	  Yet	  across	  the	  board,	   these	  societies	  have	  strong	  capacities	  to	  produce	  detailed	  technical	  input	  on	  matters	  pertaining	  to	  retail	  and	  commercial	  mortgage	  lending.	  This	   is	   a	   result	  of	   the	   focus	  of	   their	  business:	   their	  operations	   require	   them	   to	  know	  their	  markets,	   their	  products	  and	   their	  borrowers	   in	  great	  detail.	  As	  one	  representative	  explained	  it	  to	  me:	  	  
“On	   the	   information,	   typically	   it	   has	   been	   good,	   because	   they	   all	   have	   to	  
have,	  because	  they’re	  basically	  a	  ‘factory’	  type	  business	  –	  when	  you’re	  doing	  
retail	   banking	   and	   retail	   savings,	   you	   have	   large	   numbers	   of	   smaller	  
transactions,	  compared	  with	  a	  corporate	  business,	  where	  you	  might	  have	  a	  
few	  big	   loans.	  So	  you’ve	  got	  to	  have	  good	  IT	  that	  deals	  with	  all	  of	   that.	  So	  
that’s	  really	  important.”	   (Interview,	  11th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  This	  business	  activity	  gives	  an	  extremely	  strong	  knowledge	  of	   the	  operation	  of	  these	  markets,	  and	  so	  an	  ability	  to	  provide	  detailed	  input	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  rule	  changes.	  Thus,	   the	   interviewee	  went	  on	   to	  explain	   that	   some	  building	  societies	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had	   powerful	   internal	   models,	   with	   which	   they	   could	   precisely	   quantify	   the	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  changes	  on	  lending	  activity.	  	  
5.4.2.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses:	  how	  the	  resources	  were	  used	  
H2:	  The	  associational	  hypothesis	  These	  firms’	  minimal	   lobbying	  resources	  meant	  that	  their	  efforts	  were	  both	  far	  narrower	   in	   scope,	   and	   far	   less	   co-­‐ordinated.	   Through	   their	   representative	  association	  they	  had	  a	  good	  awareness	  of	  the	  European	  policy-­‐making	  process:	  of	  the	  need	  to	  track	  issues	  through	  successive	  fora,	  and	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  importance	  of	  the	  EBA.	  But	  in	  practice	  their	  ability	  to	  translate	  this	  into	  a	  coherent	  strategy	  was	  very	  slight.	  Again,	  we	  can	  trace	  their	  activities	  through	  the	  venues.	  	  
5.4.2.2.1:	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  Across	   the	   interviews	   I	   saw	   how	   impressions	   of	   the	   EBA	   among	   the	   building	  societies	  varied.	  For	  the	  larger	  ones	  (such	  as	  Nationwide,	  as	  we	  have	  seen),	  there	  was	  an	  acute	  understanding	  of	  the	  EBA’s	  role,	  and	  its	  significance	  in	  the	  overall	  European	  regulatory	  process.	  For	  example,	  one	  commented	  that:	  
	  “…	   the	   primary	   setting	  where	   the	   actual	   rules	   are	   settled	   is	   Europe,	   and	  
whatever	  happens	   in	  the	  UK	  is	  mostly	  minor.	  So	  I	   think	  the	  understanding	  
that	  the	  big	  stuff	  is	  happening	  in	  Europe,	  if	  not	  in	  Basel,	  and	  the	  Basel	  stuff	  
is	  given	  effect	   in	  Europe,	  and	   then	   there’s	  not	  much	   left	   to	  argue	  about	   in	  
the	  UK	  –	  is	  absolutely	  taken	  on	  board.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  However,	   the	  smaller	  ones	  continued	  to	  retain	  a	  distinctly	  national	  perspective	  on	   the	   regulation,	   seeing	   the	  main	  players	   in	   their	  players	  as	  domestic.	  As	  one	  representative	  explained	  it	  to	  me:	  
“They	  depend	  heavily	  on	  their	  trade	  bodies,	  what	  their	  peers	  are	  doing,	  and	  
chatting	  to	  each	  other	  at	  conferences,	  and	  then	  following	  what	  Nationwide	  	  
or	  Yorkshire	  do,	  or	  Coventry	  do,	  and	  just	  copying	  it.”	  (Interview,	  9th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  He	   then	  went	   onto	   to	   label	  managers	   of	   such	   firms	   has	   having	   a	   ‘survival	   and	  golf’	  mentality:	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“Yeah	  –	  they	  want	  the	  society	  to	  survive	  and	  they	  like	  playing	  golf.”	  (Interview,	  9th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  Connected	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  awareness	  on	  European	  regulation,	  and	  their	  individual	  resource	  weaknesses,	   the	  building	  societies	  effectively	  delegated	  their	   lobbying	  to	   their	   representative	  association.	  Looking	  across	   the	  period,	  we	  can	   see	  very	  weak	  levels	  of	  response	  to	  consultation	  exercises.	  	  
Table	  5.4:	  Responses	  to	  EBA	  consultations	  by	  British	  building	  societies	  and	  the	  BSA,	  2011-­‐15	  
Year	   Individual	  societies	   Building	  Societies’	  Association	  2011-­‐12	   	   1	  2012-­‐13	   3	   6	  2013-­‐14	   	   8	  2014-­‐15	   1	   3	  
Source:	  Documents	  downloaded	  from	  EBA	  website	  	  The	   BSA	   sent	   staff	   to	   hearing	   and	   participated	   in	   consultations,	   but,	   as	   a	  representative	   explained	   to	  me,	   the	   association	  was	  very	   careful	   about	  what	   it	  involved	  itself	  in:	  
“We’re	   selective.	  Because	  you	  have	   to	   think	   there	  are	  well	  over	  a	  hundred	  
sets	  of	  text	  come	  out,	  just	  on	  CRDIV.	  There’s	  so	  much	  that	  we	  have	  to	  be	  very	  
selective.”	   (Interview,	  4th	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  Thus,	   for	   example,	   the	   BSA	   took	   part	   in	   discussions	   over	   retail	   banking,	  commenting	  on	  rules	  regarding	  the	  treatment	  of	  retail	  deposits	  in	  the	  calculation	  of	  liquidity	  ratios.	  One	  piece	  of	  input	  began	  with	  a	  note	  of	  caution:	  
‘However,	  in	  the	  very	  short	  time	  available,	  we	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  secure	  
much	  detailed	  input	  from	  our	  members,	  consequently	  our	  response	  remains	  
general,	  and	  high	  level.’	   (Nationwide	  Building	  Society,	  2013b:	  1)	  	  It	  then	  went	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  retail	  customers	  with	  deposits	  at	  building	  societies	  (rather	   than	   ‘proprietary	   banks’)	  were	  more	   loyal,	   and	   less	   likely	   to	  withdraw	  their	   funds	   in	   the	  event	  of	  market	  stresses.	  Overall,	  what	  was	  significant	  about	  the	  BSA’s	  regulatory	   lobbying	  was	  how	  its	   informational	  resources	  constrained	  the	  quality	  and	  breadth	  of	  its	  input:	  in	  rule-­‐making	  discussions	  it	  was	  often	  out-­‐done	  by	  both	  the	  mid-­‐tier	  retail	  banks	  and	  the	  large	  universals,	  who	  simply	  had	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far	  more	  precise	  information	  and	  far	  stronger	  ability	  to	  provide	  input	  on	  a	  range	  of	  topics.	  Just	  as	  problematic	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  interfacing:	  although	  the	  BSA	  had	  staff	  committed	  to	  representation,	  they	  were	  usually	  focussed	  on	  the	  legislative	  arena,	   and	   could	   not	   cover	   this	   emerging	   regulatory	   venue	   as	  well.	  Hence,	   the	  association	  also	  struggled	  to	  build	  personal,	  individual	  contacts	  with	  the	  EBA.	  	  
5.4.2.2.2:	  European	  legislative	  arena	  It	  was	   the	   larger	   societies	  were	   able	   to	   track	   the	  discussions	   over	   CRDIV/CRR	  among	  the	   legislative	  actors,	  and	  to	   follow	  the	  progress	  of	   the	  drafts.	  However,	  their	  weak	  representation	  resources	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  effectively	  closed	  out	  of	  legislative	  lobbying.	  	  For	  the	  remainder,	  again,	  the	  effort	  was	  delegated	  to	  the	  BSA.	  This	  body,	  as	  we	  have	   seen,	   was	   not	   without	   its	   own	   resourcing	   problems.	   It	   remarked	   in	   a	  consultation	  response	  to	  the	  European	  Commission	  in	  2010:	  	  
‘We	  regret	  we	  have	  neither	  the	  time	  nor	  in-­‐house	  expertise	  to	  provide	  [such	  
figures]	  –	  and	  believe	  many	  of	  our	  members	  are	  in	  the	  same	  position’	  	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2010:	  1)	  	  Notwithstanding	   these	   difficulties	   it	   did	   manage	   some	   penetration	   of	   the	  discussions	   in	   the	   legislative	   arena.	   The	   association	   relied	   on	   the	   services	   of	  another	  trade	  body:	  
“we	  belong	  to	  the	  …	  it’s	  called	  the	  BBB	  –	  the	   ‘Britain	  in	  Brussels	  Bureau’	  –	  
it’s	  the	  CBI	  outpost	  in	  Brussels.	  They’re	  like,	  they’re	  a	  listening	  post,	  they’re	  
on	  the	  ground,	  and	  they’re	  keeping	  us	  in	  the	  picture	  of	  what’s	  happening.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  Through	  this	   link	   it	  established	  contacts	  with	   the	  Commission,	  and	  was	  able	   to	  use	   them	   to	   raise	   concerns	   over	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   legislation.	   In	   particular,	  attention	  was	  focussed	  on	  attaining	  victories	  at	  this	  framework	  level,	  in	  order	  to	  set	  the	  boundaries	  of	  future	  debates.	  As	  one	  interviewee	  remarked:	  	  
“We	  …	  so	  we	  could	  see	  which	  way	  the	  wind	  was	  blowing,	  but	  we	  were	  clear	  
that	  ultimately	  the	  thing	  that	  would	  determine	  the	  maximum	  of	  what	  was	  
possible	   was	   the	   CRDIV	   text	   –	   so	   everything	   else	   was	   secondary.	   The	   key	  
thing	  was	  to	  get	  the	  right	  stuff	   in	  the	  CRDIV	  text	  …	  and	  so	  going	  there	  we	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first	  of	  all	  talked	  to	  the	  people	  in	  the	  DG	  –	  we	  happened	  to	  know	  one	  or	  two	  
people	  there,	  some	  of	  them	  were	  FSA	  secondees	  and	  so	  on,	  so	  that	  was	  the	  
obvious	  place	  to	  start.”	   (Interview,	  4th	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  Meanwhile	   the	   lobbying	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   was	   often	   conducted	   in	  tandem	   with	   the	   European	   Association	   of	   Co-­‐Operative	   Banks,	   with	   whom	   it	  found	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   common	   cause.	   Indeed,	   it	  was	   through	   its	   links	  with	   the	  EACB	  that	  it	  achieved	  much	  of	  its	  access	  to	  the	  Parliament,	  and	  later	  was	  able	  to	  gain	  accreditation	   for	   its	  own	  staff.	  Overall,	   then,	   in	   this	  arena	  we	  can	  read	  the	  BSA’s	  efforts	  as	  being	  characterised	  by	  a	  need	  to	  extract	  maximum	  return	  from	  scarce	  lobbying	  resources:	  hence	  the	  focus	  on	  collaborative	  work	  with	  the	  EACB,	  and	  hence	  the	  explicit	  targeting	  of	  effort	  at	  this	  framework	  level.	  	  
5.4.2.2.3:	  Domestic	  venues	  Instead,	   both	   the	   individual	   societies	   and	   the	   BSA	   focussed	   their	   regulatory	  lobbying	  efforts	  on	  the	  home	  front.	  They	  lobbied	  the	  PRA	  directly,	  re-­‐deploying	  staff	  used	  to	  managing	  supervisory	  relationships	  to	  more	  specific	  lobbying	  roles.	  The	  BSA	  also	  held	  bilateral	  meetings	  with	  Treasury	  staff	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  mutual	  sector.	  	  In	   these	   domestic	   discussions,	   their	   rather	   specific	   domestic	   role	   showed	  through.	  British	  regulators,	  and	  particularly	  Treasury	  officials,	  were	  very	  keen	  to	  monitor	  the	  health	  of	  the	  UK	  retail	  mortgage	  market,	  and	  the	  societies	  were	  well-­‐placed	  to	  provide	  expert	   input	  on	  this	  subject.	  They	  supplied	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  technical	  expertise	  and	  data,	  advising	  domestic	  policy-­‐makers	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  various	   European	   rules	   on	   lending	   activity.	   In	   particular,	   they	   often	   sought	   to	  influence	  British	  regulatory	  actors’	  implementation	  of	  these	  European	  rules.	  For	  example:	  
‘The	   BSA	   continues	   to	   support	   a	   suitably	   differentiated	   leverage	   ratio	  
framework,	  as	  clearly	  envisaged	  by	  Article	  511	  of	  the	  Capital	  Requirements	  
Regulation	   (CRR),	   as	   a	   supplementary	   tool	   to	   the	   risk-­‐based	   capital	  
framework	   of	   CRR,	  which	   should	   remain	   the	   primary	   regime.	   The	   Capital	  
Measure	  must	  remain	  total	  Tier	  1,	  as	  already	  specified	  in	  CRR	  Article	  429.	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Reasoned	   contributions	   to	   the	  debate	  on	  use	  of	  a	   leverage	   ratio	  are	   to	  be	  
welcomed.	   But	   the	   [British]	   leverage	   framework	   marks	   a	   fundamental	  
departure,	  even	  from	  what	  has	  so	  far	  been	  agreed	  and	  published	  by	  Basel	  or	  
in	   the	   EU,	   and	   –	   in	   effect	   –	   abandons	   the	   primacy	   of	   risk-­‐based	   capital	  
adequacy	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  primitive	  approach,	  as	  an	  over-­‐reaction	  to	  the	  
problem	   of	  model	   risk.	   In	   short,	   we	   regret	   the	   regulator	   appears	   to	   have	  
come	  up	  with	  the	  wrong	  answer.’	   (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2014:	  1)	  	  At	  stake	  here	  was	   the	  domestic	   implementation	  of	   the	  European	   leverage	  ratio	  rules	   (themselves	   derived	   from	   Basel	   III).	   The	   BSA	   argued	   forcefully	   for	   an	  approach	   that	   remained	   true	   to	   the	   European	   plans,	   rather	   than	   the	   intended	  British	  approach	  –	  which	  would	  enforce	  tougher	  rules	  on	  the	  national	  sector.	  	  
5.4.2.3:	  Summary:	  The	  building	  societies	  At	  this	  point,	  we	  can	  review	  the	  building	  societies’	  story	  against	  the	  predictions	  of	   the	  theory.	  As	  before,	   the	  theoretical	  expectation	   linking	  the	  structure	  of	   the	  market	   to	   the	  resources	   is	  borne	  out:	   these	  small	   firms	  had	  very	   little	  capacity	  for	   individual	   lobbying.	   Furthermore,	   the	   patterns	   of	   engagement	   in	   the	  regulatory	  arena	  support	  H2,	   in	  that	  what	   little	   lobbying	  of	  the	  EBA	  took	  place,	  was	   conducted	   via	   the	  Building	   Societies	  Association.	  However,	   the	  BSA’s	   own	  resource	  weakness	  meant	   it	   could	  not	  meet	   the	  European	   regulator’s	   need	   for	  precise	  technical	  input,	  and	  so	  the	  societies	  representation	  was	  weak.	  	  
5.4.3:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  British	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  Having	   examined	   the	   entire	   sector,	   we	   are	   now	   in	   a	   position	   to	   consider	   the	  performance	  our	   theorised	  causal	  model.	  Firstly,	   the	   initial	  premise	   linking	   the	  variety	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  to	  the	  resource	  distribution	  has	  stood	  up	  well.	  The	  market-­‐based	   system	   is	   represented	   by	   a	   banking	   sector	   spread	   across	   three	  tiers,	  each	  of	  which	   is	  marked	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  concentration	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Shabani	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Zysman,	  1983).	  At	   the	   top,	   five	  very	   large	  universal	  banks	   have	   extensive	   lobbying	   resources.	   They	   hold	   significant	   interfacing	  capacities,	   with	   staff	   dedicated	   to	  monitoring	   policy-­‐making	   processes,	   and	   to	  representation	   in	   the	   various	   fora;	   they	   also	   have	   huge	   amounts	   of	   expertise	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spread	   across	  many	   policy	   areas,	   and	   so	   an	   ability	   to	   provide	   a	  wide	   range	   of	  informational	   input.	   Most	   importantly,	   these	   banks	   have	   integrated	   their	  resources	   into	   coherent	   operations,	   placing	   regulatory	   lobbying	   on	   a	   par	  with	  commitments	  to	  risk	  management.	  	  Below	   these,	   a	   number	   of	   smaller	   firms	   continue	   to	   have	   resources,	   but	   these	  lack	   sophistication	  or	   strength.	  Thus,	   the	  banks	  have	   interfacing	   staff,	   but	   they	  are	  often	  separated	  across	  venues	  (domestic	  and	  European)	  or	  functions	  (public	  affairs	  and	  regulatory	  liaison).	  Likewise	  they	  have	  in-­‐house	  expertise,	  but	  this	  is	  of	  a	   far	  narrower	   focus;	  and	  overall	   their	   lobbying	  capacities	  are	  simply	  not	  as	  well	   integrated	   as	   their	   large	   cousins.	   Finally,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   45	   building	  societies	   have	   virtually	   no	   proprietary	   lobbying	   resources.	   They	   may	   have	  outward-­‐facing	   staff,	   but	   these	   are	   usually	   dedicated	   to	   managing	   the	   firms’	  relationship	   with	   supervisors,	   rather	   than	   lobbying	   over	   rules.	   As	   for	  information	  generating,	  they	  may	  be	  specialists	  in	  British	  mortgage	  lending,	  but	  are	  rarely	  able	   to	  marshal	  expertise	  on	  other	  areas	  of	  regulatory	  policy.	   In	   this	  way,	   looking	   across	   the	   entire	   sector,	   we	   can	   see	   the	   lobbying	   resources	  reflecting	   the	   structures	   defined	   by	   the	   underlying	   market-­‐based	   financial	  system.	  	  From	  this	  starting	  point	  we	  can	  move	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  hypotheses.	  H1	  linked	  resources	  with	  direct	   lobbying	  of	  the	  EBA,	  and	  was	  borne	  out.	  The	  large	  British	  banks,	  with	  the	  most	  extensive	  resources,	  were	  the	  most	  active	  lobbyists	  in	   the	   European	   regulatory	   arena.	   They	   used	   their	   interfacing	   resources	   to	  penetrate	   the	  new	  venue,	  and	  had	  the	   internal	  ability	   to	  generate	   the	   technical	  input	   the	  EBA	  required.	  Through	  their	   interactions,	   they	  were	  heavily	   involved	  in	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   EBA	   crafted	   its	   rules	   supporting	   the	   CRDIV/CRR	  package,	   and	   in	   fine-­‐tuning	   the	   reporting	   templates.	   All	   of	   this	   activity	   was	  buoyed	   by	   an	   astute	   perception	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   EBA’s	   rule-­‐making	  authority,	  and	  the	  effect	  that	  had	  on	  the	  locus	  of	  regulatory	  power	  in	  Europe.	  	  As	   we	   go	   down	   the	   sector	   we	   turn	   to	   the	   second	   hypothesis,	   linking	   reduced	  resources	   to	   greater	   associational	   activity.	   Again,	   this	   was	   supported	   by	   the	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empirical	   patterns:	   the	   mid-­‐tier	   banks	   and	   the	   small	   building	   societies	   relied	  extensively	  on	  delegating	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  either	  the	  BBA	  or	  the	  BSA.	  For	  the	  mid-­‐tier	  banks,	  the	  problem	  was	  perhaps	  a	  lack	  of	  integration	  of	  their	  resources,	  rather	  than	  a	  real	  weakness	  of	  resources	  per	  se;	  while	  for	  the	  small	  societies,	  the	  inability	   to	   represent	   themselves	   at	   this	   new	   venue,	   or	   to	   generate	   relevant	  expertise,	  was	  harmful.	  	  It	  was	  thus	  through	  the	  BBA	  and	  the	  BSA	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  these	  banks’	  European	  regulatory	  lobbying	  was	  achieved.	  	  However,	   there	  were	  several	  aspects	  of	   the	  British	  story	  which	  take	  us	  beyond	  the	  hypotheses,	  and	  which	  merit	  some	  analysis.	  First,	  both	  H1	  and	  H2	  examined	  regulatory	   lobbying	  of	   the	  EBA,	   yet	   the	  data	   showed	  how	  all	   three	   tiers	   of	   the	  British	   sector	   pursued	   extensive	   lobbying	   in	   the	   legislative	   arena.	   This	   was	  perhaps	   habitual:	   they	  were	   simply	  more	  used	   to	   engaging	  with	   the	  European	  Commission	  and	  the	  Parliament,	  as	   this	  was	  where	  previous	  activity	  had	  taken	  place.	  But	  it	  also	  reflected	  the	  essential	  complexity	  of	  the	  Lamfalussy	  process,	  as	  for	  much	  of	  this	  period	  the	  EBA	  was	  engaged	  in	  drafting	  specific	  rules	  while	  the	  higher-­‐level	   legislation	   had	   not	   yet	   been	   passed.	   In	   such	   a	   situation,	   it	   seems	  natural	  for	  banks	  (of	  whatever	  stripe,	  and	  using	  whatever	  means	  they	  could)	  to	  target	   their	   efforts	   at	   the	   legislative	   arena,	   where	   useful	   compromises	   could	  potentially	  be	  achieved.	  	  Secondly,	   and	   similarly,	   all	   the	   banks	   continued	   to	   use	   their	   contacts	   on	   the	  domestic	  front,	  and	  to	  maintain	  distinctive	  national	  elements	  to	  their	  strategies.	  The	  difference	  was	  in	  the	  relative	  weightings,	  and	  in	  the	  intention.	  For	  the	  large	  banks,	   lobbying	  of	   the	  PRA	  was	  simply	  a	  component	  of	  a	  much	   larger	  portfolio	  strategy	  –	  and	  one	  which	  was	  pitched	   towards	  Europe.	  Furthermore,	   their	  aim	  was	  to	  garner	  support	  among	  domestic	  actors,	  so	  that	  they	  could	  be	  put	  to	  use	  lobbying	   for	   the	   banks	   in	   either	   the	   political	   channel	   (the	   Treasury	  representative	  working	  in	  the	  Council)	  or	  the	  regulatory	  channel	  (the	  PRA	  staff	  working	  in	  the	  EBA).	  In	  contrast,	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  sector,	  domestic	  engagement	  remained	  more	   of	   a	   priority,	   and	   was	   undertaken	  more	   with	   the	   intention	   of	  gaining	  favourable	  implementation	  (where	  possible)	  on	  the	  national	  level.	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Thirdly,	  running	  against	  the	  implications	  of	  H1,	  the	  large	  banks	  did	  participate	  in	  associational	   approaches.	   However,	   this	   was	   a	   highly	   instrumental,	   and	   often	  selfish	  use	  of	  this	  channel:	  they	  used	  the	  trade	  bodies	  to	  garner	  access	  to	  venues	  (and	  particularly	  to	  individual	  MEPs),	  or	  to	  cleanse	  politically	  awkward	  message	  on	  topics	  such	  as	  remuneration.	  Finally,	  continuing	  this	  theme,	  the	  associational	  representation	   of	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   sector	  was	   rather	  weak.	   Several	   of	   the	  mid-­‐sized	  banks	  found	  themselves	  too	  big	  to	  rely	  on	  effective	  representation	  by	  the	   BBA	   or	   the	   BSA,	   yet	   too	   small	   and	   under-­‐resourced	   to	   really	   lobby	  themselves.	   Meanwhile	   the	   BSA,	   when	   lobbying	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   building	  societies,	   was	   itself	   constrained	   by	   a	   shortfall	   in	   resources	   –	   especially	   in	   the	  ability	   to	   produce	   the	   required	   information	   input.	   These	   findings	   are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  5.5.	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Table	  5.5:	  Summary	  of	  British	  banks’	  engagement	  across	  the	  arenas	  








Initially	  cautious	  and	  awkward;	  engagement	  improved	  with	  time.	  	  	  Became	  adept	  at	  regulatory	  lobbying	  –	  providing	  detailed	  technical	  input	  and	  data	  to	  help	  rule-­‐making.	  	  
Extremely	  well-­‐connected:	  used	  established	  contacts	  with	  the	  EC	  and	  EP	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  policy-­‐making	  discussions.	  	  Excelled	  at	  legislative	  lobbying:	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  generate	  high-­‐quality	  information.	  	  Used	  trade	  associations	  strategically,	  to	  broker	  access	  or	  to	  cleanse	  awkward	  messages.	  




anks	   Poorly	  connected.	  Struggled	  with	  representation;	  the	  larger	  UK	  banks	  were	  able	  to	  dominate	  the	  technical	  discussions.	  	  Participated	  in	  associational	  activity,	  but	  struggled	  to	  achieve	  effective	  representation	  because	  of	  difficulty	  in	  establishing	  consensus	  positions.	  
Connected:	  able	  to	  monitor	  outputs,	  but	  struggled	  with	  individual	  representation.	  	  Relied	  on	  (often	  European)	  trade	  associations.	  	  Skilful	  at	  legislative	  lobbying	  on	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  retail	  banking,	  but	  unable	  to	  contribute	  to	  wider	  discussions.	  




s	   Poorly	  connected.	  Struggled	  with	  representation;	  and	  with	  providing	  technical	  input	  beyond	  mortgage	  issues.	  	  Delegated	  to	  associations,	  but	  struggled	  to	  achieve	  effective	  representation	  because	  of	  resource	  weaknesses.	  
Able	  to	  monitor	  discussions,	  but	  only	  by	  re-­‐directing	  staff	  away	  from	  domestic	  coverage.	  The	  smaller	  societies	  relied	  extensively	  on	  the	  BSA.	  	  The	  BSA	  was	  able	  to	  achieve	  some	  representation	  –	  but	  only	  by	  allying	  with	  the	  EACB.	  
Remained	  strongly	  connected	  to	  domestic	  regulatory	  actors	  –	  out	  of	  a	  distinct	  ‘national’	  self-­‐perception.	  	  Lobbied	  for	  favourable	  implementation	  of	  European	  rules.	  
	  However,	  the	  findings	  also	  serve	  to	  support	  the	  central	  theoretical	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis,	  linking	  lobbying	  behaviours	  to	  national	  origins.	  In	  the	  British	  sector,	  direct	   lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA	   by	   the	   large	   banks	   ran	   alongside	   the	   weak	  associational	  activity	  of	  the	  smaller	  banks.	  This	  arose	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  lobbying	   resources	   caused	   by	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   domestic	   market,	   which	  centralised	  resources	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  firms	  and	  left	  the	  remainder	   of	   the	   sector	   impoverished.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   theoretical	  model	   has	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indeed	  allowed	  us	   to	   link	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	   the	  British	  banks	  back	   to	  the	  market	  structures	  defined	  by	  underlying	  variety	  of	  financial	  capitalism.	  It	  is	  to	  a	  very	  different	  variety	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  5.5:	  The	  German	  sector	  Moving	  from	  Britain	  to	  Germany	  takes	  us	   from	  the	  most	  consolidated	  sector	   in	  Europe	   to	   perhaps	   the	   most	   fragmented.	   But	   as	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   Four,	   the	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  national	  contexts	  runs	  far	  deeper:	  it	  rests	  on	  a	  very	  different	   mode	   of	   financial	   capitalism.	   In	   Germany,	   historical	   patterns	   of	  institutional	  development	  have	  created	  a	  financial	  system	  in	  which	  banks	  play	  a	  role	  as	  stable,	  long-­‐term	  intermediaries	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Geschenkron,	  1962;	  Zysman,	  1983).	  Credit	   is	  provided	  to	  the	  real	  economy	  predominantly	  via	  bank	  loans,	   rather	   than	   through	   the	   operation	   of	   dynamic	   capital	   markets.	   In	   this	  climate,	   banks	   derive	   district	   advantages	   from	   remaining	   small,	   local	   and	   –	  crucially	  –	  close	   to	   their	  customers.57	  As	  a	   result,	   there	   is	  a	   far	   lesser	  pressure,	  compared	  to	  the	  British	  system,	  towards	  consolidation,	  and	  so	  we	  see	  a	  banking	  landscape	  populated	  by	  a	  great	  many	  individual	  firms.	  	  In	  the	  coming	  section,	  we	  investigate	  how	  this	  underlying	  structure	  impacted	  the	  lobbying	   behaviour	   of	   these	   banks.	   As	  with	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   British	   sector,	  this	  is	  performed	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  overarching	  theoretical	  framework,	  with	  data	  presented	  to	  support	  the	  analysis.	  	  
5.5.1:	  The	  German	  sector	  and	  its	  resources	  The	   fragmentation	   of	   the	   German	   sector	   is	   arranged	   around	   three	   pillars.	   The	  first	   contains	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘commercial	   banks’:	   privately-­‐owned	   firms	   which	  operate	  for	  profit.	  The	  next	  contains	  those	  banks	  incorporated	  under	  public	  law,	  which	   operate	   mainly	   at	   the	   state	   level	   and	   which	   are	   often	   integrated	   into	  regional	   government	   structures.	   Last	   is	   the	   co-­‐operative	  pillar,	   in	  which	   reside	  the	  many	  mutually	  owned	  banks	  which	  are	  active	  in	  the	  communities	  and	  towns	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  This	  proximity	  helps	   them	  banks	  manage	  the	  additional	   informational	  burden	  brought	  about	  by	  this	  mode	  of	  intermediation.	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across	   Germany.	   These	   three	   have	   separate	   but	   intertwined	   histories,	   and	   are	  now	  kept	  apart	  by	  the	  German	  regulatory	  framework.	  	  At	   the	   top	   of	   each	   sit	   a	   number	   of	   large	   institutions.	   The	   private	   pillar	   has	   its	  
Großbanken	  –	  firms	  such	  as	  Deutsche	  Bank	  and	  Commerzbank.	  These	  may	  have	  extensive	  international	  businesses,	  but	  their	  presence	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  is	  actually	   rather	   small.	   Next,	   the	   Landesbanken	   sit	   atop	   the	   public	   pillar,	   and	  operate	   as	   clearing	   banks	   for	   the	   smaller	   publicly	   owned	   firms;	   similarly,	  regional	   co-­‐operative	   banks	   organise	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   community-­‐based	  mutuals.	  	  We	   examined	   the	   lobbying	   resources	   of	   the	  Großbanken,	   and	   their	   consequent	  behaviours,	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   and	   so	   they	   can	   now	   be	   set	   aside.	   The	  remaining	   two	   classes	   of	   large	   bank	  do	  have	   some	  of	   their	   own	   resources:	   for	  example,	   the	   Landesbanken	   have	   staff	   committed	   to	   engagement	   with	   public	  actors	   at	   home	   and	   in	   Europe,	   and	   are	   able	   to	   maintain	   an	   awareness	   of	  regulatory	  developments	   at	   various	   levels.	   They	  have	   individual	   accreditations	  to	  enter	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (EU	  Transparency	  Register),	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  experience	  in	  policy	  advocacy	  work.	  	  Below	   these	   large	   banks,	   the	   individually-­‐held	   lobbying	   resources	   fall	  dramatically.	  A	  very	  few	  private	  banks	  have	  begun	  to	  invest	  in	  developing	  their	  own	  government	  relations	  teams,	  such	  as	  Aareal	  Bank	  (Interview,	  13th	  February	  2015	   (a),	   Brussels).	   The	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	   smaller	   banks,	   across	   all	   three	  pillars,	   lack	   the	   financial	   resources	   to	   support	   lobbying	   efforts.	   As	   it	   was	  explained	  to	  me	  at	  one	  point:	  
	  “Small	  savings	  banks	  with,	  I	  think,	  50	  staff!	  50!	  So	  how	  on	  earth	  should	  they	  
apply	  all	  these	  things?	  Read	  1,000	  pages	  of	  legislation,	  sometimes	  not	  even,	  
let’s	  say,	  being	  provided	  in	  time	  for	  discussion	  –	  at	  least	  not	  for	  discussion	  in	  
German,	  it’s	  all	  in	  English.	  They	  can’t	  cope	  with	  that.	  They	  are	  not	  able	  to	  do	  
that!”	   (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  Looking	  at	  the	  resource	  distribution,	  then,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  underlying	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  showing	  through.	  There	  are	  a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  large	  firms	  with	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some	   holdings	   of	   their	   own	   (occasionally	   very	   extensive	   –	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Deutsche	  Bank),	  and	  then	  a	  vast	  swathe	  of	  banks	  across	  all	  three	  pillars	  who	  are	  simply	  too	  small	  to	  sustain	  such	  resources.	  This	  supports	  our	  initial	  premise:	  the	  bank-­‐based	   financial	   system	   has	   generated	   a	   fragmented	   banking	   landscape,	  which	   has	   in	   turn	   driven	   the	   holdings	   of	   the	   lobbying	   resources	   among	   the	  constituent	  banks.	  	  In	  such	  a	  situation	  it	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  lobbying	  efforts	  are	  organised	  almost	  wholesale	  via	  representative	  bodies.	  Yet	  perhaps	  we	  should	  not	  think	  of	  this	  as	  ‘delegation’	  so	  much	  as	  ‘organisation’:	  the	  peak	  associations	  representing	  the	   three	  pillars	  organise	   the	   lobbying	   responses	  of	   the	  German	  banks	   so	   they	  themselves	  do	  not	  have	   to.	  More	   importantly,	   the	  small	  banks	  –	  particularly	   in	  the	   public	   and	   mutual	   pillars	   –	   co-­‐operate	   in	   dense	   networks	   which	   are	  marshalled	   by	   their	   associations,	  which	   in	   turn	   perform	   a	   variety	   of	   functions	  beyond	  simply	  lobbying.	  It	  to	  these	  bodies	  that	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  
5.5.2:	  The	  German	  peak	  associations	  Each	   of	   the	   three	   pillars	   is	   represented	   by	   a	   trade	   association:	   the	  Deutscher	  
Sparkassen-­‐	   und	   Giroverband	   (DSGV)	   for	   the	   public	   savings	   banks,	   the	  
Bundesverband	   der	   Deutschen	   Volksbanken	   und	   Raiffeisenbanken	   (BVR)	   for	   the	  co-­‐operatives,	   and	   the	   Bundesverband	   deutscher	   Banken	   (BdB)	   for	   the	   private	  banks.	   These	   three	   are	   all	   long-­‐established	   entities,	   either	   dating	   far	   back	   into	  the	  20th	  century	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DSGV)	  or	  having	  been	  reconfigured	  during	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  BdB).	  They	   are	   federal	   bodies,	   comprising	   smaller	   sub-­‐units	   which	   operate	   at	   the	  regional	  level.	  At	  ground	  level	  these	  regional	  associations	  mirror	  the	  local	  focus	  of	  their	  constituent	  banks,	  helping	  to	  integrate	  them	  with	  local	  political	  channels.	  The	  peak	  associations	  also	  have	  strong,	  hierarchical	  internal	  structures;	  the	  BdB,	  for	   instance,	   has	   a	  Members’	   Assembly	  which	  meets	   every	   year	   and	   elects	   the	  Delegates’	  Assembly,	  and	  this,	  in	  turn,	  elects	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors,	  who	  appoint	  a	  President.	  The	  leadership	  bodies	  are	  structured	  to	  create	  a	  deliberate	  balance	  between	  types,	  or	  sizes	  of	  member	  (Interview,	  13th	  February	  2015	  (a),	  Brussels).	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Thus	   the	  BdB’s	  board	  has	   four	  members	   for	   the	   large	  banks,	   three	   for	  regional	  banks,	  two	  for	  the	  private-­‐client	  banks,	  and	  one	  for	  the	  foreign	  banks.	  	  All	  three	  associations	  represent	  the	  views	  and	  concerns	  of	  their	  respective	  sub-­‐sector	  of	  German	  banking.	  However,	  as	  well	  as	   this	   lobbying	   function	  they	  also	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  other	  services.	  They	  advise	  their	  members	  on	  practical	  issues	  of	  banking	  policy,	  and	  on	  implementation	  of	  new	  regulations.	  	  The	  DSGV	  and	  the	  BVR	   operate	   joint	   liability	   and	   deposit	   protection	   schemes,	   which	   bring	   vital	  stability	   to	   their	   (often	   very	   small)	   members.	   The	   BdB	   runs	   a	   financial	  ombudsman	  scheme.	  These	  extra	  services	  –	  on	  top	  of	  pure	  representation	  –	  give	  the	  groups	  a	  very	  strong	  hold	  over	  their	  members,	  which	  in	  turn	  helps	  stabilise	  collective	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
5.5.2.1:	  Resources	  and	  inner	  workings	  These	   three	   associations	   have	   extensive	   resource	   endowments.	   They	   all	   have	  large	   numbers	   of	   staff	   dedicated	   to	   monitoring	   policy-­‐making	   processes	   at	  various	  levels;	  these	  have	  been	  established	  in	  Brussels	  for	  over	  a	  decade,	  and	  all	  three	   associations	   have	   staff	   accredited	   to	   enter	   the	   Parliament	   (EU	  Transparency	   Register).	   These	   staff	   are	   also	   responsible	   for	   external	  representation,	  and	  have	  amassed	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  experience	  in	  interacting	  with	  European	  policy-­‐makers.	   In	  a	  move	  to	  embrace	   the	  regulatory	  arena,	   the	  DSGV	  transferred	  staff	  to	  London	  in	  2014	  to	  manage	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  EBA.	  	  	  These	  strengths	  are	  matched	  by	  extensive	  holdings	  of	   resources	   for	  generating	  high-­‐quality	   information.	   Their	   internal	   structure	   enables	   the	   associations	   to	  efficiently	  draw	  on	  expertise	  from	  their	  membership	  base:	  	  
“We	  have	  working	  groups	  where	  we	  integrate	  all	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  the	  
association	  and	   the	  organisation.	  Below	  us	   there	  are	   local	  associations	  on	  
state	   level	   …	   and	   we	   are	   connected	   to	   them	   very	   closely	   and	   they	   are	  
sending	  their	  specialists	  into	  our	  working	  groups	  so	  that	  we	  have	  some	  sort	  
of	  fora	  where	  we	  can	  discuss	  all	  the	  different	  issues.”	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	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The	   same	   professionalization	   also	   extends	   to	   strong	   internal	   brokerage:	   the	  highly	  developed	   internal	  structures	  are	  extremely	  useful	   in	  sourcing	  expertise	  (and	   data	   to	   support	   this	   expertise)	   from	  within	   the	   organisation.	   The	   overall	  outcome	   is,	   across	   all	   three	   associations,	   substantial	   strengths	   in	   generating	  expertise	  and	  communicating	  it	  to	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  Equally	   noteworthy	   are	   their	   internal	   decision-­‐making	   arrangements.	   For	  example	  the	  BdB’s	  hierarchical	  structure	  grants	  banks	  of	  all	  sizes	  an	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  input	  into	  its	  position-­‐taking	  process:	  	  
“Yes	  –	  so	  we	  are	  not	  also	  driven	  by	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  larger	  national	  banks.	  
Someone	   said	   ...	   in	  German	  our	  name	   is	  Bundesverband	  Deutsche	  Banken,	  
and	   some	   guy	   said	   ‘Often	   you	   are	   Bundesverband	  Deutsche	   Bank	   aren't	  
you?’	   That's	   not	   true.	  We	  have	   over	   200	  members	   in	   our	   association,	   and	  
also	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  smaller	  banks	  are	  important	  for	  us	  …”	  (Interview,	  18th	  December	  2013,	  London)	  	  The	   BVR,	   meanwhile,	   consciously	   works	   to	   pitch	   itself	   towards	   its	   smaller,	  weaker	  members	  when	  establishing	  its	  position	  on	  an	  issue:	  
“And	  when	  we	  have	  to	  find	  a	  position	  for	  the	  co-­‐operative	  group	  in	  Germany	  
...	  then	  our	  focus	  is	  always	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  these	  small-­‐	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  
banks,	  because	  we	  have	  responsibility	  for	  our	  members,	  and	  if	  there	  is	  …	  not	  
a	   common	   side	   to	   some	   problems,	   then	   …	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   small-­‐	   and	  
medium-­‐sized	  banks	  is	  always	  the	  leading	  aspect.”	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  Similarly	  the	  DSGV	  places	  great	  reliance	  on	  dialogue	  with	  its	  regional	  units,	  who	  in	   turn	   work	   closely	   with	   the	   local	   savings	   banks	   to	   garner	   consensus.	   These	  preferences	   are	   then	   filtered	   up	   through	   the	   organisation’s	   tiers.	   These	  approaches,	   in	   all	   three	   associations,	   act	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   positions	   taken	   in	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  represent	  as	  broad	  a	  base	  as	  possible.	  	  	  These	  associations	  therefore	  have	  significant	  holdings	  of	  lobbying	  resources,	  and	  are	  able	  to	  handle	  engagement	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  members	  effectively.	  They	  have	  staff	   dedicated	   to	   monitoring	   regulatory	   discussions,	   and	   to	   representing	   the	  associations	  in	  the	  various	  fora,	  and	  their	  internal	  structures	  mean	  they	  are	  able	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to	  draw	  on	  the	  expertise	  and	  manpower	  of	  their	  membership	  and	  their	  regional	  sub-­‐units.	  	  
5.5.2.2:	  Integration	  into	  domestic	  structures	  Importantly,	   the	   three	   associations	   are	   brought	   together	   in	   the	   Deutsche	  
Kreditwirtschaft	  (‘DK’	  –	  the	  German	  Banking	  Industry	  Committee).	  This	  umbrella	  body	  represents	  the	  entire	  German	  banking	  sector,	  and	  works	  to	  forge	  consensus	  positions	   among	   the	   three	   sub-­‐sectors.	   The	   three	   share	   the	   presidency	   on	   an	  annual	   rotating	   basis.	   This	   has	   long	   been	   a	   central	   component	   of	   the	   German	  regulatory	   machine:	   it	   was	   formerly	   part	   of	   an	   ‘interest-­‐rate	   cartel’	   which	  worked	   with	   the	   Bundesbank	   to	   set	   and	   disseminate	   bank	   rates	   (Lütz,	   2004:	  174),	  and	  now	  remains	  the	  key	  conduit	  through	  which	  engagement	  between	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  public	  actors	  is	  structured.	  	  	  As	  well	   as	   this	   formal	   combined	   arrangement,	   the	   three	   peak	   associations	   are	  also	   separately	   integrated	   into	   the	   domestic	   regulatory	   apparatus.	   Despite	  essentially	   being	   a	   regime	   centred	   on	   an	   independent	   statutory	   body,	   German	  financial	   regulation	   has	   long	   included	   a	   neo-­‐corporatist	   style	   almost	   akin	   to	  industry	  self-­‐regulation.	  Under	  this	  scheme	  certain	  key	  regulatory	  tasks,	  such	  as	  the	   monitoring	   of	   behaviour,	   or	   the	   setting	   of	   standards	   for	   processing	   card	  payments	  (Deutscher	  Sparkassen	  und	  Giroverband,	  2013),	  have	  been	  delegated	  to	   the	   peak	   associations.	   As	   a	   result	   they	   have	   become	   established	   regulatory	  actors	   in	   their	   own	   right,	   and	   are	   very	   active	   players	   in	   domestic	   policy	  discussions.	  
	  
5.5.3:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses:	  how	  the	  resources	  were	  used	  
H2:	  The	  associational	  hypothesis	  The	   peak	   associations	   put	   these	   resources	   to	   use	   in	   the	   lobbying	   over	  CRDIV/CRR.	   The	   very	   different	   arrangement	   of	   the	   activity	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   far	  stronger	   engagement	   than	   the	  medium-­‐sized	   and	   small	   British	   banks.	   As	  with	  the	  large	  banks	  at	  the	  very	  start	  of	  this	  empirical	  analysis,	  the	  data	  showed	  how	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these	  German	  peak	  associations	  were	  able	  ‘follow	  the	  pen’	  effectively.	  References	  to	   this	   theme,	   gleaned	   from	   the	   interviews,	   are	   shown	   in	   Table	   5.6.	   A	   second	  theme,	  which	  we	  will	  see	  evidence	  of	  in	  their	  regulatory	  lobbying,	  was	  a	  distinct	  cynicism	   directed	   at	   the	   EBA	   –	   and	   its	   working	   practices,	   resources	   and	  structure.	  	   Table	  5.6:	  References	  to	  a	  ‘staged’	  approach	  to	  lobbying	  
ID	   Quote	  (Interview,	  31st	  July	  2014,	  London)	   “So	  we	   do	   this,	   I	  would	   say,	   at	   each	  …	  at	   first	  we	   start	  with	   the	   Commission,	  then	   we	   have	   the	   Council,	   that	   means	   we	   try	   to	   talk	   with	   our	   national	  government,	  our	  representatives	  of	  the	  national	  government	  in	  the	  Council,	  and	  
then	  our	  procedure	  how	  we	  do	   this,	   so	   they	  know	  what	  our	  concerns	  are	  and	  
they	  can	  assess	  if	  they	  are	  valid	  or	  not,	  and	  can	  bring	  in	  our	  concerns	  in	  their	  
discussion.” (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	   “We	   know	   how	   the	   legislative	   process	   works.	   Usually,	   of	   course,	   it’s	   the	   best	  thing	  that	  you	  are	  in	  touch	  already	  with	  those	  guys	  from	  the	  Commission	  who	  are	   drafting	  …	   that’s	   if	  …	   if	   you	   can	   convince	   them	  already	   to	   take	   on	  board	  
certain	   issues	   –	   wonderful,	   great.	   Then,	   of	   course,	   you	   have	   to	   address	  
Parliament,	   so	   of	   course,	   we	   address	   especially	   the	   German	   MEPs,	   but	   not	  
exclusively	  –	  it	  can	  happen	  that	  we	  get	   in	  touch	  with	  the	  non-­‐German	  ones	  as	  
well.	   And	   of	   course,	   then,	   the	   Council	   –	   and	   that	   means	   the	   government	   in	  
Berlin.”	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	   “So	  we	  do	   this,	   I	  would	   say	  …	  at	   first	  we	   start	  with	   the	  Commission,	   then	  we	  have	  the	  Council,	  that	  means	  we	  try	  to	  talk	  with	  our	  national	  government,	  our	  representatives	  of	  the	  national	  government	  in	  the	  Council…”	  	  
5.5.3.1:	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  The	   representatives	   of	   the	   associations	   I	   interviewed	   all	   expressed	   a	   clear	  understanding	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   EBA	   as	   a	   regulatory	   lobbying	   venue.	  However,	  they	  also	  admitted	  to	  not	  having	  matched	  the	  attention	  they	  paid	  it	  to	  that	  given	  to	  the	  legislative	  arena.	  Thus:	  	  
“Oh,	  I	  think	  that	  …	  we	  are	  not	  well	  organised	  in	  this.	  We	  are	  trying	  to	  catch	  
up	  a	  bit	  in	  this	  respect.	  So	  with	  the	  EBA	  …	  I	  have	  the	  impression	  it’s	  not	  yet	  
so	  intensive	  as	  it	  should	  be.	  We	  are	  now	  focussing,	  I	  think	  we	  have	  reached	  a	  
defined	   and	   performing	   infrastructure	   dealing	  with	   Level	   One,	   with	   Level	  
Two	   we	   are	   still	   …	   trying	   to	   find	   what	   is	   the	   best.	   Do	   we	   need	   to	   send	  
someone	  to	  London?	  For	  instance	  –	  is	  that	  something	  to	  do?”	  (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  Nonetheless,	   the	   associations’	   combined	   engagement	   with	   the	   EBA	   began	   far	  earlier	  than	  the	  British	  associations,	  and	  rose	  far	  faster:	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Table	  5.7:	  Responses	  to	  EBA	  consultations	  by	  German	  peak	  associations,	  2011-­‐15	  
Year	   DSGV	   BVR	   BdB	   DK	  	  2011-­‐12	   1	   	   	   1	  2012-­‐13	   4	   	   2	   8	  2013-­‐14	   3	   	   1	   26	  2014-­‐15	   1	   	   1	   20	  
Source:	  Documents	  downloaded	  from	  EBA	  website	  	  The	  German	  peak	  associations	  were	  able	  to	  comment	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues.	  Where	  the	  large	  private	  banks	  naturally	  dominated	  discussions	  on	  the	  regulation	  of	  wholesale	  markets,	  the	  groups	  representing	  the	  smaller	  banks	  contributed	  to	  consultations	   on	   rules	   for	   retail	   markets.	   They	   also	   provided	   input	   on	   certain	  ‘cross-­‐over	  issues’:	  new	  rules	  which	  affected	  the	  large	  international	  firms	  and	  the	  small	  regional	  lenders	  alike.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  they	  submitted	  guidance	  on	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  liquidity	  rules	  –	  relating	  to	  the	  outflow	  risks	  associated	  with	  retail	  deposits:	  
‘[The]	   information	   that	   is	   available,	   however,	   generally	   shows	   that	  
compared	  to	  many	  other	   funding	  sources,	   retail	  deposits	  are	  one	  the	  most	  
sticky	  forms	  of	  unsecured	  financing	  for	  a	  bank,	  and	  outflows	  within	  a	  period	  
of	  30	  days	  of	  severe	  stress	  are	  contained	  to	  10%-­‐15%	  at	  maximum.	  The	  EBA	  
referenced	  analysis	  of	  outflows	  from	  25%-­‐100%	  in	  certain	  deposit	  products	  
is	  not	  recognized	  by	  the	  information	  available	  to	  us.	  	  (Deutsche	  Kreditwirtschaft,	  2013:	  4)	  	  This	  example	  shows	  the	  technical	  detail	  typical	  of	  their	  submissions	  to	  the	  EBA,	  which	   the	   associations	   were	   able	   to	   generate	   using	   their	   highly	   developed	  internal	  processes.	  However,	  also	  evident	  is	  a	  hint	  of	  the	  negative	  perception	  of	  the	  European	  regulatory,	  shown	  in	  the	  criticism	  expressed	  in	  the	  final	  sentence.	  	  These	   information-­‐generating	   abilities	   were	   supported	   by	   the	   associations’	  significant	   interfacing	   resources.	   They	   established	   outposts	   in	   London	   to	  facilitate	   engagement	   with	   the	   EBA,	   and	   these	   staff	   then	   co-­‐ordinated	   the	  shuttling	  back	  and	  forth	  of	  regulatory	  policy	  experts	  from	  Germany.	  	  
“…	   it’s	   being	  done	  by	  our	   experts.	  We	  are	  –	  none	  of	  us	   is	   an	   expert	   in	   the	  
area	  of	  capital	  requirements.	  When	  it’s	  getting	  to	  the	  Level	  Two,	  it’s	  getting	  
more	   technical,	   usually,	   so	   you	   need,	   let’s	   say,	   a	   lot	   of	   background	   on	   a	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specific	  file	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  questions	  then.	  Well,	  this	  knowledge,	  this	  know-­‐
how,	  we	   don’t	   have	   here	   –	  we	   have	   it	   in	   Berlin.	   So	  we	   are	   here,	  with	   our	  
representatives,	  who	  are,	  let’s	  say,	  generalists	  in	  their	  approach	  –	  can	  cover	  
different	  areas,	  and	  if	  you	  need	  to	  fly	  in	  a	  real	  expert	  you	  fly	  him	  in.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  These	   experts,	   in	   turn,	   were	   sourced	   from	   the	   working	   groups	   –	   occasionally	  from	  the	  regional	  sub-­‐associations,	  or	  the	  banks	  themselves	  where	  necessary.	  It	  was	  this	  ability	  to	  integrate	  the	  outward-­‐facing	  representative	  capacity	  with	  the	  internal	  expertise	  which	  accounted	  for	  the	  strong	  presence	  of	  the	  German	  sector	  in	   the	   European	   regulatory	   arena.	   Importantly,	   much	   of	   the	   activity	   was	   also	  structured	   at	   an	   even	   higher	   level	   via	   the	   DK,	   which	   meant	   the	   associations	  presented	  a	  single,	  unified	  voice	  when	  delivering	  their	  input.	  	  	  The	  staff	  in	  these	  outposts	  also	  strove	  to	  establish	  connections	  with	  members	  of	  the	  EBA’s	   secretariat.	  At	   times	   this	  was	  constrained	  by	  what	   they	  perceived	  as	  the	  EBA’s	  opacity,	   and	   the	  difficulty	   caused	  by	   its	  policy	  of	   convening	  working	  groups	   which	   were	   then	   disbanded	   once	   a	   certain	   rule,	   or	   template,	   was	  finalised.	  At	  outcome	  of	  this	  was	  a	  chaotic	  approach	  to	  gathering	  data:	  
“…	  all	  the	  time	  they’re	  asking	  for	  data	  that	  they	  already	  have,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  
the	  other	  they	  can	  use	  what	  they	  asked	  for	  a	  year	  ago.	  But	  instead,	  then	  they	  
draw	  it	  up	  anew	  …	  because	  the	  way	  they	  work	  is	  they	  form	  a	  working	  group,	  
from	  scratch,	  and	  people	  sit	   there,	  and	  they	  …	  start	  discussing	   ‘How	  could	  
we	   do	   this?	   What	   do	   we	   need	   for	   it?’	   And	   suddenly	   you	   have	   new	  
requirements	   that	   are	   not	   …	   consolidated	   with	   what	   the	   EBA	   did	   before.	  
There’s	  no	  history,	   or	   there’s	  no-­‐one	  who	  has	   the	  good	  view	  of	   everything	  
that’s	   happened,	   because	   they	   always	   start	   from	   new,	   they	   always	   start	  
from	  scratch.”	   (Interview,	  17th	  September	  2014,	  London)	  	  In	   general,	   however,	   interview	   subjects	   from	   the	   peak	   associations	   often	  indicated	   that	   the	   strength	   of	   their	   representative	   activity	   –	   the	   way	   they	  marshalled	   input	   and	   presented	   unified	   messages	   –	   afford	   them	   a	   privileged	  position	  in	  European	  regulatory	  discussions.	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5.5.3.2:	  European	  legislative	  arena	  In	   discussions	   on	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   framework	   legislation,	   the	   German	  associations,	   and	   the	   plethora	   of	   banks	   they	   represented,	   were	   very	   quick	   to	  engage	  with	  policy-­‐makers.	  This	  activity	  began	  with	  the	  submission	  of	  responses	  to	   consultations	   issued	   by	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   (Interview,	   31st	   July	   2014,	  London).	  	  In	  Europe,	  the	  associations	  held	  regular	  meetings	  with	  representatives	  of	  DG	  MARKT,	  using	  their	  lengthy	  experience	  in	  such	  dialogues	  to	  broker	  access.	  Likewise	   they	   soon	   established	   contacts	   with	   MEPs:	   beginning	   with	   German	  representatives,	  they	  then	  extended	  their	  coverage	  to	  MEPs	  from	  other	  member	  states.	  These	   contacts	  were	  possible	  because	  of	   the	   associations	  had	   long	  kept	  staff	  specifically	  dedicated	  to	  engaging	  with	  these	  legislative	  actors:	  
“…	  we	  have	  increased	  staff	  here	  in	  Brussels	  significantly.	  I’m	  working	  for	  the	  
DSGV	  since	  1990,	  and	  since	  1995	  I	  was	  already	  in	  charge	  here	  of	  our	  office,	  
in	  Brussels.”	   (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  Similarly,	   interviewees	   often	   explained	   how	   their	   experience	   at	   this	   process	  meant	  they	  were	  able	  to	  follow	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  CRDIV/CRR	  package	  from	  the	  outset.	  For	  example:	  
“…	  of	  course,	  it’s	  the	  best	  thing	  that	  you	  are	  in	  touch	  already	  with	  those	  guys	  
from	   the	   Commission	   who	   are	   drafting	   …	   that’s	   if	   …	   if	   you	   can	   convince	  
them	   already	   to	   take	   on	   board	   certain	   issues	   –	  wonderful,	   great.	   Then,	   if	  
that	  doesn’t	  work,	  of	  course,	  you	  have	  to	  address	  Parliament,	  so	  of	  course,	  
we	  address	  especially	  the	  German	  MEPs,	  but	  not	  exclusively	  –	  it	  can	  happen	  
that	  we	  get	  in	  touch	  with	  the	  non-­‐German	  ones	  as	  well.	  And	  of	  course,	  then,	  
the	   Council	   –	   and	   that	   means	   our	   member	   of	   the	   Council	   means	   the	  
government	  in	  Berlin.”	   (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  The	  length	  of	  this	  European	  engagement	  gave	  the	  peak	  associations	  considerable	  experience	  in	  lobbying	  at	  this	  level,	  which	  was	  not	  matched	  by	  the	  associations	  representing	   the	   smaller	   UK	   banks.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   medium-­‐	   and	   small-­‐sized	  German	   banks	   (those	   beyond	   Deutsche	   and	   Commerzbank)	   had	   far	   greater	  representation	   in	   those	   fora	   than	   what	   had	   been	   achieved	   by	   their	   British	  counterparts.	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Interestingly,	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   this	   work	   was	   facilitated	   via	   the	   three	   parallel	  
European	   trade	   bodies:	   the	   European	   Savings	   Bank	   Group,	   the	   European	  Association	   of	   Co-­‐operative	   Banks,	   and	   the	   European	   Banking	   Federation.	  However,	   in	   all	   three	   cases,	   their	   ability	   to	   work	   with	   these	   bodies	   was	   far	  stronger	   than	   that	   of	   the	   BBA	   or	   the	   BSA,	   as	   their	   greater	   ability	   to	   generate	  information,	  and	  their	  stronger	  experience	  in	  associational	  representation,	  made	  their	   transition	   upwards	   to	   European	   engagement	   far	   smoother.	   The	  engagement	   extended	   beyond	   simply	   participating	   in	   discussions	   and	  contributing	  to	  joint	  papers:	  the	  German	  associations	  loaned	  staff	  upwards	  into	  these	  European	  bodies	  to	  lead	  position-­‐taking	  processes.	  For	  example:	  	  
“…	  we	  are	   very	  active	  at	   the	  European	  Banking	  Federation	   level,	  we	  have	  
three	   colleagues	   who	   chair	   working	   groups	   at	   the	   EBF	   level.	   I	   chair	   the	  
Market	   Risk	   working	   group	   at	   the	   European	   Banking	   Federation,	   and	  
another	   guy	   here,	   another	   colleague	   at	  my	   association	   is	   the	   chair	   of	   the	  
Own	   Funds	   working	   group,	   and	   another	   one	   is	   the	   chair	   of	   the	   Large	  
Exposures	  working	  group.”	   (Interview,	  18th	  December	  2013,	  London)	  	  Similarly,	   the	   associations	   forged	   close	   links	   with	   other	   national	   bodies.	   For	  example,	   the	   DSGV	   co-­‐operated	   extensively	  with	   its	   Austrian	   counterpart,	   and	  even	  sought	  to	  work	  further	  afield:	  	  
“…	  we	   did	  manage	   to	   establish	   a	   very	   good	  working	   relation	   between	  Mr	  
Cameron	   Fine,	   the	   head	   of	   ICBA	   [Independent	   Community	   Bankers	   of	  
America]	  …	  and	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  our	  efforts.”	  	  (Interview,	  17th	  September	  2014,	  London)	  	  
5.5.3.3:	  Domestic	  venues	  Running	  in	  parallel	  with	  this	  European	  engagement	  came	  a	  very	  strong	  lobbying	  effort	   directed	   at	   domestic	   authorities	   –	   chiefly	   the	   BaFin,	   but	   also	   the	  Bundesbank	   and	   the	   Finance	  Ministry.	   Some	   respondents	   commented	   on	   how	  these	  engagements	  actually	  outweighed	  their	  European	  regulatory	  lobbying.	  For	  example:	  
“Yeah,	   there	   is,	   there	   are	   much	   more	   direct	   meetings	   with	   BaFin	   and	  
Bundesbank,	  if	  I	  compare	  the	  number	  with	  EBA.	  We	  are	  ….	  we	  are	  also	  on	  a	  
bilateral	  basis	  in	  much	  closer	  contact	  to	  BaFin.”	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	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  Here,	  again,	  the	  associations	  made	  use	  of	  their	  extensive	  resources:	  particularly	  significant	  on	  the	  home	  front	  were	  the	  strong	  bonds	  they	  had	  with	  the	  regulatory	  regime.	   This	   had	   long	   integrated	   associational	   representation	   into	   German	  policy-­‐making,	  and	  so	  these	  bodies	  naturally	  drew	  on	  these	  connections	  to	  now	  discuss	  the	  implementation	  of	  European	  policy.	  	  However,	  the	  deeply	  embedded	  structures,	   with	   engagement	   routed	   through	   the	   DK,	   were	   also	   adapted	   to	  discuss	  strategies	  for	  shaping	  European	  rules.	  This	  represented	  a	  deliberate	  aim	  to	   have	   the	   BaFin	   echo	   the	   sector’s	   concerns	   upwards	   into	   the	   European	  regulatory	  arena.	  The	  peak	  associations	  were	  acutely	  aware	  of	  this	  ‘second	  path’	  into	  the	  EBA:	  
“We	  have,	  of	  course,	  discussions	  with	  the	  BaFin.	  The	  BaFin	  is	  also	  part	  of	  the	  
EBA,	  because	  it’s	  on	  the	  board	  of	  supervisors,	  so	  the	  national	  supervisors	  are	  
very	  much	  involved	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  EBA	  …	  [We]	  also	  try	  to	  talk	  with	  the	  
EBA	  on	   the	   secretariat	   level	  about	  our	   concerns,	   so	  we	  approach	   the	  EBA	  
from	  two	  sides,	  I	  would	  say.”	   (Interview,	  31st	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  A	  similar	  approach	  was	  used	  to	  garner	  support	  from	  domestic	  political	  actors.	  As	  a	  representative	  of	  one	  association	  put	  it:	  	  
“Our	  impression	  is	  that	  also	  members	  of	  the	  Bundestag,	   for	  example,	  come	  
often	   to	   Brussels	   to	   have	   meetings.	   We	   try	   and	   get	   them	   involved	   in	   the	  
debate,	   and	   to	   have	   positions	   on	   the	   legislative	   dossiers,	   and	   to	   get	  more	  
and	  more	  engaged.”	   (Interview,	  13th	  February	  2015	  (a),	  Brussels)	  	  
5.5.4:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  German	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  Looking	  across	  the	  entire	  German	  sector,	  we	  can	  now	  review	  its	  story	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  First,	  the	  initial	  premise	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  review	  of	  the	   landscape.	   The	   heavily	   bank-­‐based	   financial	   system	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   a	  fragmented	  sector	  arranged	  over	  three	  distinct	  pillars;	  within	  each	  of	  these	  there	  are	  a	  few	  large	  banks	  and	  a	  great	  many	  smaller	  institutions	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Detzer	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Zysman,	   1983).	   Certain	  members	   of	   the	   former	   category	   –	  notably	  Deutsche	  Bank	  –	  have	  significant	  resources	  of	  their	  own,	  but	  for	  the	  vast	  majority	   the	   proprietary	   holdings	   of	   lobbying	   resources	   are	   almost	   negligible.	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Thus,	   we	   can	   connect	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   underlying	   variety	   of	   financial	  capitalism	  to	  their	  lobbying	  resources.	  	  As	  we	  saw	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  the	  extensive	  resources	  of	  the	  large	  commercial	  banks	   enabled	   them	   to	   lobby	   the	   EBA	   directly,	   albeit	   as	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   effort	  which	   saw	   them	   behaving	   in	   line	   with	   the	   large	   British	   banks.	   This	   finding	  served	  to	  support	  the	  ‘resource	  hypothesis’	  (H1).	  	  Meanwhile,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	  weaker	   individual	   resources,	   the	   small	   German	  banks	   did	   indeed	   delegate	   their	   regulatory	   lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA	   to	   the	  representative	   bodies	   –	   meaning	   that	   the	   implication	   of	   the	   ‘associational	  hypothesis’	   (H2)	   stood.	   These	   groups	   had	   long	   been	   integrated	   into	   domestic	  policy-­‐making	   structures,	   and	   so	   had	   a	   smooth	   transition	   into	   the	   European	  regulatory	   arena.	   In	   this	   new	   space	   they	   made	   use	   of	   the	   extensive	   lobbying	  resources	   that	   they	   had	   historically	   deployed	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene.	   They	  established	  outposts	  in	  London	  to	  manage	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  EBA,	  or	  else	  re-­‐assigned	   staff	   from	  aspects	  of	  European	  policy	  work	   to	  make	   frequent	   trips	  there.	   These	   staff	   were	   then	   able	   to	   call	   on	   the	   deep	   holdings	   of	   expertise	  residing	  in	  the	  working	  groups,	  and	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  the	  associations’	  federal	  structures.	   Most	   importantly,	   it	   was	   the	   organisation	   of	   lobbying	   effort	   into	   a	  coherent	  operation,	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  internal	  brokerage,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  extensive	  representation	  of	  the	  small	  German	  banks	  in	  the	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  	  However,	  as	  ever	  there	  were	  certain	  complexities	  to	  the	  German	  story.	  Through	  their	  associations	  the	  German	  banks	  made	  heavy	  use	  of	  lobbying	  in	  the	  European	  legislative	  arena.	  Again,	  this	  was	  a	  mix	  of	  conscious	  choice	  –	  pursuing	  an	  arena	  where	   compromises	   could	   still	   be	   won	   –	   and	   habit	   –	   engaging	   with	   a	   more	  familiar	  set	  of	  institutions.	  	  Likewise,	   they	   engaged	   strongly	   with	   domestic	   actors.	   This	   was	   no	   doubt	  inspired	   by	   their	   embeddedness	   in	   national	   decision-­‐making	   structures,	  which	  had	   long	   served	   to	  bind	   them	   into	   relationships	  with	   the	  Finance	  Ministry,	   the	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Bundesbank	   and	   the	  BaFin.	  But	   perhaps	  what	  marks	   this	   out	   compared	   to	   the	  equivalent	  actions	  of	  the	  small	  British	  banks	  was	  its	  intent:	  this	  was	  deliberately	  undertaken	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  recruiting	  these	  public	  actors	  as	  supporters	  in	  Europe,	  whereas	  the	  British	  banks	  tended	  to	  use	  the	  domestic	  channel	  to	  win	  favourable	  implementation	  at	  home.	  Their	  engagements	  over	   these	   levels	  are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  5.8.	  	  
Table	  5.8:	  Summary	  of	  German	  banks’	  engagement	  across	  the	  arenas	  









s	   Quick	  to	  realise	  the	  new	  venue’s	  potential.	  	  Became	  adept	  at	  regulatory	  lobbying	  –	  providing	  detailed	  technical	  input	  and	  data	  to	  help	  rule-­‐making.	  
Extremely	  well-­‐connected:	  used	  established	  contacts	  with	  the	  EC	  and	  EP	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  policy-­‐making	  discussions.	  	  Excelled	  at	  legislative	  lobbying:	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  generate	  high-­‐quality	  and	  high-­‐level	  political	  and	  technical	  information.	  	  Participated	  in	  associational	  activity	  with	  the	  BdB,	  but	  preferred	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  own	  efforts.	  




Operated	  exclusively	  via	  the	  peak	  associations,	  and	  via	  the	  DK.	  	  Quickly	  embraced	  the	  EBA.	  	  Skilful	  at	  regulatory	  lobbying:	  able	  to	  garner	  information	  and	  communicate	  effectively.	  	  Matched	  their	  European	  regulatory	  lobbying	  with	  equal	  efforts	  pitched	  at	  domestic	  actors.	  
Extremely	  well-­‐connected:	  experienced	  lobbyists	  on	  the	  European	  scene,	  with	  extensive	  access	  to	  the	  EC	  and	  the	  EP.	  	  Excelled	  at	  legislative	  lobbying:	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  generate	  high-­‐quality	  and	  high-­‐level	  political	  and	  technical	  information.	  	  
Closely	  integrated	  into	  domestic	  regulatory	  fora	  (particularly	  via	  the	  DK).	  Used	  these	  discussions	  to	  transmit	  lobbying	  pressure	  further	  up	  the	  European	  chain.	  
	  This	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  why	  the	  German	  associations	  were	  better	  at	  lobbying	  in	  the	  emergent	  regulatory	  arena	  than	  their	  British	  equivalents	  –	  and	  thus	  how	  the	  small	   German	   banks	   were	   better	   represented.	   The	   German	   bodies’	   strength	  arose	   from	   three	   important	   features,	   or	   areas	   of	   difference.	   First,	   each	   one’s	  membership	   comprised	   a	   homogenous	   set	   of	   banks,	   with	   similar	   business	  models	   and	   concerns,	   which	   made	   establishing	   common	   positions	   far	   easier.	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This	  was	  reinforced	  by	   the	  second:	   these	  groups	  had	   internal	  structures	  which	  meant	  that	  lobbying	  efforts	  were	  far	  more	  disciplined,	  and	  so	  there	  was	  far	  less	  rogue	  activity	   from	  German	  banks.	  Third,	   the	  organisations	   themselves	  had	   far	  greater	  lobbying	  resources,	  and	  in	  particular	  had	  integrated	  these	  into	  the	  kinds	  of	  coherent	  operations	  we	  saw	  run	  by	  the	  large	  universal	  banks	  (both	  British	  and	  German).	   In	  combination,	   these	   features	  enabled	  the	  German	  peak	  associations	  to	  provide	  a	  clear,	  unified	  and	  above	  all	  strong	  voice	  to	  the	  EBA.	  	  Importantly,	   these	   features	   also	   all	   relate	   to	   the	   structural	   patterns	   in	   the	  German	   banking	   market.	   Overall,	   what	   we	   see	   is	   far	   less	   individual	   direct	  lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA	   than	   in	   the	   British	   context	   (really	   carried	   out	   by	   a	   single	  bank);	   instead	   the	   sector	   lobbied	   the	   EBA	   very	   effectively	   through	   its	   peak	  associations.	   These	   behaviours	   arose	   from	   the	   way	   the	   fragmented	   market	  dispersed	   lobbying	   resources	   across	   the	   entire	   sector,	   and	   allowed	   the	  associations	  to	  play	  a	  strong	  role	  in	  lobbying	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  German	  banks.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  in	  turn	  relate	  the	  way	  the	  German	  banks	  lobbied	  the	  EBA	  back	  to	  the	   features	  of	   their	  national	  context	  (or	  their	   financial	  system)	  –	  and	  so	  we	  see	  support	  for	  the	  central	  theoretical	  argument,	  linking	  lobbying	  behaviours	  to	  national	  origins.	  	  5.6:	  Conclusion	  Overall,	   then,	   how	   have	   the	   expectations	   derived	   from	   our	   theorised	   causal	  model	   fared?	   The	   distribution	   of	   the	   lobbying	   resources	   have	   indeed	   followed	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  markets,	  and	  so	  of	  the	  two	  different	  financial	  systems	  (Allen	  &	   Gale,	   2000;	   Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	   &	   Levine,	   1999;	   Zysman,	   1983).	   In	   the	   UK,	   the	  market-­‐based	   system	   has	   generated	   a	   consolidated	   sector,	   in	   which	   the	  resources	  are	  held	  by	  a	  cluster	  of	  banks	  in	  the	  top	  tier;	  meanwhile	  those	  in	  the	  second	   and	   third	   layers	   have	   far	   fewer	   proprietary	   lobbying	   resources.	  Conversely,	  the	  German	  bank-­‐based	  system	  has	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  fragmented	  sector	  in	   which	   informational	   resources	   are	   dispersed	   among	   a	   larger	   number	   of	  players;	  these	  resources	  are	  then	  gathered,	  and	  consolidated	  and	  put	  to	  use,	  by	  the	  peak	  associations	  which	  represent	  the	  three	  pillars	  of	  the	  sector.	  In	  this	  way,	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we	  can	  establish	  the	  link	  between	  the	  underlying	  variety	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  	  and	  the	  lobbying	  resources.	  	  Secondly,	   analysis	   of	   the	   ‘resource’	   and	   ‘associational’	   hypotheses	   (H1	  and	  H2)	  enabled	   us	   to	   further	   link	   these	   varieties	   of	   financial	   capitalism	   through	   to	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  We	  saw	  how	  increased	  informational	  resources	  did	  indeed	  translate	   to	   greater	  direct	   engagement	  with	   the	  EBA,	   and	  how	   for	   the	   smaller,	  impoverished	   banks,	   associational	   representation	   was	   instead	   the	   norm.	   The	  findings	   also	   reveal	   two	   patterns	   taking	   us	   beyond	   the	   model’s	   focus	   on	   the	  European	   regulatory	   arena.	   Many	   interviewees,	   representing	   banks	   from	   both	  countries	   and	   all	   sub-­‐sectors,	   reported	   that	   they	   continued	   to	   engage	   with	  
legislative	  actors	  over	  broad	  principals,	  in	  parallel	  with	  their	  lobbying	  of	  the	  EBA.	  Secondly,	  they	  all	  also	  retained	  a	  focus	  on	  domestic	  regulatory	  actors,	  directing	  various	  degrees	  of	  lobbying	  effort	  at	  national	  authorities.	  	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  findings	  support	  key	  implications	  of	  the	  European	  interest	  group	   literature.	   A	   prominent	   strand	   in	   this	   highlights	   the	   importance	   of	  informational	   resources	   as	   determinants	   of	   lobbying	   behaviours	   (Chalmers,	  2011;	  2013;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012);	  and	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  banks’	  holdings	  of	  such	  resources	  shaped	   the	  way	   they	  engaged	  with	   the	  EBA.	  The	   literature	  also	  demonstrates	   how	   unitary	   actors	   cope	   with	   resource	   weaknesses	   by	  participating	   in	   associational	   activity	   (C.	   Mahoney,	   2007);	   in	   this	   chapter,	   we	  have	  seen	  how	  the	  smaller	  banks	  in	  both	  national	  contexts	  relied	  heavily	  on	  their	  representative	   bodies.	   Along	   similar	   lines,	   studies	   of	   information	   provision	  (Bouwen,	   2002;	   Dür	   &	   De	   Bièvre,	   2007;	   Michalowitz,	   2004)	   have	   shown	   how	  unitary	  actors	  are	  more	  effective	  at	  marshalling	  precise	   technical	   expertise	  –	  a	  finding	   echoed	   by	   the	   informational	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   British	   trade	   bodies.	  Finally,	  an	  implication	  common	  to	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  private	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  run	  complex,	  dynamic	  strategies	  using	  multiple	  venues	  and	  approaches	  (Alter	  &	  Vargas,	  2000;	  Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	  2011;	  Guiradon,	  2000;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	  &	   Richardson,	   2006);	   this	   has	   been	   supported	   by	   the	   banks’	   (of	   all	   sizes)	  engagement	  with	  venues	  beyond	  the	  EBA.	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The	  analysis	  also	  showed	  important	  variations	  in	  the	  behaviours	  of	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  banks	  when	  lobbying	  the	  EBA.	  For	  the	  British,	  direct	  engagement	  by	  the	  large	  banks	  ran	  alongside	  the	  weak	  associational	  activity	  of	  the	  smaller	  banks	  and	  the	  building	   societies	   –	  which	  was	   itself	   undermined	  by	   the	  problems	  experienced	  by	   the	   associations.	   These	   patterns	   arose	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	  lobbying	  resources	  (related	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  banking	  market),	  which	  were	  heavily	  pitched	  towards	  a	   few	  very	   large	  banks,	  with	  the	  result	   that	   the	  rest	  of	  the	  sector	  –	  and	  its	  representative	  bodies	  –	  remained	  impoverished.	  Conversely,	  the	   German	   sector	   saw	   far	   less	   individual,	   direct	   lobbying	   (being	   essentially	  dominated	   by	   one	   bank);	   instead,	   the	   sector	   lobbied	   through	   the	   peak	  associations,	  which	  were	  able	   to	  draw	  upon	  significant	   lobbying	  resources	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  EBA	  far	  more	  effectively	  than	  their	  British	  counterparts.	  Again,	  this	   behaviour	   arose	   because	   of	   the	   way	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   vastly	   more	  fragmented	  banking	   landscape	  dispersed	   lobbying	   resources	   across	   the	   sector,	  and	   afforded	   the	   peak	   associations	   far	   greater	   strength.	   The	   losers,	   overall,	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  medium-­‐sized	  and	  small	  British	  firms.	  	  Viewing	   the	   empirical	   findings	   in	   this	   way,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   they	   support	   the	  central	  theoretical	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis:	  that	  banks’	   lobbying	  of	  the	  EBA	  was	  shaped	  by	  their	  national	  origins.	  The	  analysis	  has	  given	  us	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  banks’	  resources	  –	  and	  their	  resultant	  lobbying	  behaviours	  –	  are	  themselves	  rooted	   in	   the	   structures	   of	   their	   domestic	   financial	   systems.	   The	  market-­‐	   and	  bank-­‐based	  arrangements	  gave	  rise	   to	  very	  different	  distributions	  of	   resources	  among	  the	  banks,	  in	  turn	  shaping	  very	  different	  sets	  of	  behaviours.	  	  This	   chapter	   has	   focussed	   on	   the	   approaches	   British	   and	   German	   banks	   took	  when	  lobbying	  the	  EBA,	  and	  examined	  how	  their	  resources	  shaped	  whether	  they	  lobbied	   alone	   or	   via	   an	   association.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter,	   we	   pick	   up	   on	   a	  particular	  element	  of	  the	  empirical	  story	  identified	  here:	  the	  continued	  focus	  on	  domestic	  regulatory	  actors.	  We	  consider	  why	  this	  was,	  and	  examine	  how	  banks’	  preferences	  over	  European	  financial	  regulation	  shaped	  their	  selection	  of	  venue.	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Chapter	  6:	  Preferences	  
6.1:	  Introduction	  When	   lobbying	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation,	   banks	   now	   face	   a	   new,	  supranational	   body	   –	   the	  European	  Banking	  Authority	   (EBA).	   This	   has	   a	   novel	  institutional	   form:	   as	   an	   ‘agencified	   network’	   (Levi-­‐Faur,	   2011:	   810)	   it	   has	   a	  central	   secretariat,	   but	   relies	   heavily	   on	   input	   from	   the	   regulatory	   authorities	  which	   exist	   at	   the	   national	   level.	   Their	   continuing	   role	   gives	   banks	   a	   choice	   of	  paths	  in	  accessing	  the	  EBA,	  in	  that	  they	  can	  either	  lobby	  it,	  or	  their	  own	  national	  authority.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  present	  data	  which	  show	  that	  selecting	  between	  these	  targets	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  perceptions	  banks	  have	  of	  European	  financial	  regulation,	  and	  the	  preferences	  that	  these	  generate.	  Both	  of	   these,	   in	  turn,	  derive	   from	  the	  regulatory	  paradigms	  on	  which	  rest	  their	  domestic	  regulatory	  regimes.	  Bringing	  these	   intuitions	   together,	   I	   argue	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   link	  between	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  banks	  and	  their	  national	  origins.	  	  This	   chapter	   analyses	   the	   second	   element	   of	   the	   causal	   model	   outlined	   in	  Chapter	  Two.	  The	  presumption	   that	  banks	  necessarily	  seek	   to	   lobby	   the	  EBA	   is	  relaxed,	  and	  we	  allow	  them	  to	  deliberately	  target	  their	  domestic	  regulator.	  As	  an	  initial	   premise,	   we	   took	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   preferences	   of	   banks,	   and	   of	  regulatory	   actors,	   derive	   from	   the	   paradigm	   which	   underpins	   their	   domestic	  regulatory	  regime.	  The	  causal	  model	  gave	  us	  a	  set	  of	  hypotheses,	  which	  have	  as	  their	   dependent	   variable	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours	   –	   expressed	   as	   a	  combination	  of	  the	  venue	  selected	  (domestic	  or	  European)	  and	  the	  informational	  input	   supplied.	  The	   first	  hypothesis	  predicted	   that	   the	  alignments	  between	   the	  preferences	  shape	  lobbying	  behaviours,	  with	  banks	  directing	  efforts	  at	  the	  venue	  whose	   preferences	   are	   closest	   to	   their	   own.	   The	   mechanism	   operates	   thus:	   a	  bank,	   in	   deliberating	   over	  where	   to	   lobby,	   scans	   the	  preferences	   of	   its	   various	  possible	  targets	  and	  acts	  accordingly.	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  predicted	  that	  the	  banks	  would	  shift	  the	  input	  they	  employed	  in	  either	  venue	  to	  suit	  its	  distinctive	  rules	  –	  while	  all	   the	   time	  retaining	  an	  expression	  of	   their	  regulatory	  paradigm.	  These	  are	  laid	  out	  below:	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‘The	  alignment	  hypothesis’	  
H3:	   Banks	   will	   lobby	   their	   domestic	   regulator,	   or	   the	   EBA,	   based	   the	  
alignment	   of	   their	   preferences	   over	   a	   given	   issue.	   The	   greater	   the	  
alignment,	   the	   greater	   the	   likelihood	   that	   a	   particular	   venue	   will	   be	  
targeted.	  	  
‘The	  informational	  matching	  hypothesis’	  
H4:	  Banks	  will	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  various	  regulatory	  venues,	  
and	  will	  adapt	  their	  input	  accordingly.	  	  Next,	   the	   chapter	   examines	   the	   third	   and	   final	   element	   of	   the	   causal	  model.	   It	  analyses	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   preference-­‐based	   factors	   shaping	  behaviour	  and	  the	  consideration	  of	  banks’	  lobbying	  resources,	  thereby	  bringing	  together	   the	   two	   alternative	   explanations.	   Again,	   the	   model	   gave	   us	   an	  hypothesis,	  which	  is	  laid	  out	  below:	  
‘The	  interaction	  hypothesis’	  
H5:	   The	   greater	   a	   bank’s	   resources,	   the	  more	   likely	   it	   is	   to	   able	   to	   lobby	  
according	  to	  its	  preferences.	  	  These	  hypotheses	  enable	  us	  understand	  banks’	  lobbying	  behaviours,	  and	  also	  to	  connect	   the	   findings	  back	   to	   the	  underlying	  European	   interest	  group	   literature	  on	  which	  this	  study	  is	  founded.	  Thus,	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  venue-­‐shopping	  (Baumgartner	  &	   Jones,	  1991;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006)	   inspire	   the	  notion	  of	  banks’	  flexibility	  in	  navigating	  their	  complex	  environment;	  while	  implications	  of	  studies	  of	   informational	   lobbying	  (Baumgartner	  &	  Leech,	  1998;	  Bouwen,	  2002;	  Dür	  &	  De	  Bièvre,	  2007;	  Michalowitz,	  2004)	  are	   represented	   in	  our	  expectation	  that	  banks	  adapt	  their	  input	  according	  to	  the	  tastes	  of	  the	  institutional	  audience	  being	   targeted.	  We	   thus	   have	   an	   entire	   theoretical	   chain	   to	   examine:	   from	   the	  variations	  in	  the	  underlying	  regulatory	  paradigm,	  through	  preferences,	  and	  into	  the	  factors	  shaping	  lobbying	  behaviour	  taken	  from	  the	  interest	  group	  literature.	  	  	  I	   test	   the	   hypotheses	   using	   a	   series	   of	   examples	   drawn	   from	   the	   many	  problematic	   areas	   of	   regulatory	   change	   over	  which	   British	   and	   German	   banks	  lobbied.	   As	   was	   discussed	   during	   the	   Research	   Design	   chapter,	   these	   were	  selected	   so	   as	   to	   give	   a	   broad	   coverage	   of	   issues	   arising	   from	   the	   European	  legislative	   package,	   and	   to	   allow	   the	   analysis	   to	   be	   framed	   around	   a	   coherent	  empirical	  narrative.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	  begin	  by	  presenting	  a	  brief	   review	  of	   the	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two	   national	   paradigms,	   in	   order	   to	   situate	   them	   afresh	   in	   the	   European	   and	  national	  contexts.	  Then,	  across	  two	  sub-­‐sections,	  I	  present	  data	  on	  these	  areas	  of	  regulatory	   change,	   and	   on	   the	   associated	   lobbying	   behaviours.	   As	   with	   the	  previous	  chapter,	   I	  distinguish	  between	   ‘large	  banks’	  and	   ‘the	  rest.’	  Section	  five	  discusses	   the	   findings	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   overall	   theory,	   and	   of	   the	   underlying	  literatures.	  	  6.2:	  Paradigms	  reprised:	  liberalism,	  ordo-­‐liberalism	  and	  regulatory	  liberalism	  The	   national	   regulatory	   paradigms	   contain	   core	   beliefs	   about	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market,	  and	  about	  how	  banking	  should	  be	  regulated.	  As	   we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   Four,	   the	   British	   regulatory	   model	   rests	   on	   a	   liberal	  paradigm:	   markets	   are	   thought	   to	   exist	   separately	   from	   the	   state,	   and	   to	   be	  populated	   by	   rational,	   utility-­‐maximising	   private	   actors.	   Regulation	   by	   public	  authority	  is	  directed	  towards	  ensuring	  that	  competition	  prevails,	  since	  that	  is	  the	  mechanism	  through	  which	  efficient	  allocation	  of	  capital	  is	  achieved.	  Accordingly,	  regulation	   should	   not	   involve	   itself	   in	   the	   inner	   workings	   of	   banks;	   rather,	  responsibility	  rests	  with	  management	  to	  run	  their	  own	  affairs.	  Going	  beyond	  this	  threshold	   would	   impinge	   on	   the	   liberty	   of	   market	   actors,	   and	   undermine	   the	  efficient	   operation	   of	   the	   banking	   system.	   In	   turn,	   this	   paradigm	   underpins	   a	  broader	  regulatory	  model	  described	  as	  ‘managed	  competition’	  (Thatcher,	  2007).	  For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  salient	  feature	  of	  this	  regulatory	  edifice	  is	  that	  it	  rests	  on	  the	   private	   ownership	   and	   management	   of	   banks,	   and	   so	   uses	   competitive	  market	  forces	  to	  exert	  discipline	  on	  actors.	  	  In	   contrast,	   the	  German	  model	   rests	   on	   a	   set	   of	   paradigmatic	   beliefs	   based	   on	  ordo-­‐liberalism.	   Competition	   is	   still	   valued,	   but	   seen	   as	   a	   feature	   of	   financial	  markets	   to	   be	  managed;	   these	  markets	   are	   seen	   to	   exist	   in	   a	   legal	   framework	  created	   by,	   and	   governed	   over	   by,	   the	   state	   (Bonefeld,	   2012).	   Financial	  regulation	   is	   integrated	   into	   an	   overall	   economic	   structure	   of	   co-­‐ordinated	  capitalism	   (P.A.	   Hall	   &	   Soskice,	   2001).	   Again,	   the	   salient	   feature	   for	   us	   is	   the	  presence	   of	   very	   different	   forms	   of	   ownership:	   there	   are	   large	   banks	   which	  operate	   through	   a	   joint-­‐stockholder	   model,	   but	   there	   are	   also	   a	   great	   many	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which	  are	  publicly-­‐	  or	  mutually-­‐owned.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  regulatory	  regime	  with	  a	  lesser	  focus	  on	  competitive	  pressures	  in	  equity	  markets	  as	  a	  means	  of	  exercising	  regulatory	  authority.	  Instead,	  the	  system	  affords	  a	  much	  greater	  and	  more	  direct	  role	   for	   the	   state;	   thus,	   for	   example,	   lending	   activities	   are	   directed	   towards	  certain	  pre-­‐defined	  ends,	  and	  banks	  are	   legally	  required	  to	   limit	  their	  activities	  to	  certain	  geographical	  regions.	  The	  overall	  result	  is	  a	  regulatory	  regime	  with	  a	  circumscribed	   view	   of	   equity	   capital	   ratios,	   which	   instead	   seeks	   to	   shape	  behaviour	   through	   carefully	   managed	   interactions	   with	   banks.	   These	   are	  structured	   through	   the	   corporatist	   patterns	   which	   pervade	   German	   policy-­‐making	  –	  and	  so	  we	  have	  an	  example	  of	  broader	  ‘industry-­‐led’	  regulatory	  model	  (Thatcher,	  2007).	  	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  view	  the	  British	  and	  German	  models	  described	  above	  relative	   to	   the	   ideational	   structure	   of	   European	   financial	   regulation,	   which	   is	  grounded	   in	   a	   global	   paradigm	   of	   ‘regulatory	   liberalism’	   (Lall,	   2012;	   Major,	  2012).	   This	   paradigm	   holds	   that	   financial	   markets	   should	   be	   free	   from	   state	  control	  –	  hence	   the	  break	   from	  the	  Keynesian	  structures	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  era.	   Meanwhile,	   regulatory	   efforts	   should	   be	   aimed	   at	   handling	   the	   negative	  externalities	  which	  may	  arise	   in	  financial	  markets,	  and	  at	  ensuring	  the	  stability	  and	  soundness	  of	  banks	  or	  taming	  their	  occasionally	  egregious	  behaviour.	  Again,	  however,	   the	   encouraging	   of	   competition	   is	   a	   primary	   regulatory	   goal,	   as	  competition	  brings	  efficiency	  and	  discipline.	  The	  regulatory	  aims	  are	  achieved	  by	  imposing	   minimum	   capital	   requirements	   on	   banks,	   and	   this	   tool	   reveals	   an	  important	   element	   of	   the	   paradigm:	   regulatory	   control	   is	   exercised	   using	   the	  pressures	   of	   equity	   markets	   to	   shape	   behaviour.	   European	   bank	   regulation	  derives	  fairly	  cleanly	  from	  this	  framework,	  consistent	  with	  a	  long-­‐run	  inclination	  towards	   opening	   up	   markets	   and	   fostering	   competition	   under	   the	   banner	   of	  establishing	  the	  single	  market	  (Grossman	  &	  Leblond,	  2011;	  Mügge,	  2013).	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	  situate	  the	  British,	   liberal	  paradigm	  closer	  to	  Europe	  than	  German	  ordo-­‐liberalism:	  although	  they	  share	  a	   faith	   in	  competition,	   the	   latter’s	  pre-­‐occupation	   with	   a	   strong	   directing	   role	   for	   the	   state	   sets	   it	   apart.	  Furthermore,	  so	   too	  does	   its	   lesser	   focus	  on	  equity	  capital,	  and	  the	  pressure	  of	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competitive	  capital	  markets,	  as	  regulatory	   tools.	  The	  relative	  positioning	  of	   the	  three	   sets	   of	   beliefs	   has	   important	   consequences	   for	   the	   British	   and	   German	  perspectives	  on	  European	  financial	  regulation.	  	  Next,	  we	  can	  also	  draw	  out	  from	  the	  two	  national	  paradigms	  some	  beliefs	  about	  the	   institutional	   manifestation	   of	   regulatory	   authority.	   In	   the	   British	   liberal	  tradition,	   authority	   is	   vested	   in	   an	   institution	   which	   enjoys	   a	   high	   degree	   of	  independence	  and	  discretion	  in	  exercising	  its	  duties.	  This	  is	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  feature	   to	   ensure	   its	   credibility,	   which	   in	   turn	   generates	   a	   broad	   trust	   among	  market	  actors	  in	  the	  efficient	  and	  technical	  pursuit	  of	  regulation.	  The	  same	  trust	  also	  means	   that	   the	   discretion	   practiced	   by	   the	   regulator	   does	   not	   shade	   into	  arbitrary	   behaviour.	   In	   the	   British	   perspective,	   the	   financial	   regulator	   is	   an	  independent	  actor	  embedded	  in	  the	  market	  it	  seeks	  to	  regulate.	  	  The	   German	   version	   takes	   us	   to	   a	   similar	   end-­‐point,	   but	   via	   a	   different	   route.	  Here,	   the	   focus	   is	   still	   on	   a	   regulator	   which	   is	   independent	   of	   government	  control;	   again,	   this	   feature	   is	   important	   in	   fostering	  a	   trust	   in	   the	  credibility	  of	  the	  overall	  regime.	  However,	  this	  time	  there	  is	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  separating	  the	   political	   role	   of	   policy-­‐making	   from	   the	   technocratic	   business	   of	  implementation.	  Thus,	   the	  discretion	  available	   to	   the	  regulator	   in	  exercising	   its	  duties	  is	  less,	  as	  it	  must	  follow	  procedures	  laid	  down	  by	  its	  political	  principals.	  In	  this	  context	  the	  regulator	  is	  an	  independent	  actor,	  but	  at	  an	  arm’s	  length	  remove	  from	  the	  market	  it	  oversees,	  and	  subject	  to	  a	  smaller	  zone	  of	  discretion.	  	  This	   brief	   review	   has	   served	   to	   remind	   us	   of	   the	   tents	   of	   the	   two	   national	  regulatory	   paradigms.	   Placing	   each	   in	   a	   wider	   domestic	   context,	   and	   viewing	  each	  in	  relation	  to	  European	  financial	  regulation,	  helps	  sketch	  a	  holistic	  view	  of	  the	   national	   environments.	   We	   can	   now	   explore	   how	   these	   drove	   lobbying	  behaviour	  in	  more	  detail,	  and	  so	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  will	  examine	  a	  set	  of	   problematic	   areas	   of	   regulatory	   change	   which	   animated	   the	   British	   and	  German	  sectors.	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6.3:	  The	  British	  sector	  In	  what	   follows	   I	  present	  data	  pertaining	   to	   the	   instances	  of	   regulatory	  change	  faced	  by	   the	  British	  sector.	  These	  are	  used	  to	  examine	  the	  empirical	  validity	  of	  the	   initial	   premise,	   and	   then	   of	   the	   ‘alignment’	   and	   ‘informational	   matching’	  hypotheses.	  	  
6.3.1:	  The	  British	  perspectives	  on	  bank	  regulation	  We	  begin	  our	  study	  of	  the	  British	  banks’	  lobbying	  by	  establish	  a	  high-­‐level	  view	  of	   the	   various	   actors’	   perceptions	   of	   bank	   regulation.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   my	  research,	   many	   interviewees	   made	   remarks	   revealing	   such	   perceptions,	   and	  these	   can	   be	   drawn	   into	   four	   themes:	   the	   liberal	   nature	   of	   British	   bank	  regulation;	   its	   consistency;	   its	  basic	   congruence	  with	  European	  regulation;	  and	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  key	  regulatory	  actors.	  	  	  First,	  several	  spoke	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  domestic	  regime,	  or	  of	  their	  experiences	  in	  dealing	   with	   its	   institutions,	   in	   ways	   which	   referred	   to	   the	   underlying	   liberal	  paradigm.	  For	  example,	  the	  discussions	  often	  turned	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  how	  British	  regulators	   focussed	   on	   reviewing	   banks’	   internal	   processes	   and	   management	  structures,	   rather	   than	   the	   substance	   of	   individual	   decisions.	   Thus,	   a	   former	  member	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  commented:	  
“It’s	  always	  been	  quite	  ‘high-­‐level’;	  they’ve	  always	  resisted	  the	  assertion	  that	  
it’s	   ‘light-­‐touch’	   or	   ‘soft-­‐touch’.	   They’ve	   always	   tried	   to	   describe	   it	   as	  
‘principles’,	   and	   now	   ‘judgement-­‐based’	   –	   that’s	   the	   big	   thing.	   In	   other	  
words,	  what	  this	   is	   trying	  to	  do	   is	   to	  take	  a	  broad	  view	  of	  the	   firm,	  get	  an	  
understanding	  of	   its	   strategy,	   its	   systems,	   its	  people,	  and	  at	  a	   top	   level	   try	  
and	   make	   a	   judgement	   about	   whether	   that	   adds	   up.	   And	   that	   whole	  
approach,	   is	  a	  big	   contrast	  with	   the	   ‘examiner’	  approach,	   that	  happens	   in	  
the	   States	   –	  where	   you	   have	   hundreds	   of	   embedded	   examiners	   looking	   at	  
loan	  books,	  particular	  decisions,	  approvals,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth.”	  (Interview,	  4th	  November	  2014,	  London)	  	  This	  perception	  of	  a	  ‘high-­‐level	  approach’	  was	  echoed	  by	  a	  representative	  of	  one	  the	  banks:	  
“…	  they	  were	  really	  overseeing	  the	  governance	  around	  [the	  firm],	  and	  who	  
was	  doing	  what	  in	  the	  decision	  process,	  and	  oversight.	  Yes,	  there	  was	  some	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modelling	  things,	  but	   their	  main	  point	  was	   ‘You	  do	  not	  do	  any	  quant	  stuff	  
until	  you	  actually	  get	  the	  governance	  right.’”	  (Interview,	  14th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  In	   terms	   of	   consistency,	   respondents	   referred	   to	   the	   remarkable	   steadiness	   of	  this	  approach	  through	  the	  years	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  For	  example:	  
“The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  move	  away	   from	  talking	  about	   ‘principles-­‐based’,	  as	  
opposed	   to	   rules,	   tick-­‐box,	  which	  was	   the	   FSA	   line,	   to	   now	  Andrew	  Bailey	  
talking	  about	  being	  judgemental	  …	  is	  a	  change	  in	  tone,	  but	  it’s	  recognisably	  
got	   the	   same	   idea	   about	   what	   the	   supervisor’s	   doing	   –	   namely,	   the	  
supervisor	   is	   exercising	   an	   oversight	   over	   the	   bank;	   it	   isn’t	   minutely	  
examining	  all	  its	  works.”	   (Interview,	  4th	  November	  2014,	  London)	  	  Here,	   the	   respondent’s	   phrase	   ‘the	   same	   idea’	   was	   echoed	   by	   several	   other	  mentions	   of	   an	   essential	   consistency	   in	   the	   regulatory	   approach,	   which	   was	  perhaps	   remarkable	   given	   the	   change	   in	   the	   institutional	   landscape	  during	   the	  period.	  	  Third,	  these	  extended	  into	  expressions	  regarding	  the	  congruence	  of	  the	  British,	  liberal	   approach	   with	   the	   principles	   behind	   European	   bank	   regulation.	  Respondents	  often	  explained	  how	  much	  of	  the	  European	  legislation	  was	  aimed	  at	  established	   a	   ‘level	   playing	   field’,	   on	   which	   banks	   could	   compete	   fairly.	   For	  example,	  one	  remarked	  that:	  
“And	  I	  think,	  you	  know,	  be	  really	  clear	  about	  this:	   firms	  and	  banks	  want	  a	  
single	   rulebook,	   it	  makes	   everyone’s	   life	  a	   lot	   easier,	   and	   so	   that	  mandate	  
that	  the	  EBA	  has	  is	  broadly	  very,	  very	  supported.”	  (Interview,	  4th	  April	  2014	  (b),	  London)	  	  This	   indicates	   the	   feelings	  of	  support	   I	  came	  across	   for	  a	  common,	  harmonised	  regulatory	   framework.	  Arising	   from	   this	  were	  observations	  of	   the	   centrality	   of	  the	   EBA	   in	   the	   process	   of	   implementing	   these	   rules	   –	   and	   in	   particular	   as	   a	  bulwark	  for	  British	  interests	  against	  a	  powerful	  block	  of	  Eurozone	  countries.	  For	  example,	  one	  respondent	  explain	  that:	  
“…	  and	  then	  I	  think	  you	  get	  to	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  EBA,	  [and]	  
that’s	  a	  really	  difficult	  mix	  to	  stir	  properly.	  I	  mean	  it’s	  essential	  from	  the	  UK	  
perspective	  that	  the	  EBA	  works,	  because	  it’s	  sort	  of	  the	  ‘referee’	  [laughs]	  …	  
It	   has	   a	   role	   …	   but	   increasingly	   it	   might	   entirely	   depend	   on	   the	   way	   the	  
	   192	  
Eurozone	   –	   non-­‐Eurozone	   relationship	   goes.	   You	   know,	   so	   if	   we	   stay	  
connected	  but	  not	   in	   the	  Eurozone,	   then	   the	  EBA	  will	   continue	   to	  have	  an	  
important	  role	  and	  a	  really	  difficult	  one…”	  (Interview,	  7th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  Fourth,	   notwithstanding	   the	   affinity	   with	   the	   domestic	   regime,	   there	   were	  frequent	  mentions	  of	  a	  distinct	  retrenchment	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  British	  regulator.	  Although	   the	  banks	   still	   felt	   they	  and	   the	  PRA	  were	  cut	   from	   the	   same	  cloth,	   a	  clear	   impression	   arose	   from	  my	   conversations	  with	   bank	   representatives	   that	  the	   regulator	   was	   pulling	   back	   from	   open	   and	   frequent	   engagement	   with	   the	  sector.	  Examples	  of	  these	  references	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  6.1.	  	  
Table	  6.1:	  British	  interviewees	  references	  to	  ‘retrenchment’	  
ID	   Quote	  Interview,	  14th	  May	  2013,	  London	   “So	  to	  be	  honest	  they	  went	  from	  being	  a	  very	  dominant	  force:	  they	  used	  to	  hold	  big	   round	   tables	   in	   their	   building	   with	   great	   big	   seminars	   and	   awareness	  sessions	   and	   a	   lot	   of	   engagement,	   very	   good	   engagement,	   between	   them,	   the	  
Treasury,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  representatives	  and	  the	  industry,	  both	  in	  London	  
and	  in	  Brussels.	  All	  that	  completely	  stopped,	  literally	  completely	  stopped.”	  Interview,	  18th	  March	  2014,	  London	  (a)	   “Yes,	   certainly	  under	  Basel	   II	   there	  used	   to	  be	  a	   lot	  of	   the	  credit	   risk	  working	  groups,	  and	  the	  market	  risk	  working	  groups,	  and	  …	  my	  impression	  is	  that	  they	  [are	  now]	  less	  active.”	  Interview,	  18th	  March	  2014,	  London	  (b)	   “So	   things	   like,	   in	   the	   very	   early	   days	   of	   the	  PRA,	   you	  used	   to	   have	   close	   and	  continuous	  meetings	  –	  C&Cs	  –	  the	  word	  ‘close’	  was	  dropped.	  It	  was	  intentional	  by	  them.”	  Interview,	  26th	  March	  2014,	  London	   “There’s	   eleven	  pages	   of	   questions	   on	   three	   pages	   of	   rules,	   because	   there’s	   so	  much	  unanswered.	  Now	  the	  PRA	  aren’t	  really	  looking	  to	  engage	  on	  any	  of	  that	  stuff.	  They	  kind	  of	  said	  ‘Take	  your	  best	  step,	  tell	  us	  what	  you’re	  doing’	  Or	  even,	  
‘You	  tell	  us,	  and	  unless	  we	  come	  back	  and	  shout	  at	  you	  about	  it,	  or	  until	  we	  do,	  
keep	  doing	  it.’” 	  This	  withdrawal	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  conscious	  policy	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  on	  forming	  the	  PRA.	  A	  member	  of	  staff	  explained	  that:	  
“Yeah	  …	  so	  …	  I	  mean,	  Mervyn	  King,	  when	  we	  became	  the	  PRA,	  set	  very	  much	  
the	   tone	  about	   lots	  of	   things	  we	  do	  as	  an	  organisation,	  as	   the	  PRA,	  which	  
was	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  ‘We	  do	  not	  negotiate	  with	  industry.’	  I	  always	  thought	  
that	  was	  something	  like	  ‘We	  have	  a	  view	  on	  what	  we	  want,	  and	  if	  industry	  
don’t	  like	  it,	  then	  bad	  luck.’”	   (Interview,	  15th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  Importantly,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  this	  retrenchment	  did	  not	  effect	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  banks	  and	  their	  associations	  continued	  to	  direct	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  the	  UK	  regulator.	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In	   these	   various	   perspectives,	   as	   they	   were	   articulated	   to	   me	   during	   the	  interviews,	   we	   can	   see	   evidence	   of	   the	   liberal	   paradigm.	   The	   banks	   were	  embedded	  in	  a	  construct	  which	  called	  for	  high-­‐level,	  principles-­‐based	  regulation,	  and	   one	   which	   prioritised	   open	   competition	   with	   consistent	   rules	   regulatory	  goal.	   This	   showed	   through	   in	   the	  way	   they	   described	   both	   the	  British	   and	   the	  European	   regulatory	   landscapes.	   This	   serves	   as	   a	   high-­‐level	   validation	   of	   the	  initial	   premise:	   the	   positions	   of	   the	   British	   banks	  were	   rooted	   in	   the	   national	  regulatory	  paradigm.	  	  
6.3.2:	  The	  large	  banks	  and	  remuneration	  With	   this	   general	   picture	  of	   the	   various	   actors’	   positions	   in	  place,	  we	   can	  now	  move	   to	  examining	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  banks	  over	  specific	   instances	  of	  regulatory	  change.	   In	  each	  of	   the	   following	  examples,	   I	  study	  the	  behaviours	   in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  ‘alignment’	  and	  ‘information	  matching’	  hypotheses	  (H3	  and	  H4).	  	  The	   CRDIV/CRR	   legislative	   package,	   and	   the	   ensuing	   rule-­‐making,	   contained	   a	  great	  many	  aspects	  which	  animated	  the	  UK	  banks.	  Among	  the	  most	  prominent,	  however,	  were	  the	  new	  policies	  on	  remuneration.	  	  
6.3.2.1:	  Prelude:	  The	  European	  rules	  and	  the	  British	  preferences	  	  The	  provisions	  of	  the	  CRDIV/CRR	  package	  covering	  remuneration	  originated	  in	  an	   amendment	   tabled	   by	   a	   Belgian	   Green	  MEP,	   Phillippe	   Lamberts	   (Barker	   &	  Schäfer,	   2013).	   This	   imposed	   a	   cap	   on	   the	   ratio	   –	   of	   1:1	   –	   between	   bank	  employees’	  fixed	  salary	  and	  their	  discretionary	  bonus;	  banks	  could	  raise	  this	  to	  2:1,	  but	  only	  with	  the	  explicit	  approval	  of	  their	  shareholders.	  The	  legislation	  also	  imposed	   significant	   reporting	   requirements	   on	   banks,	   as	   they	   would	   now	   be	  obliged	  to	  disclose,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  numbers	  of	  staff	  to	  whom	  they	  paid	  more	  than	  €1	  million.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  matter	  became	  something	  of	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo:	  the	  Parliament	  demanded	  that	  it	  be	  carried,	  in	  return	  for	  its	  approval	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  CRDIV/CRR	  package.	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Looking	  at	  these	  new	  rules	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  detect	  two	  sets	  of	  intentions.	  At	  one	  level	   was	   a	   fairly	   basic,	   politicised	   desire	   to	   ‘punish’	   the	   banks:	   to	   bring	   to	  account	  the	  institutions,	  if	  not	  the	  individuals	  within	  them,	  which	  had	  caused	  the	  financial	   crisis.	   At	   a	   deeper,	   perhaps	   more	   considered	   level	   was	   a	   distinct	  intention	   to	   reconfigure	   the	   incentive	   structures	   operating	   within	   banks,	   to	  restrict	   short-­‐termist,	   overly-­‐risky	   behaviour	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   bankers	   and	  traders.	  There	  was	  thus	  a	  genuine	  concern	  for	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  system	  behind	  these	  rules.	  	  This	   issue	  primarily	   impacted	   the	   five	  universal	  banks	  at	   the	   top	  of	   the	   sector,	  who	  had	  large	  numbers	  of	  highly-­‐paid	  staff.	  However,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  British	  market	  meant	  that	  there	  were	  also	  mid-­‐tier	  banks	  (such	  as	  Santander,	  and	  TSB)	  which	  were	  effected;	   though	   in	  reality,	   the	   lobbying	  efforts	  were	  dominated	  by	  the	   large	   banks.	   Their	   perceptions	   of	   this	   issue	   were	   clear,	   and	   one	  representative	  described	  it	  thus,	  rather	  bluntly:	  
“And	  then	  remuneration.	  That	  was	  a	  real	  slap	  in	  the	  face.”	  (Interview,	  7th	  May	  2014,	  London)	  	  Their	   preferences,	   arising	   from	   this	   basic	   perception,	   were	   across	   two	  dimensions:	   for	   both	   less	   regulation	   and	   less	   harmonisation.	   On	   the	   first,	   they	  felt	  that	  the	  cap	  was	  just	  not	  ‘right’	  in	  some	  way.	  One	  respondent	  stressed:	  
“I	   think	  remuneration	   is	   seen	  as	   just	  being	   troublesome	  really	   in	   the	  UK,	   I	  
think	   that’s	   seen	  as	   being	  a	   political,	   rather	   than	   really	   a	  ….	   than	  a	   good	  
risk-­‐based	  piece	  of	  regulation.	  But	  caps	  and	  all	  that	  sort	  of	  stuff,	  I	  think	  it’s	  
just	  not	  our	  way.”	   (Interview,	  7th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  He	  went	  to	  explain	  how	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  control	  banks’	  behaviour	  it	  was	  misguided,	  and	   more	   fundamentally,	   it	   ran	   against	   the	   principle	   that	   responsibility	   for	  managing	   such	   issues	   squarely	   with	   the	   firms	   themselves.	   On	   these	   grounds,	  appeal	  to	  ‘less	  regulation’	  meant	  no	  statutory	  restrictions	  on	  pay.	  Meanwhile,	  on	  the	  second	  dimension,	  the	  banks	  had	  a	  distinct	  preference	  for	  local	  flexibility	  in	  administering	  whatever	  cap	  was	  decided	  upon	  –	  and	  so	  less	  harmonisation.	  This,	  they	   felt,	   could	   at	   least	   ensure	   that	   certain	   employment	   practices	   could	   be	  protected.	   In	   these	   preferences	   the	   large	   banks	  were	   not	   simply	   acting	   out	   of	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self-­‐interest;	   they	   were	   also	   essentially	   vocalising	   a	   preference	   based	   on	   the	  distinctly	   liberal	   conceptions	   of	   how	   the	   regulation	   of	   private	   market	   actors	  should	  work.	  	  The	   official	   British	   position	   –	   that	   of	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   PRA	   –	  was	   aligned	  with	  these	  banks.	  While	  officials	  recognised	  the	  importance	  of	  aligning	  pay	  with	  risk	   attitudes,	   and	   were	   broadly	   in	   favour	   of	   restrictions	   on	   up-­‐front	   cash	  bonuses	  and	  of	  claw	  back	  mechanisms	  (Barker	  &	  Parker,	  2012),	  they	  were	  highly	  sceptical	  of	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  statutory	  cap	  on	  the	  remuneration	  ratio.	  Andrew	  Bailey,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  PRA,	  was	  reported	  to	  have	  said:	  
‘Let	  me	  be	  blunt,	  the	  bonus	  cap	  is	  the	  wrong	  policy,	  the	  debate	  around	  it	  is	  
misguided.’	   (Fleming	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  	  Again,	  the	  official	  perspectives	  on	  the	  remuneration	  policies	  can	  be	  linked	  back	  to	  the	  underlying	  paradigm:	  like	  the	  banks,	  British	  regulators	  felt	  that	  these	  rules	  went	   against	   the	   tenets	   of	   their	   fundamental	   beliefs	   in	   how	   market	   actors’	  behaviour	  should	  be	  controlled.	  	  On	   this	   issue,	   then,	   we	   can	   see	   the	   combined	   preferences	   of	   the	   banks	   and	  regulators	   drawing	   on	   the	   British	   liberal	   paradigm.	   The	   opposition	   to	   the	   cap,	  and	   the	   calls	   for	   flexibility	   in	   implementation	   –	   at	   the	   very	   least	   –	   echoed	   the	  principles	   in	   the	   paradigm	   of	   freedom	   for	   market	   actors	   and	   discretion	   for	  regulators.	   This	   serves	   to	   further	   support	   our	   initial	   premise.	   The	   preferences	  against	  the	  	  	  
6.3.2.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses	  against	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  
H3:	  The	  alignment	  hypothesis	  We	  begin	  our	   review	  of	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  with	   the	  examination	  of	   their	  venue	  selection,	  and	  so	  of	  the	  ‘alignment’	  hypothesis.	  On	  this	  issue	  the	  large	  UK	  banks	   concentrated	   their	   efforts	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene:	   as	   we	   saw	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   they	   had	   strong	   links	   with	   British	   political	   and	   regulatory	  actors,	  and	  used	  these	  extensively	  to	  lobby	  over	  remuneration.	  On	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	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level	   they	   made	   use	   of	   their	   supervisory	   relationships	   with	   the	   PRA	   to	   push	  against	   the	   new	   rules,	   and	   further	   up	   the	   organisation	   they	   were	   able	   to	   use	  personal	  contacts	  with	  senior	  staff,	  both	  in	  supervision	  and	  in	  policy,	  to	  arrange	  direct	  and	  private	  meetings.	  Similar	  approaches	  were	  deployed	  to	  lobby	  officials	  in	  the	  Treasury,	  where	  the	  large	  banks	  frequently	  met	  senior	  figures	  such	  as	  Sir	  Nicholas	  Macpherson	  and	  John	  Kingman	  (the	  first	  and	  second	  secretaries	  to	  the	  Chancellor,	   respectively).	   They	   were	   able	   to	   contact	   certain	   key	   MPs,	   such	   as	  members	  of	   the	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee	  and	  successive	  City	  Ministers	  Sajid	  Javid	  and	  Nicky	  Morgan.	  	  Importantly,	   the	   process-­‐tracing	   exercise	   showed	   that	   this	   domestic	   activity	  formed	  the	  core	  of	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  strategy.	  Examining	  the	  efforts	  of	   the	  banks,	  and	  using	  material	  from	  interviews,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  they	  approached	  actors	  on	  the	  home	  front	  with	  the	  deliberate	  intention	  of	  having	  them	  pass	  the	  lobbying	  effort	  further	  up	  the	  European	  chain.	  One	  respondent	  commented	  that:	  	  
“…	  if	  you’re	  trying	  to	  lobby	  the	  EBA	  over	  [this],	  one	  of	  the	  pipes	  up	  to	  that	  is	  
to	  work	  with	  your	  domestic	  regulator	  and	  get	  them	  to	  back	  you.”	  (Interview,	  3rd	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  Another	  referred	  more	  explicitly	  to	  the	  way	  banks	  sought	  to	  engage	  the	  support	  of	  the	  national	  authority:	  
“…	  they	  target	  the	  PRA,	  and	  use	  them	  as	  a	  lobbyist	  in	  Europe,	  co-­‐opt	  them…”	  (Interview,	  29th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  Similar	  pass-­‐through	  approaches	  employed	  a	  political	  route,	  with	  banks	  exerting	  pressure	  on	  domestic	   actors	   in	   the	  hope	  of	   gaining	   support	   in	  other	  European	  domains.	  Part	  of	  this	  involved	  broadening	  the	  lobbying	  efforts	  to	  include	  a	  legal	  challenge	   to	   the	   proposals,	   and	   one	   bank	   obtained	   a	   formal	   opinion	   from	   its	  lawyers	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  proposed	  cap	  ‘contravened	  EU	  law’	  (Barker,	  2013).	  Others	  soon	  fell	   in	  behind	  this	  strategy,	  and	  although	  the	  public	  salience	  of	   the	  issue	   chilled	   the	   support	  of	   the	  Treasury	   for	   such	  an	  action,	   chancellor	  George	  Osborne	  was	  eventually	  persuaded	  to	  launch	  a	  legal	  challenge	  to	  the	  bonus	  rules	  in	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (Barker	  et	  al.,	  2013).	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Secondly,	  the	  banks	  also	  undertook	  a	  degree	  of	  lobbying	  in	  Europe	  on	  their	  own	  behalf:	   they	   engaged	   with	   the	   EBA	   through	   its	   public	   channels,	   attending	  consultation	  hearings	  on	   the	  subject	  and	  submitting	  written	   responses	   to	   rule-­‐making	  procedures.	  They	   also	  worked	  beyond	   the	  EBA,	   and	   lobbied	   legislative	  actors.	   Through	   their	   pre-­‐existing	   contacts	   they	   approached	   key	  parliamentarians	  –	  Lamberts	  himself,	  naturally,	  but	  also	  the	  rapporteurs	  on	  the	  dossier.	  One	  bank	  managed	  to	  bring	  Lamberts	  to	  its	  London	  offices,	  and	  take	  him	  on	  a	  tour	  of	  their	  trading	  floor	  –	  as	  part	  of	  a	  pitch	  which	  stressed	  the	  problems	  with	  his	  suggestions	  (Barker	  &	  Schäfer,	  2013).	  	  However,	  the	  data	  revealed	  several	  distinct	  themes	  surrounding	  this	  example	  of	  regulatory	  change	  which	  hampered	  the	  banks’	  lobbying	  efforts.	  Firstly,	  they	  only	  appreciated	  its	  significance	  very	  late	  on	  in	  the	  legislative	  process:	  they	  had	  been	  digesting	   the	   new	   rules	   pertaining	   to	   the	   capital	   and	   liquidity	   ratios	   imposed	  under	  CRR,	  and	  had	  only	  been	  vaguely	  aware	  of	  the	  proposals	  to	  cap	  pay.	  As	  one	  interview	  subject	  put	  it	  to	  me:	  
“…	  fairly	  early	  on	  there	  was	  an	  event	  which	  [Philippe	  Lamberts]	  spoke	  at	  in	  
London,	  which	  I	  went	  along	  to	  …	  would	  have	  been	  mid-­‐way	  through	  2010	  …	  
and	  …	  there	  was	  five	  of	  us	  showed	  up	  to	  this	  Belgian,	  who	  I	  knew	  was	  a	  co-­‐
rapporteur	  on	  CRDIV	  …	  Hardly	  anyone	   showed	  up	   to	   it,	   I	   think	   there	  was	  
someone	   from	   a	   university,	   there	   was	   me,	   one	   of	   the	   US	   banks,	   certainly	  
none	  of	  the	  UK	  banks	  bothered	  to	  go	  to	  it.”	  (Interview,	  14th	  May	  2013,	  London)	  	  The	  second	  was	  the	  salience	  of	  the	  issue:	  in	  the	  heated	  public	  discourse	  following	  the	   financial	   crisis	   remuneration	   became	   an	   emotive	   topic,	   and	   disapproval	   of	  bankers’	   bonuses	  was	   high.	   The	   chief	   executive	   of	  RBS,	   for	   example,	   bowed	   to	  media	   pressure	   and	   declined	   the	   bonus	   his	   board	   had	   awarded	   him	   (Moore,	  2012).	  This	  controversy	  constrained	  the	  banks’	  ability	  to	  discuss	  the	  topic	  with	  political	   actors,	   particularly	   as	   it	   became	   bound	   up	   with	   partisan	   positioning	  among	  the	  parties:	  
“Remuneration,	   of	   course,	   is	   highly	   politicised.	   It’s	   a	   fairly	   simple	   and	  
straightforward	   topic,	   but	   it	   has	   these	   political	   connotations,	   and	   these	  
have	  huge	  …	  implications	  as	  to	  how	  one	  actually	  goes	  about	  communicating	  
…	  and	  with	  the	  election	  here	  coming	  up	  [next	  year]	  it’ll	  become	  even	  more	  
so.”	   (Interview,	  13th	  May	  2013,	  London)	  
	   198	  
Furthermore,	   the	   Treasury	   officials	  whom	   the	   banks	  were	   lobbying	  were	  well	  aware	   of	   the	   dangers	   of	   being	   seen	   to	   be	   siding	   with	   the	   banks.	   As	   one	  representative	  explained:	  	  
“…	   [discussions]	   suddenly	   became	   focussed	   around	   the	   remuneration	   side.	  
And	  again,	   then	  we	  entered	  the	  sort	  of	  …	  the	  weird	  situation	  of	  debates	  of	  
‘Well	  how	  much	  does	  a	  bank	  like	  us	  actually	  want	  to	  lobby	  on	  bonuses?’	  We	  
don’t	  want	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  doing	  that,	  and	  …	  the	  Treasury	  was	  trying	  to	  –	  
bless	  them	  –	  not	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  ‘We’re	  all	  about	  banks.’	  So	  they	  were	  taking	  it	  
easy.”	   (Interview,	  3rd	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  The	  third	  difficulty	  arose	  the	  public	  actors’	  own	  positioning	  on	  the	  issue.	  During	  this	   period	   regulatory	   officials	   and	   Treasury	   staff	   were	   still	   working	   on	  constituting	   a	   new	   domestic	   institutional	   landscape,	   as	   the	   FSA	   was	   being	  dismantled	   and	   re-­‐created	   as	   the	   PRA	   and	   the	   FCA.	   Later,	   once	   the	   new	  landscape	  had	  been	  established,	  differences	  in	  positioning	  between	  public	  actors	  and	   the	   banks	   emerged.	   Although	   intuitively	   aligned	   with	   the	   banks,	   the	   PRA	  pressed	   back	   against	   their	   efforts	   on	   remuneration,	   because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	  constructive	  engagement	  they	  had	  shown	  on	  other	  topics.	  The	  same	  was	  true	  of	  the	   Treasury,	   and	   in	   conversations	   the	   bonus	   cap	   almost	   fell	   victim	   to	   horse-­‐trading	  between	  the	  two	  parties:	  	  
“And	   so	   …	   when	   it	   came	   to	   issues	   like	   the	   bonus	   cap,	   what	   ended	   up	  
happening	   was	   that	   the	   industry	   started	   getting	   very	   concerned,	   it	   then	  
started	   trying	   to	  have	  a	  dialogue	  with	   the	  UK	  government,	  again,	  and	   the	  
Treasury	   team	   was	   saying	   ‘Yeah,	   but	   you’ve	   been	   arguing	   against	   what	  
we’ve	  been	  trying	  to	  achieve.’”	   (Interview,	  14th	  May	  2013,	  London)	  	  These	   difficulties	   led	   the	   banks	   to	   structure	   their	   engagement	   from	   2013	  onwards	   through	   trade	   bodies	   –	   principally	   the	   British	   Bankers’	   Association	  (BBA)	   and	   Association	   for	   Financial	   Markets	   in	   Europe	   (AFME).	   Many	   of	   the	  responses	   to	   consultations	  on	   remuneration	  hosted	  by	   the	  PRA	  were	  provided	  by	  the	  BBA	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  banks,	  while	  AFME	  took	  a	  more	  European	  role	  and	  contacted	  MEPs	  (Barker,	  2012).	  The	   latter,	   for	   its	  part,	  often	   found	  working	  on	  this	   issue	   rather	   awkward,	   since	   its	   membership	   included	   several	   European	  wholesale	   banks	   whose	   position	   on	   the	   issue	   differed	   from	   the	   British.	   A	  representative	  of	  the	  association	  explained	  that	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“…	  however	  you	   look	  at	   it	   it’s	   really	  a	  UK	   issue,	  and	  …	   it’s	  …	  we	  …	   I	  know	  
we’ve	   tried	   to	   do	   some	  work	  with	   the	  BBA	  but	   it’s	   really	   quite	   a	   different	  
focus	  because	  the	  BBA	  will	  talk	  about	  the	  city’s	  competitiveness	  and	  the	  UK	  
economy,	   and	  we	   can’t	   really	   say	   those	   things,	   because	  we’re	   a	   European	  
organisation.”	   (Interview,	  17th	  June	  2013,	  London)	  	  Notwithstanding	   these	   difficulties,	   the	   banks	   pursued	   lobbying	   efforts	   which	  placed	  domestic	   engagement	   at	   the	   core	  of	   the	   strategy.	  This	   supports	  H3:	   the	  broad,	   general	   alignment	   between	   the	   banks	   and	   the	   domestic	   actors	   led	   the	  former	   to	   concentrate	   their	   efforts	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene.	   Such	   efforts	   were	  undertaken	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   using	   these	   domestic	   alliances	   to	   exert	   pressure	   in	  Europe;	   these	   were	   often	   successful,	   even	   if	   the	   second-­‐order	   approaches	   to	  have	   the	   rules	   changed	   pursued	   by	   public	   actors	   failed.	   However,	   the	   public	  salience	  of	  the	  issue,	  and	  the	  PRA’s	  wider	  strategic	  thinking,	  served	  to	  constrain	  the	  banks’	  lobbying.	  	  
H4:	  The	  informational	  matching	  hypothesis	  Beyond	   these	   considerations	   of	   the	   venues	   targeted	   we	   can	   also	   focus	   on	   the	  input	  supplied	  –	  and	  so	  examine	  the	  ‘informational	  matching’	  hypothesis.	  In	  their	  domestic	  engagements,	  the	  large	  British	  banks,	  and	  their	  associations,	  deployed	  distinctly	   ‘national’	   arguments.	   From	   the	   data,	   two	   parallel	   complaints	   to	   the	  PRA	   can	   be	   identified,	   regarding	   the	   likely	   harm	   caused	   by	   the	   rules	   to	   the	  stability	  and	  soundness	  of	  the	  sector.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  ran	  thus:	  to	  maintain	  overall	  levels	  of	  pay,	  the	  banks	  would	  have	  to	  raise	  fixed	  salaries.	  This	  would	  harm	  their	  flexibility	  to	  reduce	  outgoings	  in	  times	  of	  stress,	  and	  mean	  that	  an	   increasing	   proportion	   of	   earnings	   would	   have	   to	   be	   spent	   on	   fixed	   costs,	  rather	   than	   being	   put	   into	   reserves	   as	   retained	   earnings.	   This	  would	   have	   the	  perverse	   effect	   of	   actually	   making	   them	   less	   safe.	   The	   Financial	   Times,	   citing	  banks’	  arguments	  on	  the	  topic,	  commented	  that:	  
‘…	   the	   European	   rule	   changes	   could	   restrict	   banks’	   ability	   to	   keep	   costs	  
flexible.	   Instead	  of	  cutting	  bonuses	   in	  cyclical	  downturns,	   they	  will	  have	  to	  
go	  through	  the	  disruptive	  and	  expensive	  process	  of	  cutting	  more	  jobs.’	  (Jenkins,	  2012)	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Secondly,	   the	   banks	   argued	   that	   remuneration	   was	   meant	   to	   be	   used	   to	  incentivise	  good	  behaviour,	  but	  the	  more	  it	  was	  fixed	  (as	  base	  salary),	  the	  more	  that	  effect	  would	  be	  dulled.	   If	  all	  behaviour	  was	  to	  be	  rewarded	  with	   the	  same	  level	   of	   pay,	   then	   at	   best	   bankers	  would	   have	   no	   reason	   to	   take	   risks	   –	  which	  would	   have	   a	   knock-­‐on	   effect	   on	   lending.	   At	   worst,	   they	   would	   be	   under	   no	  incentive	   to	   behave	   well,	   and	   so	   would	   actually	   run	   greater	   risks.	   When	  deploying	   such	   arguments	   to	   domestic	   regulatory	   actors	   the	   UK	   banks	   firmly	  pushed	   the	   impact	   the	   rules	  would	   have	   on	   the	   systemic	   stability	  of	   the	  British	  
sector.	  	  Meanwhile	   to	   other	   domestic	   actors,	   and	   in	   the	   public	   domain,	   the	   UK	   banks	  argued	  strongly	  that	  the	  rules	  would	  have	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  
of	   the	  British	   sector.	   The	   higher	   cost	   base	   would	  make	   them	   less	   attractive	   to	  investors,	  and	  more	  worryingly,	  high-­‐paid	  staff	  would	  desert	  the	  banks	  in	  favour	  of	  employers	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  European	  bonus	  cap	  rules.	  Both	  of	  these	  would	  harm	  the	  banks’	  ability	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  global	  banks,	  and	  undermine	  the	  competitive	  position	  of	  what	  was	  an	  industry	  of	  vital	  strategic	  importance	  for	  the	  UK.	   Moreover,	   the	   argumentation	   drew	   on	   beliefs	   in	   the	   liberal	   regulatory	  paradigm,	   under	   which	   such	   a	   heavy-­‐handed	   measure	   was	   deemed	  inappropriate.	   Their	   opposition,	   couched	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	  inadvertent	   harm	   to	   systemic	   stability,	   showed	   an	   expression	   of	   the	   principle	  that	  responsibility	  for	  performance,	  and	  for	  risk-­‐management,	  lay	  with	  the	  firms	  themselves,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  interfered	  with	  by	  outside	  agents.	  	  	  When	  lobbying	  the	  EBA	  their	  input	  differed	  slightly	  to	  what	  had	  been	  deployed	  on	  the	  national	  scene.	  As	  the	  EBA’s	  intention	  was	  to	  create	  a	  level	  playing	  field	  by	  enforcing	   this	   rule	   on	   all	   banks	   in	   the	   EU,	   the	   large	   UK	   banks	   realised	   that	  complaints	   about	   the	   impact	   on	   competitiveness	   would	   gain	   little	   traction.	  Essentially,	   the	   EBA	   was	   creating	   a	   competitive	   landscape	   in	   which	   this	   cap	  existed	   and	   applied	   to	   all	   banks	   –	   and	   so	   insisting	   that	   it	   would	   harm	   the	  competitive	  position	  of	  the	  British	  sector	  would	  just	  seem	  to	  be	  special	  pleading.	  Instead	  they	  focussed	  on	  specifying	  the	  technical	  details	  through	  which	  the	  cap	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would	   be	   applied;	   concentrating,	   for	   instance,	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   staff	  impacted:	  
EBA	  Question:	   ‘Staff	   shall	  be	   identified	  as	  having	  a	  material	   impact	  on	  an	  
institution’s	   risk	   profile	   if	   they	   are	   awarded	   variable	   remuneration	   that	  
exceeds	  both	  of	  the	  following	  amounts:	  	  
75%	  of	  the	  fixed	  component	  of	  remuneration;	  	  
ii.	  EUR	  75	  000	  
Is	  this	  criterion	  appropriate	  to	  identify	  risk	  takers?	  	  
	  
Bank	  Answer:	   ‘This	  criterion	  does	  not	   relate	   to	   risk	   taking	  so	   it	   cannot	  be	  
considered	   directly	   appropriate	   for	   identifying	   risk	   takers.	   As	   a	   backstop	  
criterion	   for	   use	   in	   certain	   types	   of	   institution,	   it	   may	   be	   appropriate.	  
However,	  at	  this	  level	  of	  remuneration,	  the	  percentage	  part	  of	  the	  criterion	  
is	   very	   sensitive	   to	   small	   changes	   in	   fixed	   remuneration.	   The	   list	   would	  
therefore	   be	   quite	   volatile	   annually.	   It	   would	   not	   be	   appropriate	   for	   an	  
institution	  such	  as	  Barclays,	  where	  a	  variable	  award	  of	  EUR	  75,000	   is	  not	  
considered	  large.’	   (Barclays	  Bank,	  2013:	  3)	  	  Similar	  flexing	  was	  evident	  in	  their	  lobbying	  of	  European	  legislative	  actors.	  Here,	  again,	   they	   downplayed	   the	   impact	   the	   rules	   would	   have	   on	   their	   competitive	  positions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   other	   banks,	   as,	   like	  with	   the	   EBA,	   that	  was	   seen	   to	   be	   too	  obviously	  a	   self-­‐serving	   case	   to	  be	  making.	  Again,	   therefore,	   the	  banks	   tried	   to	  explain	   the	   technical	   deficiencies	   of	   the	   policy.	   For	   example,	   a	   position	   paper	  targeted	  at	  MEPs	  raised	  the	  following	  objection:	  
‘…	   a	  metric	   to	   determine	   the	   ratio	   of	   fixed	   to	   variable	   remuneration	  may	  
result	  in	  reduced	  bonuses	  but	  increases	  in	  salaries	  and	  other	  allowances	  to	  
keep	  the	  total	  compensation	  package	  the	  same.	  This	  consequent	  reduction	  
in	   variable	   compensation	   would	   reduce	   firms’	   ability	   to	   apply	   risk	  
adjustment	  measures	   as	   well	   as	   decrease	   the	   opportunity	   to	   reduce	   total	  
compensation	  where	  performance	  of	  the	  employee	  or	  the	  business	  is	  below	  
expectations.	   This	   potentially	   pays	   for	   poor	   performance	   and	   gives	   less	  
flexibility	   to	   the	   business,	   paradoxically	   reducing	   one	   of	   the	   interventions	  
available	   in	   a	   stress	   situation	   as	   it	   reduces	   the	   flexibility	   to	   reduce	   costs,	  
perhaps	   also	   in	   response	   to	   lower	   revenues.	   As	   a	   result	   returns	   and	   thus	  
retained	  earnings	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  lower,	  reducing	  retentions	  available	  
to	  bolster	  capital	  and	  so	  presenting	  risks	  to	  both	  stability	  and	  growth.’	  (British	  Bankers'	  Association,	  2012:	  14)	  	  The	   significance	   here	   is	   the	   careful	   avoidance	   of	   national	   argumentation,	   and	  instead	   the	   focus	   on	   technical	   language	  highlighting	  unintended	   consequences.	  The	   variation	   between	   this,	   the	   argumentation	   used	   at	   the	   EBA,	   and	   at	   home,	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show	   an	   acute	   flexing	   of	   input	   according	   to	   the	   tastes	   of	   the	   venues	   being	  targeted.	  	  
6.3.2.3:	  Summary:	  Remuneration	  In	   summary,	  we	   can	  make	   some	   observations	   about	   the	   lobbying	   surrounding	  the	  bonus	  cap	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  First,	  the	  premise	  connecting	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm	  and	  the	  preferences	  is	  supported:	  the	  banks’	  opposition	  was	  grounded	  in	  a	  belief	  that	  such	  a	  measure	  was	  inappropriate,	  as	  it	  trampled	  on	   the	   separation	   between	   the	   state	   and	   the	   private	   affairs	   of	   market	   actors.	  Secondly,	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  ‘alignment	  hypothesis’	  (H3)	  were	  borne	  out,	  in	  that	  the	  banks’	  selection	  of	  primary	  lobbying	  venues	  reflected	  the	  fundamental,	  if	  slightly	   fractious,	   congruence	   of	   their	   preferences	   and	   those	   of	   the	   PRA.	   The	  extent	   to	  which	   they	  were	  able	   to	  actually	  penetrate	   these	  venues	  and	  achieve	  any	   traction	   was	   conditioned	   by	   factors	   beyond	   their	   control,	   such	   as	   the	  salience	  of	  the	  issue	  and	  those	  bodies’	  own	  desire	  to	  maintain	  a	  suitable	  distance	  from	  the	  banks.	  Nonetheless,	  our	  theorised	  causal	  mechanism	  stands:	   the	   large	  banks’	  preferences	  were	  rooted	  in	  their	  belief	  in	  the	  British	  regulatory	  paradigm,	  and	  their	  choice	  of	  lobbying	  venue	  reflected	  a	  decision	  based	  on	  the	  alignment	  of	  these	  preferences.	  	  Third,	  the	   ‘informational	  matching’	  hypothesis	  (H4)	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  data.	  The	   banks	   flexed	   the	   presentation	   of	   their	   input	   in	   different	   venues,	   stressing	  elements	  such	  as	  systemic	  stability	  or	  national	  competitiveness	  as	  appropriate.	  This	   showed	   a	   following	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   very	   different	   discursive	   venues.	  Overall,	   though,	   their	   efforts	   were	   framed	   around	   a	   fairly	   consistent	   message	  referring	   to	   the	   harm	   the	   restrictions	   would	   have	   on	   the	   free	   operation	   of	  competition	   in	   the	   marketplace.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   reflected	   the	   strength	   of	   their	  paradigmatic	  belief	  in	  competition.	  	  
6.3.3:	  The	  building	  societies	  and	  capital	  A	  second	  major	  area	  of	  contention	  between	  Europe	  and	  the	  British	  sector	  was	  on	  the	  definitions	  of	  instruments	  allowable	  as	  capital.	  This	  particularly	  troubled	  the	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building	  societies.	  In	  the	  coming	  section	  we	  review	  the	  lobbying	  activities	  of	  the	  key	   actors:	   the	   larger	   societies,	   the	   smaller	   firms,	   and	   their	   representative	  association.	  	  
6.3.3.1:	  Prelude:	  The	  European	  rules	  and	  the	  British	  preferences	  The	  ‘CRR’	  component	  of	  the	  legislative	  package	  purified	  the	  types	  of	  instrument	  financial	   institutions	   could	   hold	   as	   components	   of	   their	   ‘core’	   capital	   layer.	   As	  part	   of	   the	   overall	   drive	   to	   bolster	   the	   equity	   levels	   of	   European	   banks,	   this	  outlawed	   the	   use	   of	   any	   instrument	   which	   bore	   fixed,	   non-­‐discretionary	  payments.	   There	   was	   a	   clear	   linkage	   between	   this	   intention	   and	   the	   liberal	  aspect	  of	  the	  European	  regulatory	  paradigm,	  with	  the	  emphasis	  it	  placed	  on	  the	  role	  of	  shareholders	  in	  absorbing	  banks’	  losses	  –	  and	  its	  use	  of	  the	  pressures	  of	  equity	   capital	   markets	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   exerting	   discipline	   on	   financial	  institutions.	  	  For	  the	  UK	  building	  societies	  this	  move	  posed	  significant	  problems.	  As	  mutually-­‐owned	  entities	  they	  had	  no	  equity	  share	  capital	  in	  issue,	  and	  a	  large	  part	  of	  their	  buffers	  was	   composed	  of	   retained	  earnings.	  They	  did	   have	   securities	   in	   issue	   -­‐	  Permanent	   Interest-­‐Bearing	   Shares	   (‘PIBS’)	   –	   but	   these	   fell	   precisely	   into	   the	  category	   CRDIV/CRR	   sought	   to	   eliminate.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   2008-­‐10,	   several	  building	   societies	   came	   into	  great	  difficulties	  with	   their	   capital	   ratios;	   later,	   an	  examination	   of	   the	   Co-­‐Operative	   Bank’s	   balance	   sheet	   conducted	   by	   British	  regulators	  exposed	  a	  £1.5bn	  shortfall.	  With	  these	  on-­‐going	  capital	  problems,	  and	  with	  revenues	  squeezed	  by	  stubbornly	  low	  interest	  rates	  and	  sluggish	  business	  levels,	  the	  sector	  was	  firmly	  opposed	  to	  the	  banning	  of	  these	  instruments.	  	  British	   regulators,	   meanwhile,	   had	   rather	   nuanced	   preferences	   on	   the	   issue.	  They	  had	  some	  sympathy	  with	  the	  building	  societies,	  and	  had	  previously	  worked	  with	   them	   to	   design	   instruments	   which	   complied	   with	   earlier	   versions	   of	   the	  European	  capital	  adequacy	  laws.	  Similarly,	  they	  had	  often	  sought	  to	  work	  closely	  with	   the	   societies	   to	   safeguard	   the	   systemic	   stability	   of	   this	   sub-­‐sector	   –	  recognising,	  in	  particular,	  its	  importance	  in	  domestic	  mortgage	  lending.	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However,	  over	  this	  issue	  the	  regulators	  were	  keen	  to	  implement	  CRDIV/CRR	  as	  closely	   as	   possible.	   The	   reasoning	   was	   two-­‐fold.	   First,	   there	   was	   a	   distinct	  tendency	   among	   British	   regulators	   to	   question	   the	   soundness	   of	   the	   building	  societies,	  and	  the	  wisdom	  of	  their	  expansion	  strategies	  and	  capital	  management.	  This	  was	  no	  doubt	  borne	  of	  the	  many	  problems	  the	  societies	  had	  suffered	  during	  the	   crisis,	   during	  which	   the	   sub-­‐sector	  was	   rocked	  by	  bail-­‐outs	   (such	  as	  of	   the	  Dunfermline	   Building	   Society)	   and	   mergers	   –	   the	   Derbyshire,	   Cheshire,	  Scarborough,	   Chesham,	   Chelsea	   and	  Norwich	   and	  Peterborough	   societies	  were	  all	   taken	   over	   in	   the	   years	   following	   the	   financial	   crisis	   (Moore,	   2014).	   This	  scepticism	   shaded	   into	   a	   desire	   for	   these	   firms	   to	   de-­‐mutualise,	   and	   to	   open	  themselves	  and	  allow	  market	   forces	  –	   that	   is,	   equity	  capital	  markets	  –	   to	  exert	  some	   discipline.	   In	   this	   sense	   it	   was	   the	   regulators	   who	   took	   a	   position	  more	  easily	   identifiable	  as	   in	   line	  with	   the	  British	   liberal	  paradigm.	  Meanwhile,	   their	  siding,	   albeit	   subtle,	  with	  European	  actors	  on	   this	   showed	   their	  preference	   for	  extending	  the	  reach	  of	  equity	  into	  the	  co-­‐operative	  sector.	  	  The	  second	  reason	  was	  rather	  more	  practical.	  As	  with	  remuneration,	   this	   issue	  was	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  packet	  of	  strategic	  thinking,	  where	  the	  UK	  regulators	  sought	  to	  make	  gains	  over	  European	  actors	  by	  winning	  the	  ability	  to	  gold-­‐plate	  regulations.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   changes	   to	   mutuals’	   capital	   needed	   to	   be	  implemented	   cleanly,	   so	   that	   the	   PRA	   could	   then	   safely	   over-­‐shoot	   on	   other	  elements	  of	  the	  rules	  (for	  example,	  by	  exceeding	  the	  leverage	  ratio	  rules).	  	  Taking	  these	  positions	  together,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  rather	  fractious	  relationship	   between	   the	   societies	   and	   both	   European	   and	   British	   regulators.	  The	  legislation	  sought	  to	  remove	  a	  central	  component	  of	  their	  balance	  sheet,	  and	  the	  EBA,	  as	  ever,	  sought	  to	  draft	  the	  rules	  such	  that	  this	  was	  achieved.	  The	  PRA,	  meanwhile,	   may	   have	   been	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   societies’	   concerns,	   but	  nonetheless	   stuck	   to	   its	   liberal,	   pro-­‐competition	   principles	   and	   sought	   to	  transpose	  this	  part	  of	  the	  regulation	  as	  cleanly	  as	  possible.	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6.3.3.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses	  against	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  
H3:	  The	  alignment	  hypothesis	  The	   building	   societies	   focussed	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   on	   this	   issue	   on	   the	  domestic	   scene.	   The	   engagements	   were	   divided	   into	   two	   broad	   groups:	   the	  larger	  societies	  (such	  as	  Nationwide,	  Yorkshire	  and	  Coventry)	  were	  able	  to	  make	  direct	   contact	   with	   domestic	   public	   actors	   on	   their	   own	   behalf,	   while	   the	  remainder	  routed	  their	  work	  through	  the	  Building	  Societies’	  Association	  (BSA).	  In	   fact,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   degree	   of	   overlap	   between	   these,	   in	   that	   the	   larger	  societies	   also	   participated	   in	   BSA	   discussions	   and	   contributed	   to	   its	   positions	  papers.	  	  The	  societies	  lobbied	  the	  PRA:	  they	  began	  by	  directing	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  staff	  in	  its	   supervision	   function,	   hoping	   to	   use	   established	   contacts	   to	   open	   lines	   of	  communication	   with	   the	   regulator.	   This	   was	   only	   really	   viable	   for	   the	   larger	  societies,	   since	  only	   they	  had	   individual	  supervisory	  relationships;	  many	  of	   the	  rest	  were	  under	   joint	  supervisory	  arrangements	  and	  so	  had	   little	  direct	  access.	  The	  BSA,	  meanwhile,	  had	  more	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  staff	  in	  the	  PRA’s	  policy	  unit,	  where	  it	  was	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  early	  conversations	  over	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  European	  rules.	  	  Elsewhere,	   the	   building	   societies	   sought	   to	   move	   beyond	   this	   explicitly	  regulatory	  venue.	  The	  intention	  was	  to	  play	  a	   ‘divide-­‐and-­‐conquer’	  game	  in	  the	  regime’s	   institutional	   structure,	   making	   up	   for	   weakness	   in	   one	   area	   with	  strengths	   in	   another.	   Thus,	   they	   lobbied	   officials	   in	   the	   Treasury	   –	   making	  contact	  with	  senior	  civil	  servants	  and	  advisers.	  They	  even,	  to	  an	  extent,	  managed	  to	  prize	  apart	   the	  relationship	  with	   the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  by	   targeting	   lobbying	  efforts	  beyond	  the	  PRA	  and	  directly	  at	  the	  divisions	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  the	  health	  of	  the	  UK	  mortgage	  market	  (and	  reporting	  into	  the	  Bank’s	  Monetary	  Policy	   Committee).	   Straddling	   all	   of	   these	   were	   efforts	   directed	   at	   key	  parliamentarians,	  such	  as	  Mark	  Hoban	  and	  Andrew	  Tyrie	  (both	  on	  the	  Treasury	  Select	  Committee).	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They	  also	  worked	  further	  afield,	  and	  lobbied	  in	  Europe	  over	  this	  issue.	  However,	  three	   important	   themes	   emerged	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   data	   which	   qualify	  their	  work	  at	  this	  level.	  First,	  they	  weighted	  their	  European	  engagement	  towards	  the	  legislative	  arena:	  
“We	  were	  particularly	  engaged	  ...	  I	  went	  and	  saw	  people	  in	  the	  relevant	  unit	  
in	  the	  Commission,	  we	  saw	  various	  people	   in	  the	  Parliament,	  on	  the	  ECON	  
committee…”	   (Interview,	  4th	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  They	  worked	  these	  contacts	  they	  had	  in	  order	  to	  try	  and	  influence	  this	  policy	  at	  a	  very	  high	  level	  early	  on	  in	  the	  period,	  and	  once	  the	  legislative	  drafts	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  completed,	  their	  activity	  declined.	  Second,	  the	  interactions	  they	  had	  with	  the	  EBA	   were	   weak	   and	   fragmented	   –	   inspired	   by	   negative	   perceptions	   of	   this	  regulatory	  venue.	  I	  came	  across	  several	  expressions	  of	  this	  view,	  such	  as:	  
“…	   dealing	   with	   the	   EBA	   is	   a	   little	   different	   …	   the	   people	   who	   own	   the	  
relationship	  with	  the	  domestic	  regulators	  don’t	  own	  the	  EBA.	   I	  don’t	   think	  
they	  even	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  ‘proper’	  regulator.”	  (Interview,	  12th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  This	  quote	  indicates	  the	  impression	  these	  firms	  had	  of	  the	  EBA,	  but	  also	  reflects	  their	  approach	  of	  keeping	  regulatory	  lobbying	  efforts	  in	  distinct	  silos;	  as	  a	  result,	  their	   engagement	  with	   the	  EBA	  was	  harmed	  by	   the	   lack	  of	   integration	   in	   their	  efforts.	  What	   little	   they	   did	  do	  was	   concerned	  with	   gaining	   approval	   for	   their	  new	   capital	   instrument,	   rather	   than	   attempting	   to	   influence	   the	   design	   new	  policy	  as	   it	  developed.	  Third,	  all	   their	  European	  was	  distinctly	   subordinated	   to	  their	  domestic	   lobbying;	   and,	   unlike	   the	   large	  banks	  before	   them,	   they	  did	  not	  seek	   to	   recruit	   British	   public	   actors	   to	   lobby	   on	   their	   behalf	   further	   up	   the	  European	  chain	  (Interview,	  9th	  July	  2014,	  London).	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  data	  show	  that	  the	  overall	  focus	  on	  the	  domestic	  arena	  did	  not	  wholly	   stem	   from	   an	   alignment	   of	   preferences.	   Granted,	   the	   PRA	   was	  sympathetic	   to	   the	  plight	  of	   the	  building	   societies,	  but	   this	  was	  perhaps	  only	  a	  superficial	   sympathy.	   The	   British	   regulators	   saw	   a	   need	   to	   build	   a	   practicable	  replacement	   for	   the	   existing	   capital	   instrument	   –	   the	   PIBS	   –	   but	   were	   also	  concerned	   to	   tighten	   the	   discipline	   of	   this	   sub-­‐sector	   and	   to	   show	   a	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determination	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   various	   scandals	   and	   crises	   that	   had	   rocked	   it.	  Rather,	   the	   focus	  on	   the	  domestic	  arena	  was	   linked	   to	  a	   theme	  which	  emerged	  from	  the	  data	  showing	  these	  firms’	  ‘national’	  self-­‐perception.	  For	  example:	  
“...	  and	  I	  think,	  if	  we’re	  honest,	  I	  think	  we	  probably,	  I	  think	  we’ve	  understood	  
how	   to	   …	   get	   on	   with	   our	   national	   regulator	   better,	   and	   we	   have	   been	  
playing	  that	  game	  longer.”	   (Interview,	  11th	  January	  2015,	  London)	  	  These	   were	   British	   firms,	   embedded	   in	   a	   British	   regulatory	   regime,	   with	  distinctly	   national	   business	   models.	   Although	   they	   identified	   the	   new	   capital	  rules	   as	   essentially	   a	  European	   issue,	   this	   rootedness	   led	   them	   to	   focus	  on	   the	  national	  scene.	  Likewise,	  the	  detailed	  rules	  implementing	  the	  change	  were	  seen	  as	  closed	  off:	  the	  societies	  saw	  no	  benefit	  in	  lobbying	  the	  EBA	  to	  influence	  their	  writing,	   nor	   to	   engage	   the	   PRA	   as	   a	   representative	   and	   use	   a	   ‘pass-­‐through’	  approach	  to	  exert	  pressure	  on	  the	  EBA.	  	  
H4:	  The	  informational	  matching	  hypothesis	  Examining	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  leads	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  input	  deployed	  in	  the	  various	  venues	  targeted	  by	  the	  buildings	  societies.	  The	  process-­‐tracing	  exercise	  revealed	  how	  the	  societies’	  efforts	  on	  the	  home	  front	  fell	  into	  two	  distinct	  phases.	  The	   first	   involved	   running	   a	   set	   of	   consequential	   arguments	   aimed	   at	   the	  regulatory	  and	  political	  actors.	  To	   the	  PRA,	   through	  bilateral	  meetings	  or	  open	  consultation	   processes,	   they	   stressed	   the	   impact	   the	   ban	  would	   have	   on	   their	  capital	  positions,	  and	  drew	  attention	  to	  their	  likely	  response:	  
‘So,	  alongside	  earnings	  retention,	  the	  immediate	  adjustment	  to	  the	  demand	  
for	  higher	  [capital]	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  to	  be	  met	  from	  deleveraging	  than	  
is	   the	   case	   for	  proprietary	  banks.	  And	   it	   is	   in	   this	   context	   that	   the	   sudden	  
and	   unforeseen	   implementation	   of	   the	   [changes]	   on	   1	   January	   2014	   is	  
particularly	  objectionable.	  As	  our	  members	  have	  explained	  at	  a	  face	  to	  face	  
meeting	  with	  PRA	  policy	  staff,	  a	  sudden	  step	  change	  of	  this	  nature	  cannot	  be	  
coped	  with	  by	  extra	  earnings	  retention	  (remembering	  that	  mutuals,	  unlike	  
proprietary	  banks,	  already	  retain,	  rather	  than	  distributing,	  their	  earnings),	  
leaving	  in	  the	  short	  term	  some	  severe	  deleveraging	  as	  the	  only	  alternative.’	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2013b:	  12)	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The	   BSA	   also	   stressed	   the	   significant	   departure	   in	   approach	   between	   the	   PRA	  and	   its	   predecessor	   (the	   FSA)	   which	   had	   earlier	   suggested	   a	   more	   phased	  implementation	  schedule:	  
‘However,	   the	   unexpected	   proposal	   to	   bring	   in	   almost	   all	   [the	   changes]	  
immediately,	   100%,	   on	   1	   January	   2014	   is	   extremely	   unwelcome.	   We	   are	  
clear	  that	  these	  need	  to	  be	   implemented	   in	  due	  course,	  but	  we	  are	  equally	  
clear	  that	  for	  good	  reason	  both	  Basel	  III	  and	  CRDIV	  outlined	  a	  very	  modest	  
glide	  path,	  beginning	  in	  2014,	  but	  only	  at	  20%	  a	  year.	  And	  FSA	  committed	  
in	  October	  2012	  not	  to	  accelerate	  this	  transition	  path.	  
This	   general	   position	  was	   reaffirmed	   in	   FSA’s	   last	   statement	   on	   CRDIV	   in	  
February	   2013.	   PRA	   has	   now	   without	   warning	   reneged	   on	   that	   clear	  
commitment,	  causing	  extensive	  detriment	  to	  our	  members.’	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2013b:	  5)	  	  Meanwhile,	   to	  domestic	  political	  actors,	   the	  societies	  pressed	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  change	  on	  their	  capacity	  to	  maintain	  growth	  in	  mortgage	  lending.	  A	  press	  release	   by	   the	   BSA	   detailed	   the	   various	   areas	   of	   growth	   the	   sub-­‐sector	   had	  enjoyed	  (mortgage	   lending,	  current	  account,	  et	  cetera),	  ending	  with	  a	  comment	  that:	  
‘Mutuals	   have	   increased	   their	   lending	   across	   the	   spectrum	   to	   all	   types	   of	  
borrowers	  including	  ﬁrst	  time	  buyers	  and	  those	  with	  small	  deposits.	  In	  fact	  
lending	   to	  ﬁrst	   time	  buyers	  accounted	   for	  almost	  a	   third	  of	  all	   lending	  by	  
the	  sector	  in	  the	  year	  to	  June,	  helping	  38,000	  people	  take	  the	  ﬁrst	  step	  on	  to	  
the	   property	   ladder.	   This	   has	   been	   achieved	   ahead	   of	   the	   launch	   of	   the	  
Government’s	   Help	   to	   Buy:	   Mortgage	   Guarantee	   Scheme,	   demonstrating	  
that	  mortgage	  ﬁnance	  for	  those	  with	  lower	  deposits	  is	  already	  available	  at	  
a	  building	  society.’	   (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2013c:	  1)	  	  This	   was	   designed	   to	   play	   alongside	   the	   government’s	   aim	   to	   use	   a	   buoyant	  housing	  market	   to	  encourage	   the	  country’s	  economic	  recovery:	   such	  a	  strategy	  would	  be	  harmed,	  or	  even	  derailed,	  if	  the	  societies	  were	  not	  helped	  in	  resolving	  the	   problem	   of	   the	   banned	   capital	   instruments.	   These	   arguments	   were	   thus	  deployed	  as	  part	  of	   their	   ‘divide-­‐and-­‐conquer’	  approach,	  which	  saw	  them	  push	  domestic	   institutions	   against	   each	   other	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   gaining	   a	   favourable	  outcome.	  Across	  these	  submissions,	  however,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  societies	  and	  the	   BSA	   were	   careful	   to	   frame	   their	   input	   around	   technical	   issues	   –	   such	   as	  implementation	   timelines	   –	   when	   addressing	   regulators;	   and	   broader,	   more	  ‘national’	  themes	  when	  dealing	  with	  political	  actors.	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  The	  next	  phase	  came	  later	  on,	  once	  the	  PRA	  had	  acknowledged	  the	  problem	  and	  stepped	  up	  to	  help	  design	  a	  CRDIV-­‐compliant	  capital	  instrument.	  Now,	  the	  input	  shifted	   in	   line	   with	   the	   new	   demands	   of	   the	   situation:	   the	   societies	   began	   to	  lobby	  these	  domestic	  actors	  on	  more	  precise	  points	  of	  design.	  A	  particular	  issue	  was	  whether	  the	  new	  securities	  could	  be	  sold	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  or	  if	  –	  as	  the	  regulators	  preferred	  –	  they	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  institutional	  investors.	  Here,	  the	  BSA	  met	  regulators’	  calls	  for	  input	  with	  suitably	  technical	  expertise,	  helping	  to	  specify	  the	  legal	  form	  of	  the	  new	  instrument:	  	  
‘We	   agree	   that	   CCDS	   should	   be	   capable	   of	   being	   issued,	   subject	   to	   the	  
proposed	   safeguards,	   to	   retail	   investors	   who	   are	   not	   high	   net	   worth	   or	  
sophisticated.	   The	   principal	   safeguards	   -­‐	   a	   specific	   risk	   warning	   that	   the	  
client	  must	  sign	  to	  acknowledge,	  and	  an	  undertaking	  to	  limit	  investment	  to	  
a	   small	   percentage	   of	   net	   investable	   wealth,	   provide	   the	   additional	  
consumer	  protection	  that	  is	  needed.	  
We	   expect	   that	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   proposals	   would	   be	   that	   consumers	   who	  
decide	  to	  invest	  in	  these	  securities	  would	  have	  at	  least	  a	  basic	  awareness	  of	  
the	  risks	  involved,	  and	  would	  only	  invest	  money	  they	  could	  afford	  to	  lose.’	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2015a:	  2)	  	  So	   the	   societies	   showed	   an	   ability	   to	   subtly	   shift	   their	   input	   on	   the	   domestic	  scene,	   stressing	   different	   aspects	   of	   their	   argument	   to	   different	   audiences.	   But	  interestingly,	   the	   themes	  gleaned	   from	  the	  data	  showed	  how	  their	  efforts	  were	  also	   often	   explicitly	   framed	   around	   references	   to	   ‘competition’:	   the	   societies	  were	  not	  seeking	  to	  isolate	  themselves	  from	  competitive	  pressures,	  but	   instead	  emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   competition	   in	   bringing	   about	   efficiency	   and	  lowering	   costs	   for	   borrowers.	   In	   the	   interviews	   I	   held	  with	   representatives	   of	  these	  firms,	  they	  explained	  how	  they	  had	  appealed	  to	  a	  respect	  for	  diversity,	  and	  had	  called	  for	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  which	  sustained	  the	  various	   legal	   forms	  of	  banking	  institutions	  present	  in	  the	  British	  market.	  Such	  diversity,	  they	  insisted,	  made	  for	  more	   effective	   competition,	   by	   offering	   the	   consumer	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   choice.	  Examples	  of	  this	  consistent	  line	  of	  argumentation	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  various	  consultation	  documents	  and	  press	  releases	  issued	  on	  the	  domestic	  scene;	  these	  are	  summarised	  in	  Table	  6.2.	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Table	  6.2:	  References	  to	  diversity	  and	  competition	  
ID	   Quote	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2013d)	  
‘A	   fall	   in	   the	   diversity	   of	   the	   ﬁnancial	   services	   sector	   is	   potentially	   both	  
damaging	   the	   resilience	   of	   the	   ﬁnancial	   system	   and	   reducing	   effective	  
competition	  for	  consumers.’	  (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2015b)	  
‘Market	   resilience	   and	   consumer	   choice	   will	   be	   improved	   if	   regulations	   are	  
required	   to	   encourage	   and	   foster	   different	   business	   models	   as	   well	   as	   broad	  
product	  ranges	  as	  they	  design	  new	  regulation.’	  (Beale,	  2012)	   ‘The	  UK	  needs	   a	   retail	   banking	   sector	   characterised	   by	   strong	   competition,	   a	  
diversity	   of	   business	   models	   and	   a	   focus	   on	   meeting	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   real	  
economy.’	  	  These	   mentions	   of	   ‘competition’	   are	   significant,	   as	   they	   show	   how	   these	  societies,	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  capital	  rules,	  continued	  to	  run	  arguments	  that	  were	  framed	  around	  a	  core	  tenet	  of	  the	  underlying	  liberal	  paradigm.	  	  In	  their	  European	  lobbying,	  meanwhile,	  the	  building	  societies	  gently	  shifted	  their	  input	  again.	  They	  realised	  that	  arguments	  based	  on	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  rule	  on	  the	  domestic	  market	  would	  have	  little	  traction	  in	  European	  circles,	  and	  so	  they	  made	  appeals	   to	   a	   broader	   principal.	   To	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Parliament,	  where	  their	  energies	  were	  focussed,	  they	  again	  called	  for	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  they	  could	  adhere	  to,	  and	  which	  were	  practicable	  and	  appropriate.	  The	  move	  to	  restrict	  the	  capital	   instruments,	   they	   argued,	   originated	   in	   a	   policy	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Basel	  texts,	   which	   had	   themselves	   been	   written	   with	   private-­‐owned	   ‘PLC	   banks’	   in	  mind.58	  Purifying	  the	  types	  of	  capital	  held	  by	  those	  firms	  was	  perfectly	  sensible,	  but	  applying	  those	  new	  definitions	  to	  co-­‐operative	  banks	  was	  deeply	  misguided:	  	  
“[CRR]	  fetishized	  common	  equity	  …	  it	  regarded	  it	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  form	  
of	   loss-­‐absorbing	   capital.	   And	   if	   you	   apply	   that	   logic	   to	   building	   societies	  
you	  get	  a	  category	  error:	  we	  just	  aren’t	  configured	  that	  way.”	  (Interview,	  4th	  June	  2014,	  London)	  	  They	   also	   pushed	   this	   a	   little	   further.	   The	   BSA,	   for	   instance,	   argued	   that	  European	  actors	  were	  using	  CRDIV/CRR	  to	  punish	  the	  entire	  sector	  for	  its	  role	  in	  causing	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  Instead,	  it	  argued	  that	  the	  building	  societies	  had	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Recall	   the	   discussion	   in	   Chapter	   Four:	   the	   conceptual	   framework	   on	   which	   Basel	   III	   rested	  included	  a	  strong	  role	  for	  equity	  capital	  –	  as	  both	  a	  means	  of	  constraining	  banks’	  behaviour	  and	  absorbing	   their	   losses.	   It	   was	   European	   legislative	   actors	   who	   decided,	   when	   translating	   the	  Accords	  into	  legislation,	  to	  apply	  this	  principle	  to	  all	  financial	  institutions.	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largely	   blameless	   in	   causing	   it	   (and	   indeed	  were	   victims	   of	   its	   effects)	   and	   so	  punishing	   them	   by	   forcing	   these	   rules	   on	   them	   was	   inappropriate.	   As	   one	  interviewee	  put	  it	  to	  me:	  	  
“…	   part	   of	   the	   persuasive	   narrative	   is	   that	   all	   the	   problems	   that	   those	  
directives	   are	   designed	   to	   solve	   are	   problems	   of	   ‘large,	   bad	   banks’,	   so	   of	  
course	   the	   biggest	   push	   back	   on	   all	   of	   this	  will	   come	   from	   the	   large,	   bad	  
banks;	  so	  we	  say	  ‘Look	  we	  buy	  into	  all	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  stuff,	  but	  when	  you	  
do	  these	  bits,	  just	  don’t	  screw	  us	  up.’”	   (Interview,	  11th	  January	  2015)	  	  Finally,	  the	  societies,	  and	  the	  BSA,	  continued	  to	  argue	  for	  proportionality	  and	  for	  a	   respecting	   of	   diversity	   when	   lobbying	   the	   EBA.	   For	   example,	   a	   consultation	  response	  commented	  that:	  	  
‘We	  also	  recognise	  that	  the	  cooperative	  and	  mutual	  sectors	  in	  particular	  are	  
diverse:	  there	  is	  no	  harmonisation	  at	  EU	  level,	  and	  differences	  owe	  much	  to	  
national	  and	  even	  local	  traditions.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  devise	  
additional	   criteria	   related	   (for	   instance)	   to	   access	   to	   reserves,	   or	   to	   the	  
redemption	   of	   shares,	   that	   apply	   to,	   or	   cater	   for,	   all	   existing	   bona	   fide	  
cooperatives	  or	  mutuals.’	   (Building	  Societies	  Association,	  2012:	  1)	  	  Interestingly,	  these	  examples	  –	  the	  interview	  quote	  and	  the	  extract	  from	  an	  EBA	  submission	  –	  show	  a	  consistent	  line	  of	  argument	  framed	  around	  specificity,	  or	  a	  separation	  in	  the	  European	  rules	  between	  the	  large	  banks	  and	  the	  mutual	  sector.	  The	   societies,	   and	   the	   BSA,	   avoided	   direct	   mention	   of	   the	  British	   market,	   and	  broadened	   their	   response	   to	  supporting	  all	  European	  mutuals.	  But	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  these	  arguments	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  competition	  being	  sought	  as	  a	  regulatory	  goal.	  So	  embedded	  were	  they	  in	  the	  British	  liberal	  paradigm	  that	  they	   actively	   supported	   competition,	   but	   insisted	   on	   appropriate,	   relevant	   and	  practicable	  rules.	  	  
6.3.3.3:	  Summary:	  Building	  societies’	  capital	  Overall,	  we	  can	  review	  these	  lobbying	  behaviours,	  and	  their	  causes,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	   theory.	   First,	   the	   initial	   premise	   stands:	   the	   basic	   positions	   of	   the	   various	  actors	   derived	   from	   the	   tenets	   of	   the	   liberal	   regulatory	   paradigm.	   For	   the	  societies,	  the	  objections	  were	  about	  the	  harm	  to	  their	  viability,	  but	  they	  did	  not	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challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  competition	  being	  a	  key	  regulatory	  good.	  For	  the	  PRA,	  the	  preferences	   derived	   from	   a	   desire	   to	   see	   CRDIV/CRR	   implemented	   cleanly	   (so	  that	  it	  could	  then	  be	  safely	  exceeded	  in	  certain	  key	  respects)	  and	  the	  particular	  preferences	   regarding	   building	   societies’	   capital	   constituted	   a	   response	   to	   the	  sub-­‐sector’s	  problems	  during	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	   two	   sets	   of	   preferences	   may	   have	   shared	   common	   roots	   in	   the	   liberal	  paradigm,	   but	   they	   themselves	   did	   diverge:	   the	   building	   societies	   stood	   to	   be	  harmed	  by	  the	  change	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  capital,	  while	  the	  regulator	  was	  closer	  to	   the	  European	   thinking	  on	   the	   issue.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  eventual	  need	   to	  bring	  about	  a	  practicable	  solution	  did	  bring	  the	  two	  sides	  together,	  but	  this	  was	  not	  a	  clear,	   unquestioned	   alignment.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   societies	   on	  engagement	   on	   the	   British	   scene	   came	   not	   from	   a	   conscious	   recognition	   of	  aligned	  preferences,	  but	  from	  an	  intuitive	  embeddedness	  in	  domestic	  structures.	  This	  gives	  us	  a	  rather	  circumscribed	  support	  for	  H3,	  as	  the	  societies	  lobbied	  their	  domestic	  public	  counterparts	  more	  through	  force	  of	  habit	  than	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  alignment	  of	  preferences.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	   we	   found	   similarly	   contingent	   support	   for	   H4	   in	   the	   data.	   The	  presentation	  of	  their	  message	  varied	  between	  venues,	  on	  both	  the	  domestic	  and	  the	   European	   fronts.	   To	   national	   regulators,	   they	   stressed	   the	   impacts	   of	   the	  rules,	   and	   how	   it	   could	   bring	   about	   significant	   adjustment	   costs;	   to	   political	  actors,	   and	   even	   to	   components	   of	   the	   central	   bank	   other	   than	   the	   new	  regulatory	   authority,	   they	   argued	   that	   the	   rule	  would	   constrain	   their	   ability	   to	  lend,	   and	   to	  maintain	   the	   growth	   in	   the	  UK	  mortgage	  market.	   In	   Europe,	   they	  dropped	  these	   ‘national’,	  and	  consequential	   lines,	   in	   favour	  of	  arguments	  about	  the	  application	  (as	  a	  punishment)	  of	  rules	  designed	  for	  a	  different	  class	  of	  bank	  onto	   a	   largely	   innocent	   mutually-­‐owned	   sector.	   This	   flexing	   supports	   the	  implication	  of	  H4	  –	  namely	  that	  they	  were	  sensitive	  to	  the	  discursive	  rules	  of	  the	  various	  venues,	  and	  the	  tastes	  of	   the	  various	  audiences,	  and	  altered	  their	   input	  accordingly.	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The	  slight	  exception	  to	  this	  was	  their	  activity	  in	  the	  European	  regulatory	  arena.	  While	  they	  certainly	  provided	  technical	  expertise,	  and	  some	  data,	  into	  the	  EBA’s	  rule-­‐making	  processes	  on	  this	  issue,	  their	  regulatory	  lobbying	  was	  rather	  weak.	  More	  significantly,	  they	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  view	  this	  body	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  legislative	  apparatus,	  and	  to	  use	  the	  sort	  of	  ‘suitability’	  arguments	  that	  they	  had	  previously	   directed	   at	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Parliament.	   This	   represented	   a	  possible	   mis-­‐reading	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   this	   new	   venue,	   which	   was	   explicitly	  regulatory,	  precise,	  and	  technical.	  	  
6.3.4:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  entire	  UK	  sector	  Having	   now	   reviewed	   issues	   effecting	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   sector,	   we	   are	   in	   a	  position	   to	   connect	   the	   story	   back	   to	   our	   causal	   model,	   and	   to	   make	   some	  general	   observations.	   Firstly,	   the	   initial	   premise	   linking	   the	   positions	   and	  preferences	  of	   the	  actors	   to	   the	  underlying	   regulatory	  paradigm	  stood.	  For	   the	  large	  banks,	   the	  objections	   to	   the	  remuneration	  rules	  were	  based	  not	  only	   in	  a	  practical	   concern	   for	   the	   costs	   involved	   in	   compliance,	   but	   also	   in	   a	   deeper	  feeling	  that	  this	  was	  an	  illiberal	  move:	  pay	  levels	  were	  the	  concern	  of	  the	  banks’	  management,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  regulatory	  control.	  Similarly,	  they	  feared	   the	   effect	   the	   rules	   would	   have	   on	   their	   ability	   to	   compete	   with	   other	  banks	   not	   under	   the	   reach	   of	   European	   legislation.	   The	   building	   societies,	   for	  their	   part,	   felt	   that	   the	   restrictions	   on	   the	   types	   of	   capital	   they	   could	   use	  threatened	   the	   diversity	   of	   the	   UK’s	   financial	   sector,	   which	   in	   turn	   harmed	  competition	  and	   reduced	  consumer	   choice.	   In	  both	   cases	   the	  preferences	  were	  for	   less	   regulation	   and	   less	   harmonisation:	   the	   European	   rules	   should	   not	  impinge	  on	   free	  competition,	  and	  domestic	  authorities	  should	  be	  able	   to	  adjust	  their	  implementation	  to	  suit	  local	  needs.	  These	  various	  preferences	  all	  drew	  on	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  British	  liberal	  paradigm,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  private	  management,	  limited	  regulatory	  reach,	  and	  competition	  as	  a	  key	  policy	  goal.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  British	  regulator,	  the	  linkage	  to	  the	  fundamental	  paradigm	  was	  perhaps	  a	  little	  more	  complex.	  Like	  the	  banks	  and	  the	  building	  societies,	  the	  PRA	  had	  a	  key	  concern	  to	  ensure	  conditions	  under	  which	  competition	  could	  prevail:	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hence	   its	   opposition	   to	   the	   remuneration	   rules	   (on	   the	   grounds	   that	   they	  weakened	  the	  British	  sector’s	  ability	  to	  compete	  on	  the	  world	  global	  stage),	  and	  hence	  its	  support	  for	  the	  purifying	  of	  building	  societies’	  capital	  (on	  the	  grounds	  that	   more	   ‘equity-­‐like’	   capital	   could	   help	   strengthen	   corporate	   control	   and	   so	  improve	  discipline	   in	   the	  sector).	  But	  cutting	  across	   this	  was	  a	  desire	   to	  go	   far	  
beyond	  CRDIV/CRR,	  and	  to	  set	  a	  tough	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  the	  UK	  sector.	  This	   was	   borne	   of	   a	   distinctly	   new	   element	   of	   its	   mandate	   (compared	   to	   is	  predecessor,	  the	  FSA)	  –	  to	  safeguard	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  It	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	   the	   costs	  a	   collapse	  would	  bring	   to	   the	  national	   finances,	   and	  was	  constantly	  minded	  to	  prioritise	  tough	  regulation.	  	  Turning	   to	   the	   ‘alignment	   hypothesis’	   (H3),	  we	   see	   a	   good	  performance	  mixed	  with	   some	   qualifications.	   The	   large	   banks	  were	   aware	   of	   the	   preferences	   over	  the	   remuneration	   rules	   that	   they	   shared	   with	   the	   PRA,	   and	   so	   directed	   their	  lobbying	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene.	   For	   the	   building	   societies,	   the	   data	   show	   that	  
their	   focus	  on	  British	  –	   rather	   than	  European	  –	  venues	  was	  driven	  more	  by	  an	  intuitive	  sense	  of	  rootedness	  than	  by	  a	  conscious	  choice	  based	  on	  an	  awareness	  of	   alignment.	   A	   key	   difference	   in	   these	   various	   domestic	   engagements	   was	   in	  their	   intent:	   the	   large	  banks	  sought	   to	  use	   their	   lobbying	  of	  domestic	  actors	   to	  transfer	   pressure	   upwards	   in	   the	   European	   chain,	  while	   the	   building	   societies	  simply	   sought	   to	   negotiate	   a	   workable	   implementation	   of	   European	   rules.	  Furthermore,	  for	  the	  larger	  banks,	  domestic	  lobbying	  was	  matched	  by	  European	  activities,	   including	  contacts	  with	  legislative	  actors,	  other	  member	  states,	  and	  –	  crucially	   –	   the	   EBA.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   building	   societies’	   domestic	   lobbying	   took	  priority	  over	  any	  European	  engagement,	  and	  what	  little	  they	  did	  was	  focussed	  on	  the	  legislative	  arena	  –	  they	  failed	  to	  match	  the	  larger	  banks’	  regulatory	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  the	  EBA.	  	  The	   ‘informational	   matching	   hypothesis’	   (H4)	   performed	   rather	   better.	   The	  larger	   banks	   shifted	   the	   presentation	   of	   their	   input	   across	   all	   their	   various	  audiences.	  At	  home,	  they	  stressed	  the	   impact	  the	  bonus	  cap	  would	  have	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	   the	  UK	  sector,	  or	  on	   its	  systemic	  stability	  (when	  addressing	  the	   PRA).	   In	   Europe,	   and	   especially	   at	   the	   EBA,	   they	   switched	   from	   this	   into	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technical	   arguments,	   highlighting	   flaws	   in	   the	   cap’s	  design,	   and	   in	   the	   rules	  by	  which	  it	  would	  be	  implemented.	  The	  building	  societies	  showed	  the	  same	  flexing:	  at	   home,	   they	   ran	   variations	   on	   a	   consequentialist	   theme,	   altering	   it	   for	   either	  regulatory	  or	  political	  interlocutors;	  and	  in	  Europe	  they	  instead	  focussed	  on	  the	  inappropriateness	   of	   using	   these	   rules	   to	   punish	   the	   mutual	   sector.	   The	  exception	  for	  them	  was	  the	  failure	  to	  adapt	  this	  message	  when	  targeting	  the	  EBA.	  Overall,	  these	  subtle	  shifts	  by	  the	  various	  private	  actors	  display	  a	  conscious	  and	  deliberate	  alteration	  of	  their	  input	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  various	  venues	  –	  and	  so	  supports	  H4.	  	  To	  help	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  complexity	  we	  can	  turn	  to	  the	  final	  hypothesis:	   it	   is	  the	   interaction	   between	   these	   preferences	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation,	  and	   the	   resource	   holdings	   of	   the	   financial	   institutions	   involved,	   which	   best	  explains	  their	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  For	  the	  large	  banks,	  their	  extensive	  resource	  holdings	   enabled	   them	   to	   engage	   in	   domestic	   lobbying	   as	   part	   of	   a	   far	   larger	  portfolio	  strategy,	  which	  also	  saw	  them	  engaging	  with	  legislative	  actors	  and	  with	  the	   EBA.	   In	   their	   regulatory	   lobbying	   at	   this	   venue,	   they	   could	   generate	   and	  deploy	  the	  sort	  of	  input	  that	  enabled	  them	  access	  to,	  and	  a	  prominent	  role	  in,	  the	  EBA’s	  rule-­‐making	  procedures.	  Conversely,	  for	  the	  building	  societies,	  far	  weaker	  resources	   left	   them	   focussing	  on	   the	  domestic	   scene	   as	   their	  priority,	  with	   the	  engagement	   with	   the	   European	   bodies	   subordinate.	   Similarly,	   their	   resource	  constraints	   meant	   they	   were	   not	   able	   to	   provide	   the	   sort	   of	   precise	   input	  required	  by	  the	  EBA,	  leaving	  their	  regulatory	  lobbying	  of	  it	  very	  weak.	  	  The	   crucial	   difference	   among	   these	   firms	  was,	   as	  we	   saw	   in	   Chapter	   Five,	   the	  sophistication	   of	   their	   lobbying	   operations.	   The	   large	   banks	   had	   extensive	  interfacing	   resources	   spread	   across	   all	   fronts:	   contacts	   with	   domestic	   actors,	  European	   legislators	   and	   latterly	   the	   EBA.	   They	   had	   the	   internal	   capacity	   to	  generate	   the	   many	   different	   kinds	   of	   information	   –	   and	   importantly,	   the	  supporting	   expertise	   –	  which	   they	   could	   then	   feed	   into	   these	   various	   lobbying	  venues.	   Significantly,	   they	   had	   integrated	   these	   into	   coherent	   operations,	  enabling	   them	   to	   select	   venues,	   and	   alter	   input,	   in	   line	   with	   preferences.	   The	  much	  smaller	  building	  societies	   lacked	  all	   these	  capacities,	  and	  so	  struggled.	   In	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this	   sense,	  we	   can	   appreciate	  how	  variations	   in	   their	   national	   contexts	   shaped	  the	  way	  banks	  lobbied	  the	  EBA.	  	  6.4:	  The	  German	  sector	  We	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  second	  empirical	  context,	  and	  in	  what	  follows	  I	  present	  data	  on	   the	   areas	   of	   regulatory	   change	   which	   impacted	   the	   German	   sector.	   Again,	  these	   are	   used	   to	   examine	   the	   initial	   premise,	   and	   then	   the	   ‘alignment’	   and	  ‘informational	  matching’	  hypotheses.	  	  
6.4.1:	  The	  German	  perspectives	  on	  EU	  bank	  regulation	  Our	  first	  task	  is	  to	  establish	  an	  overall	  contextual	  picture,	  bringing	  out	  the	  high-­‐level	   perceptions	   on	   bank	   regulation	   of	   German	   actors.	   During	   the	   research	  patterns	  emerged	   from	  the	  various	  sources	  of	  data,	  which	  can	  be	  grouped	   into	  four	  themes:	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  German	  banking	  model;	  a	  scepticism	  of	  European	  financial	  regulation;	  and	  of	   its	   institutional	  apparatus;	  and	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  BaFin.	  	  First,	  many	  interview	  subjects	  articulated	  a	  clear	  defence	  of	  the	  unique	  German	  banking	   system.	   They	   described,	   for	   example	   how	   the	   three-­‐pillar	   system	  supported	   the	   Mittelstand	   –	   the	   vibrant	   small-­‐	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   enterprise	  sector	   which	   contribute	   so	   much	   to	   Germany’s	   economic	   success.	   One	  respondent	  explained	  how	  the	  small	  banks	  in	  the	  public	  and	  co-­‐operative	  pillars	  were	  vital	  parts	  of	  community	  life,	  and	  how	  they	  supported	  local	  enterprises:	  
“So	   this	   is	   a	   completely	   different	   situation,	   and	   our	   economic	   structure,	  
which	   is	  …	  very	  much	  dominated	  by	   small-­‐  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises,	  
very	  healthy	  small-­‐  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises,	  that	  have	  a	  very	  …	  close	  
relationships	   to	   local	   savings	   banks,	   to	   local	   co-­‐operative	   banks.	   For	  
example,	   because	   the	  …	   they’re	   very	   close	   locally,	   geographically,	   but	  also	  
with	   respect	   to	   the	  mental	   surroundings	   –	   and	  …	   so	   I	   think	   local	   savings	  
banks	  and	  local	  co-­‐operative	  banks	  understand	  very	  well	  the	  needs	  of	  small-­‐	  
and	   medium-­‐sized	   enterprises	   in	   our	   regions,	   so	   we	   have	   no	   one	   strong	  
economic	  centre	  in	  Germany	  that	  dominates	  on	  a	  national	  level.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  July	  2014,	  London)	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Respondents	   also	   explained	   how	   this	   arrangement	   also	   found	   support	   from	  	  domestic	  regulatory	  actors:	  
“With	   the	   BaFin,	   usually,	   they	   –	   of	   course,	   we	   have	   a	   long-­‐lasting	  
relationship	   with	   them,	   so	   they	   understand.	   And	   most	   of	   them	   will	   be,	   I	  
think,	  staunch	  supporters,	  for	  instance,	  of	  our	  three-­‐pillar	  system.	  Whereas	  
some	  European	  guys	  will	   say	   ‘Well,	  OK,	   this	   three-­‐pillar	   system	  belongs	   to	  
the	  past	  and	  should	  be	  scrapped	  in	  Germany.’”	  (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  This	  perspective	  was	  strongly	  connected	  to	  the	  second	  theme,	  which	  described	  an	   intuitive	   scepticism	   of	   European	   financial	   regulation.	   Opinions	   here	   often	  revolved	   around	   the	   incompatibility	   between	   European	   rules	   and	   the	   unique	  German	  landscape.	  Thus:	  
“So	  …	  the	  savings	  banks	  …	  they	  are	  working	  on	  a	  decentralised,	  on	  a	   local	  
level.	  So	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘regional	  principle’	  is	  applied,	  so	  they	  are	  not	  allowed	  
to	   do	   business,	   core	   business	   outside	   their	   region.	   So	   you	   have	   high	  
decentralisation,	   [and]	   public	   law	   status,	   and	   all	   that	   is	   something	   that,	  
well,	  where	  we	  were	  at	  loggerheads	  with	  European	  policies	  for	  quite	  a	  long	  
time.	  Because	  Brussels	  had	  completely	  different	  ideas	  of	  what	  the	  European	  
banking	   industry	   should	   look	   like.	   They	  were,	   let’s	   say,	   very	  much	   in	   love	  
with	  the	  shareholder	  value	  oriented	  approach	  –	  so,	  of	  course,	  banks	  who	  are	  
public	   do	   not	   serve,	   primarily,	   shareholders,	   they	   are	   so-­‐called	   ‘mission-­‐
oriented	  banks’	  …	  of	  course	  they	  have	  to	  earn	  money,	  but	  the	  first	  goal	  is	  not	  
to	  maximise	  profits	  but	  to	  serve	  their	  local	  communities.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  Another	   interviewee	   objected	   to	   the	   harmonisation	   pursued	   by	   European	  financial	   regulation,	  which	  had	  been	  designed	  with	   large,	   internationally-­‐active	  banks	  in	  mind	  
“…	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  is	  a	  very	  general	  attitude	  at	  the	  European	  level,	  if	  
you	   talk	   to	   European	   officials	   there,	   because	   they	   always	   say	   ‘That	   is	   our	  
mission.	   That	   is	   our	   mission.	   That	   is	   our	   charter.	   We	   have	   to	   create	   the	  
internal	   market’	   and	   …	   there	   is	   always	   the	   idea	   to	   make	   cross-­‐border	  
activities	  easier,	  and	  we	  always	  say	   ‘We	  are	  not	   interested	   in	  cross-­‐border	  
activities.’”	   (Interview,	  11th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  A	  similar	  objection	  inspired	  the	  third	  theme,	  which	  was	  an	  equivalent	  scepticism	  of	   the	   institutional	   apparatus	   of	   European	   financial	   regulation.	   The	   domestic	  arrangement	   allowed	   for	   a	   clear	   separation	   between	   ‘policy’	   (which	   was	   the	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preserve	  of	   the	  political	   system)	   and	   ‘regulation’	   (which	  was	   technocratic,	   and	  delegated	   to	   independent	   actors).	   In	   Europe,	   German	   actors	   saw	   these	   roles	  blurred	  in	  the	  EBA:	  its	  complex	  structure	  and	  opaque	  processes	  left	  it	  exposed	  to	  being	   manipulated	   to	   distinctly	   political	   (that	   is,	   policy-­‐making)	   ends	   by	  powerful	   actors.	   This	   perspective	   was	   evident	   in	   speeches	   and	   other	   public	  pronouncements	  by	  German	  actors	  I	  examined.	  For	  example,	  the	  BaFin’s	  annual	  report	  of	  2011	  made	  very	  strong	  comments	  about	  the	  EBA:	  
‘…	  the	  EBA	  has	  come	  up	  with	  a	  new	  definition	  of	  capital	  that	  simply	  ignores	  
both	   the	   current	   legal	   position	   and	   the	   transition	   periods	   agreed	   by	   the	  
Basel	  Committee	  for	  Basel	  III	  –	  with	  consequences	  that	  no	  one	  can	  foresee.	  
The	   general	   public	   is	   not	   privy	   to	   how	   this	   decision	   was	   reached.	   People	  
would	   be	   rather	   perplexed	   by	   the	   considerable	   lack	   of	   clearly	   defined	  
corporate	   governance	   structures	   –	   such	   structures	   being	   the	   only	   way	   of	  
ensuring	   that	   the	   processes	   have	   legitimacy.	   This	   throws	   up	   a	   number	   of	  
concerns	   for	   the	   future.	   It	  would	   be	   unfortunate	   if	   the	   European	  Banking	  
Authority	  were	  to	  fall	  into	  disrepute	  right	  at	  the	  start	  of	  its	  activities.’	  (BaFin,	  2011:	  5)	  	  	  The	   key	   element	   of	   this	   extract	   in	   support	   of	   this	   theme	   is	   the	   reference	   to	  ‘corporate	  governance’	  and	   ‘legitimacy’:	   the	  German	  regulator	  was	  here	  raising	  important	  –	  and	  deeply	  principled	  –	  questions	  about	  the	  EBA’s	  functioning.	  	  The	   final	   theme	   sits	   as	   a	   parallel	   to	   the	   UK	   regulatory	   context:	   like	   the	   PRA,	  respondents	   explained	   how	   the	   BaFin	   had	   responded	   to	   the	   move	   towards	  centralised	   European	   financial	   regulation	   (and	   in	   particular,	   the	   move	   from	  directives	  to	  regulations)	  by	  pulling	  back	  from	  engagement	  with	  the	  sector.	  The	  traditional	   structures	   of	   domestic	   regulatory	   lobbying,	   arranged	   through	   the	  peak	  associations,	  were	  under	  pressure.	  Examples	  of	  these	  references	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  6.3.	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Table	  6.3:	  German	  interviewees	  references	  to	  ‘retrenchment’	  
ID	   Quote	  Interview,	  17th	  September	  2014,	  London	   “…	  we	  used	  to	  have	  three	  to	  four	  meetings	  a	  year.	  And	  now,	  it’s	  one,	  at	  most	  it’s	  two	  meetings	   a	   year,	   and	  all	   of	   these	  meetings,	   the	  BaFin	  has	   to	   be	   forced	   to	  make	   an	   appointment.	   So	   we	   ask	   them	   ‘Please,	   it’s	   time	   for	   another	  
appointment,	   because	   all	   these	   papers,	   all	   the	   EBA	   papers,	   all	   the	   topics,	   we	  
need	  to	  talk	  about	  it.’	  They	  don’t	  want	  to	  talk	  about	  it…”	  Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels	   “…	  this	  is	  a	  complaint	  coming	  from	  my	  Berlin	  colleagues,	  that,	  [the	  BaFin]	  keep	  their	   distance,	   and	  maybe	   they	   have	   to	   keep	   their	   distance	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	  criticism	  that	  they	  are	  too	  close	  to	  the	  banks.”	  Interview,	  11th	  July	  2014,	  London	   “Basel	   II	   was	   transferred	   at	   the	   national	   level	   into	   our	   German	   banking	   act,	  and	  this	  …	  this	  process	  of	  national	   transfer	  and	  national	   implementation	  was	  very	   …	   closely	   accompanied	   by	   different	   working	   groups	   that	   contained	  
supervisory	  representatives,	  industry	  representatives,	  but	  also	  some	  academics,	  
or	   auditors.	   So	   that	  was,	   I	   think,	   really,	   really	   fruitful.	   It	   has	   changed.	   If	   you	  
look	   at	   CRDIV	   and	   CRR,	   [that]	   has	   to	   be	   transferred	   into	   national	   law,	   and	  
there	  now	  we	  have	  realised	  that	  the	  co-­‐operation	  in	  drafting	  the	  legislation	  is	  
much,	  much	   less	  open,	  much	   less	   close	  with	   the	   industry,	   [and]	   sometimes	  we	  
have	   one	   week	   for	   large,	   comprehensive	   …	   draft	   legislation.	   So	   this	   is,	  
sometimes	  it’s	  really	  a	  joke.”	  	  Again,	  these	  quotes	  show	  the	  strength	  of	  feeling	  captured	  by	  this	  theme.	  They	  tell	  a	   story	  of	   a	  purposeful	   and	   thorough	   retreat	   from	   interactions	  with	  banks	  and	  their	  associations.	  	  Across	   these	   four	   themes,	   we	   can	   see	   evidence	   in	   the	   data	   of	   both	   the	   link	  between	  the	  ordo-­‐liberal	  regulatory	  paradigm	  and	  the	  actors’	  perspectives,	  and	  the	  pressure	  the	  domestic	  regulatory	  construct	  was	  under	  from	  Europeanisation.	  From	  this	  general	  starting	  point,	  we	  can	  now	  move	  to	  two	  particular	  instances	  of	  lobbying	  in	  more	  detail,	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  hypotheses.	  	  
6.4.2:	  The	  large	  banks	  and	  the	  leverage	  ratio	  With	   this	   general	   picture	   in	   place,	   we	   can	   now	   move	   to	   studying	   specific	  instances	  of	   lobbying	  over	   areas	  of	   regulatory	   change.	   In	   each	  of	   the	   following	  examples,	   I	   analyse	   the	   behaviours	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   ‘alignment’	   and	  ‘informational	  matching’	  hypotheses.	  	  We	  begin	  with	  an	  issue	  which	  impacted	  the	  large	  German	  banks,	  and	  study	  their	  preferences	   and	   associated	   lobbying	   behaviours.	   For	   these	   large,	  internationalised	   players	   an	   area	   of	   particular	   difficulty	  was	   the	   new	   leverage	  ratio.	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6.4.2.1:	  Prelude:	  The	  European	  rules	  and	  the	  German	  preferences	  Among	  the	  new	  tools	  for	  regulating	  banks	  created	  by	  the	  Basel	  III	  Accord	  was	  the	  leverage	   ratio.	  Other	   such	   ratios	   used	   to	   govern	  behaviour	   took	   a	   fine-­‐grained	  approach,	   applying	   different	   risk-­‐weightings	   to	   different	   classes	   of	   asset	   and	  comparing	   them	  to	  often	  quite	  nuanced	  readings	  of	   the	  bank’s	  capital	  position.	  The	   new	   ratio,	   however,	   offered	   regulators	   a	   means	   to	   cut	   through	   the	  complexity	  of	  the	  banks’	  asset	  holdings	  and	  capital	  structures:	  the	  ratio	  of	  their	  equity	  capital	   to	   their	   total	  unweighted	  assets	   could	  not	  exceed	  3%.	  This	  policy	  represented	   an	   example	   of	   regulatory	   liberalism	   in	   action,	   as	   it	   offered	   a	   new	  regulatory	  tool	  which	  essentially	  made	  of	  use	  of	  equity	  capital	  ratios	  as	  a	  means	  for	  controlling	  banks’	  behaviour.	  	  It	  was	  thus	  intended	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  backstop,	  behind	  the	  other	   limits	   imposed	  on	  capital	  adequacy.	  As	  a	  crude	  measure	  it	  could	  not	  (in	  theory)	  be	  manipulated	  by	  the	  banks,	  and	  so	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  simple	  indicator	  of	  their	  overall	  riskiness:	  essentially,	   where	   a	   regulatory	   authority	   was	   not	   entirely	   certain	   of	   a	   bank’s	  capital	   position	   based	   on	   the	  more	   nuanced	   calculation,	   this	   could	   be	   used	   to	  give	   an	   alternative	   perspective.	   European	   actors	   envisioned	   that	   it	   would	   be	  applied	  uniformly	  across	  Europe’s	  banks	  –	  an	  important	  consideration	  given	  its	  intended	  use	  as	  a	  clear,	  consistent	  indicator	  of	  risk.	  However,	  they	  were	  sensitive	  to	  the	  adjustment	  costs	  the	  measure	  imposed	  on	  banks,	  and	  so	  built	  in	  a	  lengthy	  implementation	  period.	  	  	  The	  large	  German	  banks	  were	  opposed	  to	  this	  new	  ratio.	  At	  a	  high	  level	  we	  can	  relate	   their	   nervousness	   and	   opposition	   to	   the	   leverage	   ratio	   to	   a	   practical,	   or	  material,	   self-­‐interest:	   the	   large	   German	   banks	   had	   among	   the	   worst	   leverage	  ratios	   of	   all	   the	   large	   European	   banks,	  which	  meant	   that	   they	  would	   bear	   the	  brunt	  of	   the	   impacts	   to	   their	  balance	  sheets.	  Firms	  such	  as	  Deutsche	  Bank	  also	  had	   complex	   balance	   sheets	   with	   large	   derivative	   positions	   and	   holdings	   of	  trading,	   rather	   than	   banking,	   assets,	   which	   had	   arisen	   from	   their	   activities	   on	  global	   financial	   markets;	   others	   had	   significant	   holdings	   of	   low-­‐risk	   loans	  provided	   as	   trade	   finance.	   Both	   of	   these	   asset	   classes	   would	   be	  disproportionately	   punished	   by	   the	   leverage	   rules,	   as	   they	   did	   not	   distinguish	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between	   different	   risk	   profiles.	   They	   were	   thus	   concerned	   that	   the	   ratio’s	  implementation	   as	   a	   regulatory	   tool	   –	   with	   sanctions	   for	   non-­‐compliance	   –	  would	  trigger	  adjustment	  costs,	  in	  re-­‐shaping	  balance	  sheets	  and	  in	  investments	  in	   the	   necessary	   reporting	   capability.	   They	   had	   clear	   preferences	   for	   its	  implementation	  to	  be	  delayed,	  and	  for	  national	  authorities	  to	  be	  able	  to	  alter	  the	  way	  it	  was	  to	  be	  implemented	  to	  suit	  specific	  markets.	  	  	  The	  regulatory	  preferences	  were	  broadly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  objections	  of	  the	  large	  banks.	  German	  officials	  were	  afraid	  of	  the	  banks’	  possible	  response	  to	  the	  rules,	  which	   could	   see	   them	   reducing	   their	   asset	   bases	   by	   cutting	   back	   on	   lending,	  which	   would	   harm	   the	   tentative	   recovery	   Germany	   was	   constructing	   in	   these	  post-­‐crisis	  years.	   In	  particular	   they	  were	  concerned	  about	   the	   impact	  of	  such	  a	  scaling	  back	  on	  the	  vital	  provision	  of	  trade	  finance	  to	  German	  firms	  (Interview,	  22nd	  May	  2014,	  London).	  	  So	   both	   banks	   and	   regulatory	   officials	   shared	   a	   practical	   opposition	   to	   the	  leverage	  ratio.	  Yet	  looking	  more	  deeply	  into	  this	  objection	  we	  can	  see	  the	  effects	  of	   the	   ordo-­‐liberal	   regulatory	   paradigm	   showing	   through.	   For	   example,	   in	  adjusting	   their	   balance	   sheets	   to	   respond	   to	   this	   new	   rule,	   they	   could	   either	  reduce	   their	  asset	  base	  by	   reducing	   lending,	  or	  boost	   their	  equity	  capital.	  Both	  sets	   of	   actors	   –	   the	   banks	   and	   the	   regulators	   –	   knew	   this	   second	   would	   be	  especially	   difficult	   for	   German	   banks,	   because	   the	   overall	   scarcity	   of	   equity	  capital	  in	  the	  banking	  sector	  as	  a	  whole,	  relative	  to	  other	  national	  contexts.	  This,	  in	   turn,	  was	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   German	   regulatory	   regime	   and	   the	   broader	  economic	  model,	  which	  featured	  a	  lesser	  role	  for	  equity	  and	  competitive	  capital	  markets.	  In	  short,	  they	  feared	  that	  it	  was	  going	  to	  be	  harder	  for	  German	  banks	  to	  issue	  more	  equity	  capital	  simply	  because	  there	  would	  be	  less	  domestic	  demand	  for	  such	  shares.	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6.4.2.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses	  against	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  
H3:	  The	  alignment	  hypothesis	  We	   start	   with	   an	   analysis	   of	   their	   venue	   selection,	   and	   so	   of	   the	   ‘alignment	  hypothesis’.	   The	   large	   German	   banks	   worked	   heavily	   on	   the	   domestic	   arena	  when	   lobbying	   over	   the	   leverage	   ratio.	   Deutsche	   Bank	   and	   Commerzbank	   had	  particularly	   close	   relationships	   with	   the	   BaFin,	   and	   held	   numerous	   high	   level	  conversations	   about	   how	   to	   mange	   their	   problems	   arising	   from	   the	  implementation	  of	   the	  ratio	  (Interview,	  13th	   July	  2014,	  London;	   Interview,	  22nd	  November	   2014,	   London).	   These	   focussed	   on	   two	   topics:	   how	   to	   adapt	   their	  balance	  sheets	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  new	  ratio,	  and	  –	  more	  importantly	  –	  how	  to	  oppose	  the	  ratio	  in	  European	  circles.	  The	  two	  became	  intertwined	  as	  the	  banks	  used	  domestic	  actors	  to	  press	  the	  case	  for	  certain	  elements	  of	  netting	  to	  be	  allowed,	  which	  would	  help	  them	  reduce	  their	  asset	  base	  and	  improve	  their	  ratios	  without	   having	   to	   raise	   fresh	   equity.	   Later,	   in	   2013	   and	   2014,	   both	   banks	   did	  manage	   to	   issue	   large	   tranches	   of	   equity	   capital	   –	   partly	   overcoming	   the	  perceived	   problems	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   demand	   for	   such	   shares	   among	   the	   German	  public.	   In	  practice,	  sizeable	  portions	  of	  these	  new	  issuances	  were	  purchased	  by	  large	  institutional	  investors,	  and	  by	  Middle	  Eastern	  sovereign	  wealth	  funds	  (Ross	  &	   Schäfer,	   2014).	   These	   issuances	   had	   to	   be	   carefully	   stage-­‐managed,	   as	   the	  banks	   concerned	  had	   been	   identified	   as	   ‘systemically	   significant’	   by	   regulators	  and	  so	  were	  under	  close	  scrutiny	  by	  the	  EBA	  (and	  other	  national	  regulators,	  such	  as	  the	  SEC	  and	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  in	  the	  US).	  The	  banks’	  closeness	  to	  the	  BaFin	  was	   motivated	   by	   the	   alignment	   of	   the	   perspectives,	   and	   by	   a	   sense	   of	   its	  continuing	   institutional	   importance	   on	   the	   domestic	   scene.	   As	   one	  representative	  stated:	  
“It’s	   like,	   I	  guess,	  having	  your	  parents:	   ‘They	   say	   this,	  but	   they	   say	   that’	  …	  
but	  then	  also	  …	  I	  guess	  it’s	  also	  then	  making	  this	  calculation:	  ‘You’re	  the	  one	  
that	  can	  take	  away	  my	  pocket	  money.’”	  (Interview,	  14th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  The	  domestic	   engagement	  was	  matched	  with	   lobbying	   on	   the	  European	   scene.	  The	   large	  banks	   targeted	  efforts	   at	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  Parliament,	  where	  they	   sought	   to	   exploit	   their	   strong	   connections	   with	   staff	   to	   press	   their	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opposition	  to	  the	  leverage	  ratio.	  The	  target	  of	  these	  engagements	  later	  switched	  to	  the	  EBA,	  where	  they	  participated	  in	  the	  many	  consultation	  sessions	  aimed	  at	  specifying	   the	   precise	   implementing	   rules.	   These	   dealt	  with	   issues	   such	   as	   the	  supervisory	   regime	   which	   would	   support	   the	   new	   ratio,	   and	   the	   disclosure	  standards	  covering	  the	  leverage	  metric	  in	  published	  accounts.	  	  In	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  lobbying	  efforts	  two	  clear	  themes	  emerged	  from	  the	  data.	  The	   first	   was	   just	   how	   integrated	   the	   aspects	   of	   the	   strategy	   were:	   the	   large	  banks	  may	  have	  directed	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  home	  front,	  but	  they	  were	  also	  conscious	  of	   connecting	   these	   to	   European	   engagement.	   In	   particular,	   they	   aimed	   to	  win	  support	  from	  key	  domestic	  actors,	  convincing	  them	  of	  their	  case	  and	  using	  them	  to	   amplify	   their	   message.	   Second,	   and	   running	   slightly	   against	   this,	   was	   a	  prevailing	   frustration	   at	   the	   BaFin’s	   withdrawal	   from	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   regulatory	  discussions.	  One	  respondent	  explain	  that:	  
“…	  going	  back	  to	  our	  earlier	  point:	  they	  have	  a	  rule-­‐book	  to	  hold	  us	  to,	  and	  
their	  role	  is	  to	  see	  ‘Have	  we	  done	  this,	  have	  we	  done	  that,	  have	  we	  done	  x,	  y,	  z?	  If	  we	  haven’t	  –	  have	  they	  clamped	  down	  on	  us?’	  It’s	  not	  to	  help	  us.”	  (Interview,	  14th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  He	   also	   explained	   that	   this	   retrenchment	   was	   at	   least	   partly	   founded	   on	   the	  BaFin’s	   own	   self-­‐perception	   as	   a	   strictly	   neutral	   implementer	   of	   European	  financial	  regulation:	  
“BaFin,	  in	  general,	  take	  a	  very	  …	  ‘This	  was	  the	  rule	  that	  was	  agreed,	  and	  it’s	  
not	  our	  place	  to	  complain.’	  So	  that’s	  …	  why	  we	  struggled	  to	  know	  what	  they	  
thought.	  We	  felt	  they	  didn’t	  have	  a	  strong	  policy	  position.	  They	  just	  tell	  you	  
‘We	  take	  the	  rule	  as	  it’s	  written,	  and	  we	  make	  sure	  you’re	  compliant	  to	  the	  
letter	  of	  the	  law.’”	   (Interview,	  22nd	  November	  2014,	  London)	  	  
H4:	  The	  informational	  matching	  hypothesis	  Examining	   the	   second	   hypothesis	   leads	   us	   to	   consider	   the	   input	   deployed	   in	  these	   various	   venues	   targeted	   by	   the	   large	   German	   banks.	   Interestingly,	   the	  argumentation	   run	   by	   the	   German	   actors	   in	   the	   various	   venues	   held	   to	   a	  consistent	  theme,	  attacking	  the	  leverage	  ratio’s	  central	  logic	  on	  two	  fronts.	  First,	  they	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  be	  counter-­‐productive	  as	  a	  regulatory	  measure,	  since	  it	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would	   direct	   banks	   towards	   riskier	   lending.	   Second,	   they	   argued	   that	  complexities	   lurking	  behind	  the	  calculation	  meant	  that	   it	  could	  never	  give	  truly	  comparable	  figures	  –	  and	  so	  its	  implementation	  should	  be	  flexed	  and	  altered	  by	  national	  authorities	  at	  their	  own	  discretion.	  	  On	  the	  domestic	   front	   the	   large	  banks	  ran	  a	  range	  of	  consequential	  arguments,	  highlighting	  the	  damage	  the	  leverage	  ratio	  would	  do	  to	  their	  business	  activity	  –	  and	  in	  particular	  their	  lending.	  These	  were	  explicitly	  ‘national’,	  and	  stressed	  the	  resulting	  harm	  to	   the	  German	  economy.	  Meanwhile	   the	   line	  of	  attack	   focussing	  on	  national	  discretion	  were	  echoed	  by	  German	  public	   actors,	  who	  argued	   that,	  given	  the	  varying	  accounting	  conventions	  at	  play	  across	  the	  single	  market,	  such	  a	  ratio	   could	   never	   give	   comparable	   figures	   in	   a	   meaningful	   way.	   For	   example,	  Sabine	  Lautenschläger	  –	  a	  Bundesbank	  deputy	  president	  and	  board	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  –	  made	  a	   speech	   in	  2013	   in	  which	   she	   commented	  that:	  
‘Why	   isn’t	   it	   comparable?	   Banks	   use	   different	   accounting	   standards.	   For	  
example,	   it	   is	  well	  known	  that	  the	  netting	  rules	   for	  derivatives	  under	   IFRS	  
are	   much	   more	   restrictive	   than	   under	   US	   GAAP	   putting	   banks	   reporting	  
under	  IFRS	  at	  a	  comparative	  disadvantage.	  	  
The	   lack	  of	   comparability	  has	   implications:	   comparing	   the	   leverage	  ratios	  
in	  the	  United	  States	  with	  those	  in	  Canada,	  Switzerland	  or	  with	  the	  Basel	  III	  
leverage	  ratio	  is	  like	  comparing	  apples	  with	  oranges.’	  (Lautenschläger,	  2013)	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   awkward	   retrenchment	   of	   the	   BaFin	   from	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  regulatory	   discussions,	   this	   extract	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   domestic	   support	   the	  banks	  had	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  These	   arguments	   were	   also	   paralleled	   in	   their	   lobbying	   further	   afield,	   in	   the	  European	   legislative	   arena.	   For	   example,	   through	   the	   BdB,	   the	   German	   banks	  pointed	  out	  many	  unintended	   consequences	  of	   the	   leverage	   ratio,	   and	  under	   a	  heading	  of	  ‘Macroeconomic	  Implications	  of	  the	  Proposals’	  they	  warned	  of	  higher	  borrowing	  costs	  for	  users	  of	  banking	  services:	  
‘As	  a	  result,	  an	  adequate	  and	  stable	  supply	  of	  credit	  to	  private	  households,	  
businesses	   and	   the	   public	   sector	   is	   endangered.	   Sustained	   negative	  
macroeconomic	   effects	   (adverse	   impact	   on	  macroeconomic	  growth	  due	   to	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less	   consumer	   and	   investor	   demand,	   higher	   unemployment,	   less	   public	  
revenue,	  etc.)	  are	  the	  consequence.	  	  
As	  a	   consequence	  of	   the	   foreseeable	   capital	   formation	   squeeze,	   banks	  will	  
have	   to	   respond	  by	   cutting	  back	   their	   lending	  and	  other	  assets.	  A	  marked	  
shortage	   of	   credit	  would	   be	   the	   result,	   as	   the	   cutback	   required	   to	   comply	  
with	   the	   regulatory	   ratios	   would	   be	   considerable.	   For	   example,	   the	  
additional	  capital	  required	  would	  be	  equivalent	  to	  a	  cutback	  in	  the	  volume	  
of	  housing	  finance	  of	  around	  €2	  trillion.	  According	  to	  the	  Bundesbank,	  this	  
is	  almost	  double	  the	  existing	  volume	  of	  private	  housing	  finance	  in	  Germany.’	  (Bundesverband	  deutscher	  Banken,	  2010:	  2)	  	  The	   argumentation	   focussed	   on	   the	   harm	   the	   ratio	   could	   cause	   to	   economic	  conditions,	  and	  brought	  up	  specific	  impacts	  to	  the	  German	  economy.	  They	  als”	  :	  2o	   brought	   up	   local	   specificity,	   arguing	   that	   if	   the	   ratio	   was	   to	   be	   used	   its	  calibration,	   and	   the	   definition	   of	   its	   terms,	   should	   be	   subject	   of	   significant	  discretion	   by	   national	   authorities.	   Similarly,	   in	   this	   high-­‐level,	   policy-­‐shaping	  venue,	  the	  large	  banks	  were	  confident	  enough	  in	  their	  case	  to	  directly	  challenge	  the	   European	   actors	   on	   the	   fundamental	   concepts	   of	   the	   leverage	   ratio.	   They	  argued	   that	   it	   was	   misguided,	   in	   that	   being	   so	   insensitive	   to	   risk	   profiles	   of	  different	  asset	  classes	   it	  would	  cause	   tensions	  with	  other	  policy	  objectives.	  For	  example,	  a	  respondent	  recounted	  a	  discussion	  with	  the	  Commission:	  
“…	  because	  regulators	  will	  say	  that	  it’s	  about	  simplicity	  and	  comparability	  
And	  I	  guess	  that’s	  an	  attractive	  proposition,	  but	  I	  give	  you	  another	  example.	  
How	  does	  that	  interact	  with	  other	  financial	  objectives?	  For	  instance,	  around	  
the	   objective	   of	   moving	   to	   central	   clearing.	   The	   LR	   works	   on	   the	   basic	  
premise	   that	   it’s	   simple,	   and	   it	   ends	   up	   disincentivising	   central	   clearing,	  
because	  of	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  central	  counterparties.”	  (Interview,	  13th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  He	  also	  explained	  the	  many	  elements	  to	  these	  banks’	  legislative	  lobbying:	  
“I	  think	  it’s	  multiple	  strands.	  The	  ‘unintended	  consequences’,	  if	  you	  consider	  
the	  clearing	  example,	  that’s	  …	  that’s	  a	  good	  unintended	  consequence.	  Then	  
we	   also	   argue	   that	   it	   doesn’t	   make	   sense	   in	   Germany	   because	   of	   the	  
structuring	   of	   the	   economy.	   Then	   there’s	   the	   one	   about	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  
wasn’t	   meant	   to	   be	   a	   binding	   constraint,	   and	   it’s	   become	   that.	   So	   not	  
necessarily	  challenging	  its	  use,	  or	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  Saying	  ‘I	  accept	  it	  as	  an	  
idea,	  but	  don’t	  use	  it	  as	  a	  front	  stop,	  don’t	  make	  it	  the	  binding	  constraint.’”	  (Interview,	  13th	  July	  2014,	  London)	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When	   lobbying	   the	   EBA,	   the	   banks	   consciously	   kept	   their	   involvement	   to	   the	  finer	   points	   of	   constructing	   the	   accompanying	   rules.	   In	   this	   area,	   they	   were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  helping	  draft	  the	  reporting	  templates	  through	  which	  data	  on	  leverage	   positions	   would	   be	   gathered.	   One	   submission	   highlighted	  inconsistencies	  in	  the	  calculations	  being	  applied:	  
‘First,	   the	   formula	   for	   calculation	   of	   the	   leverage	   ratio	   differs	   from	   that	  
proposed	  under	  Basel	   III	   and	  CRD	  4.	  Both	  Basel	   III	   and	  CRD	   IV	   state	   that	  
“Institutions	   shall	   calculate	   the	   leverage	   ratio	   as	   the	   simple	   arithmetic	  
mean	  of	  the	  monthly	  leverage	  ratios	  over	  a	  quarter”	  (cf.	  paragraph	  416(2)	  
of	  the	  draft	  CRD	  IV).	  This	  rule	   is	  reiterated	  in	  paragraph	  18	  of	  Annex	  II	  of	  
the	  ITS,	  however	   followed	  by	  a	  statement	  that	   ‘Reporting	  should	  therefore	  
be	  based	  on	  quarterly	  averages	  of	  monthly	  measures	  [...]’.	  As	  such,	  the	  entire	  
template	   is	   designed	   to	   cover	   quarterly	   averages	   of	   both	   exposure	   and	  
capital	  measures,	   based	   on	  which	   a	   leverage	   ratio	   is	   calculated	   (leverage	  
ratio	   =	   average	   capital	   over	   average	   exposure).	   That	   approach	   is	  
mathematically	   different	   from	   the	   average	   of	   the	   respective	   monthly	  
leverage	   ratios	  within	   the	   given	   quarter.	  We	   believe	   the	   CRD	   IV,	   Basel	   III	  
formulation	  should	  be	  used.’	   (Deutsche	  Bank,	  2012:	  4)	  	  This	   example	   shows	   the	   contrast	   between	   their	   input	   at	   the	   EBA,	   and	   the	  broader	  political	  argumentation	  used	  in	  the	  legislative	  arena.	  At	  this	  regulatory	  venue	   they	   focussed	   on	   specific	   technicalities,	   rather	   than	   using	   the	   ‘national’	  arguments	   they	   had	   used	   elsewhere,	   or	   highlighting	   unintended	   consequences	  and	  tensions	  with	  other	  objectives.	  	  
6.4.2.3:	  Summary:	  Leverage	  In	   summary,	  we	   can	  make	   some	   observations	   about	   the	   lobbying	   surrounding	  the	   leverage	   ratio	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   theoretical	   model.	   First,	   the	   premise	  connecting	   the	   regulatory	   paradigm	   and	   the	   preferences	   is	   supported:	   the	  opposition	   may	   have	   had	   distinctly	   practical	   overtones	   (reflecting	   the	   high	  leverage	  ratios	  of	  the	  large	  German	  banks),	  but	  it	  also	  had	  deeper	  roots.	  Indeed,	  these	  banks’	  high	  leverage	  ratios	  (relative	  to	  those	  of	  other	  national	  sectors)	  was	  in	   a	   sense	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   lower	   levels	   of	   equity	   capitalisation	   in	   the	  German	   economy	   –	   itself	   intrinsically	   linked	   to	   the	   underlying	   ordo-­‐liberal	  philosophy.	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Secondly,	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  ‘alignment	  hypothesis’	  (H3)	  were	  borne	  out,	  in	  that	  the	  banks’	  selection	  of	  primary	  lobbying	  venues	  reflected	  the	  congruence	  of	  the	   various	   actors’	   preferences	  on	   this	   issue.	  On	   this	   issue	   the	   large	  banks	   felt	  intuitively	  close	   to	  domestic	  regulators	  –	  and	   the	  central	  bank	  and	   the	  Finance	  Ministry	   –	   and	   so	   directed	   their	   efforts	   there.	   However,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   (in	  particular)	   the	   BaFin’s	  withdrawal	   from	  direct	   and	   open	   engagement	  with	   the	  banking	   sector	   the	   firms	   often	   felt	   frustrated,	   and	   so	   matched	   their	   domestic	  efforts	  with	  wider	  approaches	  involving	  European	  actors.	  	  Third,	   the	   ‘informational	   matching’	   hypothesis	   (H4)	   was	   supported.	   The	   large	  banks	   pursued	   distinctly	   ‘national’	   arguments	   when	   lobbying	   domestic	   actors,	  and	   shifted	   these	   to	   suit	   the	   different	   rules	   of	   the	   European	   venues.	   When	  submitting	  input	  to	  the	  EBA	  they	  were	  careful	  to	  pare	  down	  the	  German	  aspects	  of	  their	  argumentation,	  instead	  focussing	  on	  precise,	  technical	  detail.	  	  
6.4.3:	  The	  small	  banks	  and	  SME	  lending	  We	  now	   turn	   to	   the	   last	   of	   the	   four	   examples	   of	   lobbying	   behaviour.	   Here	  we	  move	  from	  the	  large	  banks	  to	  the	  plethora	  of	  smaller	  firms	  in	  the	  long	  tails	  of	  the	  German	  sector.	  	  
6.4.3.1:	  Prelude:	  The	  European	  rules	  and	  the	  German	  preferences	  One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  battlegrounds	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  new	  capital	  rules,	  with	  Basel	  III,	  and	  the	  European	  institutions,	  seeking	  to	  overhaul	  both	  elements	  of	  the	  capital	  ratio.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  on	  the	  denominator	  the	  new	  legislation	  only	  allowed	  the	  purest	  forms	  of	  equity	  capital	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  core	  capital	  layer.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   rules	   pertaining	   to	   the	   numerator	   continued	   the	   approach	   of	  Basel	  II	  of	  standardising	  procedures	  for	  assigning	  risk-­‐weightings	  to	  assets.	  The	  intent	  behind	   this	  was	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   treatment	  of	   assets	   across	   the	   single	  market	   was	   harmonised,	   and	   so	   prevent	   banks	   potentially	   manipulating	   their	  balance	  sheet	  values.	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These	   were	   specific	   changes	   to	   the	   capital	   adequacy	   ratio	   per	   se.	   However,	  applied	   alongside	   other	   changes	   –	   such	   as	   the	   imposition	   of	   a	   countercyclical	  capital	   conservation	   buffer59	  –	   the	   net	   outcome	   was	   a	   second-­‐order	   effect:	  although	   the	   individual	   risk-­‐weightings	   of	   certain	   asset	   classes	  were	  not	   being	  changed,	  the	  amount	  of	  capital	  banks	  would	  have	  to	  hold	  against	  them	  increased.	  In	   particular,	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   layering	   of	   capital	   increases,	   additional	  buffers	  and	  the	  application	  of	  risk-­‐weightings,	  loans	  to	  SMEs	  would	  now	  have	  to	  be	  backed	  by	  higher	  levels	  of	  capital.	  	  This	  move	   posed	   difficulties	   for	   the	   small	   German	   banks.	   A	   core	   part	   of	   their	  client	  base	  were	   the	   local	  SMEs,	   the	   layer	  of	  small	   firms	  comprising	  Germany’s	  
Mittelstand.	   As	   one	   interviewee	   explained,	   this	   issue	  quickly	   became	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  representative	  associations:	  
“So	  that	  was	  the	  first	  concern,	  that	  [the	  rules]	  would	  not	  kill	  the	  …	  the	  SME	  
financing.	   Where,	   let’s	   say,	   we	   have	   differences	   in	   the	   approach	   between	  
continental	   Europe	   and	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   economies:	   continental	   Europe,	   and	  
especially	   in	   Germany,	  we	   have	   75-­‐80%	  of	   finance	   for	   SMEs	   coming	   from	  
the	   banks	   as	   intermediaries	   –	   in	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   economies	   it’s	   usually	   the	  
other	  way	  round,	  it’s	  usually	  the	  capital	  markets	  oriented.	  Nevertheless	  we	  
wanted	  to	  defend	  our	  system,	  and	  therefore	  we	  wanted	  to	  keep	  the	  capital	  
requirements	  for	  SME	  loans	  as	  low	  as	  possible.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  June	  2014	  (b),	  Brussels)	  	  The	  significance	  here	  is	  the	  mention	  of	  the	  very	  different	  economic	  structure	  in	  Germany,	   compared	   with	   the	   financing	   arrangements	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	  economies	   –	   echoing	   the	   general	   theme	   identified	   in	   the	   overall	   contextual	  picture	   outlined	   earlier.	   Along	   similar	   lines,	   respondents	   also	   spoke	   of	   the	  integration	  of	  small	  banks	  in	  the	  local	  economy:	  
“…	  so	  in	  Germany	  you	  have	  this	  bunch	  of	  decentralised	  local	  banks	  taking	  in	  
money	  from	  the	  local	  population,	  reinvesting	  immediately	  in	  the	  small-­‐	  and	  
medium-­‐sized	  enterprise	  sector	  –	  symbiosis,	  as	  I	  said.	  So	  both	  institutions	  –	  
the	   local	   banks	  and	   the	   SMEs	  –	   they	  depend	  on	   each	  other.	   You	  have	   this	  
local	   flow	   of	   money	   –	   local	   deposits	   being	   reinvested	   80,	   90%	   into	   local	  
economies…”	   (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  These	  additional	  buffers	  were	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	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Raising	   the	   capital	   charge	   on	   loans	   to	   these	   firms	   would	   make	   them	   more	  expensive,	   constraining	   lending	   and	   raising	   costs	   for	   borrowers	   (or	   both).	  Stemming	   from	   this	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   small	   banks	   centred	   on	   the	  application	  of	   an	  additional	   scaling	   factor,	   to	   restore	   the	   capital	   charge	  against	  SME	   loans	   back	   to	   the	   status	   quo:	   an	   example	   of	   how	   preferences	   can	   forma	  round	  a	  specific	  change	  to	  a	  rule,	  rather	  than	  referring	  more	  generally	  to	  ‘more’	  or	   ‘less’	   regulation.	  Fundamentally,	   this	  was	   founded	  on	  a	  principled	  objection:	  the	  small	  banks	  played	  a	  vital	  social	  function	  in	  Germany	  by	  channelling	  savings	  towards	   these	   local	   enterprises,	   and	   the	   new	   standardised	   European	   rules	  threatened	  the	  viability	  of	  this	  role.	  	  German	  public	  actors	  shared	  this	  stance,	  also	  supporting	  the	  vital	  economic	  role	  of	  the	  Mittelstand.	  The	  BaFin,	  for	  example,	  emphasised	  the	  distinctive	  character	  of	  the	  national	  financial	  model,	  and	  its	  integration	  in	  a	  larger	  economic	  strategy.	  	  In	  the	  roots	  of	  these	  preferences	  we	  can	  see	  signs	  of	  ordo-­‐liberal	  philosophy	  at	  work.	  Firstly,	   this	  paradigm	  called	  for	  banking	  markets	  to	  be	  subordinated	  to	  a	  broader	   economic	   strategy,	   and,	   importantly,	   for	   banks	   to	   be	   put	   to	   use	  furthering	  distinct	  social	  ends	  –	  such	  as	  supporting	  local	  enterprises.	  The	  threat	  to	   this	   posed	   by	   the	   SME	   treatments	   inspired	   the	   opposition	   of	   the	   various	  actors.	  Secondly,	  the	  paradigm,	  and	  the	  wider	  regulatory	  model,	  called	  for	  close	  co-­‐operation	   among	   domestic	   actors	   in	   the	   setting	   of	   policy.	   Such	   structures	  were	  being	  circumvented	  by	  the	  centralisation	  of	  regulation	  in	  Europe,	  and	  this	  observation	  inspired	  the	  opposition	  of	  the	  various	  actors.	  	  
6.4.3.2:	  Testing	  the	  hypotheses	  against	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours	  
H3:	  The	  alignment	  hypothesis	  We	  begin	  with	  the	  examination	  of	  their	  venue	  selection,	  and	  so	  of	  the	  ‘alignment’	  hypothesis.	   First,	   we	   should	   note	   that	   the	   lobbying	   efforts	   on	   this	   issue	   were	  organised	  by	  the	  peak	  associations	  representing	  the	  small	  German	  banks	  –	  as	  we	  saw	   in	   Chapter	   Five.	   Their	  working	   groups,	   and	   their	   federal	   structures,	  were	  used	  to	  assemble	  the	  input	  of	  the	  banks	  across	  the	  three	  pillars,	  from	  specialised	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commercial	   banks	   to	   local	   co-­‐operative	   institutions.	   The	   subsequent	  coordination	  work	  was	   then	   undertaken	   by	   the	   overall	   umbrella	   organisation,	  the	  DK.	  This	  was	  an	  example	  of	  the	  normal	  pattern	  of	  interest	  representation	  in	  Germany	  in	  action.	  	  Through	   these	   associational	   channels	   the	   small	   banks	   focussed	   their	   lobbying	  efforts	  on	  the	  domestic	  scene.	  One	  representative	  explained	  to	  me	  that:	  
“…	   we	   are	   primarily	   focussing	   on	   the	   national	   level	   and	   so	   …	   the	   main	  
communications	   take	  place	  on	   the	  national	   level	  with	   the	  national	  bodies,	  
with	  the	  BaFin,	  with	  the	  Bundesbank,	  with	  the	  Federal	  government	  here	  in	  
Berlin,	  and	  I	  think	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  especially…”	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	  	  The	  peak	  associations	  opened	  dialogues	  with	   the	  BaFin	  over	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  new	  SME	  weightings,	  and	  submitted	  input	  to	  its	  domestic	  consultation	  processes.	  Further	   afield,	   the	   peak	   associations	   also	   engaged	   with	   other	   key	   regulatory	  actors,	   such	   as	   the	   Bundesbank	   and	   the	   Finance	   Ministry.	   The	   associations	  cooperated	  with	  the	  central	  bank	  in	  writing	  a	  report	  on	  the	  default	  rates	  of	  firms	  in	   the	  Mittelstand,	   highlighting	   how	   robust	   they	   were	   compared	   to	   the	   other	  European	  SME	  sectors.	  An	  interviewee	  described	  the	  process:	  
“…	  we	  had	  a	  huge	  discussion	  about	   the	   SME	   risk	  weights,	   and	  we	  worked	  
together	   with	   the	   Bundesbank,	   and	   the	   Bundesbank	   did	   a	   study	   on	   the	  
appropriateness	  of	  the	  new	  risk	  weights.	   It’s	  a	  very,	  very	   interesting	  study.	  
The	   Bundesbank’s	   finding	  was	   that	   the	  Basel	   II	   risk	  weights,	   without	   the	  
Basel	  III	  increments,	  even	  the	  Basel	  II	  risk-­‐weights	  are	  too	  high	  for	  German	  
SMEs,	  when	  you	  look	  at	  all	  the	  default	  data	  for	  the	  past	  15	  years.”	  (Interview,	  17th	  September	  2014,	  London)	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	   strong	   domestic	   engagements,	   the	   small	   banks	   and	   their	  associations	   also	   pursued	   lobbying	   efforts	   in	   Europe	   –	   as	   part	   of	   a	   deliberate	  strategy	  of	  ‘following	  the	  pen.’	  They	  tracked	  the	  issue	  from	  the	  early	  discussions	  in	   the	   legislative	   arena	   to	   the	   later,	  more	   precise,	   deliberations	   in	   the	  EBA.	  As	  with	  the	  interactions	  with	  national	  bodies,	  much	  of	  this	  effort	  was	  co-­‐ordinated	  by	  the	  DK,	  which	  helped	  to	  present	  a	  unified	  and	  clear	  voice	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  SME	  capital.	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During	   the	   research	   two	   distinct	   themes	   emerged	   regarding	   this	   focus	   on	   the	  domestic	  arena.	  First,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  obvious	  alignment	  between	  the	  sector	  and	  the	  public	  actors	  over	  the	  difficulties	  arising	  from	  the	  regulatory	  change,	  several	  respondents	   indicated	   that	   they	   felt	   an	   intuitive	   closeness	   to	   the	   BaFin	   (in	  particular),	  and	  almost	  expected	  its	  support.	  For	  example:	  
“Yes,	  we’ve	  a	  very	  close	  relationship	  to	  our	  BaFin,	  and	  …	  so	  we	  think	  …	  we	  
have	   the	   idea	   they	   …	   not	   only	   in	   a	   literal	   way,	   they	   understand	   our	  
language.”	   (Interview,	  11th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  In	   this	   context,	   the	   frustration	   about	   the	   regulator’s	   retrenchment	   (outlined	  earlier)	  came	  through,	  as	  representatives	  of	   the	  associations	   felt	   they	  were	  not	  being	  sufficiently	  supported.	  	  Secondly,	   there	  was	  a	  clear	   integration	  of	   their	  domestic	   lobbying	   in	  a	  broader	  strategy	   encompassing	   European	   venues.	   The	   BaFin	   and	   Bundesbank	   were	  approached	  with	  the	  explicit	  intention	  of	  engaging	  them	  to	  lobby	  on	  the	  sector’s	  behalf	  in	  Europe.	  One	  interviewee	  explained	  that:	  	  
“…	  we	  have,	  of	  course,	  discussions	  with	  the	  BaFin.	  The	  BaFin	  is	  also	  part	  of	  
the	  EBA,	  because	  it’s	  on	  the	  board	  of	  supervisors,	  so	  the	  national	  supervisors	  
are	  very	  much	  involved	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  EBA	  because	  most	  of	  the	  working	  
groups	  comprises	  national	  supervisors,	  and	  so	  we	  have	  usually	  one	  national	  
supervisor	  in	  one	  working	  group.”	   (Interview,	  31st	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  
H4:	  The	  informational	  matching	  hypothesis	  From	  this	  examination	  of	   the	  venues	   targeted,	  we	  now	   turn	   to	   the	  variation	   in	  input	  across	  the	  audiences	  (and	  so	  to	  the	  testing	  of	  H4).	  Naturally,	  in	  discussions	  with	   domestic	   actors,	   the	   lobbying	   efforts	   were	   often	   framed	   around	  consequential	   arguments,	   stressing	   how	   the	   increased	   capital	   charges	   would	  constrain	   lending	  and	  so	  harm	  the	  growth	  achieved	  by	  the	  SMEs.	  But	  the	   input	  developed	   into	   a	  more	   pragmatic	   form,	  with	   the	   associations	   advising	   on	   how	  the	  European	  capital	  rules	  could	  be	  adjusted	  to	  minimise	  this	  impact	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London).	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At	   the	   EBA,	   the	   peak	   associations	   obeyed	   the	   discursive	   rules	   of	   the	  supranational	   regulatory	   venue,	   and	   provided	   detailed	   technical	   expertise.	   For	  example,	  the	  input	  provided	  by	  the	  DK	  described	  the	  impacts	  of	  the	  changes:	  
‘By	   increasing	   the	   capital	   conservation	   buffer	   (2.5%)	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
countercyclical	  capital	  buffer	  (up	  to	  2.5%),	  the	  capital	  backing	  increases	  by	  
31%	   to	   63%.	   For	   the	   standardised	   approach	   (SA),	   this	   translates	   into	   a	  
capital	   adequacy	   requirement	   for	   such	   exposures	   between	   8%	  and	   9.75%	  
pursuant	   to	   Basel	   III	   (the	   exposures’	   risk	   weight	   multiplied	   by	   the	   total	  
capital	   ratio	   plus	   capital	   buffer).	   Under	   the	   present	   rules,	   this	   would	  
correspond	  to	  an	  increase	  of	  the	  respective	  risk	  weight	  from	  75%	  to	  100%	  –	  
150%’	  	   (Deutsche	  Kreditwirtschaft,	  2012:	  9)	  	  The	  paper	  was	  very	   careful	   to	   explain	   the	   cumulative	   effects	  of	   the	   changes	   in	  highly	  precise	  terms,	  avoiding	  mentions	  of	  the	  specificities	  of	  the	  German	  sector.	  	  	  	  However,	   it	   is	   also	   interesting	   to	   note	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   the	   regulatory	  lobbying	   of	   the	   EBA	  was	  marked	   by	   distinctly	  national	   overtones.	   Later	   in	   the	  same	   paper,	   the	   DK	  went	   on	   to	   analyse	   the	   recent	   health	   of	   the	   German	   SME	  sector	   in	   detail,	   examining	   the	   insolvency	   rates	   and	   the	   losses	   incurred	   by	  German	  banks	  as	  a	  result	  of	  SME	  defaults.	  It	  concluded	  that:	  
‘The	   review	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   capital	   adequacy	   requirements	   in	   the	  
SME	  segment	  clearly	  exceed	  the	  underlying	  risks.	  What	   is	  more,	  we	  should	  
like	  to	  note	  that	  there	  have	  not	  been	  any	  skyrocketing	  risks	  during	  the	  time	  
of	   the	   economic	   and	   financial	   crisis,	   either.	   Hence,	   the	   existing	   capital	  
adequacy	   requirements	   are	   very	   fit	   for	   purpose	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   SME	  
loans.’	   (Deutsche	  Kreditwirtschaft,	  2012:	  16)	  	  We	   would	   expect	   to	   see	   such	   distinctly	   national	   arguments	   were	   used	   in	   the	  legislative	   arena.	   Indeed,	   one	   respondent	   explained	  how	  he	  had	   argued	  with	   a	  member	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  staff:	  
“I’m	  not	  so	  interested	  in	  the	  question	  if	  the	  rule	  is	  also	  fitting	  the	  Austrian	  or	  
the	  …	  Dutch	  market,	  or	  the	  Danish	  market	  –	  I’m	  interested	  in	  the	  question	  
‘Is	  the	  rule	  fitting	  to	  the	  situation	  which	  we	  find	  in	  our	  market?’”	  (Interview,	  20th	  August	  2014,	  London)	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Running	   through	   these	   arguments,	   whether	   at	   home,	   at	   the	   EBA,	   or	   in	   wider	  European	   circles,	   was	   a	   consistent	   appeal	   to	   proportionality.	   Respondents	  explained	  how	  they	  had	  had	  to	  push	  hard	  to	  achieve	  a	  workable	  set	  of	  rules:	  	  
“…the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  is	  something	  that	  everybody	  is	  committed	  
to,	   but	   that’s	   only	   theory.	   That’s	   only	   theory.	   We	   have	   it	   always	   in	   the	  
recitals,	   for	   example,	   of	   every	   legislative	   package,	   that	   the	   ‘principle	   of	  
proportionality	  shall	  be	  applied’,	  in	  that	  way	  the	  rules	  …	  can	  cover	  different	  
types	  of	  institutions,	  different	  sizes,	  different	  business	  models,	  different	  risk	  
profiles,	   and	   should	   be	   applied	   in	   a	   proportionate	   way	   to	   take	   these	  
different	  types	  of	  institutions	  into	  account.	  But	  we	  see	  …	  in	  many	  areas	  it’s	  a	  
‘one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all’	   approach,	   and	   if	   we	   talk	   to	   the	   officials	   of	   the	   EBA	   they	  
always	   say	   ‘Our	   main	   objective	   full	   harmonisation,	   full	   harmonisation.	  
That’s	  our	  mission.’	  And	  we	  …	  we	  don’t	  find	  it	  very	  funny.”	  (Interview,	  11th	  July	  2014,	  London)	  	  Through	  the	  interview	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  ‘proportionality’	  meant	  not	  applying	  rules	  designed	  for	  large	  multi-­‐nationals	  to	  the	  very	  small,	  regional	  banks;	  but	  it	  also	  meant	   respecting	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	  German	   economic	  model	   and	   the	  approach	  to	  banking.	  	  
6.4.3.3:	  Summary:	  SME	  lending	  Overall,	  we	  can	  review	  these	  lobbying	  behaviours,	  and	  their	  causes,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  theory.	  First,	  the	  initial	  premise	  connecting	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm	  and	  the	  preferences	  is	  supported:	  the	  positions	  of	  the	  German	  actors	  drew	  explicitly	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  ordo-­‐liberal	  paradigm	  –	  in	  particular	  in	  focus	  on	  a	  social	  role	  for	  banking	  and	  on	  close	  relationships	  between	  banks	  and	  the	  regulatory	  regime.	  	  	  Secondly,	   the	   ‘alignment	   hypothesis’	   (H3)	   found	   support:	   the	   small	   German	  banks	  lobbied	  their	  national	  authorities	  extensively	  over	  the	  issue.	  However,	  as	  with	  the	  larger	  banks,	  this	  was	  qualified	  slightly:	  the	  small	  banks	  stayed	  at	  home	  out	   of	   an	   intuitive	   sense	   that	   the	   structures	   of	   domestic	   representation	  would	  continue	  to	  serve	  them,	  and	  found	  themselves	  frustrated	  by	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  key	  regulatory	  actors.	  	  Third,	   the	   ‘informational	   matching’	   hypothesis	   (H4)	   had	   limited	   support.	   The	  banks	  did	   vary	   their	   input	   across	   the	   venues,	   and	  provided	   technical	   expertise	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where	  it	  was	  required	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  regulatory	  arena).	  But	  their	  input	  was	  also	  consistently	   built	   around	   an	   appeal	   for	   specificity,	   and	   marked	   by	   frequent	  mentions	  of	   the	  harm	   the	   change	  would	  do	   to	  German	   lending.	  The	  use	  of	   this	  approach	   at	   the	   EBA,	   in	   particular,	   seems	   to	   indicate	   a	   perception	   of	   it	   as	   an	  extension	   of	   the	   legislative	   apparatus,	   rather	   than	   a	   supranational,	   technical	  body	  where	  national	  arguments	  are	  unwelcome.	  	  
6.4.4:	  A	  review	  of	  the	  entire	  German	  sector	  Having	   now	   examined	   two	   instances	   of	   regulatory	   change	   which	   together	  impacted	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  sector,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  connect	  the	  story	  back	  to	   the	   theory	   and	   make	   some	   overarching	   observations.	   Firstly,	   the	   initial	  premise	   was	   supported.	   The	   distinctive	   ordo-­‐liberal	   philosophy,	   with	   its	  emphasis	  on	   ‘managed	  competition’,	  social	  banking	  and	  tight	  structures	   linking	  banks	  and	  the	  regulatory	  regime	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  various	  actors’	  positions.	   In	  particular,	   this	   translated	   into	  a	   rather	  sceptical	  perception	  of	   the	  EBA,	  and	  of	  the	  way	  its	  structure	  left	  it	  open	  to	  being	  manipulated	  into	  playing	  a	  para-­‐political	  role.	  For	  the	   large	  banks,	   the	  objections	  to	  the	   leverage	  rules	  had	  shades	  of	  practicality	  and	  self-­‐interest	  to	  them,	  but	  ultimately	  their	  relative	  lack	  of	  equity	  capital	  reflected	  a	  feature	  of	  German	  capitalism,	  and	  of	  the	  associated	  regulatory	   regime.	   Meanwhile	   the	   small	   banks’	   opposition	   to	   the	   changes	  impacting	  SME	   lending	  arose	  directly	  stemmed	  from	  what	   they	  saw	  as	  a	  direct	  clash	   between	   the	   German	   banking	   model	   and	   the	   European	   vision	   of	  ‘shareholder	  banks.’	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  ‘alignment	  hypothesis’	  (H3),	  we	  saw	  a	  mixed	  performance.	  Its	  key	  implication	  was	   borne	   out:	   both	   sets	   of	   banks	   found	   themselves	   closer	   to	   the	  preferences	  of	  the	  national	  regulator	  than	  Europe,	  and	  so	  directed	  their	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  the	  home	  front.	  However,	  investigating	  the	  motivations	  further	  seemed	  to	   show	   that,	   rather	   than	   being	   borne	   of	   a	   conscious	   appreciation	   of	   the	  alignment,	   these	  domestic	   foci	   arose	   from	  an	   intuitive	   sense	   that	   the	  domestic	  patterns	  of	  interest	  representation,	  and	  of	  integration	  into	  a	  domestic	  regulatory	  structure,	   would	   continue	   to	   apply.	   Hence	   the	   frustration	   at	   the	   BaFin’s	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retrenchment,	   and	   hence	   also	   the	   extensive	   use	   of	   lobbying	   efforts	   at	   the	  European	  level.	  	  Finally,	  the	  ‘informational	  matching	  hypothesis’	  (H4)	  also	  had	  qualified	  support.	  The	  banks,	   large	   and	   small,	   flexed	   their	   input	   according	   to	   the	   venue	   –	   in	   that	  they	  recognised	  the	  EBA’s	  need	  for	  technical	  expertise	  and	  were	  careful	  to	  direct	  the	   appropriate	   material	   at	   it.	   Meanwhile,	   they	   ran	   variations	   of	   ‘national’	  arguments	   on	   the	   domestic	   front,	   flexing	   the	   level	   of	   detail	   for	   different	  audiences.	  But	  again,	  looking	  closely	  at	  the	  content	  of	  their	  argumentation	  at	  the	  EBA,	   we	   saw	   in	   both	   sets	   of	   lobbying	   distinctive	   national	   overtones	   to	   their	  input.	   This	   seems	   odd,	   as	   our	   expectation	   was	   that	   this	   venue,	   with	   its	  supranational	   role	   and	   requirement	   for	   clean,	   neutral	   input,	   would	   not	   be	  targeted	  with	  such	  material.	  	  To	  help	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  complexity	  we	  can	  turn	  to	  H5:	  it	  was	  an	  interaction	  of	  the	   preferences	   (generally	   in	   opposition	   to)	   European	   financial	   regulation	   and	  the	   lobbying	   resources	   the	   actors	   could	   call	   upon	   which	   best	   explained	   their	  behaviours.	  All	  the	  banks	  had	  distinct	  preferences	  which	  put	  them	  at	  odds	  with	  Europe	   –	   and	   so	   pushed	   them	   to	   lobby	   at	   home	   –	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   their	  resource	   endowments	   enabled	   them	   to	   broaden	   their	   lobbying	   efforts	   beyond	  the	  domestic	  arena	  and	  into	  European	  venues.	  There	  was	  little	  disparity	  between	  the	  large	  and	  the	  small	  banks	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  venues	  they	  were	  able	  to	  target	  –	  because	   the	   organisational	   strength	   and	   significant	   resources	   holdings	   of	   the	  peak	   associations	   meant	   that	   smaller	   banks	   could	   match	   the	   breadth	   of	   the	  larger	  banks’	  engagement.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  both	  the	  individual	   large	  banks	   and	   the	   German	   peak	   associations	   had	   highly	   sophisticated	   lobbying	  operations,	  with	  significant	  informational	  resources	  and	  an	  integrated	  approach	  to	   their	   management	   and	   use.	   This	   enable	   all	   the	   German	   banks	   to	   achieve	  effective	  representation	  at	  the	  venues	  they	  targeted.	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6.5:	  Conclusion	  What	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  analysis,	  across	   the	   four	   instances	  of	  regulatory	   policy	   change?	   The	   initial	   premise	   of	   the	   model	   was	   broadly	  supported:	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   underlying	   regulatory	   paradigms	   did	   indeed	  shape	   the	   positions	   and	   preferences	   of	   the	   various	   actors	   –	   linking	   the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  lobbying	  back	  to	  the	  organising	  theory	  of	  variation	  (P.A.	  Hall	  &	  Soskice,	  2001).	  For	  the	  British,	  a	  perhaps	  superficial	  congruence	  with	  European	  regulatory	   liberalism	   gave	  way	   to	   principled	   objections	   to	   specific	   elements	   of	  the	   new	   framework	   (the	   remuneration	   and	   the	   capital	   rules);	   while	   for	   the	  Germans,	   an	   intuitive	   scepticism	   of	   European	   regulation	   was	   reflected	   more	  directly	  in	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  leverage	  ratio	  and	  the	  impacts	  to	  SME	  lending.	  These	   same	   underlying	   paradigms	   featured	   later	   heavily	   in	   the	   cores	   of	   the	  various	  banks’	  arguments:	  calling	  for	  competition	  (for	  the	  British)	  and	  specificity	  	  (for	  the	  Germans).	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   ‘alignment’	   and	   ‘informational	   matching’	  hypotheses	   allowed	   us	   to	   link	   these	   fundamental	   differences	   in	   the	   national	  contexts	  to	  the	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  We	  saw	  how,	  across	  all	  four	  examples,	  there	  were	   alignments	   between	   banks	   and	   regulatory	   actors	   over	   the	   area	   of	  regulatory	   policy	   change.	   However,	   the	   strength	   of	   this	   alignment	   varied,	   as	  regulators	  took	  their	  own	  practical	  or	  strategic	  positions	  on	  the	  issues.	  We	  also	  saw	  how	  these	  alignments	  (however	  fractious)	  came	  with	  a	  domestic	  focus	  in	  the	  banks’	  lobbying	  efforts;	  and	  how	  the	  banks	  integrated	  (to	  varying	  degrees)	  their	  efforts	  across	  the	  domestic	  and	  European	   levels.	  Although	  this	  offers	  a	  support	  for	  the	  ‘alignment’	  hypothesis	  (H3),	  we	  are	  also	  left	  with	  the	  impression	  that	  this	  domestic	   regulatory	   lobbying	  was	  often	  driven	  by	  a	   sense	  of	   embeddedness	   in	  the	  national	  regime,	  rather	  than	  a	  conscious	  awareness	  of	  an	  alignment.	  Indeed,	  this	  embeddedness	  even	  helped	  over-­‐ride	  the	  retrenchment	  of	  the	  PRA	  and	  the	  BaFin:	   although	   the	   regulators	  were	   pulling	   back	   from	   engagement,	   the	   banks	  continued	  to	  see	  them	  as	  primary	  targets	  for	  their	  regulatory	  lobbying.	  	  	  Secondly,	   our	   examination	   of	   the	   ‘informational	   matching’	   hypothesis	   (H4)	  showed	   how	   the	   banks	   varied	   their	   input	   according	   to	   the	   venue	   they	   were	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targeting,	   but	   also	   how	   they	   also	   kept	   a	   clear	   theme	   to	   their	   message.	   The	  consistency	   of	   these	   messages	   shows	   the	   continuing	   strength	   of	   the	   domestic	  regulatory	   paradigms;	   but	   it	   also	   reveals	   –	   perhaps	   –	   a	   deliberate	   use	   of	  inappropriate	  argumentation	  in	  the	  supranational	  regulatory	  arena.	  	  Third,	   as	   we	   saw	   when	   considering	   H5,	   the	   combination	   of	   resources	   and	  preferences	  was	  key	   in	  shaping	  how	  banks	  navigated	  this	  complex	  opportunity	  structure.	  The	  significant	  resource	  holdings	  of	  the	  large	  UK	  banks,	  driven	  by	  the	  structure	   of	   their	   consolidated,	   market-­‐based	   system	   (Allen	   &	   Gale,	   2000;	  Shabani	   et	   al.,	   2015;	   Zysman,	   1983)	   enabled	   them	   to	   pursues	   a	   dynamic	   and	  complex	   strategy	   –	   embracing	   several	   venues	   and	   delivering	   appropriate	  informational	   input.	  Conversely,	   the	  weaker	  resources	  of	   the	  building	  societies,	  and	   then	   of	   their	   representative	   association,	   restricted	   their	   flexibility	   and	   left	  them	   pursuing	   a	   narrower	   strategy.	   	   For	   the	   German	   sector,	   the	   more	  fragmented,	  bank-­‐based	  system	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Detzer	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Zysman,	  1983)	   dispersed	   resources	   far	   more	   widely.	   The	   large	   individual	   banks	   had	  resources	  that	  set	  them	  apart	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  their	  sector,	  but	  also	  enabled	  them	  to	   lobby	   in	   a	  manner	   similar	   the	   large	   British	   banks.	   Finally,	   the	   associational	  strength	   of	   the	   smaller	   banks	   enabled	   them	   to	   lobbying	  more	   effectively	   than	  their	  British	  equivalents.	  	  Overall,	   the	   patterns	   in	   the	   observed	   lobbying	   behaviours	   chime	   with	   key	  elements	   of	   the	   European	   interest	   group	   literature.	   	   The	   flexibility	   and	  dynamism	  displayed	  by	  the	  banks	  echoes	  previous	  works	  on	  venue-­‐shopping	  in	  the	  EU	  (Guiradon,	  2000;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006),	  which	  have	  stressed	   the	   ability	   of	   private	   actors	   to	   negotiate	   a	   complex	   and	   changeable	  opportunity	  structure.	  Furthermore,	  the	  importance	  of	  resources	  in	  determining	  the	   reach	  of	   these	   strategies	   –	  with	   the	   small	  British	  banks	   in	  particular	  being	  disenfranchised	   by	   their	   weakness	   –	   reminds	   us	   of	   aspects	   of	   the	   literature	  highlighting	   the	   central	   role	   of	   informational	   resources	   in	   shaping	   lobbying	  behaviours	  (Chalmers,	  2011;	  2013;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012;	  Klüver,	  2010).	  	  
	   238	  
Yet	   cutting	   through	   these	   dynamic	   strategies	   was,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   a	   clear	  prioritisation	   of	   domestic	   engagement	   –	   which	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   present	  regardless	  of	  the	  resource	  capacities	  of	  the	  banks.	  This	  behaviour	  arose	  from	  the	  banks’	  embeddedness	  in	  domestic	  regimes,	  which	  even	  endured	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  retrenchment	   of	   the	   national	   authorities.	   This	   reminds	   us	   of	   the	   robustness	   of	  the	   relationships	   in	   the	   domestic	   regulatory	   communities,	   linking	   together	  private	  actors	  and	  national	  authorities	  (Ayers	  &	  Braithwaite,	  1992;	  Coen,	  2005).	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  central	  theoretical	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis,	  linking	  lobbying	  behaviours	   to	   national	   origins.	   The	   stance	   of	   both	   banks	   and	   regulators	   in	  opposition	  to	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  CRDIV/CRR	  reviewed	  in	  this	  chapter	  serves	  to	   show	   the	   endurance	   of	   national	   regulatory	   paradigms.	  Next,	  when	   selecting	  between	  the	  EBA	  and	  continuing	  to	  lobby	  their	  national	  authorities,	  British	  and	  German	   banks	   chose	   the	   latter.	   In	   other	   words,	   their	   venue	   selection	   in	   the	  complex	  European	  regulatory	  arena	  reflected	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  roots	  in	  their	  national	  regimes	  –	  showing	  how	  their	  lobbying	  behaviours	  were	  shaped	  by	  their	  origins.	  Finally,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  were	  then	  able	  to	  diversify	  beyond	  their	  domestic	   prioritisation	   was	   shaped	   by	   their	   resource	   holdings,	   which	   in	   turn	  were	  a	  function	  of	  the	  structures	  of	  their	  national	  markets.	  	  	   	  
	   239	  
Chapter	  7:	  Conclusions	  
7.1:	  Introduction	  This	  project	   set	  out	   to	   examine	   the	   factors	   shaping	   the	   lobbying	  behaviours	  of	  private	   actors	   in	   a	   distinctive,	   new	   setting:	   the	   emergent	   European	   regulatory	  arena.	  A	  great	  deal	  is	  known	  about	  how	  such	  lobbying	  is	  directed	  at	  established	  legislative	   actors,	   such	   as	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Parliament	   (Bouwen,	   2002;	  2004;	  Coen,	  2007;	  Dür	  &	  Mateo,	  2012;	  Eising,	  2007b;	  Klüver,	  2012;	  Rasmussen,	  2011);	  and	  about	  a	   subtly	  different	   form	  –	   referred	   to	  as	  regulatory	  lobbying	   –	  which	  takes	  place	  on	  the	  domestic	  scene.	  Recent	  changes	  in	  the	  EU’s	  institutional	  capacity	   have	   created	   a	   new	   venue	   in	   between	   these	   two	   (Levi-­‐Faur,	   2011;	  Thatcher,	   2011);	   indeed,	   the	   move	   to	   crystallise	   regulatory	   authority	   at	   the	  supranational	   level	   has	   begun	   the	  process	   of	   usurping	   these	  national	   contexts.	  The	  institutions	  in	  this	  new	  layer	  thus	  represent	  an	  important	  new	  target	  for	  the	  lobbying	   efforts	   of	   private	   actors,	   and	   two	   features	   of	   this	   crystallisation	  combine	   to	   create	   an	   area	   for	   research	   where	   current	   theoretical	   coverage	   is	  underdeveloped.	   First,	   the	   bodies	   in	   the	   supranational	   regulatory	   layer	   have	   a	  novel	  institutional	  form	  –	  hybrids	  of	  networks	  and	  agencies	  –	  and	  this	  creates	  a	  complex	   landscape	   in	   which	   private	   actors	   operate.	   Secondly,	   and	   more	  importantly,	  their	  role	  signifies	  a	  move	  by	  the	  EU	  into	  the	  (previously	  national)	  business	  of	  market	  delivery,	  or	  the	  writing	  of	  specific	  rules	  by	  which	  regulation	  is	   achieved.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   presented	   a	   question:	   what	   shapes	   the	   way	   private	  actors	  lobby	  in	  this	  new	  arena?	  This	  thesis	  approached	  the	  question	  by	  focussing	  on	  a	  particular	  domain,	   the	  banking	  sector,	   and	  so	  on	  a	   certain	   institution:	   the	  European	  Banking	  Authority	  (EBA).	  	  The	   central	   argument	   the	   thesis	   explored	   was	   that	   behaviours	   in	   the	   new	  European	   regulatory	   arena	  were	   shaped	   by	   the	   national	   origins	   of	   the	   private	  actors	   involved.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   features	   of	   their	   national	   contexts	   have	  conditioned	   the	   way	   they	   engage	   with	   domestic	   regulatory	   actors,	   and	   such	  patterns	   then	   feed	   through	   into	   their	   European	   regulatory	   lobbying	   activities.	  The	   ‘varieties	   of	   capitalism’	   (P.A.	   Hall	   &	   Soskice,	   2001)	   approach	  was	   used	   to	  focus	   on	   two	   specific	   manifestations	   of	   national	   variety	   –	   the	   structure	   of	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banking	  market	  (as	  determined	  by	  the	  prevailing	  variety	  of	  financial	  system)	  and	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  paradigm	  sitting	  behind	  the	  regulatory	  regime.	  	  From	   this	   theoretical	   starting	   point,	   the	   thesis	   developed	   a	   causal	   model	   to	  examine	   and	   explain	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours.	   The	   dependent	   variable	  was	  taken	   to	   be	   their	   behaviours:	   the	   approach	   taken,	   the	   venue	   targeted,	   and	   the	  informational	   input	   used.	   The	   independent	   variables	   derived	   from	   the	   two	  aspects	   of	   national	   variety,	   and	   the	   overall	  model	   was	   constructed	   over	   three	  elements,	   each	   containing	  hypotheses	  which	   linked	   the	  behaviours	  back	   to	   the	  national	  contexts.	   In	  the	  first	  element,	  banks	  responded	  to	  the	  centralisation	  of	  regulatory	  authority	  at	  the	  EBA	  and	  so	  sought	  to	  lobby	  it.	  The	  ‘resource’	  and	  the	  ‘associational’	   hypotheses	   (H1	   and	   H2)	   drew	   on	   the	   tenets	   of	   the	   European	  interest	  group	  literature	  –	  particularly	  on	  the	  strand	  focussing	  on	  the	  importance	  of	   informational	   resources	   (Chalmers,	   2011;	   2013;	   Klüver,	   2012),	   and	   on	  associational	   activity	   (C.	   Mahoney,	   2007).	   They	   posited	   that	   greater	   resource	  endowments	  would	   lead	   to	  direct	  and	   individual	   lobbying	  of	   the	  EBA;	  and	  that	  weaker	   resources,	   conversely,	  would	   lead	  banks	   to	   lobby	   it	  using	  associational	  approaches.	   The	   distribution	   of	   these	   lobbying	   resources	   was	   theorised	   to	   be	  connected	  to	   the	  underlying	  variety	  of	   financial	  capitalism	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  &	  Levine,	  1999;	  Zysman,	  1983).	  	  The	   second	   element	   recognised	   that	   the	   novel	   institutional	   form	   of	   the	   EBA	  allowed	  banks	  two	  paths	  to	  reaching	  it:	  lobbying	  it,	  or	  working	  via	  their	  national	  authorities.	  Thus,	  the	  ‘alignment’	  hypothesis	  (H3)	  drew	  on	  the	  studies	  of	  venue-­‐shopping	  in	  the	  EU	  (Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	  2011;	  Guiradon,	  2000;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	   &	   Richardson,	   2006),	   and	   examined	   how	   the	   banks’	   preferences	   over	  European	   financial	   regulation	   shaped	   their	   choice	   of	   venue.	   These	   preferences	  were	   theorised	   to	   derive	   from	   the	   underlying	   regulatory	   paradigms	   in	   their	  national	  contexts.	  Coming	  from	  these	  preferences	  were	  the	  types	  of	  input	  used,	  which	   were	   the	   subject	   of	   the	   ‘informational	   matching’	   hypothesis	   (H4):	   the	  information	   provided	   would	   vary	   according	   to	   the	   discursive	   rules	   of	   these	  venues.	  Finally,	  the	  third	  element	  examined	  the	  possible	  interaction	  between	  the	  
	   241	  
resource-­‐	  and	  the	  preference-­‐based	  explanations,	  with	  H5	   seeking	   to	   link	   them	  together.	  
	  7.2:	  Findings	  In	   the	   following	  section	   I	  present	   the	   findings	  of	   the	  study,	   laid	  out	  across	   two	  layers.	   We	   begin	   with	   themes	   found	   in	   the	   empirical	   context,	   which	   set	   the	  overall	  picture;	  and	  then	  move	  onto	  those	  findings	  pertaining	  specifically	  to	  the	  theoretical	  model.	  	  
7.2.1:	  Contextual	  findings	  
7.2.1.1:	  Regulatory	  retrenchment	  The	   data	   gathered	   from	   the	   interviews	   showed	   how	   the	   national	   authorities	  involved	   in	   bank	   regulation	   dramatically	   pulled	   back	   from	   engagement	   during	  the	   period.	   The	   two	   regulators	   –	   the	   PRA	   and	   the	   BaFin	   –	   continued	   to	   hold	  consultations	   to	   gather	   input	   from	   their	   charges	   over	   the	   EBA	   proposals,	   but	  these	  became	  largely	  routine	  exercises	  –	  and	  declined	  in	  frequency	  and	  quality.	  In	  certain	  areas	  the	  European	  standards	  still	  allowed	  some	  measure	  of	  national	  discretion	   in	   implementation,	   but	   in	   these	   instances	   both	   regulators	   only	  conducted	  minimal	  consultation	  exercises,	  and	  indeed	  published	  their	  intentions	  as	  more	  or	  less	  completed	  articles.	  	  Furthermore,	  under	  previous	  iterations	  of	  the	  European	  financial	  legislation,	  the	  national	   authorities	   had	   provided	   guidance	   to	   banks	   on	   how	   certain	   policies	  would	  be	  implemented,	  and	  used	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  business	  of	  regulation.	  Now,	  with	  CRDIV/CRR,	  both	  the	  PRA	  and	  BaFin	  stopped	  this	  entirely,	  advising	  banks	  to	  obtain	  their	  own	  guidance	  from	  their	  lawyers,	  or	  to	  approach	  the	  EBA	  directly.	  This	   may	   be	   understandable,	   given	   the	   new	   rule-­‐making	   framework,	   but	   the	  banks	  found	  it	  immensely	  frustrating.	  	  The	  key	  reason	  for	  this	  retrenchment	   lay	   in	  the	  shift	   in	  approach	  from	  Europe.	  Now	  that	  the	  writing	  of	  the	  rules	  had	  moved	  upwards	  into	  the	  single	  rulebook,	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the	   national	   authorities	   felt	   they	   had	   no	   space	   to	   provide	   guidance	   on	  implementation.	  Worse,	   doing	   so	  would	   place	   them	   on	   a	   very	   dangerous	   legal	  footing,	  as	  the	  EBA	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  examine,	  and	  remedy,	  any	  inconsistent	  implementation	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   interference	   of	   national	   regulators.	   But	  this	  retrenchment	  was	  also	  the	  result	  of	  a	  distinct	  attitudinal	  shift	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  national	  authorities	  themselves:	  the	  PRA,	  in	  particular,	  was	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	   potential	   danger	   caused	   by	   being	   seen	   to	   ‘negotiate’	   with	   banks	   (even	   if	  ‘negotiation’	   actually	   meant	   productive	   and	   useful	   consultation).	   Interview	  respondents	  also	  reported	  that	  there	  was	  a	  distinct	  sense,	  among	  the	  banks,	  that	  the	  national	  authorities	   felt	   side-­‐lined	  –	   that	   the	  EBA	  had	  reduced	   their	  role	   to	  simply	  being	  implementing	  agents.	  	  
7.2.1.2:	  Negative	  perceptions	  of	  the	  EBA	  Across	   the	   research	   many	   of	   the	   individuals	   I	   spoke	   to	   expressed	   varying	  perceptions	  of	  the	  EBA.	  Representatives	  of	  the	  large	  British	  banks	  often	  saw	  it	  as	  a	   vital	   bulwark	   of	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   single	  market,	   or	   a	   guarantor	   of	   British	  interests	   against	   the	   possibility	   of	   caucus	   voting	   by	   the	   Eurozone	   members.	  Others	   –	   particularly	   representatives	   of	   the	   German	   banks	   –	   viewed	   it	   with	  suspicion,	  cautious	  of	  the	  way	  its	  complex	  structure	  left	  it	  open	  to	  bring	  pulled	  in	  distinctly	  ‘political’	  directions	  by	  powerful	  national	  actors.	  	  Yet	   cutting	   through	   these	  varying	  perceptions	  was	   a	  basic	   frustration	  with	   the	  EBA.	   Respondents	   frequently	   stressed	   its	   lack	   of	   resources,	   and	   how	   its	   rule-­‐making	   role	   was	   compromised	   by	   a	   scarcity	   of	   manpower.	   Likewise,	   they	  complained	   about	   the	   weakness	   of	   its	   working	   practices:	   the	   approach	   of	  convening	  a	  working	  group	  to	  deliver	  a	  certain	  standard,	  and	  then	  disbanding	  it,	  meant	   that	   the	   EBA	   had	   a	   very	   shallow	   institutional	  memory.	   This	   resulted	   in	  significant	   duplication	   of	   work	   across	   standards	   or	   reporting	   templates,	   and	  contributed	  to	  an	  overall	  lack	  of	  credibility.	  	  In	   turn,	   this	   extended	   into	   a	   clear	   criticism	   of	   its	   role.	   Firstly,	   while	   the	  framework	   legislation	   dragged	   on	   and	   was	   delayed	   by	   intergovernmental	  
	   243	  
battling	   in	   the	   Council,	   the	   EBA	   came	   to	   be	   defining	   standards	   against	   as-­‐yet-­‐unfinished	   legislative	   texts.	   Secondly,	   more	   fundamentally,	   respondents	  expressed	  a	  frustration	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  truly	  harmonised	  regulatory	  standards	  could	   be	   achieved	   that	   would	   still	   allow	   banking	   markets	   to	   function.	   For	  example,	   they	   explained	   to	   me	   how	   the	   EBA	   had	   the	   unenviable	   (if	   not	  impossible)	  task	  of	  defining	  ‘a	  residential	  mortgage’	  and	  its	  associated	  regulatory	  treatment	   in	   a	   way	   which	   could	   respect	   the	   diversity	   of	   home	   ownership	  practices,	  and	  lending,	  across	  Europe.	  	  
7.2.1.3:	  Weak	  interdependence	  	  The	   theme	   of	   ‘negativity’	   gave	   way	   to	   the	   third	   contextual	   finding:	   the	  relationship	   between	   banks	   and	   the	   EBA	   was	   fractious	   and	   contingent,	  regardless	  of	  the	  latter’s	  role	  as	  the	  European	  rule-­‐making	  authority.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  banks	  lobbied	  the	  EBA	  varied	  significantly,	  as	  did	  the	  nature	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  information	  they	  provided	  (as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  later	  research	  findings).	  This	  suggests	  a	  rather	  weak,	  unstable	   interdependence	  between	   the	  banks	  and	  their	  new	  supranational	  regulator.	  	  There	   were	   several	   possible	   reasons	   behind	   this.	   One	   is,	   perhaps,	   a	   standard	  story	  of	   institutional	  development:	  such	  bonds	  of	   interdependence	  take	  time	  to	  develop.	   But	   equally,	   we	   are	   reminded	   again	   of	   the	   enduring	   (and	   in-­‐built)	  complexity	   of	   the	   Lamfalussy	   process,	   by	   which	   texts	   are	   passed	   from	   the	  ‘framework’	   stage	   in	   the	   legislative	   arena	   to	   a	   ‘regulatory’	   stage	   at	   the	   EBA.	  Delays	   in	   the	   first	  obviously	  hampered	   the	   stabilisation	  of	   relationships	   in	   this	  new	  regulatory	  community.	  	  Secondly,	   there	  was	   an	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  development	  of	   an	   interdependent	  relationship	  was	  undermined	  by	   the	  EBA	   itself	   –	  more	   specifically,	   in	   terms	  of	  what	   it	   could	   provide	   to	   banks	   in	   return	   for	   their	   attention.	   Studies	   of	   such	  symbiosis	  at	  the	  European	  level	  have	  stressed	  the	  provision	  of	  an	  ‘access	  good’	  in	  exchange	   for	   expertise:	   thus,	   legislative	   actors	   provide	   privileged	   access	   to	  future	  decision-­‐making	   fora,	  or	  a	   form	  of	  precious	   ‘insider	  status’	   (Broscheid	  &	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Coen,	   2003).	   Likewise,	   on	   a	   national	   level,	   regulators	   are	   able	   to	   offer	   the	  opportunity	   to	   shape	   market	   delivery	   through	   shared	   rule-­‐making,	   or	   to	  participate	   in	   a	   flexible,	   responsive	   regulatory	   regime	   (Ayers	   &	   Braithwaite,	  1992;	  Coen,	  2005).	  The	  EBA	  was	  only	  weakly	  able	  to	  offer	  either	  of	  these.	  	  These	   contextual	   findings	   provide	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   institutional	   landscape:	  retrenchment	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   national	   authorities,	   over-­‐ride	   negative	  perceptions	   of	   the	   EBA,	   and	   a	   weak,	   contingent	   and	   fragmented	   relationship	  between	  the	  banks	  and	  the	  European	  regulator.	  With	  these	  in	  place	  we	  can	  turn	  to	  the	  findings	  which	  relate	  to	  the	  causal	  model.	  	  
7.2.2:	  Research	  finding	  1:	  Resources	  matter	  The	  first	  element	  of	  the	  causal	  model	  examined	  varieties	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  and	   resources.	   The	   initial	   premise	   linked	   the	   underlying	   variety	   of	   financial	  capitalism	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	   lobbying	   resources;	   and	   the	   hypotheses	   then	  predicted	   that	   the	   holdings	   of	   these	   resources	   would	   shape	   whether	   banks	  lobbied	  the	  EBA	  directly,	  or	  via	  an	  association.	  	  The	   study	   showed	   that	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   national	   banking	   markets	   were	  represented	   in	   the	   distributions	   of	   the	   lobbying	   resources.	   These	   national	  markets	   were	   themselves	   manifestations	   of	   fundamental	   varieties	   of	   financial	  capitalism	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  &	  Levine,	  1999;	  Zysman,	  1983):	  the	  British	   sector	  was	   structured	  around	   three	   layers,	  where	   the	   consolidating	  pressures	   of	   a	  market-­‐based	   financial	   system	   reduced	   the	  population	   of	   banks	  and	  building	  societies.	  In	  Germany,	  meanwhile,	  the	  bank-­‐based	  financial	  system	  featured	  a	  far	  greater	  number	  of	  far	  smaller	  firms.	  The	  lobbying	  resources	  –	  the	  ability	   to	   interface	  with	   venues	   and	   generate	   the	   required	   information	   –	  were	  distributed	   accordingly,	   concentrated	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   large	   banks	  with	   the	  smaller	  banks	  having	  little	  or	  no	  proprietary	  resources.	  	  Building	  on	  this,	  the	  study	  showed	  how	  the	  way	  that	  banks	  approached	  the	  EBA	  was	  shaped	  by	  these	  resource	  holdings,	  and	  so	  the	  patterns	  of	  lobbying	  reflected	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the	   structures	   of	   the	   two	   national	   markets	   –	   supporting	   the	   ‘resource’	   and	  ‘associational’	   hypotheses	   (H1	  and	  H2).	   In	  Britain,	   the	   five	   large	   banks	   lobbied	  the	   EBA	   directly;	   the	   mid-­‐tier	   banks	   mixed	   weak	   individual	   lobbying	   with	  associational	   activity;	   and	   the	   building	   societies	   at	   the	   bottom	   relied	   almost	  entirely	  on	  their	  trade	  body.	  In	  Germany,	  one	  large	  bank	  lobbied	  directly,	  and	  the	  engagement	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  sector	  was	  structured	  through	  the	  domestic	  peak	  associations.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  way	  banks	  lobbied	  the	  EBA	  was	  shaped	  by	  their	  national	   origins	   –	   and	   so	   we	   can	   link	   lobbying	   behaviours	   with	   underlying	  varieties	  of	  financial	  capitalism.	  	  This	   finding	   accords	   with	   several	   elements	   of	   the	   European	   interest	   group	  literature,	   which	   has	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   informational	   resources	   in	  shaping	   lobbying	  behaviours.	  Rather	   than	  being	  specifically	   financial,	   these	  are	  resources	   which	   describe	   private	   actors’	   abilities	   to	   monitor	   discussions,	   and	  gather	   and	   disseminate	   appropriate	   informational	   inputs	   (Chalmers,	   2011;	  2013).	   As	   this	   study	   has	   shown,	   such	   capacities	   played	   a	   central	   role	   in	  determining	  which	  banks	  were	  able	   to	  directly	  engage	  with	   the	  EBA.	  Secondly,	  the	   literature	   has	   shown	   how,	   for	   associations,	   the	   ability	   to	   marshal	   such	  informational	  resources	  (and	  so	  to	  lobby)	  is	  driven	  by	  their	  internal	  coherence,	  organisational	  structure	  and	  specificity	  (Klüver,	  2012).	  In	  the	  present	  study	  this	  is	   supported	   by	   a	   comparison	   between	   the	   German	   peak	   associations	   and	   the	  trade	   bodies	   representing	   the	   British	   banks:	   the	   former’s	   far	   greater	  endowments	   of	   lobbying	   resources	   were	   a	   function	   of	   their	   very	   different	  internal	   structure,	   and	   the	   homogeneity	   of	   their	   membership.	   However,	   this	  consideration	  of	  the	  German	  peak	  associations	  also	  reveals	  a	  finding	  which	  runs	  slightly	   against	   an	   early	   implication	   of	   the	   literature:	   that	   unitary	   actors	   are	  better	   able	   to	   provide	   technical	   expertise,	   and	   so	   are	  more	   effective	   lobbyists	  (Bouwen,	  2002;	  Dür	  &	  De	  Bièvre,	  2007;	  Michalowitz,	  2004).	  The	  decentralised	  structure	  of	   the	  German	  associations,	  and	  their	  ability	   to	  garner	   input	  via	   their	  working	  groups,	  enabled	  them	  to	  match	  the	  precise	  technical	  expertise	  provided	  by	  the	  large	  banks.	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The	  analysis	  of	   these	  hypotheses	  also	  revealed	   two	  oddities,	  however.	  First,	  all	  the	  sets	  of	  banks	  surveyed	  lobbied	  extensively	  in	  the	  European	  legislative	  arena,	  often	   in	  parallel	  with	   their	  activities	  at	   the	  EBA.	  Again,	  we	  are	  reminded	  of	   the	  enduring	   complexity	   of	   Europeanised	   financial	   regulation:	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   its	  institutional	  apparatus	  and	  its	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  Second,	  the	  study	  revealed	  how,	  despite	  extensive	   lobbying	   resources,	   the	   large	  banks	  across	  both	  sectors	  engaged	  in	  associational	  lobbying	  –	  both	  at	  the	  EBA	  and	  in	  the	  legislative	  arena.	  The	  decision	  to	  employ	  such	  channels	  was	  often	  based	  on	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  question	  (its	  public	  salience,	  perhaps);	  and	  so	  this	  finding	  connects	  to	  a	  theme	   in	   the	   interest	   group	   literature	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   issue	   dynamics	   in	  shaping	  associational	  activity	  (Baumgartner	  &	  Mahoney,	  2008;	  Coen,	  2007).	  	  Overall,	   the	   findings	   of	   this	   element	   of	   the	   causal	   model	   align	   well	   with	   the	  European	  interest	  group	  literature.	  But	  they	  also	  support	  the	  central	  theoretical	  argument	   of	   this	   thesis:	   that	   the	  way	  banks	  went	   about	   lobbying	   the	  EBA	  was	  shaped	  by	  their	  national	  origins,	  reflected	  in	  their	  resource	  holdings.	  	  
7.2.3:	  Research	  finding	  2:	  Preferences	  matter	  The	   second	   element	   of	   the	   causal	   model	   examined	   varieties	   of	   regulatory	  paradigm	  and	  preferences.	  The	  initial	  premise	  linked	  the	  fundamental	  paradigm	  behind	   the	   national	   regulatory	   regime	   to	   the	   perceptions	   and	   preferences	   of	  various	   actors	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation.	   The	   hypotheses	   then	  predicted	  that	  the	  alignment	  between	  banks	  and	  either	  the	  national	  regulator	  or	  the	   EBA	   would	   shape	   banks’	   selection	   of	   their	   lobbying	   target;	   and	   that	   they	  would	  alter	  their	  input	  according	  to	  the	  discursive	  rules	  of	  the	  venue	  selected.	  	  The	   study	   showed	   that	   the	   national	   regulatory	   paradigms	   shaped	   the	   actors’	  perceptions	  and	  preferences,	  both	  at	  a	  high	   level	  and	  over	  specific	   instances	  of	  regulatory	  change.	  For	  the	  large	  British	  banks,	  the	  pro-­‐competition	  tenets	  of	  the	  liberal	   paradigm	   influenced	   both	   their	   intuitive	   support	   for	   a	   harmonised	  European	   regulatory	   framework	   (which	   would	   foster	   fair	   competition	   on	   the	  European	   scene),	   but	   also	   the	   principled	   objection	   to	   the	   remuneration	   rules	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(which	   threatened	   their	   ability	   to	   compete	   with	   non-­‐EU	   banks	   on	   the	   global	  scene).	  The	   latter	  also	  harmed	   the	   freedom	  of	  private	  market	  actors	   to	  set	  pay	  levels,	  and	  so	  extended	  the	  reach	  of	  regulatory	  authority	  unacceptably.	  For	   the	  British	   building	   societies,	   a	   European	   regulatory	   framework	   which	   promoted	  competition	   was	   welcomed,	   as	   long	   as	   it	   clearly	   differentiated	   between	   ‘PLC	  banks’	  and	  those	  structured	  around	  other	  forms	  of	  ownership	  model.	  In	   Germany,	   the	   ordo-­‐liberal	   paradigm	   enshrined	   a	   more	   nuanced	   view	   of	  competition,	   and	   of	   the	   use	   of	   competitive	   equity	   markets	   as	   a	   regulatory	  mechanism	   for	   controlling	   behaviour.	   It	   also	   allowed	   the	   direction	   of	   banking	  activity	   by	   the	   state	   towards	   a	   clear	   social	   end.	   These	   elements	   shaped	   the	  sector’s	   intuitive	   scepticism	   of	   European	   regulation,	   and	   of	   the	   EBA.	   The	  opposition	   to	   the	   leverage	   ratio	   revealed	   a	   critical	   perspective	   of	   standardised	  capital	   metrics	   as	   a	   regulatory	   tool,	   while	   the	   small	   banks’	   opposition	   to	   the	  changes	  impacting	  SME	  lending	  arose	  from	  their	  perception	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  ‘regional	  principle’	  –	  which	  specifically	  restricted	  competition	  in	  the	  name	  of	  providing	  ‘mission-­‐oriented	  banking.’	  	  The	   study	   showed	   how,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   the	   alignment	   of	   preferences	  with	  regulatory	  actors	  over	  these	  instances	  of	  regulatory	  change	  shaped	  banks’	  venue	  selections.	  Across	   the	  board,	  banks	   found	  themselves	  positioned	  closer	   to	   their	  national	  authorities	  than	  to	  Europe,	  and	  directed	  their	  efforts	  at	  these	  domestic	  bodies.	  What	   varied	  was	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  preferences	   of	   the	   regulators	  (and	   the	   resulting	   alignment)	   were	   ‘clean’	   (as	   in	   the	   example	   of	   the	   PRA	   on	  remuneration),	  or	  were	  pragmatic	  and	  circumscribed	  (as	   in	   the	  example	  of	   the	  PRA	   and	   building	   societies’	   capital).	   Similarly,	   what	   varied	   was	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   domestic	   lobbying	   arose	   from	   a	   conscious	   awareness	   of	   alignment,	   or	  from	  an	  almost	  habitual	  expectation	  that	  the	  national	  authority	  was	  the	  first	  port	  of	   call.	   These	   findings	   supported	   –	   albeit	   conditionally	   –	   the	   ‘alignment	  hypothesis’	  (H3).	  	  The	   study	   also	   showed	   that,	   along	  with	   this	   domestic	   lobbying,	   the	   banks	   also	  targeted	  efforts	  at	  the	  EBA,	  and	  at	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  Across	   these	   various	   venues	   they	   did	   indeed	   flex	   their	   argumentation	   and	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informational	   input	   –	   providing	   support	   for	   the	   ‘informational	   matching	  hypothesis’	   (H4).	   They	   used	   national	   rhetoric	   at	   home,	   running	   consequential	  arguments	   stressing	   the	   impact	   of	   rule	   changes	   on	   competitiveness	   (the	   large	  banks	   on	   remuneration);	   their	   livelihood	   (the	   British	   building	   societies	   on	  capital);	  their	  adjustment	  costs	  (the	  large	  German	  banks	  on	  leverage);	  and	  their	  ability	   to	   lend	   to	   SMEs	   (the	   small	   German	  banks).	   They	   then	  used	   less	   partial,	  more	  technical	  input	  at	  the	  EBA;	  indeed,	  they	  largely	  switched	  their	  input	  at	  the	  supranational	  regulatory	  venue	  from	  ‘argumentation’	  to	  ‘expertise.’	  However,	  we	  also	  saw	  how	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  German	  banks	  –	  they	  continued	  to	   apply	   distinctly	   national	   overtones	   to	   their	   input	   to	   the	   EBA,	   seemingly	  treating	  it	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  legislative	  arena.	  	  These	  various	  findings	  chime	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  EU	  interest	  group	  literature.	  Firstly,	  according	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  ‘venue-­‐shopping’	  (Alter	  &	  Vargas,	  2000;	  Beyers	  &	  Kerremans,	  2011;	  Holyoke,	  2003;	  Mazey	  &	  Richardson,	  2006),	  private	  actors	  are	  adept	  at	   selecting	  between	  alternate	  venues	   in	   their	  opportunity	   structure,	  according	   to	   an	   internal	   rationale	   which	   includes	   a	   consideration	   of	   which	  audience	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  most	  receptive.	  However,	  many	  of	  these	  studies	  deal	  essentially	   with	   a	   static	   opportunity	   structure,	   whereas	   this	   thesis	   has	   shown	  how	  banks	  were	  able	  respond	  to	  a	  change	   in	  their	  environment:	  to	  absorb	  new	  venues	  as	  they	  arose,	  and	  to	  run	  dynamic,	  multi-­‐pronged	  strategies	  which	  target	  several	   venues.	   Secondly,	   a	   subtle	   expectation	   of	   this	   theory,	   and	   one	   given	  further	   flesh	   in	   studies	   of	   informational	   lobbying	   (Bouwen,	   2002;	   McGrath,	  2007)	  is	  that	  private	  actors	  must	  meet	  the	  tastes	  or	  informational	  requirements	  of	  the	  venue	  being	  lobbied.	  This	  found	  some	  support	  in	  the	  examples	  reviewed	  in	  Chapter	   Six:	   the	   banks	   were	   careful	   to	   deliver	   technical	   input	   to	   the	   EBA	  (responding	  to	  its	  specific	  requirement),	  but	  also	  often	  overlaying	  this	  expertise	  with	  distinctly	  national	  argumentation.	  	  The	  almost	  instinctive	  focus	  the	  banks	  had	  on	  domestic	  actors	  also	  connects	  to	  a	  theme	   in	   the	   regulatory	   governance	   literature.	   Although	   this	   sits	   rather	  awkwardly	   against	   the	   retrenchment	   of	   the	   national	   authorities	   (as	  we	   saw	   in	  the	   earlier	   contextual	   finding)	   the	   banks’	   domestic	   lobbying	   reminds	   us	   of	   the	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institutional	  interdependence	  which	  emerges	  between	  those	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  regulatory	   relationship	   (Ayers	   &	   Braithwaite,	   1992;	   Coen,	   2005).	   This	  embeddedness	  in	  the	  domestic	  regulatory	  regime	  helps	  us	  explain	  how,	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  withdrawal	  by	  the	  PRA	  and	  the	  BaFin,	  the	  banks	  continued	  to	  direct	  lobbying	  efforts	  at	  them.	  	  Overall,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  element	  of	  the	  causal	  model,	  albeit	  rather	  contingent,	  align	  well	   with	   the	   European	   interest	   group	   literature.	   They	   also	   support	   this	  study’s	  central	  theoretical	  argument:	  that	  banks’	  relative	  prioritising	  of	  domestic	  and	  European	  regulatory	  venues	  was	  shaped	  by	  their	  national	  origins,	  reflected	  here	  as	  the	  paradigmatic	  frameworks	  behind	  their	  domestic	  regulatory	  regimes.	  	  
7.2.4:	  Research	  finding	  3:	  Interaction	  effect	  matters	  Finally,	  we	  come	  to	  the	  third	  element	  of	  the	  causal	  model,	  which	  considered	  the	  interaction	  between	  resources	  and	  preferences	  in	  shaping	  lobbying	  behaviours.	  The	  central	  finding	  here	  is	  that	  it	  was	  increased	  resources	  which	  enabled	  more	  complex	   and	   extensive	   lobbying	   strategies,	   and	  which	   allowed	   banks	   to	   lobby	  according	   to	   their	   preferences.	   Thus,	   for	   the	   large	   banks	   in	   both	   sectors,	   their	  ability	   to	   monitor	   proceedings	   and	   generate	   expertise	   (their	   informational	  resources,	  in	  short)	  enabled	  them	  to	  deliver	  powerful	  domestic	  lobbying	  efforts,	  but	   also	   to	  match	   these	  with	   direct	   engagement	  with	   the	  EBA.	   In	   particular,	   it	  was	  the	  integration	  of	  these	  resources	  into	  a	  structured	  operation	  which	  meant	  they	   could	   move	   nimbly	   between	   regulatory	   venues,	   and	   provide	   appropriate	  technical	  expertise	  where	  it	  was	  required.	  It	  also	  enabled	  them	  to	  move	  beyond	  regulatory	  lobbying,	  and	  to	  target	   legislative	  actors.	  These	  significant	  resources	  enabled	  them	  to	  lobby	  on	  their	  preferences,	  and	  to	  mount	  powerful	  challenges	  to	  the	  remuneration	  and	  leverage	  rules.	  	  For	   the	  small	  German	  banks,	   the	  extensive	  resource	  endowments	  of	   their	  peak	  associations,	  and	  the	  similar	  integration	  of	  these	  into	  coherent	  operations,	  which	  enabled	  them	  to	  match	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  large	  banks	  across	  the	  various	  venues.	  These	  bodies	  could	  use	   long-­‐established	  (albeit	   fracturing)	  connections	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with	   domestic	   actors;	   but	   could	   also	   use	   their	   extensive	   expertise-­‐generating	  resources,	   based	   around	   their	   decentralised	   working	   groups,	   to	   match	   the	  informational	   requirements	   of	   the	   EBA.	   These	   resources	   also	   equipped	   them	  well	   to	  engage	  with	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	  European	  Parliament,	  where	   they	  could	  deliver	  legislative	  lobbying.	  Overall,	  the	  resource	  endowments	  meant	  they	  could	  act	  on	  their	  preferences	  and	  lobby	  powerfully	  –	  across	  several	  venues	  –	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  SME	  lending	  changes.	  	  The	  British	  building	  societies	  had	  a	  very	  different	  story.	  For	   them,	  a	  paucity	  of	  resources	  meant	   associational	   activity	   via	   the	   BSA	  was	   the	   norm;	   and	   its	   own	  deficiency,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  coherence	  of	  its	  lobbying	  operation,	  meant	  its	  efforts	  were	   circumscribed.	   It	   engaged	  with	   the	   domestic	   regulator	   out	   of	   necessity	   –	  even	  though	  the	  PRA	  was	  only	  grudgingly	  supportive	  on	  the	   issue	  of	  capital,	  at	  best.	  Further	  afield,	  the	  BSA	  lacked	  the	  interfacing	  resources	  to	  handle	  both	  the	  European	   legislative	   arena	  and	   the	  EBA,	   and	   so	  pitched	   its	   efforts	   towards	   the	  former;	   and	   it	   lacked	   the	   expertise-­‐gathering	   resources	   to	   match	   the	   EBA’s	  specific	   requirements.	   This	  meant	   the	   societies,	   ultimately,	   could	   not	   lobby	   on	  their	  preferences.	  	  Together,	   these	   findings	   connect	   the	   study	   back	   to	   the	   underlying	   EU	   interest	  group	   literature.	   But	   they	   also	   combine	   to	   provide	   a	   distinct	   contribution:	   the	  way	  banks	   lobbied	  was	   shaped	  by	   the	   features	  of	   their	  domestic	   contexts.	  The	  study	   operationalised	   these	   features	   as	   variations	   in	   the	   prevailing	   mode	   of	  financial	   capitalism,	   and	   in	   the	   fundamental	   paradigm	   sitting	   behind	   the	  regulatory	   regime.	   The	   contribution	   is	   significant,	   because	   thus	   far	   our	  understanding	   lobbying	  has	   focussed	  on	  the	  established	   legislative	  arena,	  while	  this	   study	   has	   shed	   light	   on	   activity	   in	   the	   regulatory	   arena.	   Here,	   the	   novel	  institutional	  form	  of	  the	  EBA,	  and	  its	  role	  in	  seeking	  to	  integrate	  the	  deep	  cores	  of	  national	  political	  economies,	  kept	  domestic	  authorities	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  banks’	  European	   regulatory	   lobbying.	  Meanwhile,	   the	  way	   they	  operated	   in	   their	  new	  opportunity	  structure	  –	  how	  they	  selected	  and	  approached	  their	  target,	  and	  what	  informational	   goods	   they	   provided	   –	  were	   shaped	   by	   factors	   deeply	   rooted	   in	  their	   national	   environments.	   The	   institutional	   aspects	   of	   the	   regulatory	   arena,	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and	   the	   robustness	   of	   the	   national	   environments	   shown	   by	   the	   study,	   suggest	  that	   European	   regulatory	   lobbying	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   distinctly	   national	   in	  character.	  	  7.3:	  Broader	  implications	  As	   well	   as	   these	   findings,	   the	   study	   raises	   several	   implications	   which	   can	   be	  connected	  to	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  literatures,	  and	  to	  discussions	  about	  the	  prospects	  of	  financial	  integration	  in	  Europe.	  	  
7.3.1:	  European	  regulatory	  governance	  The	   findings	  of	   the	   study	   focussing	  on	   the	   interactions	  between	  banks	  and	   the	  EBA,	  and	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  EBA	  itself,	  resonate	  with	  themes	  in	  the	  European	  regulatory	  governance	  literature.	  Studies	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  crystallisation	  of	  the	  networks	  into	  standalone	  bodies	  raised	  various	  concerns	  about	  their	  capacities,	  structures	   and	   roles.	   Thatcher	   identified	   the	   European	   regulatory	   agencies	  which	   emerged	   from	   this	   evolution	   as	   ‘weak’,	   commenting	   that	   the	   EU	   had	  adopted	   the	   ‘agency	   form,	  but	  not	  yet	   the	   reality	  of	  agency	  governance’	   (2011:	  806).	   Similarly,	   Egeberg	   and	   Trondal	   examined	   the	   contingent	   and	   complex	  autonomy	  of	  these	  agencies,	  noting	  how	  they	  could	  potentially	  be	  controlled	  by	  either	   their	   political	   principal	   (the	   Commission)	   or	   by	   powerful	  member	   state	  governments	  (2011).	  The	  issues	  raised	  by	  these	  studies	  have	  been	  borne	  out	  by	  this	   thesis:	   the	   engagement	   between	  banks	   and	   the	  EBA	   remained	   fragmented	  and	   contingent;	   and	   banks	   continued	   to	   see	   the	   EBA	   as	   weak	   –	   both	   in	   its	  resources	   and	  working	  practices,	   and	   in	   its	   role	   the	  overall	   process	   relative	   to	  powerful	   national	   authorities	   and	   European	   legislative	   actors.	   Similarly,	   with	  national	  regulators	  playing	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  EBA’s	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  we	  have	  a	   ‘regulatory	  actor’	  version	  of	  Egeberg	  and	  Trondal’s	   ‘national	  control’	  thesis.	   Overall,	   the	   implications	   are	   that	   the	   European	   approach	   to	   regulatory	  governance,	   via	   hybrid	   institutions	   combining	   elements	   of	   networks	   and	  agencies,	   will	   continue	   to	   struggle	   to	   achieve	   its	   aim	   of	   harmonised	   market	  delivery.	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7.3.2:	  European	  financial	  sector	  committees	  Similar	   connections,	   and	   conclusions,	   can	   be	   made	   with	   reference	   more	  specifically	  to	  European	  financial	  sector	  governance.	  For	  example,	  early	  studies	  of	   the	   regulatory	  networks	   (as	   they	  were	  at	   the	   time)	   concluded	   that	  although	  they	  nominally	  had	  a	   ‘technical’,	   supranational	  regulatory	  role,	   they	  were	  often	  pulled	  into	  ‘para-­‐political’	  activities	  either	  by	  private	  actors	  (chiefly	  banks)	  or	  by	  powerful	   national	   regulators	   (Quaglia,	   2008b).	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   use	   of	  distinctly	  ‘political’	  argumentation	  by	  banks	  when	  lobbying	  the	  EBA,	  and	  the	  co-­‐opting	  of	  national	  regulators	  to	  push	  for	  changes	  which	  seek	  to	  protect	  national	  banking	  markets	  from	  Europeanisation,	  show	  the	  continuing	  political	  role	  of	  the	  EBA.	   Meanwhile,	   Newman	   and	   Bach	   have	   examined	   the	   role	   of	   the	   EU	   as	   a	  ‘hardening	   agent’	   (2014),	   translating	   soft-­‐law	   frameworks	   agreed	   upon	   by	  transnational	  networks	  into	  national	  law,	  using	  both	  the	  legislative	  process	  and	  the	  newly-­‐centralised	   regulatory	   capacity.	  The	   complexity	  of	   the	  behaviours	   at	  the	   example	   studied	   in	   this	   thesis	   –	   the	   EBA	   –	   somewhat	   challenge	   this:	   their	  argument	   that	   the	   supranational	   regulatory	   arena	   translates	   these	   soft-­‐law	  frameworks	   cleanly	   into	   harmonised	   European	   regulation	   sits	   against	   the	  evidence	   we	   have	   seen	   of	   complex	   alliances	   of	   private	   and	   public	   actors	  cooperating	  to	  stamp	  distinctive	  national	  imprints	  on	  the	  end	  product.	  	  
7.3.3:	  Factions	  in	  European	  financial	  regulation	  Finally,	   scholars	   have	   identified	   distinctive	   factions	   present	   in	   European	  regulation	   discussions,	   both	   before	   and	   after	   the	   crisis.	   Such	   factions	   formed	  around	  either	   ‘making’	   or	   ‘shaping’	  markets;	   roughly	   equivalent	   to	   the	  UK	  and	  Germany	   (Quaglia,	   2010;	   2012).	   Implicitly,	   sitting	   behind	   these	   rival	   coalitions	  were	   two	   different	   paradigmatic	   frameworks,	   defining	   the	   way	   the	   various	  actors	   viewed	   financial	  markets	   and	   their	   regulation.	   The	   same	   approach	  was	  applied	   to	   understanding	   the	   positions	   of	   governments	   over	   CRDIV/CRR	  (Howarth	   &	   Quaglia,	   2013b),	   or	   global	   financial	   regulation	   more	   generally	  (Zimmermann,	  2010).	  The	  reflections	  of	  the	  underlying	  regulatory	  paradigms	  in	  the	   positions	   and	   preferences	   of	   banks	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation,	  revealed	   in	   this	   study,	   accord	  with	   these	  works.	   Indeed,	   the	   study	   has	   shown	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how	  such	  a	  macro-­‐level,	   comparative	  approach	  (using	   ‘governments’	  or	   ‘states’	  as	   the	   unit	   of	   analysis)	   can	   also	   be	   applied	   to	   individual	   banks,	   and	  how	   their	  attitudes	  and	  lobbying	  behaviours	  actualise	  the	  underlying	  paradigms.	  	  Studies	  have	  also	  examined,	  more	  explicitly,	  the	  ‘nexus’	  between	  financial	  actors	  and	  public	  actors,	  and	  its	  role	   in	   influencing	  the	  progress	  of	  European	  financial	  integration	   (Grossman	  &	  Leblond,	  2011;	  Mügge,	  2013).	  These	  have	  highlighted	  how	  such	   interconnections	  are	  extremely	  durable,	  and	  how	  we	  continue	   to	  see	  different	  arrangements	  which	  appear	  to	  be	  resisting	  integration.	  This	  study	  has	  supported	  this:	  the	  positioning	  of	  the	  actors	  (both	  private	  and	  public)	  away	  from	  Europe	  on	  the	  issues	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Six	  and	  the	  extensive	  and	  deliberate	  use	  of	  domestic	   lobbying	  venues,	  has	  confirmed	   this	   resistance	   to	  convergence	  and	  integration	  of	  regulatory	  models,	  and	  so	  the	  continued	  survival	  of	  distinctive	  forms	  of	  the	  ‘finance-­‐government	  nexus.’	  	  7.4:	  Limitations,	  and	  opportunities	  for	  future	  study	  Like	  most	  qualitative	  projects,	   this	  study	  took	  a	  narrow	  perspective	  and	  strove	  for	   analytical	   generalizability.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   its	   findings	   can	   be	   generalised	   –	  moderately	   –	   to	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	   empirical	   landscape	  which	   are	   somehow	  theoretically	  similar	  to	  that	  which	  the	  study	  examined.	  This	  may	  be,	  in	  a	  sense,	  a	  limitation	  of	   the	  present	  study	   (in	   that	  conclusions	  may	  not	   ‘travel’	   far),	  but	  at	  same	  time	  this	  presents	  two	  areas	  of	  opportunity.	  	  First,	   this	   study	   focussed	  on	  how	  banks	  have	   lobbied	   the	  EBA	  –	  but	  banks	   are	  just	  one	  class	  of	  financial	  actor,	  and	  the	  EBA	  just	  one	  of	  three	  bodies	  responsible	  for	  the	  supranational	  regulation	  of	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Similarly,	  there	  are	  cross-­‐cutting	   elements	   to	   European	   financial	   regulation	   which	   mean	   that	   banks	  participate	   in	   the	   lobbying	   over	   the	   design	   of	   securities	  markets,	   or	   their	   own	  interactions	  with	  hedge	  funds.	  These	  complexities	  present	  opportunities	  to	  apply	  the	  approach	  of	  this	  study	  to	  other,	  similar	  contexts,	  and	  examine	  how	  national	  origins	  continue	  to	  play	  out.	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The	  second	  area	  comes	  from	  a	  similar	  perspective.	  The	  study	  set	  out	  to	  examine	  how	   national	   origins	   shape	   the	   lobbying	   behaviours	   of	   private	   actors	   in	   the	  European	   regulatory	   arena,	   and	   the	   case	   of	   banks	   and	   the	   EBA	   was	   chosen	  because	  of	  the	  features	  of	  that	  particular	  regulatory	  relationship.	  But	  the	  rise	  of	  ‘agencified	   networks’	   in	   the	   single	   European	   regulatory	   space	   has	   impacted	  many	   other	   domains:	   Levi-­‐Faur	   surveyed	   36	   regulatory	   regimes	   (from	   drug	  addiction,	   to	   chemical	   and	  product	   safety,	   to	  utilities)	   and	   found	   some	   form	  of	  agency	  /	  network	  arrangement	  present	  in	  29	  (Levi-­‐Faur,	  2011).	  This	  affords	  an	  opportunity	  to	  test	  how	  well	  the	  theory	  –	  that	  features	  of	  national	  markets	  and	  regulatory	   regimes	   shape	   how	   private	   actors	   lobby	   their	   new	   European	  authorities	  –	  stands	  up	  in	  other	  domains.	  This	  would	  also	  allow	  one	  to	  examine	  afresh	   how	   national	   varieties	   of	   capitalism,	   or	   regulatory	   paradigm,	   endure	   in	  domains	   which	   are	   perhaps	  more	   easily	   integrated	   than	   banking	   (sitting	   as	   it	  does	  at	  the	  deep	  core	  of	  the	  national	  political	  economy).	  	  Meanwhile,	   the	   empirical	   landscape	   in	   which	   this	   study	   was	   conducted	   itself	  presents	  further	  areas	  for	  research.	  Late	  on	  in	  the	  period	  of	  the	  study,	  the	  EBA	  found	  itself	  under	  threat	  of	  being	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  which	  took	   on	   direct	   supervision	   of	   the	   systemically-­‐significant	   Eurozone	   banks	   in	  November	   2014.	   This	   has	   a	   two-­‐fold	   importance.	   First,	   Europe	   is	   moving	  towards	   integrating,	   and	   harmonising,	   supervisory	   practices,	   on	   top	   of	   the	  centralisation	   of	   rule-­‐making	   it	   has	   achieved	   to	   date	   with	   the	   EBA.	   Second,	  around	  120	  of	  Europe’s	  largest	  banks	  now	  face	  yet	  another	  interlocutor,	  the	  ECB	  –	  and	  so	  may	  see	  the	  standing	  of	  their	  own	  national	  authority	  diminish	  further.	  These	  developments	  offer	  another	  fruitful	  avenue:	  one	  can	  explore	  how	  national	  regulatory	   regimes	   fare	   when	   supervision	   –	   which	   is	   itself	   a	   feature	   of	   deep-­‐rooted	  practices,	  and	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  regulatory	  paradigm	  –	  is	  centralised	  across	  Europe.	  	  Finally,	   following	   the	   appointment	   of	   the	   Junckers	   Commission	   in	   2015,	   a	  proposal	  was	   tabled	   to	   forge	   a	   ‘capital	  markets	  union.’	   The	  banking	  union	  had	  arisen,	  in	  part,	  as	  an	  immediate	  crisis	  response,	  and	  this	  new	  project	  had	  similar	  roots:	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  by	  harmonising	  the	  standards	  surrounding	  the	  issuance	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of,	   and	   trading	   in,	   securities,	   bank	   lending	   could	   be	   circumvented	   and	   capital-­‐hungry	  European	  firms	  could	  gain	  access	   to	   funds	  through	  capital	  markets.	  Yet	  looking	   at	   this	   to	   only	   a	   superficial	   depth,	   we	   can	   see	   how	   the	   proposal	  challenges	   the	   variations	   in	   financial	   systems	   across	   Europe,	   with	   their	  distinctive	  market-­‐	  and	  bank-­‐based	  arrangements.	  This	  offers	  an	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  how	  banks	  –	  and	  perhaps	  other	  financial	  actors	  –	  lobby	  over	  this	  newest	  piece	  of	  European	  financial	  integration.	  	  7.5:	  Practical	  implications	  As	   it	   has	   generated	   some	   important	   implications	   for	   our	   understanding	   of	  European	   regulatory	   governance,	   so	   this	   study	   also	   suggests	   a	   set	   of	   practical	  implications	  for	  practitioners	  and	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  The	  study	  has	  shown	  the	  role	  in	  European	  regulatory	  policy-­‐making	  of	  the	  EBA	  in	  a	  clear	   light;	  where	  the	  higher-­‐level	   legislation	  sets	  out	  broad	  principles,	   the	  EBA	  adds	  minutely-­‐detailed	  rules.	  These	  rules	  have	  full	  legal	  effect	  and	  are	  often	  binding	  in	  national	  markets;	  and	  because	  the	  EU’s	  intention	  in	  this	  domain	  is	  to	  achieve	   maximum	   harmonisation,	   they	   apply	   almost	   uniformly	   to	   all	   credit	  institutions	   in	   the	   single	   market	   (regardless	   of	   structure,	   business	   model	   or	  ownership	   type).	   For	   banks,	   this	   means	   any	   attempts	   at	   retaining	   national	  specificities	   must	   be	   directed	   at	   this	   European	   supranational	   body	   –	   since	   in	  most	  areas	  of	  financial	  policy	  national	  discretion	  is	  scant.	  	  However,	   a	   very	   small	   step	   away	   from	   this	   central	   role	   of	   the	   EBA	   is	   the	  realisation	   that	   it	   is	   part	   of	   a	   complex	   institutional	   landscape.	   National	  authorities	  remain	  ‘spokes’	  to	  its	  ‘hub’	  (to	  paraphrase	  the	  chairman,	  Enria),	  with	  significant	   potential	   for	   shaping	   its	   outputs.	   Simultaneously,	   the	   ‘legislative’	  phase	   of	   the	   process	   has	   actually	   pushed	   further	   into	   specifying	   details	   (while	  avoiding	   the	   rules	   themselves),	   as	   the	   Commission	   and	   the	   Parliament	   have	  grown	  active	  in	  adding	  flesh	  to	  the	  high-­‐level	  frameworks.	  This	  means	  that	  while	  national	  discretion	  resulting	  in	  a	  locally	  tuned	  implementation	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  relied	  upon,	  there	  are	  still	  a	  multitude	  of	  access	  points	  open	  for	  banks	  and	  their	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representative	  bodies	  to	  lobby.	  Indeed,	  this	  complexity	  presents	  just	  as	  strong	  an	  opportunity	   for	  national	   regulators	   to	   pursue	   their	   distinctive	   agendas,	   and	   so	  for	   policy-­‐makers	   to	   stamp	   their	   preferences	   on	   the	   outputs	   of	   European	  regulatory	  governance.	  	  Secondly,	   the	   study	  has	  demonstrated	   the	   importance	  of	   lobbying	   resources	   in	  shaping	   banks’	   ability	   to	   operate	   in	   this	   complex	   opportunity	   structure.	  Individual	   institutions	   wishing	   to	   lobby	   effectively	   must	   develop	   strong	  capacities	  for	  external	  representation,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  maximise	  their	  presence	  across	   these	   venues.	   They	   must	   also	   devote	   internal	   resources	   to	   generating	  policy-­‐relevant	   expertise,	   and	   to	   delivering	   it	   in	   a	   manner	   which	  matches	   the	  norms	  and	   tastes	  of	   the	  venue	   they	  are	   targeting.	   Just	  as	   importantly,	  perhaps,	  banks	  should	  move	  to	  integrate	  these	  dual	  capacities	  into	  a	  coherent	  machine,	  so	  as	   to	   allow	   them	   to	   run	   complex	   strategies	   spanning	   multiple	   venues,	   and	   to	  leverage	   their	   internal	   sources	   of	   information	   and	   expertise	   fully.	   Indeed,	   the	  experiences	   of	   the	   British	  mid-­‐tier	   banks	   and	   the	   building	   societies	   –	   or	  more	  precisely,	   their	   associational	   activity	   compared	   to	   that	   of	   the	   German	   banks	   –	  shows	  that	  these	  considerations	  are	  just	  as	  important	  for	  representative	  bodies	  as	   they	   are	   for	   individual	   banks.	   Improving	   both	   the	   capacities	   and	   their	  integration	  will	  be	  key	   in	  helping	  banks	   lobby	  across	   their	  many	  access	  points	  over	  the	  many	  items	  on	  the	  European	  legislative	  agenda	  for	  financial	  services	  –	  spanning	  issues	  such	  as	  centralised	  supervision,	  bank	  resolution,	  and	  the	  capital	  markets	  union.	  	  7.6:	  Concluding	  remarks	  This	   project	   set	   out	   to	   examine	   how	   private	   actors	   operate	   in	   the	   emergent	  European	   regulatory	   arena,	   using	   the	   case	   of	   banks	   and	   the	   EBA.	   It	   has	  contributed	   to	   the	   theoretical	   literature	   on	   lobbying	   by	   showing	   how	   the	  financial	   systems	   of	   two	   case-­‐study	   countries,	   and	   their	   banking	   markets,	  structure	   the	   distribution	   of	   lobbying	   resources	   among	   banks	   –	   which	   then	  shape	  how	  they	  approach	  the	  EBA.	  This	  connects	  our	  understanding	  of	  varieties	  of	  financial	  capitalism	  (Allen	  &	  Gale,	  2000;	  Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  &	  Levine,	  1999;	  Story	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&	  Walter,	  1997;	  Zysman,	  1983)	  to	  our	  knowledge	  of	  lobbying	  behaviours	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  	  It	   has	   also	   employed	   the	   ‘regulatory	   paradigm’,	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   in	  which	  Hall	  used	   it	   –	   to	   explain	   policy	   change	   (1993)	   –	   but	   to	   provide	   a	   framework	   for	  understanding	   banks’	   lobbying	   behaviours.	   These	   paradigms	   influence	   banks’	  preferences	   over	   European	   financial	   regulation,	   and	   so	   shape	   their	   selection	  between	   European	   and	   domestic	   venues;	   their	   contents	   also	   shape	   the	  informational	   goods	   the	   banks	   deploy.	   This	   serves	   to	   connect	   both	   our	  knowledge	  of	   lobbying	   in	   the	  EU,	  and	  our	   thoughts	  on	   the	   futures	  of	  European	  regulatory	   governance,	   to	   the	   deep-­‐rooted	   philosophies	  which	   exist	   at	   ground	  level,	   and	   through	   which	   actors	   (private	   and	   public)	   perceive	   and	   interpret	  financial	  regulation.	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Appendices	  
Appendix	  1:	  Interview	  script	  Below	   is	   a	   sample	   of	   the	   semi-­‐structured	   script	   I	   used	   for	   the	   interviews.	   The	  questions	  would	  be	  altered	  slightly	  depending	  on	  the	  type	  (and	  national	  origin)	  of	   the	   institution	   in	  question.	  Not	   all	   the	  questions	  would	   always	  be	  used,	   and	  they	  would	  not	  necessarily	  flow	  in	  the	  order	  presented	  here.	  	  
Intro:	  	  
I’m	  researching	  the	  patterns	  of	  interaction	  between	  banks,	  trade	  associations	  and	  
policy-­‐makers,	   and	   in	   particular	   how	   they’ve	   shifted	   as	   financial	   regulation	   has	  
become	   increasingly	   Europeanised	   in	   recent	   years.	   I’m	   focussing	   on	   five	   policy	  
areas	  of	  CRDIV:	  capital,	  liquidity,	  leverage,	  remuneration	  and	  supervision.	  
	  
Industry	  preferences:	  
What	  would	  you	  say	  were	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  British	  banking	  sector	  with	  respect	  
to	  these	  policy	  areas?	  
Did	  ‘British’	  and	  ‘foreign’	  banks	  have	  different	  preferences?	  
What	  were	  the	  concerns	  of	  your	  firm	  in	  these	  areas?	  
	  
National	  /	  regulatory	  preferences:	  
What	   were	   the	   preferences	   of	   the	   British	   government?	   What	   were	   the	   ‘official’	  
preferences?	  
And	  what	  about	  those	  of	  the	  FSA	  /	  PRA?	  Did	  they	  differ?	  
[Note:	  If	  so,	  why?]	  
	  
Influence	  approaches:	  
How	  did	  your	  bank	  /	  UK	  banks	  go	  about	  communicating	  these	  preferences?	  	  
Who	  was	  contacted,	  and	  how?	  Who	  was	  contacted	  most	  often?	  
Under	   what	   circumstances	   were	   trade	   bodies	   used,	   as	   opposed	   to	   ‘individual’	  
approaches?	  
What	  sort	  of	  information	  was	  being	  conveyed	  through	  each	  of	  these	  channels?	  
Was	  there	  any	  variation	  in	  these	  approaches	  by	  policy	  area?	  Or	  with	  time?	  
How	  harmonious	  or	  co-­‐ordinated	  were	  these	  efforts?	  Did	  anyone	  break	  rank?	  
	  
Regulatory	  relations:	  
What’s	  your	  impression	  of	  how	  UK	  banks	  liaise	  with	  the	  PRA	  over	  the	  development	  
of	   these	   rules?	   Did	   they	   actively	   engage	   with	   it	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   shaping	   policy	  
outcomes?	  Why	  /	  why	  not?	  
How	  have	   they	  embraced	   the	  EBA	  as	  a	  venue	   for	   trying	   to	  exert	   influence?	   	  How	  
have	  trade	  associations	  done	  so?	  
	  
Regulatory	  cultures:	  
In	  the	  last	  part	  I	   just	  want	  to	  get	  your	  thoughts	  on	  the	   ‘regulatory	  culture’	   in	  the	  
UK.	  By	  that	  I	  mean	  aspects	  of	  the	  way	  the	  regulatory	  regime	  works,	  like	  its	  
• Approach	  to	  policy-­‐making	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• Attitude	  to	  dialogue	  with	  firms	  
• Use	  of	  standing	  committees	  /	  working	  groups	  
• Application	  of	  ‘principles’	  or	  ‘rules’	  
	  
What	  are	  your	  initial	  perspectives	  on	  this?	  
How	  did	  this	  change	  with	  the	  transition	  from	  FSA	  to	  PRA?	  
What	  has	  been	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  change	  on	  firms’	  engagement	  with	  their	  national	  
regulator?	  	  
Has	  it	  dulled	  the	  use	  of	  the	  ‘domestic	  strategies’	  you	  described	  earlier?	  Or	  effected	  
your	  domestic	  focus?	  
And	  what	  has	  been	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  EBA?	  
How	  has	  the	  regulator’s	  European	  engagement	  changed	  over	  the	  years?	  Does	  it	  try	  
to	  guide	  European	  policy?	  Or	  to	  reduce	  the	  impact	  of	  it	  at	  ground	  level?	  
In	  general,	  how	  well	  do	  you	  feel	  British	  banks	  have	  adapted	  to	  this	  new	  landscape?	  
How	  do	  they	  view	  the	  EBA?	  And	  the	  PRA?	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Appendix	  2:	  List	  of	  Interviews	  1st	  March	  2013,	  London:	  Director,	  Prudential	  Regulation,	  European	  Banking	  Authority.	  	  	  23rd	  April	  2013,	  London:	  Head	  of	  Prudential	  Regulation,	  Association	  for	  Financial	  Markets	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  13th	  May	  2013,	  London:	  Director,	  Prudential	  Regulation,	  Association	  for	  Financial	  Markets	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  14th	  May	  2013,	  London:	  Head	  of	  Financial	  Services	  Public	  Policy,	  KPMG.	  	  17th	  June	  2013,	  London:	  Director,	  Prudential	  Regulation,	  Association	  for	  Financial	  Markets	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  16th	  July	  2013,	  London:	  Executive	  Director,	  Prudential	  Regulation,	  British	  Bankers’	  Association.	  	  	  18th	  December	  2013,	  London	  (via	  telephone):	  Director,	  Banking	  Supervision,	  Bundesverband	  deutscher	  Banken	  (BdB).	  	  27th	  January	  2014,	  London:	  Head,	  Regulatory	  Policy,	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Scotland.	  	  	  4th	  March	  2014,	  London:	  Director,	  Regulatory	  Affairs,	  Credit	  Suisse.	  	  11th	  March	  2014	  (a),	  London:	  Head	  of	  Public	  Affairs,	  Nomura.	  	  11th	  March	  2014	  (b),	  London:	  Head	  of	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